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Proportionality analysis describes a particular legal technique of resolving 
conflicts between human or constitutional rights and public interests 
through a process of balancing. As a general tendency, the current vivid 
academic debate on proportionality pays, however, insufficient attention 
to the institutional context – the question of judicial review. Based on 
the premise that proportionality analysis is a permissible approach to 
resolve conflicts between rights and other interests, the present book lays 
out a strategy for courts and tribunals to deal with the challenge of using 
proportionality analysis in an adequate manner, taking into account their 
situation and context of judicial review. For this purpose, it develops the 
concept of models of judicial review in a first theoretical chapter. These 
models are then applied to six comparative case studies in German and 
United States constitutional law, the law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, European Union law, World Trade Organisation law and 
international investment law.
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chapter 1

3chapter 1 introduction
Proportionality analysis is a much discussed topic today. Adjudicators in the 
most diverse contexts face it. But how should they deal with it, how should they 
use it, how can they compare their situation with that of other adjudicators and 
draw useful lessons from such a comparison? To put it succinctly, if the German 
Federal Constitutional Court feels entitled to use proportionality analysis in 
adjudicating fundamental rights cases, does this mean that arbitrators on the 
bench of an investment tribunal should do the same – and do it in the same 
manner – when dealing with an expropriation claim?
The interpretation of vague norms makes it theoretically possible for adjudi-
cators to balance competing interests more broadly while applying such a norm. 
But at the same time, adjudicators face the problem of the legitimacy of such 
virtually law-making action.
Recent scholarship has used a broad-brush approach in promoting propor-
tionality analysis as the best answer to the problem: Where norms seem to 
permit proportionality analysis, its use is recommended.1 We introduce a 
more nuanced answer in the present study. In our view, judicial review and its 
institutional features influence to what extent adjudicators should use propor-
tionality analysis. There has been a lack of studies engaging in detail with the 
link between judicial review and proportionality analysis. We aim to close this 
lacuna with the present systematic comparative study. The aim is to provide a 
more thorough reflection, both for adjudicators and practitioners facing this 
question in actual cases and for observers and commentators whose debate 
on the answer given by adjudicators may matter in the future. The legitimacy 
of value choices is central to such an inquiry. Judicial review is partly a ques-
tion of technical competence – can complicated questions be better resolved by 
judges or legislators? Finding no clear-cut answer to this question, the present 
study focuses more on the legitimacy of reconciling competing values and the 
delegation of this task to one particular institution. Judicial review combined 
with the use of proportionality analysis means that judges are given this power. 
The central reflection of this study is how such a delegation of authority can be 
justified. If the use of proportionality analysis by courts and tribunals has to be 
justified, the elements of this justification must be found in the context in which 
they exercise this authority – the context of judicial review.
The present study thus develops the idea of pre-balancing. Substantially, it 
is an exercise by a tribunal or court which consists in weighing the arguments 
taken from the context of judicial review to ascertain how proportionality analy-
sis ought to be used; i.e. to what extent its use is justified.
To conceptualize pre-balancing, we need to take a closer look at balancing 
– proportionality analysis. Proportionality analysis itself is a procedure central 
to protecting and adjudicating rights claims. It is, however, not undisputed in 
legal theory, as opposing views would perceive rights in a more deontological 
perspective which excludes ‘balancing’ as suggested by proportionality analy-
1  See in particular the various writings of Professor Stone Sweet cited and discussed throughout this 
study.
4proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
sis.2 Robert Alexy has contributed to a vivid debate on proportionality analysis 
with his Habilitation, suggesting the existence of a category of norms which is 
necessarily applied by means of proportionality analysis.3 Alexy has based this 
Principles Theory of his on the basic assumption that fundamental rights are 
norms applied by proportionality analysis; he refers to such norms as principles, 
as opposed to rules which are applied by subsumption. Subsequently, it is shown 
that the norm-theoretic claim of the Principles Theory does not help us progress 
much in linking proportionality analysis and judicial review. However, if we 
understand proportionality analysis as mirroring the process of the balancing of 
reasons at the level of practical reasoning and of moral argumentation, we grasp 
the actual way in which the very existence of the rules of positive law and of 
authorities – such as courts – is justified. With this understanding, it becomes 
clear that individuals always balance reasons to accept authorities, so that – in 
our suggestion – authorities cannot themselves be excluded from balancing 
reasons. If balancing – proportionality analysis – is omnipresent, authori-
ties must also ‘balance balancing’, i.e. decide based on a weighing of reasons 
whether, in a particular situation, they should engage in proportionality analysis 
or not. This is pre-balancing.
Of course, the introduction of a new concept complicates the picture of 
proportionality analysis. Ockham famously suggested:
[F]rustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora[.]4
It is futile to do with more things that which can be done with fewer.
Following this principle of parsimony, we should only introduce new elements 
such as pre-balancing for a clear purpose. Even though it seems that we are 
adding more factors to the analysis than have been used to date, our hope is that 
the balance found provides a better basis for our theoretical account and the 
subsequent comparative studies, as well as for future discussion on the topic. In 
this way, we would not have violated Ockham’s principle of parsimony.
As to pre-balancing, the reasons weighed by adjudicators are, in our view, 
presented by the particular setting of judicial review. There is a wide range of 
factors, but a division into two is suggested. First, there is a broader context of 
judicial review which is marked by history, the set-up of constitutional adjudi-
cation, institutional features and the political economy of dispute settlement. 
These features play out differently in each regime, as the subsequent compara-
2  G. Pavlakos, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and the Structure of Autonomy’ (2011) 24 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 129, 129, succinctly speaks of a ‘family dispute’ between liberal 
constitutional lawyers.
3  R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am 
Main 1986).
4  Wo. Ockham, Summa Logicae (edited by Philotheus Boehner) (Franciscan Institute Publications, St. 
Bonaventure 1951), Book I Chapter 12.
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tive studies show. They are, however, of a non-normative nature and can thus 
explain, but not justify a particular use of proportionality analysis. Still, they 
can usefully inform an assessment of the truly normative arguments to be used 
in pre-balancing. The second set of features consists of arguments relating to 
the justification of judicial review itself. These arguments can in our view most 
usefully be deduced from the procedural democracy doctrine, a theory devel-
oped in United States constitutional legal doctrine. Put succinctly, the authority 
gained by an adjudicator in a situation of judicial review must be justified based 
on the value at issue that is underrepresented for some reason in the political 
democratic process and thus requires protection by means of judicial review. 
Typically, in United States constitutional law, the closer the value to be protected 
is to the functioning of the democratic process, the stronger the justification 
of judicial review is perceived to be. As becomes visible over the course of our 
study, broader concepts of democratic process and thus of the importance of 
values are also possible. We must therefore first assess the descriptive elements 
surrounding judicial review before we turn to pre-balancing the normative argu-
ments on the justification of judicial review.
The introduction of two models then sets out two possible directions in 
which this decision of pre-balancing can go. In a model of equal representation 
review, the reasons for proportionality analysis prevail, while under a model of 
special interest review, an adjudicator operates in a more constrained setting 
focused on representation of one particular value. Proportionality analysis is the 
exception rather than the rule in the latter case, and other tests – often effec-
tively sub-tests of proportionality analysis without the final step of proportional-
ity stricto sensu – are the more appropriate choice in many but not in all cases. It 
should be noted here that despite the introduction of one model where full-scale 
proportionality analysis should only play a marginal role, the present study in no 
way aims to reject proportionality analysis per se. Rather, it argues that claims 
that proportionality analysis constitutes a kind of panacea must be refined and 
adapted to the institutional context. Using pre-balancing and the two-models 
structure, it thus becomes possible both to actually assess what courts and tribu-
nals are doing and to judge whether their reasoning on the use of proportional-
ity analysis appears convincing and complete.
Based on these theoretical grounds, pre-balancing and the two models are 
then applied to a variety of legal regimes with the aim of appropriately evalu-
ating and criticizing the use of proportionality analysis in a context-sensitive 
manner. As a first advantage over earlier studies, in the framework of the 
present comparative studies, a broader set of factors is taken into account than 
in previous comparative contributions. There may thus be legitimate differences 
between what the German Federal Constitutional Court has to consider when 
engaging in proportionality analysis as compared to an arbitral tribunal in inter-
national investment law. As a second advantage, with pre-balancing and the two 
models in mind a very diverse set of legal regimes can be examined following 
a unitary structure of discussion, which renders comparisons and comparing 
criticism easier. The present study thus chooses diverse normative backgrounds 
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– fundamental rights in domestic constitutions, human rights in international 
treaties, economic competence norms in supranational and domestic constitu-
tional law, broad standards of international economic law – to assess situations 
of value conflict and their resolution by means of proportionality analysis. The 
variety of norms is combined with a variety of situations of judicial review 
– specialized constitutional and international courts and tribunals, general 
domestic and supranational courts, arbitral tribunals. However, despite this 
diversity, the focus on our concept of pre-balancing permits us both to provide 
an answer to the central question of the inquiry: How ought proportionality 
analysis to be used in different contexts of judicial review?
Having sketched the approach of this study, we should link it back to what 
has already been done. A contemporary study dealing with proportionality analy-
sis does not start out from a blank slate. Quite the contrary, a vibrant community 
of researchers has already worked intensely on the topic; but they have, in our 
view, so far left many stones unturned. We will provide a brief overview of the 
research done in legal theory and in various legal regimes; in the latter case of 
course focusing on those regimes that also feature in the case studies chosen as 
comparative studies.
In legal theory, we have already mentioned Alexy’s groundbreaking work on 
proportionality analysis. The subsequent translation of his work and thus the 
Principles Theory into English has carried the debate to the international level.5 
Scholars both in domestic constitutional law and international human rights 
law have reacted to Alexy’s work both with praise and criticism.6 After the trans-
lation of a substantial amount of scholarship into English7 and other languages,8 
the discussion has broadened even further. As our subsequent theoretical part 
shows, however, the Principles Theory – with the exception of a few recent 
contributions – has neglected the link between the institutional question of judi-
cial review and the power shift towards judiciaries that the use of proportionality 
analysis entails.9
5  R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers) (Oxford University Press, New 
York 2002).
6  See e.g. D. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004); M. Borowski, Grun-
drechte als Prinzipien (2 edn Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007); M. Kumm, ‘Democracy is not enough: Rights, 
proportionality and the point of judicial review’ in M. Klatt (ed) Institutional Reason The Jurisprudence 
of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, New York 2011); on a more critical note K. Möller, ‘Balanc-
ing and the structure of constitutional rights’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
453; G. Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2009); S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?’ (2009) 7 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 468; M. Khosla, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?: A reply’ 
(2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 298.
7  See Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers).
8  See for example the translation into Spanish by Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Teoría de los derechos fundamen-
tales, (Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid 1993).
9  M. Klatt and J. Schmidt, Spielräume im Öffentlichen Recht – Zur Abwägungslehre der Prinzipientheorie 
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2010).
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Apart from theoretical work, much work has also been done in various legal 
regimes. Intense discussion on proportionality as a legal concept has sprung up 
in Germany as a reaction to the German Federal Constitutional Court’s early 
use of the legal concept. As a consequence, there is abundant discussion in the 
field on the way in which proportionality analysis (referred to as Übermassverbot 
or Verhältnismässigkeitsgrundsatz in German) is and should be applied by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court.10
Under a different label (balancing), proportionality analysis has also started 
to play a role in United States constitutional law and has provoked vivid reactions 
among the academic community. In comparison to the German discussion, 
more attention has here been paid to the institutional dimension of propor-
tionality analysis – the question of whether a court should be called to review 
legislative acts by means of proportionality analysis or whether instead deference 
should be paid to decisions taken by parliaments.11 It is thus from this debate 
that some further inspiration can be taken for the pertinent theoretical part of 
our inquiry.
The European Court of Justice has also interpreted the law of the European 
Union using proportionality analysis. This approach has proven particularly 
useful in delineating which measures, from among the sphere of prohibited 
measures which potentially endanger the single market project, Member States 
were still permitted to take to regulate for public purposes. At the same time, 
the influence of fundamental rights in EU law has sparked interest in the use 
of proportionality analysis to delineate legitimate interference with such rights 
both by Member States in implementing EU law and by EU institutions when 
interfering with individuals’ fundamental rights.12 At the level of international 
law, the constant use of proportionality by the European Court of Human Rights 
under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
has prompted comprehensive research efforts.13 Much debate has also emerged 
on the case law in international trade law, regarding the interpretation of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs from 1947 and the law of the later 
World Trade Organisation.14 As an additional and rather new field, international 
investment law has come of age. In the case law issued by arbitral tribunals 
interpreting both bilateral investment treaties and broader regional investment 
agreements, first efforts akin to proportionality analysis have emerged. Scholars 
have observed this and started the debate on the usefulness of proportionality 
analysis in this field.15
10  See chapter 3.
11  See chapter 4.
12  See chapter 6.
13  See chapter 5.
14  See chapter 7.
15  See chapter 8.
8proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
As soon as scholars discovered the parallel use of proportionality analysis 
in various legal regimes, they also turned towards comparative studies.16 Some 
have opted to compare various national legal orders.17 Others have chosen a 
comparison between treaty regimes in international law.18 Perhaps the broadest 
account in recent scholarship has been offered by Stone Sweet and Matthews, 
who have traced the spread of proportionality analysis through various domestic 
and international legal regimes.19
Arguably, however, room remains for more pervasive research. As a starting 
point, many comparative studies remain rather descriptive and merely put the 
legal tests used by courts or tribunals in different regimes next to each other 
without engaging in a detailed examination of what contextual differences lead 
to divergent legal tests.20 Furthermore, the theoretical debate on the principles 
theory and proportionality analysis has neglected the relationship between 
judicial review and proportionality analysis with the only exception of some very 
recent efforts.21
16  For an early account of parallels between GATT 1947 case law and jurisprudence of the United States‘ 
Supreme Court see D.A. Farber and R.E. Hudec, ‘Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-Eye 
View of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1994) 47 Vanderbilt Law Review 1401.
17  See e.g. N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law : a Comparative Study (Kluwer Law 
International, London/The Hague 1996); E. Ellis (ed), The principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999); D. Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 383; M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, ‘American 
balancing and German proportionality: The historical origins’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law 263.
18  F. Ortino, ‘From ‘Non-Discrimination’ to ‘Reasonableness’: A Paradigm Shift in International Economic 
Law?’ (2005) Jean Monnet Working Paper 1; E Reid, ‘Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and WTO: 
Defining and Defending Its Limits’ (2010) 44 Journal of World Trade 877. See also the discussion on 
analogies to the European Court of Human Rights’ use of proportionality analysis in J.E. Alvarez and 
K. Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment 
Regime’ in K.P. Sauvant (ed) Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2008-2009), 440 ff.
19  A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73.
20  See e.g. M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: WTO Law in a Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 
42 Texas International Law Journal 371.
21  See e.g. W.W. Burke-White and A. Von Staden, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in 
Investor-State Arbitrations’ in S.W. Schill (ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), who argue against proportionality analysis in investor-state 
arbitration because arbitrators are not sufficiently familiar with the domestic context to successfully 
apply this type of review; or Cohen-Eliya and Porat, 263, who suggest that the historical background of 
constitutional rights review played a major part in the shaping of proportionality analysis in different 
constitutional legal regimes. See also A. Brady, Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights 
Act – An Institutionally Sensitive Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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In light of these shortcomings, the present study arguably closes a lacuna in 
two respects: First, it aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion through 
the development of pre-balancing and the idea of models of judicial review as 
typical outcomes of pre-balancing. Each of the two models presents a different 
set of arguments on the appropriate use of proportionality analysis. Second, this 
theoretical contribution is then applied in practice to a variety of legal regimes. 
The study shows that pre-balancing applies just as usefully to regimes of 
domestic constitutional law as to international legal regimes. The dividing line 
between the two models is thus not the domestic or international nature of the 
regime in which judicial review is embedded. On the contrary, in our view it is 
the particular features of judicial review that determine how the arguments are 
to be weighed and thus how proportionality analysis is to be used.

Proportionality Analysis, Pre-balancing 
and Models of Judicial Review
chapter 2
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 I Introduction
The link between proportionality analysis and judicial review 
has to date not been examined in sufficient detail. In order to tackle this topic, 
we must depart from a definition of what proportionality analysis is and what its 
costs and benefits are. We will therefore assess how the use of this legal tech-
nique can be justified. While proportionality analysis’ critics point out various 
difficulties in its practical application in adjudication, we find no existential 
challenge to proportionality analysis.
To justify its use, the Principles Theory would suggest a norm-theoretic 
approach, distinguishing between some norms that must be applied by means 
of proportionality analysis and others that do not. A more thorough understand-
ing emerges, however, if we consider proportionality analysis as an interface 
between positive law and moral values which are part of legal argumentation. 
Proportionality analysis mirrors the weighing of moral reasons in practical 
argumentation, thereby weakening the exclusionary force of the law. The postu-
late of such an open position of positive law certainly requires justification. Such 
justification comes from an exercise of weighing the force of rules of positive 
law and authorities – another use of a weighing technique like proportional-
ity analysis prior to the use of substantive proportionality analysis. With this 
conceptualization judicial review can be brought into the picture.
Having developed this relative understanding of the force of rules of positive 
law and authorities, the present chapter then has to reassess the way in which 
we perceive proportionality analysis and judicial review. It is suggested that 
both are linked, in the sense that judicial review can be understood as a specific 
exercise of authority which is based on a weighing of underlying reasons for 
the strength and shape of judicial review. We conceptualize this weighing as 
an exercise of proportionality analysis on a separate level, which we label a 
‘pre-balancing’ exercise. The separate level of pre-balancing is to some extent 
linked to recent scholarly findings under the Principles Theory, findings which 
separate the question of discretion as a balancing exercise of its own from the 
exercise of proportionality analysis between substantive values.
During the pre-balancing exercise, adjudicators weigh for themselves the 
various reasons to decide which will help them to determine to what extent and 
with what intrusiveness they should use proportionality analysis. To simplify 
the presentation of the result of this pre-balancing, we develop two models. 
Under each one of these models the reasons underlying judicial review warrant 
a different use of proportionality analysis. On the one hand, under a model of 
equal representation review the use of full-scale proportionality analysis seems 
justified, while under the model of special interest representation adjudicators 
would only rely on full-scale weighing under proportionality analysis in rather 
exceptional cases.
The reasons weighed in the pre-balancing exercise – just like the pre-balanc-
ing exercise itself – are of a normative nature, which makes it possible to assess 
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the pre-balancing as it appears to have been done by concrete adjudicators, and 
to judge whether the weighing of reasons seems to have led to a plausible result. 
At the same time, empirical factors cannot wholly be taken out of the equation. 
To understand what reasons underlie a particular setting of judicial review, it 
remains indispensable to discuss the background of each particular setting of 
judicial review with regard to aspects such as history, political economy and 
institutional characteristics.
Having established the pre-balancing exercise and the two models in theory, 
we can outline the considerations underlying the planned comparative assess-
ment of the subsequent chapters. To show the relevance of the suggested two 
models, a broad range of legal regimes should ideally be used as a sample. 
Furthermore, to demonstrate that the dividing line between the two models 
does not run along lines of domestic constitutional and international law, case 
studies from both sides were carefully selected. The structure of the compara-
tive studies mirrors the division between the empirical and normative elements 
we pointed out above. While for each legal regime first the background of 
judicial review is set out in a descriptive assessment, a second section weighs 
the normative considerations of judicial review, before the actual use of propor-
tionality is more closely examined and criticized using case law and doctrinal 
discussion.
 II Proportionality Analysis – Its Promises and Pitfalls
Discussing proportionality analysis is the logical starting point 
for a study on proportionality analysis and judicial review. If we suggest that 
some settings of judicial review may be more appropriate for the use of propor-
tionality analysis than others, we must necessarily point out the advantages and 
disadvantages of proportionality analysis.
Consequently, the present section aims to both introduce proportional-
ity analysis in detail and to present sceptical views of its use by adjudicators. 
Proportionality analysis presents the advantages of opposing values on an equal 
footing by examining all arguments equally. But simultaneously, there is a 
danger of subjective evaluations by adjudicators and of technical difficulties in 
applying the test successfully.
Simultaneously, the chapter serves to establish a uniform terminology for 
the subsequent comparative studies. Proportionality analysis has been discussed 
under various labels and on various stages: Various stages, because it appeared 
in different legal orders at different points in time, as the comparative case stud-
ies will show; various labels, because there is some terminological rank growth 
on the same topic. Terms such as proportionality, balancing or reasonableness 
are sometimes used to mean the same thing, sometimes different things.1 
1  See on the common law pedigree of the notion of reasonableness A. Barak, Proportionality – Constitu-
tional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 371 ff.
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Warnings have been issued against equating different forms of proportionality 
analysis as it is used in different legal regimes: for instance, an analysis could 
risk remaining at the ‘rhetorical’ level and underscoring actual differences in 
order to achieve some hidden goal of the comparison.2 In the present section, 
we thus also clarify the terminology used for the study at the outset to avoid 
this problem. While we have used the term proportionality analysis up to this 
point to simply denote a specific legal technique of interpreting norms, we now 
discuss the various legal tests proportionality analysis encompasses as well as 
some additional terms.
We thus begin with a discussion of the classic, four-pronged understand-
ing of proportionality analysis. At the same time, some other terms and various 
readings of proportionality analysis must be assessed. As a consequence, we 
adopt a broad reading of the phenomenon of proportionality analysis, which also 
implies looking at adjudicative tools such as the burden of proof and the stan-
dard of review.
 A  Proportionality Analysis: The Classic, Four-Pronged 
Structure
Today, the four-pronged structure of proportionality analysis is 
widely known among lawyers. The present overview aims to point out in partic-
ular the conceptual debate on the individual prongs, which on several occasions 
foreshadows the subsequent discussion of Alexy’s Principles Theory.
The main proponents of proportionality analysis are those supporting the 
Principles Theory. Consequently, the overview presented here engages both with 
their views and critical voices to conceptualize the various stages of proportion-
ality analysis, before we turn our attention to a more formal discussion of the 
Principles Theory and its holdings.3 The four prongs of proportionality analysis 
in the classic understanding are the recognition of the pursuit of a legitimate 
objective of a measure, the test of suitability, the test of necessity and the test of 
proportionality stricto sensu. When discussing proportionality analysis, a some-
what mixed picture emerges. There are advantages to proportionality analysis 
as a tool used to represent arguments on an equal footing. Critics underline the 
difficulties in its application, but ultimately no attack on its conceptual grounds 
is successful. As the perhaps most central feature for the subsequent inquiry, 
proportionality analysis amounts to a self-empowerment of the adjudicator that 
is not in itself unjustified, but requires justification.
2  J. Bomhoff, ‘Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Compara-
tive (Constitutional) Law’ (2008) 31 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 555, 557.
3  See section III.
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 i. The pursuit of a legitimate objective
Proportionality analysis is a tool used to examine whether a 
certain measure is destined to achieve some sort of value in a proportionate 
manner. The term value which we have used so far appears most suitable to 
convey a neutral image: it can encompass individual interests like human rights 
just as much as the panoply of collective interests often assembled under the 
notion of public interests. It also encompasses a vertical perspective, such as 
when the State interferes with a value, as well as a horizontal dimension, e.g. 
in cases where individuals cause a disturbance in the free enjoyment of a value 
by other individuals and the question arises whether the State must react in 
some way. As a starting point, the values that are affected – be it in a positive or 
negative way – by the measure at issue must be ascertained. Various problems 
ensue – most centrally, the question of whether some values should be excluded 
as illegitimate or whether initially more values should be admitted in a rather 
liberal fashion and then be rejected at a later stage of the subsequent balancing 
process of proportionality analysis. One could e.g. exclude some values on the 
grounds that they are moralistic or paternalistic.4
The Principles Theory suggests a rather open position which coincides 
with the vision of connectedness between law and morals that Alexy suggests.5 
Values which are principles in Alexy’s account appear to be a rather open 
notion, and their link with proportionality analysis is automatic.6 This open-
ness is, however, limited to some extent in each legal regime. In constitutional 
law, only constitutional values set out in written or unwritten limitation clauses 
can overrule other constitutional values.7 While in international legal regimes, 
issues of constitutional rank are not the pertinent question, interpretation of the 
pertinent provisions and limitation clauses operates as a similar constraint on 
the values to be admitted.8 To fully understand what is done at this first stage of 
proportionality analysis, we will take a closer look first at the notion of a value 
conflict and the debate on human rights as values in proportionality analysis, 
before turning to the notion of public interests as values. We will then also 
assess the ‘horizontal’ dimension of values.
4  M. Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportion-
ality Requirement’ in G. Pavlakos (ed.) Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 142.
5  See section IV for more detail on this point.
6  See R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 98 and 100.
7  See on this ‘weak trump model’ M. Klatt and M. Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 23.
8  See for example the discussion on the interpretation of the sub-headings of Article XX GATT in WTO 
law chapter 7 section IV.A.
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a. The notion of a conflict of values
In the Principles Theory’s account, proportionality analysis is simply the 
mode of operation of certain norms – principles. We will assess this norm-theo-
retic claim later.9 For the moment, the notion of a conflict of values merits closer 
discussion as to what sorts of conflicts are at stake. This also entails the assess-
ment of what conflicts are not the focus of the present study.
The present study does not focus in particular on a situation of conflict 
of norms. It should, however, be noted that a value conflict can entail a norm 
conflict. Examples of a rule for a conflict of norms are the maxims of lex specialis 
or lex posterior. A strict separation between proportionality analysis and other 
conflict rules is unconvincing. Closer examination of lex specialis in interna-
tional law has shown that it implies the weighing of facts to establish which 
are relevant, which in turn determine what rule is to be considered special in 
comparison to the more general one.10 At least implicitly, norm conflicts thus 
contain conflicts of values, but the codification of conflict of norms rules typi-
cally reduces the use of full-scale proportionality analysis.
Second, the present study also does not focus specifically on conflicts 
between particular legal regimes, sometimes referred to as a conflict of laws.11 
In the case of conflict of laws, the central question is which law should apply 
to a specific case in the sense of a legal order, a domestic substantive law (for 
example patent law or competition law) or a treaty regime in international law. 
However, effectively a weighing process has to take place between the values 
of the relevant laws. This process can again take the shape of proportionality 
analysis.
The typical cases examined in this study refer to values enshrined within a 
norm of one particular legal regime. However, there are also conflicts between 
values in different regimes. This problem arises in particular in international 
law. As the present study examines both domestic constitutional and interna-
tional legal regimes, the subsequent discussion of values thus also addresses the 
problem of such values that are external or foreign to a particular legal regime.12 
As a final note, our focus on value conflicts leads to less attention being paid to 
the issue of technical competence in judicial review. While certainly relevant 
e.g. in administrative review of highly technical decisions, our main concern 
remains the question of judicial review of the weighing of values in proportion-
ality analysis, as it is predominantly done by legislators.
9  See section III.
10  M. Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law – Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission’ 
(2006) ILC, 58th Session, UNDoc A/CN4/L682, 1-256 ILC Fragmentation Report, 58 paras 106-107.
11  See insightful on the distinction J. Pauwelyn and R. Michaels, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws? 
Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law’ in T. Broude and Y. Shany (eds.), 
Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), passim.
12  See section II.A.i.c.
18
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
b. Human rights as legitimate objectives
In the area of human rights, there are some views that challenge the accept-
ance of human rights as values prone to be applied in proportionality analysis. 
The general starting point for the latter position is often to derive proportional-
ity analysis from the very structure of a typical democratic constitution based 
on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and protection of fundamental 
rights.13 As our study does not exclusively focus on constitutional law and 
human or fundamental rights, we subsequently move, however, beyond this 
basis for proportionality analysis.14
Some codified concepts in human rights law seem to exclude a consideration 
of competing values and thereby challenge the use of proportionality analysis. 
These concepts are the inviolable core of human rights and so-called absolute 
human rights. Human rights are typically thought to possess an ‘inviolable 
core’. Conceptually, such a core is expressly not put in relationship with compet-
ing public interests.15 There should thus be no proportionality analysis at all, 
which is inconceivable for proponents of the Principles Theory.
Absolute human rights pose a similar challenge. Again, such rights should 
in theory not be balanced against any other right or public interest. If absolute 
rights are merely posited as the result of a proportionality exercise, implicitly the 
special rank of absolute rights loses its meaning. The precedence enshrined in 
theory in the law itself no longer answers any legal question; everything will be 
balanced.16
Recent writing, however, has managed to integrate these concepts convinc-
ingly into the Principles Theory. Even absolute rights cannot be applied in a 
perfectly abstract manner, without taking any concrete cases or other principles 
into consideration. Even the idea of establishing precedence for them already 
requires a dimension of weight and thus balancing.17 It thus appears more 
convincing to give preference to absolute rights by assigning to them a predomi-
nant abstract weight, which in practice leads to their precedence.18 For the case 
of the inviolable core, such a core also emerges from the proportionality analysis 
model. The more serious the interference with a right, the heavier the weight of 
justifying reasons must become. This automatically leads to the emergence of a 
core where virtually no countervailing principle will be able to take priority.19
13  See e.g. Barak, 226 and 234.
14  See section II.B. for a broader understanding of proportionality analysis.
15  This is even admitted by some proponents of the Principles Theory, see J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality and 
Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174, 180.
16  M. Jestaedt, ‘Die Abwägungslehre – ihre Stärken und ihre Schwächen’ in O. Depenheuer and others 
(eds.), Staat im Wort: Festschrift für Josef Isensee (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2007), 271, colourfully evokes 
the image of the trap of constitutionalisation (Konstitutionalisierungsfalle) snapping shut. See also M. 
Jestaedt, ‘The Doctrine of Balancing – its Strengths and Weaknesses’ in M. Klatt (ed.), Institutionalized 
Reason – The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 169.
17  Klatt and Meister, 32.
18  Ibid. This point will become clearer in the discussion of Alexy’s weight formula in section II.A.iv.
19  Klatt and Meister, 68, demonstrate the point using Nash’s Social Choice Function.
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The Principles Theory has also been criticized in general for its overall 
openness to balancing. Two main sceptical positions can be distinguished, one 
definitional, the other using the concept of ‘exclusionary’ reasons. Just like the 
general debate on proportionality analysis, these conceptual discussions have 
focused predominantly on human, fundamental and constitutional rights.
Several arguments were developed in support of the notion that human 
rights20 have a special position. As a seminal starting point, Dworkin developed 
the model of rights as ‘trumps’ which triumph over other policy considerations 
and are to be realized to the greatest extent possible even before such other 
interests are taken into consideration.21 Often, such models of rights are referred 
to as ‘deontological’, while the balancing model conceptualizes rights in a rather 
‘teleological’ fashion.22
From a philosophical point of view, support for this position has been added 
by Habermas. He criticizes that the use of proportionality analysis as suggested 
by the Principles Theory unduly reduces the discussion of relationships between 
human rights and the pursuit of collective goals to mere policy arguments of 
the same ranking.23 Habermas argues that human rights lose the priority they 
normally enjoy within a legal system over other considerations; the ‘firewall’ of 
their protection. This is aggravated by the lack of a rational standard of judicial 
balancing which leads important question to be decided under an overempha-
sized judicial discretion.24
Alexy rejected this ‘firewall’ argument by pointing to his Law of Balancing.25 
Its application introduces a ranking of the importance of interference with 
rights. As a consequence justification by public policy is rarely available in cases 
of severe interference with a human right. In his view, the ‘firewall’ remains 
intact even if proportionality analysis is applied.26 Others add that the advan-
tage of proportionality analysis is precisely the fact that it is able to adequately 
20  For the sake of simplicity and convenience, the term of ‘human rights’ is used hereinafter. The discus-
sion has, however, taken place with similar vigour and with the same arguments on fundamental rights 
granted at domestic constitutional level, as the pertinent comparative studies (chapters 3 and 4) show.
21  R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 266. The contrary 
position to give no special status to rights was advanced most elaborately by Raz, see J. Raz, The Morality 
of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 186 ff.
22  See on these notions G. Pavlakos, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and the Structure of Autonomy’ 
(2011) 24 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 129, 133 ff.
23  J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 2 edn (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), 256ff.
24  Ibid., 261. Rivers also supports this position; he distinguishes between two culturally different concep-
tions of proportionality for this purpose. In Continental Europe, rights and public interests are opposed 
in a formally indistinguishable way, while in English common law public interests function rather as 
limitations on rights which the courts are required to police. The continental approach with its propor-
tionality approach is thus preferable, see Rivers, 177 ff.
25  See section II.A.iv.a for discussion in detail.
26  R. Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131, 140. See also 
Barak, 490.
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quantify and put in relation competing values, and that it therefore constitutes a 
cornerstone of constitutional rights adjudication.27 A more formalistic perspec-
tive suggests that proportionality analysis does not endanger the status of 
rights in constitutional law, if the limitation of rights is understood to occur at 
a sub-constitutional level. Rights remain definite at the constitutional level, and 
merely their limitation for other rights or public interests creates a new rule 
operating below the constitutional level.28
However, it would be too much to suggest that only scholars in favour of a 
particular protection of human rights oppose proportionality analysis. Webber’s 
concept of a negotiable constitution offers a quite particular vision of consti-
tutional rights which attempts to avoid the use of proportionality analysis.29 
Limitation of a right is expressed in legislation as the expression of the people’s 
will at a given moment and simultaneously part of the right. The legislator thus 
determines the boundaries of a right and justifies its decisions in the frame-
work of a given limitations clause. It remains, however, highly questionable why 
Webber’s model opposes judicial protection of individuals’ rights against the 
potential dangers of democratic majority-rule, while entrusting the majority-
based legislator with determining a right’s content and limitations.30
Scholars who are sceptical of proportionality analysis and worried about the 
unique character of human rights are likely to opt for a definitional approach. 
For such individual values as those enshrined in human rights and those which 
are considered special, the decision on their primacy in case of conflict with 
collective interests was already taken in advance. The adjudicator’s task is thus 
to define the scope of the right within which it will prevail, while at its margins 
other collective interests – public interests – may again ‘win’ in a conflict situa-
tion. The definition of the scope of the right therefore eliminates any conflict in 
the first place, rather than to delegate the conflict to resolution by proportionality 
analysis.31
There are certain shortcomings in the definitional approach. Adjudicators 
set the limits of their own rights jurisdiction by establishing the scope of a 
right, thereby excluding consideration of a conflict between the right and public 
interests beyond this horizon. Furthermore, the definitional approach purports 
that there may be a number of clear-cut situations where exceptions to a right 
are acceptable for public interest purposes. Reality may, however, be too complex 
and present adjudicators with additional considerations that would need to be 
27  D. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 186, explains this using the 
example of the well-known racial segregation case of Brown v. Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954).
28  See Barak, 40-41.
29  G. Webber, The Negotiable Constitution – On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009).
30  See Barak, 495, who compares Webber’s views with Waldron’s general scepticism of judicial review.
31  See with further references A. McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Concep-
tual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(1999) 62 The Modern Law Review 671, 681.
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taken into account to decide upon a conflict of values. Consequently, critics 
suggest that only proportionality analysis can usefully account for all future 
cases.32 Effectively, definitional or categorical approaches to rights may end up 
simply using the balancing suggested by proportionality analysis to create the 
definitions and categories they subsequently rely on.33
Some proponents of a more definitional approach denounce the use of 
proportionality analysis because of its inherent tendency to put all the weight on 
the later stages and to water down the important discussion of what the actual 
values that are to be put in relation are. A confused starting point is difficult to 
reconcile with a correct follow-up analysis. The inherent danger is the potential 
that moral reasoning required to identify and answer important questions about 
the scope of rights and their content could be hidden or neglected because in 
any case a decision can be reached at the later stages of proportionality analy-
sis.34
It should, however, be noted that the mere use of proportionality analysis 
does not exclude using moral reasoning to ‘exclude’ values that are perceived 
as illegitimate. Examples of erroneous adjudication that are typically brought 
forward by such critics of proportionality analysis cannot rebut proportionality 
analysis as a concept.35
Related to the definitional approach, but somewhat different is the ‘excluded 
reasons’ conception of rights. Based on Raz’s account of ‘exclusionary’ and 
‘excluded’ reasons,36 its proponents suggest that in some contexts, human 
rights should be conceived not as a weight on a balance, but as a freedom to 
act combined with a prohibition for the opposing authority to interfere with 
the freedom based on certain prohibited reasons. Rather than balancing right 
and interference, an adjudicator would thus have to examine the reasons for 
the authority for acting in this ‘motivational’ perspective on rights.37 In a non-
motivational view of rights, any interference will be subject to proportionality 
analysis to see whether the right has been interfered with beyond proportion. 
Under a motivational view, proportionality analysis still remains a valid tool for 
32  See Ibid., 682-683.
33  Barak, 521.
34  See with the example of human rights adjudication in the context of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human 
rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468, 481. Tsakyrakis calls this approach of 
proponents of proportionality analysis the ‘principle of definitional generosity’.
35  M. Khosla, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?: A reply’ (2010) 8 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 298, 306. See for a similar argument G. Webber, ‘Proportionality, Balancing, and the 
Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 179.
36  See section IV for a detailed account and discussion.
37  D. Halberstam, ‘Desperately Seeking Europe: On Comparative Methodology and the Conception of 
Rights’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 166, 178.
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some situations,38 but in others courts should only assess whether a measure 
was taken for a prohibited reason. In that case it is inadmissible without any 
proportionality analysis taking place.39 Similar to the definitional approach, the 
main operation undertaken by the judiciary would thus be to examine whether 
the motives of the taker of a measure fall within a defined range of excluded 
reasons.
This latter approach suggests that rights should not simply be perceived as 
values that have to be applied by means of proportionality analysis in cases of 
conflict. Instead, they should be seen as structures, because they do not protect 
the autonomy of the individual in these situations but rather operate as means to 
define the permissible reasons for state action.40
As a related criticism of proportionality analysis, some scholars deplore the 
oversimplification that might ensue.41 The structure of rights is not necessar-
ily fully explained by admitting proportionality analysis.42 In this vein, Kumm 
argues that the link to proportionality analysis is only a part of the nature of 
rights. They do not act as ‘trumps’ prevailing automatically over policy consid-
erations; such considerations may actually override rights. But in some contexts 
rights prevail, in particular when the policy considerations include the use of 
the rights-bearer as a means. This would be the example of sacrificing one life 
to save many.43 In his account of proportionality analysis there is also room for 
the category of excluded reasons.44 Consequently, proportionality analysis may 
in some situations be too simple as an explanation structure. Values that take 
the shape of human or constitutional rights require close examination and show 
their true strength only in presence of the specific structure of reasons present 
in a factual situation.45 One could thus suggest a dual model of applying rights, 
partly by proportionality analysis and in other situations following an excluded 
reasons approach.46 The problem is, however, whether excluded reasons truly 
amount to an exclusion of reasons on a qualitative basis or rather to their exclu-
sion as values that merit only negligible weight in a balancing exercise – a rather 
38  R.H. Pildes, ‘Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law’ (1993-1994) 
45 Hastings Law Journal 711, 714.
39  Ibid., 712.
40  Ibid., 724.
41  R. Poscher, ‘The Principles Theory – How Many Theories and What is their Merit?’ in M. Klatt (ed.), 
Institutionalized Reason – The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
241-242, denounces that such an account would fall behind a state of knowledge already attained.
42  K. Möller, ‘Balancing and the structure of constitutional rights’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law 453, 463-464.
43  Kumm, 165.
44  See also Barak, 470.
45  Ibid., 166.
46  See for this suggestion I. Porat, ‘The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balanc-
ing in Constitutional Law’ (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 1393.
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quantitative approach.47 In line with the sceptical view of exclusionary reasons 
taken for the purpose of this study, the second position seems more adequate.48
This conclusion is bolstered by a convincing solution for the problem of 
rights-bearers as means suggested by Pavlakos: If in such situations the posi-
tion of the balancing agency is adopted, it is impermissible to balance certain 
reasons which undermine the character of persons as such, because the very 
‘point’ of proportionality analysis – optimisation – is lost. The authorisation 
of the agency of balancing reasons by means of proportionality analysis is lost 
‘when agency turns against itself’.49 This is, however, not tantamount to the 
introduction of excluded reasons.
Summing up, there are competing positions as to whether human rights 
should be applied by means of proportionality analysis. A number of scholars 
would suggest that definitional or excluded reasons approaches are more apt to 
protect rights. Their criticism helpfully points out the difficulties in applying 
proportionality analysis, but arguably cannot refute it in a convincing manner.
c. Public interests as legitimate objectives
As another category of values so-called ‘public interests’ or ‘policy consid-
erations’ typically enter into conflict with human rights or other values. The 
complexity of these notions stems from the difficulty of actually determining 
their content. Several theories may be used to assess what a ‘public interest’ is.50 
However, they all suffer from specific shortcomings.
According to preponderance theories, a public interest, simply put, is based 
on an aggregate of the preferences of a majority of individuals.51 There are, 
however, technical difficulties with this definition, as it is impossible to clearly 
establish preponderant views through voting if there are more than two alterna-
tives available.52 There is also a strong moral criticism to such theories, as the 
interests of a minority are sacrificed for the benefit of the interests of a majority 
without examining the merit of each group’s claims.53
Unitary interest theories aim to depart from objective interests derived from 
a theory of what is ideally good for people, i.e. what they should ideally want.54 
By necessity, a supreme moral scheme is needed for two purposes: first, to 
posit alternatives to individual interests which would make everyone better off; 
second, to remove some inappropriate values. The risks which emerge are pater-
nalism and the need to develop a universal scheme of moral values.55
47  See for this suggestion Barak, 502.
48  See section IV.C.
49  Pavlakos, 146.
50  See V. Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
51  F.J. Sorauf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’ (1957) 19 The Journal of Politics 616, 619.
52  K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2 edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
53  McHarg, 675.
54  Sorauf, 622.
55  McHarg, 675-676.
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Common interest theories similarly aim to identify a category of interests 
distinct from the ones held by individuals. These interests are, however, not 
determined by reference to morals, but by the fact that they are held by the 
public as a whole as opposed to individuals or groups of individuals. These 
values can be identified by asking in what kind of society the public would like 
to live.56 The pursuit of such an overall public interest is linked to benefits for 
the whole of society, although these benefits are not necessarily distributed in a 
uniform manner. As a problematic feature, common interest theories reduce the 
possible ground for a public interest to such an extent that it becomes effectively 
redundant.57
Another concept appears related to common interest theories: a conceptuali-
sation of the public interest as a balance of interests, in the sense that it is consti-
tuted by a compromise as the result of conflicting interests which provides indi-
viduals with durable confidence in the overall stability of a state or community.58 
It is not perfectly clear whether this compromise solution should be understood 
as compromise as procedure or as compromise as a result,59 which prepares the 
ground for procedural views on judicial review and proportionality analysis.60
Whatever approach adjudicators use to establish the existence and relevance 
of a public interest, arguably care must be taken in its definition before engag-
ing in proportionality analysis. By all too easily admitting public interests as 
values, they may face the reproach of letting wrong candidates enter into the 
weighing process of proportionality analysis. One situation that frequently poses 
problems in this regard poses is the interest of protecting a person’s or a group’s 
feelings, e.g. typically in cases where the freedom of expression conflicts with 
the freedom of religion where religion is criticized. The question becomes to 
what extent tolerance as a value must also include intolerance.61
On the other hand, adjudicators could be criticized as illegitimate gatekeep-
ers who unduly exclude arguments based on public interests from judicial 
consideration if they choose to adopt a more definitional or an ‘excluded reasons’ 
approach.
There is thus also a danger of insufficient attention being paid to the ascer-
tainment of the public interest. Values that are external to a legal regime and 
therefore appear problematic for the adjudicator are merely one example of such 
an insufficient or erroneous examination of values.
Typically, this problem is connected to the limited jurisdiction of adjudica-
tors, as is the case in international law. The tendency in international law has 
been the development of increasing specialisation. Legal regimes based on 
56  See e.g. B. Barry, Political Argument (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 173 ff.
57  Held, 156.
58  Sorauf, 623.
59  Ibid., 623.
60  See on this latter point in more detail section V.B.iv.c.
61  Barak, 274-275, suggests that an offense to a person’s or group’s feelings must be severe beyond a 
certain level of tolerance to be counted.
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treaties deal with ever more specific topics.62 The danger concerning values 
‘foreign’ to an adjudicator’s regime is that they may be misrepresented or 
ignored altogether, which may influence proportionality analysis. Adjudicators 
can thus represent as external some values which in most cases will lead to 
intra-systemic values prevailing.63 It is difficult to conceive of any adjudicator 
as neutral in this regard: A trade court is likely to evaluate the same conflict 
between trade and other values in a different manner than for example a human 
rights court.64 This can come to bear upon the interpretation used by an adjudi-
cator, but also upon other available features of the process of adjudication such 
as jurisdiction. The result is potentially the exclusion or hierarchically lower 
representation of extra-systemic values.
Another problem could potentially stem from too high a threshold for the 
admission of legitimate objectives; effectively, such a threshold could come 
down to already balancing the social importance of a value as in the final stage 
of proportionality stricto sensu, which overthrows the sequence of the sub-tests.65
The above mentioned factors render proportionality analysis difficult to 
apply. Again, however, the difficulty of establishing a public interest does not 
provide a substantive argument in favour of discarding the use of proportional-
ity analysis as such.
d.  The horizontal dimension of human rights and public interests
As a final indispensable consideration, the horizontal dimension of the 
problem of values receives increasing attention in constitutional law and should 
thus not be neglected when discussing the values acting in proportionality 
analysis. Initially, most conceptualized conflicts between values such as human 
rights and public interests as vertical conflicts on the protection of rights of the 
individual against the State intervening on behalf of the public interest. There is 
an increasing tendency to discuss infringements of rights and public interests 
caused by private parties’ actions.66 To no small extent this is due to the ever-
decreasing stability of strict forms of the public-private distinction in many 
62  Koskenniemi, p. 10 paras 5 ff.
63  See e.g. C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European 
Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’ (2009) 15 European Law 
Journal 1, with the example of a conflict between national labour law as a value opposed to the economic 
freedom of establishment enshrined in EU law.
64  Pauwelyn and Michaels, 36-37.
65  See e.g. P.W. Hogg, Canadian Constitutional Law (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007), 153, who suggests 
that in answering the first step of a pursuit of a legitimate objective, one simultaneously already answers 
the question of a proportionate effect asked at the last step of proportionality analysis.
66  See e.g. J.G. Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 
American Journal of International Law 819 in international human rights law on the increasing aware-
ness of the potential of violations of human rights norms by multinational corporations.
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constitutional legal regimes.67 Public interests are no less subject to this devel-
opment. As an example, in labour law the employee as one party to a private 
contract is protected because of his or her typical weakness, despite the arising 
conflict with the principle of equality. The latter principle should normally 
prevail in private law relations, but the public interest of workers’ protection 
intervenes here between private parties as a constraint on private autonomy.68
e. Conclusion
To conclude, discussing, defining and accepting values as legitimate objec-
tives for the purpose of proportionality analysis constitutes a step of high 
importance. At this first stage, the conception of rights of the adjudicator already 
plays a crucial role. Definitional and excluded reasons approaches would exclude 
proportionality analysis at least partly based on the nature of some values. If the 
Principles Theory is favoured, there is a danger of all too easily admitting values 
that might have deserved a closer look and perhaps should have been excluded 
outright. Yet, this is only a potential mistake, not an inevitable one. The underly-
ing reasons for the different approaches become clearer as soon as the Principles 
Theory is discussed at the level of argumentation.69 For the moment, suffice it 
to state that diligent proponents of proportionality analysis have shown that the 
exclusion of values is also possible in such an account. Opponents of proportion-
ality analysis tend to point to difficulties in the adjudicative process, but have to 
date not provided convincing conceptual flaws to bolster their claim of over-
throwing proportionality analysis as a legal technique as such.
 ii. Suitability
Suitability as the second prong of proportionality analysis 
denotes conceptually a test which examines whether by taking one measure, at 
least one value is furthered. It is not always put explicitly in all descriptions, but 
a second value must necessarily be negatively impacted, as otherwise no con-
flict of value arises in the first place. The test ‘excludes the adoption of means 
obstructing the realisation of at least one principle without promoting any prin-
ciple or goal for which they are adopted’.70 However, the focus of the test itself is 
only on the positive effect on the first value.71
67  See M. Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the 
Constitutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 341.
68  P. Mates and M. Bartoň, ‘Public versus Private Interest – Can the Boundaries Be Legally Defined?’ in 
A.J. Bělohlávek and N. Rozehnalová (eds.), Czech Yearbook of International Law – Rights of the Host States 
within the System of International Investment Protection (2011), 183.
69  See section IV.
70  Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’, 135. See also Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 
103.
71  It appears thus slightly misleading that Alexy evokes the image of Pareto-optimality in his Principles 
Theory when describing suitability, see Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’, 135. 
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The test of suitability requires an assessment of the degree of satisfaction 
of a value, but also of predictions of future facts, which involves in particular 
the possible uncertainty and the probability of reaching a result.72 The assess-
ment is thus fundamentally influenced by the distribution of the burden of 
proof among parties; a similarly vital role is played by the standard of review 
adopted by an adjudicator towards the assessments undertaken in the decision 
under scrutiny. In adjudicating suitability-based tests, adjudicators may act with 
deference, accepting a rather theoretical reason advanced for a measure. They 
can, on the other hand, engage in intense scrutiny of the likelihood of concrete 
factual effects of a measure. The main factual problem encountered at this level 
is caused by epistemic limitations: to what extent is it possible to know whether 
a measure has or will have certain effects? Such factual uncertainty should, 
however, not be the basis for extreme approaches. Neither can an adjudicator 
require extreme certainty of a result to be proven nor should a mere statement 
that a result ought to be achieved by a measure be found to be sufficient.73
At the same time, there is also a potential problem of moral argumenta-
tion for identifying a threshold. What sort of contribution is to be classified as 
a contribution towards a value? This could become problematic in cases of a 
very small effect on a value, as it remains unclear whether any effect – includ-
ing nearly or completely unintended effects – will suffice or whether a targeted 
contribution is required.
The central legal problem caused by the use of suitability is an implicit rank-
ing of the values at issue. A mere suitability test neglects the negative impact 
on the second value and is satisfied as soon as a positive effect on the first value 
can be shown – subject to the qualifications outlined above. It is a hierarchical 
solution, which is at the same time easy to administer in comparison to the later 
stages of full proportionality analysis, as the degree of moral argumentation is 
lower.
As an additional factor, inequalities between parties as to the access to 
elements of evidence may increase hierarchy.74 Adjudicators may use their 
discretion in distributing the burden of proof to strengthen or weaken the hier-
archical element of the legal test applied.
For proportionality analysis as a whole as well as for its individual sub-tests 
such as suitability, it matters crucially who is required to prove what allega-
tion and to what extent. The burden and standard of proof matter because they 
Suitability does indeed verify that at least one position is better off after taking a measure. Contrary to 
what Pareto-optimality would prescribe, however, it does not take into account whether a second posi-
tion is worse off if the first position’s benefit is given.
72  J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 167.
73  Barak, 308.
74  For a detailed examination of the ‘evidential discretion’ of courts see J. Rivers, ‘Proportionality, Discre-
tion and the Second Law of Balancing’ in G. Pavlakos (ed.) Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philoso-
phy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 182.
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implicitly establish a hierarchy between values. If, for example, a claim in favour 
of one value is perceived as the exception to the rule, often the claimant of that 
exception will carry the burden of proof and find it difficult to achieve a high 
standard of proof, which would then allow the ‘rule’ – the opposite value – to 
prevail.75
In domestic law, burden of proof issues are often partly settled by the law. 
The more proceedings involve only the review of legal issues, the less relevant 
fact-bound elements such as the burden of proof become. For instance, consti-
tutional review is often a field where legal questions are preponderant. Before 
international tribunals and courts, on the other hand, matters are often less 
well-defined. At the very least, a general principle has been identified in interna-
tional jurisprudence according to which the party who alleges something has to 
prove its claim: actori incumbit probatio.76 Often, review in international adjudi-
cation includes factual issues and the burden of proof and its sub-concepts thus 
play a vital role in proceedings.
From a law and economics perspective, the distribution of the burden of 
proof by adjudicators can be guided by various considerations. The costs of 
obtaining evidence are a first important factor. An initial burden on one party, 
i.e. the complainant, should ensure that the adjudicator’s time and resources are 
only used for claims that can be substantiated to a minimal degree by evidence. 
With similar arguments, the burden of proof is imposed on a defendant for 
provisions identified as defences, because a complainant would otherwise be 
required to produce costly evidence for a multitude of alternative pleas which a 
defendant could effectively make.77
As to the standard of proof, its varying degrees are based on the concern over 
two different types of errors in adjudication. Type 1 errors are false positives, 
i.e. applications of the norm to the ‘wrong’ situations. To avoid such over-inclu-
siveness, a high burden of persuasion can be imposed.78 Type 2 errors, i.e. false 
negatives, relate to non-applications of a norm to situations to which it should 
have applied. To avoid under-inclusiveness in such cases, a lower burden of 
persuasion is applied.79
For proportionality analysis and the typical situation of judicial review, one 
could thus impose the burden of persuasion predominantly on the state trying 
to justify its measure, because it is likely to have the resources to bring forward 
75  See also the relevance of proof issues under the sub-tests of suitability and necessity as described in 
sections II.A.ii. and II.A.iii.
76  G. Niyungeko, La preuve devant les juridictions internationales (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005), 68. Contrary 
to strict conceptions of this maxim, however, there is no rule that states that it must be the party who 
instituted the proceedings upon whom the burden falls, M. Kazazi, Burden of Proof and Related Issues – 
A Study on Evidence before International Tribunals (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 221.
77  R.A. Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence’ (1998-99) 51 Stanford Law Review 1477, 
1502-1503.
78  The classic example would be the avoidance of erroneous convictions in criminal law.
79  See Posner, 1504.
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evidence. At the same time, an excessive burden of proof would somewhat 
run counter to the fact that a legislator’s action should at least be presumed to 
be constitutional.80 In practice, some more equilibrated solutions have been 
suggested, as will be explored in the subsequent section on necessity.
Summing up, suitability is a rather weak threshold, but can be adapted by 
adjudicators in its strictness. Generally, it implies rather practical problems such 
as the appropriate attribution of the burden of proof, while there is less need for 
moral argumentation than in the later stages of proportionality analysis.
 iii. Necessity
Necessity requires a closer nexus between the two values at 
issue than suitability. The simplified example is a measure which achieves a cer-
tain degree of satisfaction of the first value and simultaneously causes a certain 
degree of non-satisfaction of the second value. Under a necessity test, the adjudi-
cator examines whether there exists an alternative measure which achieves the 
same degree of satisfaction for the first value while entailing a lower degree of 
non-satisfaction of the second value. The test is certainly closer to Pareto-opti-
mality than suitability: The second position which is made worse is the baseline, 
based on which a maximum of optimisation for the first position is sought.81 
This also implies that any measure that goes beyond the defined objective also 
fails to pass the test of necessity.
The simplification of the model is essential to engage in a necessity test: If 
for example a third value is at issue, a necessity test cannot be applied.82 This 
means, e.g., that the technical and administrative costs to take an alternative 
measure in comparison with the original measure could come into play and 
require the last prong of proportionality analysis and its weighing exercise.
Similar problems as those under a suitability test arise. However, they weigh 
in heavier as the test itself is stricter: Again, adjudicators have to assess facts, 
including future facts. The test thus entails uncertainty as to whether promised 
results can actually be achieved. Therefore, the burden of proof and the stan-
dard of review act as features to adjust the strictness of the test. As one rather 
equilibrated solution for the burden of proof, the burden of persuasion can be 
distributed between parties: the party claiming a violation of rights would have 
to identify possible alternatives less restrictive of their rights, while the burden 
of showing the exact details of the chosen measure and the alternatives – their 
restrictive effects and their contribution towards the chosen objective – would 
remain with the party justifying a measure.83
80  Barak, 443-444.
81  For a detailed account see Rivers, ‘The Second Law of Balancing’, 172.
82  Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 102.
83  See for such an attribution the solution found in WTO law, chapter 7 section IV.A.iii.c. See also Barak, 
449.
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Moral argumentation is needed to a higher degree in the case of neces-
sity than for suitability. The identification of alternative measures leaves some 
leeway to the adjudicator: In order to qualify as an alternative, a measure must 
achieve the same degree of satisfaction. Conceptually, one may contend that 
it is impossible for two measures to achieve the exact same positive result for 
a certain value. In practice, moral argumentation must ensure that a justified 
decision is taken on whether the same degree of satisfaction is achieved. Simi-
larly, moral argumentation is inevitable in assessing how the negative effect on 
e.g. a constitutional right is weighed.
Measures achieve a variety of effects, positive and negative, intended and 
non-intended.84 Adjudicators thus enjoy leeway as to how narrow or broad they 
draw the circle of potential alternatives. This may not only manifest in interpre-
tative leeway, i.e. the breadth of the concept of an alternative. Adjudicators may 
also loosen the standard of review for this purpose and accept with less intense 
scrutiny the arguments of a party.
Such deference is required in particular if there is a leeway of epistemic 
discretion for legislators in their choice of measure. Adjudicators may find it 
appropriate to respect this discretion in their scrutiny.85
A last crucial feature of a necessity test is – as in the case of suitability – the 
hierarchical representation of values that such a test entails. Conceptually, a 
certain degree of satisfaction of the first value can be ‘bought’ for the price of 
dissatisfying the second value to the lowest extent possible. If a very high level of 
satisfaction of the first value is sought, inevitably there are fewer and fewer alter-
natives with a lower impact on the second value. If the highest possible level of 
satisfaction of the first level is the aim, there will be virtually no alternative, and 
the negative impact on the second value is effectively accepted.86 Consequently, 
necessity conceptually introduces a hierarchy in favour of the first value. The 
potential leeway of the standard of review and the distribution of the burden of 
proof influence the degree of this hierarchy.
Eventually, necessity is thus also a hierarchical test. In its application, 
however, adjudicators face practical problems of attributing the burden of proof. 
There is also a substantial need for moral argumentation to assign a weight 
to the contribution of a measure and to its restrictive effect for the purpose of 
comparison with alternative measures. The need for moral argumentation is, 
however, still lower than in the case of proportionality stricto sensu. The latter 
asks for a comparison between the contribution of a measure and its restric-
tive effect, giving rise to the problem of commensurability and comparability of 
these two elements, which can only be overcome by intense moral argumenta-
tion.
84  See also Rivers, ‘The Second Law of Balancing’, 180.
85  Ibid., 169.
86  See also Ibid., 171-172.
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 iv. Proportionality stricto sensu
In its simple form, one could state that proportionality stricto 
sensu leads to a weighing between competing values to assess which value 
should prevail. At this step more extensive moral argumentation than in the 
cases of suitability and necessity is inevitable. While the Principles Theory, with 
its use of formulas, suggests that the weighing is a procedure of quasi-mathe-
matical precision and rationality, in practice adjudicators may find it difficult to 
assign weight to values and compare them, as required by proportionality stricto 
sensu. The accusation of subjectiveness is thus levelled with particular vigour 
against the use of proportionality stricto sensu.
According to the Principles Theory, proportionality stricto sensu suggests a 
rational decision-making process comparing the abstract and concrete weight of 
values in a factual situation. Alexy developed a virtually mathematical formula 
which serves as a structural explanation of constitutional argumentation, the 
so-called ‘Weight Formula’. Arguments are channelled into various factors: the 
abstract weight of principles, the concrete weight of principles and – as a proxy – 
the epistemic quality of the findings. As a result, a quasi-mathematical process 
yields a result according to which one value – in Alexy’s account, a principle – 
prevails. Alexy has termed this process the ‘Law of Balancing’.
The use of this model and the utility of proportionality stricto sensu are justi-
fied by Alexy as a consequence of the claim to correctness implicit in constitu-
tional review.87 Such review thus requires a rational procedure, and the reproach 
of irrationality is taken very seriously by proponents of the Principles Theory. 
Time and again the value of the Weight Formula has been defended as an ‘argu-
ment form of rational legal discourse’.88
In a similar vein, scholars have supported proportionality analysis as a 
potentially more ‘honest’ and transparent argumentation procedure than other 
legal tests to arrive at an informed decision.89 Barak perceives it not as the only 
option, but as the ‘best available option’ for the adjudication of constitutional 
rights claims.90 Even Kennedy, though depicting it sceptically as a ‘counsel 
of despair’, gives proportionality analysis the merit of constituting a progress 
from excessive faith in exegesis or ungrounded faith in the coherence of a legal 
system.91
87  R. Alexy, ‘The Dual Nature of Law’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 167, 168.
88  R. Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 19, 26 
ff. See also A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ 
(2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73, 89, who develop the justification of proportionality 
analysis as an ‘argumentation framework’.
89  Stone Sweet and Mathews, 89. See also A. Barak, ‘Proportionality and Principled Balancing’ (2010) 4 
Law & Ethics of Human Rights 3, 14-15.
90  Barak, 458.
91  D. Kennedy, ‘Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in Private Law’ in D. 
Kennedy (ed.), Legal Reasoning – Collected Essays (Aurora: Davies Group, 2008), 188.
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These justifications possess merit. Proportionality stricto sensu as set out 
by Principles Theory does indeed suggest an ordering of legal arguments. The 
remaining inherent danger of every order is oversimplification. Alexy suggests 
the ‘Weight Formula’ to formalize the judgments on interference and the 
importance of satisfaction. The elements of the Weight Formula and the Law of 
Balancing are discussed below and then examined as to potential difficulties in 
the adjudicative process.
a. The Weight Formula
For the purpose of explaining the Weight Formula as set out by Alexy, we 
must introduce various variables. Values as principles are referred to as P, while 
the concrete importance is designated by the variable I. The abstract weight is 
labelled W.
The adjudicator accordingly uses values on a triadic scale (light, moderate, 
serious) which are ascribed to the various components of an equation.92 The 
importance of values as principles possesses an abstract and a concrete dimen-
sion, the latter being determined by the facts of the case. The concrete impor-
tance can be derived from a counterfactual scenario: The concrete importance of 
P1 (I1) is identical to the importance achieved by omitting the interference with 
P2.93
In the framework of the Weight Formula, these elements are brought 
together in an equation. The concrete weight of the realisation of P1 against P2 
(W1,2) can be established by dividing the concrete importance of P1 (I1) by the 
concrete importance of P2 (I2).94
W(1,2) = I1 / I2
These values can then be assigned numbers, preferably based on a geometric 
rather than an arithmetic sequence.95 As an example, a value of 20 would be 
ascribed to ‘light’, 21 to ‘moderate’ and 22 to ‘serious’.
To refine the Weight Formula, the abstract weight of principles (W) is also 
brought into the equation. These abstract weights can change the outcome of 
the equation in the following manner:
W(1,2) = (I1 x W1) / (I2 x W2)
92  R. Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433, 440. 
The three levels can also be referred to as ‘minor’/’weak’, ‘moderate’ and ‘high’/’strong’ according 
to Alexy. A triadic scale is, of course, not the only possible option. As Rivers, ‘The Second Law of 
Balancing’, 184, explains, the more points there are on the scale, the more an adjudicator engages in 
fine-tuning the balancing process and the less discretion of a policy choice is left to the legislator or 
administrative decision-maker.
93  Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 441.
94  Modeled after Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 444.
95  Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 445-446.
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Ultimately, Alexy adds as a sort of proxy the reliability of empirical assumptions 
(R). This criterion relates to the ‘epistemic quality’ of the assessment of interfer-
ence and of the importance of principles. The epistemic side of Alexy’s theory 
has been called the ‘Epistemic Law of Balancing’ or ‘Second Law of Balancing’, 
which in essence prescribes that the certainty of the underlying empirical prem-
ises for the interference with a principle must increase proportionally to the 
intensity of the interference.96
W(1,2) = (I1 x W1 x R1) / (I2 x W2 x R2)
For the moment this may suffice, although this last Epistemic Law of Balancing 
requires some further discussion and critique at the level of judicial review.97 
Putting all this together, the quotient of this mathematical operation provides a 
quotient representing the Law of Balancing in action.98 The quotient becomes 
clearer if, as suggested by Alexy, a geometric rather than arithmetic sequence is 
used for the attribution of numerical values.
As a consequence, proportionality analysis in Alexy’s view constitutes a 
rational decision-making process and has to take place as soon as principles are 
at stake. All the three of the above-mentioned steps of the proportionality analy-
sis can be derived directly from the nature of principles and their collision.99
b.  The representation of values under proportionality stricto sensu
There exist, however, conceptual difficulties in implementing proportional-
ity stricto sensu as is shown subsequently. First, proportionality stricto sensu rests 
on the premise that two clear values can be identified and put in relation to each 
other. We have already discussed that the identification of a value may prove 
problematic in itself.100
However, one may also doubt the completeness of the representation of argu-
ments that a full-scale proportionality test suggests. Alexy already indicates that 
there may be situations where more than two values are at stake, and that a more 
complex ‘balancing’ exercise must take place in such situations, the concrete 
procedure of which still requires elaboration.101
Proportionality stricto sensu necessarily always remains a short-cut proce-
dure, a heuristic for decision-making. Otherwise an unlimited number of values 
could theoretically be at stake in any given situation. Whatever measure is taken 
by a state or other entity, its effects necessarily have an impact on a variety 
96  Ibid., 446. See also generally Rivers, ‘The Second Law of Balancing’.
97  See section V.B.i.
98  Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 446-447.
99  Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 102. See also M. Borowski, ‘Abwehrrechte als grundrechtliche Prin-
zipien’ in J.-R. Sieckmann (ed.) Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte – Studien zur Grundrechtstheorie 
Robert Alexys (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 92. See in more detail on this norm-theoretic claim subse-
quently section III.
100  See section II.A.i.
101  Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’, 136.
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of values, be it intentional or not. To engage in proportionality stricto sensu, 
however, means to reduce complexity by suggesting a limited number of values 
that are put in the balance. As an example, in virtually every situation where a 
measure strikes a balance between two values, one could reasonably ask whether 
the costs of the measure, its technical and administrative difficulties, should 
not weigh in as a third value. It could plausibly be argued that a state’s finances 
must be treated carefully in order not to overburden its actual capacities.102
This is not to suggest that there is no merit in reducing complexity in a legal 
analysis for the sake of feasibility. The use of a heuristic is virtually indispensa-
ble.103 However, although proportionality stricto sensu is justified as a structure 
for argumentative representation of the relevant concerns, it is so only subject to 
this limiting reduction of complexity.104
First, its structure as a heuristic gives power to judges to delineate the 
relevant values for the inquiry without necessarily providing clear criteria on 
how these judges should proceed in doing so.105
Second, the claim that the factual elements of cases themselves raise the 
required issues so that an appropriate representation of values will be achieved 
is also doubtful.106 Proportionality stricto sensu leaves it fully to the discretion 
of judges to decide which of the practically unlimited factual elements of a 
case should be considered relevant and what the criteria for this decision are.107 
Proportionality stricto sensu thus encompasses a comprehensive shift of power 
towards the adjudicative instance applying it.
c. Attributing weight to values
The second crucial stage of proportionality stricto sensu requires that weights 
be attributed to the values that have been identified as relevant. The moral argu-
mentation needed in such an exercise is not at all denied by scholars supporting 
the use of proportionality stricto sensu.108 Alexy’s view is fundamentally based 
on discourse theory: the attribution of weight for the purpose of proportionality 
102  The author is grateful to Professor Alexy for clarifying this point at the conference on ‘Proportionality 
and Post-National Constitutionalism’ at Antwerp University, 17-18 February 2011.
103  J.P. Trachtman, ‘Trade and... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity’ (1998) 9 European 
Journal of International Law 32, 39, notes that if resources and bounded rationality would allow it, courts 
would probably proceed to a full-scale comparative cost-benefit analysis, but that the constraints of 
adjudication force them to use ‘rules of thumb’, i.e. heuristics, for their decision-making.
104  See more detailed discussion on argumentative representation in R. Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional 
Review, and Representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 572, 579.
105  Jestaedt, 266. See also T.A. Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law 
Journal 943, 977.
106  Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’, 580, claims that all that is required is a 
‘sufficiently broad’ class of cases.
107  Jestaedt, 266. Similarly, Aleinikoff claims that the setting of a case can easily lead to misrepresentation, 
Aleinikoff, 978.
108  See more on this point under section IV.
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stricto sensu is part of the rational structure of discourse to establish a correct 
legal judgment, labelled summarily as ‘propositionality’.109 At the same time, 
however, Alexy does not suggest that there is simply one right answer for every 
exercise of proportionality analysis.110
For the abstract weight of a principle, Alexy suggests that in many cases 
there will be equality between values. In some cases, there may be differences. 
These seem to be based on the legal enshrinement of the value, in his example 
the German constitution.111 It remains yet to be set out in more detail on what 
criteria the determination of a differing abstract weight for certain values ought 
to be based.
As to the concrete weight of a value, Alexy suggests that the strength of an 
interference with a value can be identified by using a comparison: To establish 
how strong the interference with one value is, it must be asked what the omis-
sion of the concrete interference would mean for the value.112 This does not tell 
us, however, who is asked to identify the strength of interference. The prob-
lem of interpersonal comparisons of utility is not adequately addressed in this 
account. Interference with a certain value may be evaluated in a highly diffe-
rent way by various individuals.113 The concrete value may differ fundamentally 
based on whether one individual is asked to ‘sell’ their right to non-interference 
or whether another individual is asked to ‘buy’ an entitlement to interfere.114 
One may assume a community which gives the same weight to values across its 
individual views, but this can only be a reduction of complexity, in which the 
risk of erroneous appreciation increases the more heterogeneous the assumed 
‘community’ is in reality.
Still, these difficulties of ascribing weights to values cannot overthrow 
proportionality analysis conceptually. Some would argue that the necessary 
quantification of values can only be done irrationally and therefore correctly 
point out the difficulty of establishing the weights of values in concrete situa-
tions through rational argumentation. To reject balancing based on the assump-
tion of the impossibility of any such rational argumentation, however, is to risk 
totally ‘giving up the idea of constitutional law as a rational enterprise’.115
109  Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’, 577.
110  See closer on this point section V.A.
111  This at least appears to be what Alexy is doing, see his example for the operation of the Weight Formula 
in Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 447.
112  Ibid., 441.
113  For an economist’s perspective see N. Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility’ (1939) 49 The Economic Journal 549.
114  For the argument in more detail in the context of cost-benefit analysis see D. Kennedy, ‘Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique’ (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 387, 401.
115  Klatt and Meister, 60.
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d.  Refinements of the Weight Formula in the light of uncertainty
More recent research by proponents of the Principles Theory also admitted 
that uncertainty may be attached to the graduation of interference with a value. 
The Epistemic Law of Balancing had already introduced a variable for the reli-
ability of its empirical assumptions. Klatt, Schmidt and Meister concede that 
the problem may not simply be reliability, but true uncertainty. This uncertainty 
concerns both the empirical and normative side.
Empirical certainty describes to what extent it can be determined whether 
a certain interference with a value will occur.116 Klatt, Schmidt and Meister 
suggest a formula of their own, the law of graduation (Einstufungsgesetz), accord-
ing to which, the higher the certainty of finding a strong level of interference 
with a value is, the higher the certainty of finding a weak level of interference 
with the same value must be. Put differently, a pessimistic point of view must 
be taken in cases of doubt. The law of graduation has a ‘heuristic’ relationship 
to the Law of Balancing, as it suggests which value of empirical certainty and 
concrete interference should be used for the subsequent application of the Law 
of Balancing.117
Normative certainty relates to the exactitude with which a value can be 
attributed to the level of interference, which decreases with the fineness of the 
scale used.118 The difficulty with ever smaller scales relates to the human mind’s 
limited powers of discrimination. It appears hardly feasible to distinguish 
between two similar forms of interference if a very fine scale is used.119 Norma-
tive certainty also concerns the abstract weight given to a value in the Weight 
Formula.120
Klatt, Schmidt and Meister argue that instead of the relatively vague ‘reli-
ability’ of empirical assumptions used by Alexy, the Weight Formula should be 
construed in a more complex manner, taking into account these findings. The 
initial formula held:
W(1,2) = (I1 x W1 x R1) / (I2 x W2 x R2)
Using the variables of Re for the degree of certainty of empirical premises and 
Rn for the degree of certainty of normative premises, the formula would then 
read:121
116  M. Klatt and J. Schmidt, Spielräume im Öffentlichen Recht – Zur Abwägungslehre der Prinzipientheorie 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 24. For an English version of their arguments, see M. Klatt and J. 
Schmidt, ‚Epistemic Discretion in Constitutional Law‘ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 69, or Klatt and Meister, 109 ff.
117  Klatt and Schmidt, 24, Klatt and Meister, 118.
118  Klatt and Schmidt, 42, Klatt and Meister, 124.
119  See T. Williamson, Vagueness (London/New York: Routledge, 1994), 237 ff., discussing the problem of 
limited powers of discrimination from an epistemic point of view.
120  Klatt and Schmidt, 46, Klatt and Meister, 135.
121  In the German original, Klatt and Schmidt use the letter S (Sicherheit) instead of R (Reliability).
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W(1,2) = (I1 x W1 x Re1 x Rn1) / (I2 x W2 x Re2 x Rn2)
As an even more important result, the acknowledgement of uncertainty in the 
empirical and normative classification of interferences with values leads Klatt, 
Schmidt and Meister to concede the existence of margins of discretion (Spiel-
räume). At the empirical level, a margin of discretion emerges if the empirical 
certainty of finding two different degrees of interference is the same, which 
leads to a freedom to choose for the decision-maker.122 At the normative level, 
a margin of discretion emerges in the presence of a scale into which classifica-
tion of the abstract weight of a value or the degree of interference is not feasible 
without uncertainty. Again, the first-level decision maker may choose in such 
situations without the adjudicator’s intervention.123
These refinements of the Law of Balancing render it closer to adjudicative 
reality. The introduction of new variables of uncertainty acknowledges the 
problem of valuation identified previously. However, the price to pay is the lower 
administrability of the formula. Again numbers must be attributed to the new 
variables, which again may give rise to difficult exercises of valuation. While 
Klatt, Schmidt and Meister’s account provides more realistic insights into the 
possible reasoning of adjudicators, at the end of the day the seemingly advanta-
geous simplicity of the Weight Formula is reduced in order to reproduce more 
and more the actual complexity of situations of value conflict.
The actual process of assigning weight to values thus necessarily suffers 
from the vagueness inherent in both the required moral argumentation and in 
normative and empiric uncertainty, providing yet another open flank for criti-
cism.
e. Putting the weighed values in comparison
As the third and final step of the weighing exercise of proportionality stricto 
sensu, values must be put in comparison, so that the prevailing value can be 
identified. The central difficulty consists in finding a scale ‘external’ to the adju-
dicators subjective convictions for this purpose.124
The recognition of commensurability between values is central to the accept-
ance of comparing them. Some have objected that there exist incommensurable 
values, between which no reconciliation by means of a unit of scale can be found 
for the purpose of comparison.125 However, despite imprecision in many cases it 
122  Klatt and Schmidt, 25, thereby also reject Alexy’s view that the interference asserted by the legislator 
should also be adopted by the adjudicator. See also Klatt and Meister, 123.
123  Klatt and Schmidt, 48-49, Klatt and Meister, 130.
124  Aleinikoff, 972.
125  C.R. Sunstein, ‘Incommensurability and Valuation in Law’ (1993-94) 92 Michigan Law Review 779, 
803. For an overview of the debate and further references see F. Schauer, ‘Commensurability and Its 
Constitutional Consequences’ (1994) 45 Hastings Law Journal 785, 787 and footnote 9. Similarly scepti-
cal of a possibility to monetize and compare values Aleinikoff, 972. K.-H. Ladeur, Kritik der Abwägung in 
der Grundrechtsdogmatik : Plädoyer für eine Erneuerung der liberalen Grundrechtstheorie (Tübingen: Mohr 
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appears that a very rough comparison remains possible. This could, for exam-
ple, take the form of a statement that a particularly large amount of x may be 
worth more than a particularly small amount of y.126 Waldron coined the terms 
of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ incommensurability for this purpose.127 Strong incom-
mensurability suggests that in an individual’s knowledge there is no basis for 
knowing which decision between incommensurable values is the correct one. 
No relation can be established. In cases of weak incommensurability, a relation 
can be established, although there is no unit of scale for comparison. There is 
simply an ‘order of priority’.128 Da Silva distinguishes even more clearly between 
the types of scale needed for proportionality analysis. While opponents of 
proportionality analysis seem to attack that no cardinal ranking can be estab-
lished between competing values, da Silva suggests that only an ordinal ranking 
is needed. Comparability, not commensurability, is thus the issue.129
To defend the idea that values are comparable and not ‘social facts which 
have less in common than apples and oranges’, Alexy introduces the importance 
of values for the constitution – in his case the German one – as the relevant 
benchmark.130 Comparability comes into being based on the constitution as the 
relevant common point of view. The existence of such a benchmark also serves 
to refute the claim that proportionality analysis could privilege quantifiable over 
non-quantifiable considerations. The assignment of weights to values is based 
on such a benchmark and thus requires an external justification for the weight 
given to a value in a concrete case. The quantification of a particular value ceases 
to be the problem as soon as comparability has been established.131 Beyond the 
setting of domestic law, where a common legislator exists, the lack of a common 
point of reference may, however, render it more difficult to identify such a 
benchmark for commensurability.132 One may be left with the rather general 
benchmark of marginal societal importance of the benefits achieved or harm 
prevented to values.133
In addition, Alexy suggests the introduction of a model of scales.134 The Prin-
ciples Theory thus seems to be fundamentally based on the idea of the commen-
Siebeck, 2004), 13, emphasizes in particular the impossibility of commensurability between collective 
or public interests on the one hand and private interests on the other.
126  Sunstein, 803.
127  J. Waldron, ‘Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer’ (1994) 45 Hastings Law Jour-
nal 813, 815-816.
128  Ibid., 817.
129  V. Afonso da Silva, ‘Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and 
Rational Decision’ (2011) 31(2) Oxford J Legal Studies 273, 282 f.
130  Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 442.
131  Klatt and Meister, 61, answering here to a claim brought forward by Tsakyrakis.
132  Pauwelyn and Michaels, 26, suggest that as an example, such a benchmark may also be replaced by a 
uniform standard of welfare maximisation.
133  Barak, 484.
134  Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 442.
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surability of values, which includes the possibility of their quantification. This is 
certainly based, to no small extent, on the acceptance this theory holds for moral 
argumentation,135 but again has led to criticism of the idealist vision of propor-
tionality analysis it entails.136
Still, the conceptual claim for proportionality analysis holds, as criticism 
to date has only shown practical difficulties in applying proportionality analy-
sis without pointing out any fatal flaw. We conclude the present insight into 
proportionality stricto sensu with similar thoughts as the first one on the pursuit 
of legitimate objectives. At this stage, proportionality analysis again shows itself 
as a potentially useful and rational decision-making technique, but invests 
adjudicators with considerable power combined with difficulties, as it requires 
comprehensive moral argumentation. Adjudicators may thus have conceptual 
problems in adopting proportionality stricto sensu, and a powerful justification 
will be required.
 v. Conclusion
The present section has discussed in detail the phenomenon 
of proportionality analysis in its classic, four-pronged structure. The analysis 
shows that there is an idealized account given by the Principles Theory: Propor-
tionality analysis can thus ensure, through its various stages, that all arguments 
are heard, weighed and considered in a case so that ideally a result which opti-
mises the realisation of the competing values in a concrete case can be reached. 
A rational construction of proportionality analysis is suggested in the form of 
the Law of Balancing and the Weight Formula as mathematical equations. Apart 
from these beneficial features, however, there are a number of thorny questions 
that an adjudicator must tackle for the purpose of proportionality analysis. As 
a starting point, the values at issue must be defined and admitted in the first 
place. Under suitability and necessity, values are put in hierarchies, but there is 
a lower need for extensive moral argumentation. Under the last stage of propor-
tionality stricto sensu, the most difficult exercise of moral argumentation has to 
be undertaken. Adjudicators must weigh values, attribute abstract and concrete 
weight to them and compare the results in order to reach a decision. Every stage 
of this process poses particular problems and opens up the adjudicative func-
tion to potential criticism, as reliance on moral argumentation may also be 
denounced as unduly subjectivist decision-making.
Adjudicators who are reluctant to undertake such an exercise, which they 
perhaps perceive as extra-legal, will understandably have their difficulties in 
135  See section IV.
136  Still, it should be noted that there are even economic solutions for balancing exercises of incommensu-
rable goods, so that incommensurability arguably is no absolute obstacle for proportionality analysis. 
See in this regard on the Nash bargaining solution P.-E. Veel, ‘Incommensurability, Proportionality, and 
Rational Legal Decision-Making’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 178, 195 ff.
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particular with proportionality stricto sensu and must be given appropriate justi-
fication for why they should overcome their hesitance.
Our discussion of suitability and necessity has also pointed out the relevance 
of the burden of proof and the standard of review for ensuring the equal repre-
sentation of arguments proportionality analysis promises. The burden of proof 
is thus an intrinsic part of how proportionality analysis operates in context. An 
unbalanced distribution of the burden or an inappropriate standard of proof 
may undermine this claim of equal representation. In the following section, we 
briefly elaborate this broader perspective on proportionality analysis which will 
also guide the subsequent comparative studies. Having clarified this point, we 
can then turn to the issue of justification for adjudicators to engage in propor-
tionality analysis, which will also bring us closer to the link with judicial review.
 B A Broader Understanding of Proportionality Analysis
Up to this point, we have presented proportionality analysis as 
a four-pronged legal test. However, the four-pronged sequence is not the only 
way in which proportionality analysis can be applied. At the same time, how-
ever, it has already become obvious that the claim of equal representation of 
proportionality depends to no small extent on the accompanying features of a 
legal test, i.e. the burden of proof and the standard of review. The terminology 
and our conceptualization of proportionality analysis should be clarified before 
we engage in a comparative inquiry which juxtaposes different ways of applying 
proportionality analysis and its sub-tests. Therefore, the present section briefly 
assesses different understandings of proportionality analysis and positions our 
approach against their background before we return to our initial question of 
justifying the use of proportionality analysis by adjudicators.
 i.  Understanding proportionality analysis beyond the classic 
conceptualisation
We suggested earlier that a mere understanding of propor-
tionality as one particular interpretation or legal test is unsatisfactorily narrow. 
There are, in the literature, signs of different readings of what proportionality 
analysis actually is.137 A discussion of possible alternative readings of proportion-
ality analysis allows us to situate our approach in relation to such other readings.
Bomhoff suggests that balancing as a topic should be understood as a 
discourse bound to correspond to a specific historical legal background.138 An 
understanding of proportionality analysis as a specific method or legal test 
would lead to a functionalist approach for comparative studies. This again would 
assume all too easily that balancing is the same everywhere could end up simply 
137  E.g. Barak, 131, describes proportionality analysis as a ‘legal construction’ as well as a ‘methodological 
tool’.
138  J. Bomhoff, ‘Genealogies of Balancing as Discourse’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 109, 112-113.
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projecting experiences from one legal system onto another.139 Bomhoff’s warn-
ing is indeed appropriate. As a consequence, proportionality analysis is treated 
as a culturally embedded phenomenon in the present study. However, a mere 
suggestion to read balancing as a discourse that cannot be compared seems to 
overlook the fact that there are indeed substantially similar situations which are 
tackled in the situations of judicial review examined in the present study. Argu-
ably, the departure from legal theory can thus provide a working vocabulary and 
theoretical underpinnings for a comparative study without unduly excluding 
the historical background of proportionality analysis. Balancing as a discourse 
is thus a useful reminder of potential difficulties for a comparative inquiry, but 
arguably does not render such an exercise futile.
As another possible reading, Röhl suggests that proportionality analysis 
should be understood as part of the structure of teleological interpretation. The 
‘logic of ends and means’ of teleological interpretation encompasses the diffe-
rent steps of the proportionality test. A measure has to further its objective. This 
would already fulfil the test of suitability. At the same time, the costs caused 
have to be kept to the minimum, which implies that the least restrictive means 
is chosen, as under a test of necessity. Lastly, the relationship between the effect 
on the aim pursued and the impact on other interests has to be evaluated. A 
means could thus be disproportionate if its negative impact is excessive.140 Since 
all the requirements are included within the maxim of teleological interpreta-
tion and not bound to some legal basis in a norm or general principle of law, 
they are applicable in all fields of law.
Conceptually, proportionality analysis can thus be understood along the 
lines of teleological interpretation. Yet, interpretative rules would come in 
to determine in what circumstances teleological interpretation – and with it 
proportionality analysis – should apply, and what its relationship with other 
methods of interpretation should be. As an example, in international law the 
general rules laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties create 
no hierarchical relationship between different methods, e.g. between teleologi-
cal interpretation and contextual interpretation of a treaty text.141 In applying 
proportionality analysis, are international courts and tribunals thus superimpos-
ing teleological interpretation at the expense of other methods of interpretation? 
Or do they choose it as the most appropriate tool, i.e. as the result of a process 
of weighing various possible interpretative methods? Röhl’s account loosens the 
link between the text to be interpreted and the use of proportionality analysis, 
yet would require a more detailed explanation of the impact on and relationship 
with other methods of interpretation.
Proposing an interpretative reading in addition to Röhl’s account, Vranes 
looks for an explanation for proportionality analysis in the ‘logic of rule and 
139  Ibid., 117.
140  K.F. Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre: ein Lehrbuch (Köln: C. Heymann, 1994), 636-638.
141  M. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2009), 424 and 438.
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exception’.142 Whenever, in a given context, one norm constitutes a fundamen-
tal rule while another one constitutes a limited exception,143 means that do not 
support the aim of the exception cannot be accepted in light of the rule. In 
addition, means are only acceptable under the rule if they cause the least grave 
violation of said rule and still pursue the aim of the exception. Lastly, dispropor-
tionate means will not, according to this view, find cover under the exception.
The rule-exception construction could potentially suffer from a hierarchical 
view of the values involved. An exception in itself is subject to a rule and often 
narrowly interpreted. A value conflict in itself does not tell us, however, which 
interest is the rule and which the exception. Proportionality analysis in its truest 
sense, however, claims equal representation of arguments and may thus often 
not find adequate expression through the rule-exception model.
Barak suggests a distinction between ‘interpretive’ and ‘constitutional’ 
balancing. ‘Interpretive’ balancing is used to determine the interpretation of a 
text – statute or constitution – whose purpose is to reconcile conflicting princi-
ples. It is distinct from ‘constitutional’ balancing as it does not serve the purpose 
of determining the constitutionality of such a norm. In practice, both kinds of 
balancing are, however, based on the structure of proportionality analysis and 
its sub-tests.144 For our study, this distinction is only of lesser relevance, as the 
focus is predominantly on judicial review – i.e. on ‘constitutional’ balancing in 
Barak’s terms.
Readings of proportionality analysis through the lens of interpretative theory 
thus possess the merit of loosening the link between the text and proportional-
ity analysis.145 They help us to understand proportionality analysis as a method 
of reading norms146 rather than as a legal test derived from some words of a 
norm. However, such readings face their own challenges as has been shown.
A different approach has been taken in more recent scholarship: In their 
comparative study in international investment law, Von Staden and Burke-White 
seem to suggest that proportionality analysis cannot be understood indepen-
142  E. Vranes, Trade and the Environment – Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law, and Legal 
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 142-143.
143  The expression ‘limited exception’ is used by Vranes as by many others. In general, one might wonder 
whether unlimited exceptions can exist, as exceptions always limit the scope of application of the related 
rule. An unlimited exception in its truest sense would therefore leave a rule without scope of applica-
tion.
144  See Barak, 75 and 93 for a more concrete description.
145  See also on indeterminacy of the law, balancing and interpretation C. Gerstetter, ‘The Appellate Body’s 
‘Response’ to the Tensions and Interdependencies Between Transnational Trade Governance and Social 
Regulation’ in C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance 
and International Economic Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 115-116.
146  See also J. Christoffersen, ‘Straight Human Rights Talk – Why Proportionality does (not) Matter’ (2010) 
55 Scandinavian Studies in Law 11, 17.
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dently of the standard of review.147 This coincides with the present study’s 
suggested broader understanding of proportionality analysis as an adjudicative 
operation including procedural and methodological considerations as discussed 
in the subsequent section: An understanding of proportionality analysis that 
does not incorporate features like the flexibility of adjudication, the standard of 
review and the burden of proof is simply incomplete. With this also comes the 
realisation that there are other versions of the basic test which take inspiration 
in the classic scheme, but apply it differently.
 ii.  Balancing and other, less formalized versions of 
proportionality analysis
Our account has so far focused on proportionality analysis and 
its conceptual difficulties based on the fairly traditional four-pronged model as it 
has most fundamentally been developed in German constitutional law.148 How-
ever, this ‘pure’ form of proportionality analysis translates into a variety of diffe-
rent tests in the practice of different legal regimes. One notion that should still 
be introduced and will be of use in the subsequent comparative studies is that of 
balancing. It has been extensively used by Alexy as a description of the overall 
process of proportionality analysis and more specifically to denote proportional-
ity stricto sensu. For our purposes, however, we adopt a slightly different, more 
specific meaning: In particular in United States constitutional law,149 ‘balancing’ 
is used to define a test that does not focus strongly on textual elements of the 
norms to be interpreted. Rather, the adjudicator assembles all the potential argu-
ments, weighs them informally for the two main values at stake and takes a final 
decision, often without necessarily clearly stating what weight he or she assigns 
to what side. This open-ended version, which resembles proportionality stricto 
sensu, but in our view adopts a less formalized approach, deserves a designation 
of its own.
In practice, there exist different ways in which proportionality analysis is 
applied. In the Principles Theory’s account, proportionality analysis, including 
its ultimate stage of proportionality stricto sensu, is the only stage on which full 
representation of all arguments and a rational discourse can take place. Other 
legal tests, in particular the first two steps of suitability and necessity, can be 
derived from the process of optimisation, which principles require.150 In other 
words, if complete proportionality analysis is perceived as the ideal decision-
147  See both W.W. Burke-White and A. von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Sphere: The Standard of 
Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 283 and W.W. Burke-
White and A. Von Staden, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ 
in S.W. Schill (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010).
148  See chapter 3.
149  See chapter 4.
150  Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 101-103.
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making procedure, all other tests necessarily represent nothing but precursors 
to that test and will – as it appears – collapse into it in extreme cases which bring 
suitability and necessity to their limits.
Other alternatives to proportionality analysis could for example be the use 
of truncated tests, i.e. reliance on only suitability or on suitability and necessity 
without the final stage of proportionality stricto sensu. Apart from these trun-
cated tests, it has been suggested that proportionality stricto sensu is nothing 
but a heuristic form of cost-benefit analysis that courts would apply if they had 
the resources to do so.151 The classic four-pronged, ‘vertical’ structure of propor-
tionality analysis can also be applied in a more ‘flexible-horizontal’ manner.152 
Furthermore, some scholars suggest that next to full four-pronged proportional-
ity analysis, there also exist versions with a greater margin of deference, such 
as a mere control of plausibility, a prohibition of gross disproportionality153 or a 
guarantee of a minimal position.154
Alexy claims that such other legal tests are merely a version of proportional-
ity analysis combined with a further, formal principle which calls for deference 
in the case at issue.155 It appears, however, somewhat unsatisfying to simply 
explain alternative approaches by introducing a new principle into the balancing 
formula suggested for proportionality analysis whenever needed. At the end of 
the day, there may be a risk of representing nothing other than the complexity of 
adjudicative reality with a virtually unlimited number of interacting principles. 
Their relevance and impact remains to be determined in a convincing manner. 
One may wonder whether such a representation of reality by means of seem-
ingly objective mathematical formulae adds much to the understanding of what 
an adjudicator actually has to do in order to reach a satisfactory resolution to a 
value conflict.
In light of the incompleteness identified for proportionality stricto sensu as 
a legal test, we should thus be cautious about speaking all too dismissively of 
adjudicators using other tests as simply concealing that they are actually engag-
ing in proportionality stricto sensu. There may often be good reasons for their 
approach which merit closer attention. The present study thus aims to examine 
the influence the characteristics of judicial review on the chosen test beyond the 
notion of a formal principles. This should not be understood as a rejection of 
the concept of formal principles, but rather as an attempt to flesh out the way in 
which adjudicators weigh reasons as to how to apply the individual segments of 
proportionality analysis.
151  Trachtman, 39.
152  Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 71.
153  See e.g. B. Pieroth and B. Schlink, Grundrechte 21 edn (Heidelberg: C.F.Müller, 2005), 69.
154  See e.g. R. Poscher, ‘Einsichten, Irrtümer und Selbstmissverständnis der Prinzipientheorie’ in J.-R. 
Sieckmann (ed.) Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte – Studien zur Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 74.
155  R. Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights and Proportionality’ in C. Joerges and A. Herwig (eds.), Proportionality 
and Post-National Constitutionalism (forthcoming 2013), 11-12.
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 C Conclusion
Summing up briefly, the present section has undertaken two 
major steps. In a first discussion, it has been established what proportionality 
analysis is and why it is contested at all. In discussing its individual elements, it 
becomes clear that proportionality analysis entails answering difficult questions 
through moral argumentation. First, adjudicators must decide which values are 
actually in conflict and are subject to proportionality analysis. Second, similarly 
contentious findings must be taken by adjudicators when ascribing weight to 
values, assessing contributions and negative effects on values and comparing 
values during the different stages of proportionality stricto sensu. The substan-
tive transfer of power towards judiciaries established by the use of proportional-
ity analysis thus requires justification.
Suitability and necessity as sub-tests of proportionality analysis also make us 
aware of the need to consider other elements besides the pure interpretation of 
norms that play a role in proportionality analysis. Consequently, the standard of 
review and the burden of proof are relevant as well, in particular for a compara-
tive study that purports to examine to what extent different use has been made 
of proportionality analysis by different adjudicators and what consequences 
these distinctions have for the equal representation of arguments. As a second 
step, we have examined how our approach to proportionality analysis can be 
contrasted in particular with those approaches taken in recent literature by other 
scholars. In the light of its potential complexity and diversity of application, the 
present study aims not to suggest one single ideal version of proportionality 
analysis, but rather to examine and explain the different forms of application of 
proportionality analysis by focusing on the reasons for adjudicators to adopt one 
particular reading.156
With these clarifications, it is now time to turn to the justification of adjudi-
cators for using proportionality analysis. In establishing such a justification, the 
reasons for adjudicators to adopt different versions of proportionality analysis 
should also become clearer. For this purpose, we return to legal theory, and the 
Principles Theory in particular. As a starting point, we will examine the norm-
theoretic justification given by the Principles Theory for the use of proportional-
ity analysis. The structure of certain norms – principles – ought to provide such 
a justification.
 III  Balancing vs. Subsumption: The Norm-Theoretic 
Justification for Proportionality Analysis under the 
Principles Theory
Proportionality analysis has been shown to carry with it a 
power shift towards judiciaries. As a justification for this shift, the Principles 
156  See subsequent section V.B.
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Theory centrally erects a norm-theoretic claim: Some norms require proportion-
ality analysis for their application because of their structure.
In the following sections, we first set out the norm-theoretic distinction 
between rules and principles of the Principles Theory. While the theory has 
been refined after first criticism, there remains doubt as to the actual possibility 
of distinguishing rules and principles in a clear-cut fashion. Adjudicative prac-
tice also does not add strong foundations to the claim of a clear-cut distinction. 
As a consequence, the justification of proportionality analysis must arguably be 
found at a different level than that of the structure of the norms, and we move 
on to discuss proportionality analysis as mirroring practical argumentation.
 A  The Origin and Central Tenets of the Principles Theory: 
The Rules and Principles Distinction
Alexy’s central work on the Principles Theory was initially 
drafted in the 1980s.157 Even before this, thinkers had begun to delineate certain 
norms in terms of their structure. Esser suggested that in adjudication norms 
other than rules applied by classic subsumption play a role. Positivist accounts of 
adjudication such as those by Kelsen158 or by Hart159 would only see an excep-
tional role for extra-legal considerations beyond legal norms in the strict sense. 
Esser, however, argued that principles are omnipresent in adjudication and an 
important factor in the development of the law.160 In a similar vein, but with-
out previous knowledge of Esser’s work,161 Dworkin mounted an attack on the 
positivist viewpoint. He suggested a distinction along structural lines: The idea 
of distinguishing rules and principles was born. Rules are norms which apply 
in an ‘all or nothing’ fashion. Principles, on the other hand, possess a ‘dimen-
sion of weight’.162 They also encompass such principles that have no solid basis 
in codification or doctrine, but are part of political or social moral and therefore 
apply due to their content.163 A link between morals and law is established. Rules 
apply in specific circumstances or they do not; in the latter case they have no 
influence on the decision taken. They have a highly condensed legal content 
157  See Alexy’s Habilitation Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte.
158  H. Kelsen, ‘Juristischer Formalismus und Reine Rechtslehre’ (1929) Juristische Wochenschrift 1723, 
1726; H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre 2 edn (Wien: Verlag Österreich, 1960), 242ff.
159  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 2 edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 173ff.
160  J. Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts (Tübingen: Mohr, 1956), 
passim. It should be noted that Esser was partially reacting to the existing work of W Wilburg, Entwick-
lung eines beweglichen Systems im bürgerlichen Recht (Graz: Kienreich, 1951).
161  Poscher, ‘The Principles Theory’, 221.
162  Dworkin, 24-26.
163  P. Holländer, ‘Der Verhältnismässigkeitsgrundsatz: Variabilität seiner Struktur?’ in J.-R. Sieckmann 
(ed.) Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte – Studien zur Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2007), 185.
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which allows an unambiguous application of the rule if its conditions are ful-
filled. In cases of conflict, a rule can only apply or be invalid.
Principles are not as clear-cut in their applicability. As indicated by the 
concept of a ‘dimension of weight’, they have to be realized to the highest 
possible degree, both in the actual and legal dimension, and do not apply in the 
yes-or-no fashion which is applicable to rules.164 In case of overlap, they must be 
weighed and balanced against each other with the result of one principle prevail-
ing, but only limited to the circumstances of the case. The second principle does 
not thereby become invalid, and no general conclusion can be drawn for future 
conflict situations.165 The resolution of conflict reached by balancing constitutes 
the creation of a rule that only applies for the case at issue.
Alexy further developed these fundamental ideas. While in essence accept-
ing Dworkin’s account, he aimed to reassemble the suggestions made by 
Dworkin on fundamental rights and to establish an overall theory on funda-
mental rights based on the idea of the rules-principles dichotomy.166 His object 
of study is the German constitution and the German Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence on constitutional rights and their conflicts. Not convinced that 
the distinction between rules and principles can be based merely on a process 
of subsumption, Alexy underlines that principles are obligations to optimise, or 
more generally speaking they incorporate the idea that a certain value should be 
reached to the highest extent possible.167 They are consequently obligations of a 
prima facie character.168 This is their dimension of weight which defines princi-
ples in situations of norm conflict. Like Dworkin, Alexy suggests that principles 
collide without one or the other necessarily becoming invalidated; both are 
realized to the highest possible degree in order to give each of them appropriate 
weight. As a consequence, a rule is created, but only for the situation at hand.
This specific requirement of optimisation (Optimierungsgebot) in situations 
of norm conflict helps to explain the difference between rules and principles. 
One central difference to Dworkin becomes visible with the problem of excep-
tions: In Alexy’s view, contrary to Dworkin not all situations of conflict can be 
predicted and included in a rule. Sometimes, an exception will have to be intro-
duced because of a principle.169 The true structural distinction between rules 
and principles can therefore only emerge from an analysis of a given conflict. 
For the case of two principles, one will prevail due to its higher weight in a 
specific case without the other losing its validity. In case of a conflict between 
164  R. Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 294, 295.
165  Ibid., 296.
166  There is a clear departure from Dworkin in Alexy’s work. According to Alexy’s view, Dworkin’s account 
is non-positivistic, but still construes constitutional rights as rules. According to Dworkin, their applica-
tion entails responding to moral questions, but does not include the need for balancing, i.e. full-scale 
proportionality analysis, see Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’, 22-23.
167  Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 75.
168  Ibid., 88.
169  Ibid., 88.
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a rule and a principle, the principle will not automatically prevail because of a 
higher weight than the value underlying the rule in question. Rather, the prin-
ciple has to be accommodated within the rule by means of an exception.170 The 
logical difference results only from the analysis of a situation of collision.
Proportionality analysis is thus the manner in which principles apply. 
In Alexy’s view, it is opposed to subsumption, which is used to apply rules. 
Subsumption follows a deductive logic to reach a judgment, while proportional-
ity analysis necessarily implies the use of arithmetic at the level of proportional-
ity stricto sensu.171 Still, both methods have in common that they can be depicted 
as formulas, which Alexy calls the ‘Subsumption Formula’ and the ‘Law of 
Balancing’.172 We have already set out the structure of proportionality and the 
‘Law of Balancing’.173
 B  Norm-theoretic criticisms and the refinement of the 
principles theory
Some early work on prima facie obligations has been done in 
legal theory and has subsequently been taken up to mount an attack on the 
Principles Theory.
Searle developed a distinction between prima facie and definitive obliga-
tions.174 He described three hypotheses for this distinction: In his first inter-
pretation of prima facie norms, these do not really oblige in legal terms. There 
can thus be no real conflict between them and they cannot form the basis of or 
imply a legally binding norm. In the second interpretation, a prima facie norm 
contains a weak obligation. Only if it prevails over all other given norms in a 
specific situation does it become a definitive norm. The true character of any 
norm can therefore only be determined in view of the conditions of its applica-
tion. The third interpretation sees both prima facie and definitive norms as 
sources of obligation, which differ, however, in their manner of naming reasons 
for action, i.e. the scope of given information.
Günther applies these findings to criticize the Principles Theory and to 
suggest a different rationale for the distinction between rules and principles.175 
While he accepts the premise of a distinction, he bases it on the distinct form 
of application of rules and principles in complex situations. For this purpose, 
he rejects Searle’s first interpretation as a pure denial of conflict. He objects to 
the second on the grounds that it creates two spheres of validity for prima facie 
and definitive norms. For Günther, the validity of principles in the abstract only 
170  Ibid., 89.
171  Alexy, ‘Balancing and Subsumption’, 448.
172  Ibid., 434 and 436.
173  See section II.A.iv.
174  J. Searle, ‘Prima Facie Obligations’ in J. Raz (ed.) Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978), 89.
175  K. Günther, Der Sinn für Angemessenheit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 270.
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encompasses and requires all actions contributing towards the optimisation 
object. Taking into account the specific conditions of the actual case through 
balancing makes it possible to determine which actions are actually required. 
The absolute validity of rules, which cannot be restricted, is no contradiction. 
All arguments that could bring about a restriction of validity have already been 
considered in advance in the case of a rule.176 As for Searle’s third interpreta-
tion, in Günther’s view the distinction between the two categories is not of a 
structural nature, but determined by the use of a norm. Either a norm is used 
independently of the characteristics of the situation, or as a principle, in which 
case all factual and legal conditions are taken into account. Günther calls the 
latter the ‘conditions of action’ or ‘conditions of conversation’.177 Borowski criti-
cizes this interpretation, arguing that it does not allow for a logical connection 
between and transition from prima facie norms to definitive norms.178 In addi-
tion, the mere consideration of factors at the level of application is not identical 
to optimisation.179 The character of principles would thus remain unexplained 
in Günther’s model. However, by arguing in terms of validity, Günther usefully 
sheds light on the peculiarity of the Principles Theory: to construct a distinction 
between norms not based on their structure or validity, but referring to their 
application. Arguably, it also remains unclear why the consideration of all factors 
should not result in optimisation.
Another criticism is developed by Aarnio.180 In his view, there is a transi-
tion from rules towards principles which can be depicted on a four-step ladder: 
There are ‘rules’, ‘principle-like rules’, ‘rule-like principles’ and ‘principles’.181 
While a norm sentence possesses a prima facie meaning according to our basic 
knowledge of the language, this meaning can change in the interpretation of a 
sentence when it is applied to a specific case. Aarnio calls this the ‘all-things-
considered-meaning’.182 Since the true meaning of a norm sentence is thus not 
known before its application, there can be no sharp distinction at the level of 
norm sentences. As a working hypothesis, Aarnio suggests a weaker distinction 
thesis similar to the concept of family resemblance in the sense of Wittgenstein. 
After the application of a norm, no structural distinction between rules or 
principles can be determined within this weaker distinction thesis.183 Aarnio 
suggests that contrary to Alexy’s concept, principles as optimisation require-
ments merely represent a rule according to which optimisation has to take place 
176  Ibid., 270-276.
177  Ibid., 273.
178  M. Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien 2 edn (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 111.
179  Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, 299.
180  A. Aarnio, ‘Taking Rules Seriously’ in W. Maihofer and G. Sprenger (eds.), Law and the States in Modern 
Times (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990), 181.
181  Ibid., 184.
182  Ibid., 185.
183  Ibid., 187.
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or not.184 Principles and rules therefore share the same deontic nature,185 and 
as a consequence, even the weaker separation proposed in Aarnio’s step-ladder 
model has to be rejected. The stronger separation suggested by Alexy is logically 
even less acceptable.
In reaction to such criticism, defenders of the Principles Theory have 
accepted that the optimisation requirement can be seen as a rule.186 Borowski 
counters that the objective of the optimisation requirement (Optimierungsziel) 
can be achieved to varying degrees. The definition of a principle thus implies 
as its basis a rule requiring optimisation.187 However, in his view this does not 
render obsolete the separation between rules and principles.188 The use of the 
same deontic operator (a command) does not remove the difference in the struc-
ture of the normative content in Borowski’s view.189 Sieckmann supports this 
opinion and replies to Alexy with the creation of his own terminology:190 There 
exist in his view principles in the restricted sense which are always commands 
in a deontic sense. Norms in the broader sense, i.e. norms whose applicability 
(Geltung) is required by the principle, can be either commands or permissions. 
There is therefore indeed a deontic parallel between rules and principles. Still, 
rules are normative statements, while principles are normative arguments 
requiring the realisation of an optimisation object (Optimierungsgegenstand).191 
The difference between principles and rules can thus be refined by Aarnio’s 
contribution, but the distinction in and of itself remains valid in Sieckmann’s 
view. One can legitimately question whether the terminological switch to the 
creation of principles as ‘normative arguments’ pointing towards ‘optimisation 
objects’ satisfactorily explains the need for a distinction which seems virtually 
impossible to pinpoint in actual norm sentences.
In a different vein, Poscher questions the special position given to optimisa-
tion as a tool for the resolution of conflict situations. In his eyes, the process 
of optimisation of principles is only one among several potential provisions 
which would all create an exception for a colliding norm to remain in force.192 A 
distinction between the lines of rules and those of principles is thus not justi-
fied. There may be differences between the optimisation requirement and the 
types of provisions which create exceptions such as lex posterior or lex specialis. 
Still, these are differences in terms of content, as they also exist between other 
exceptions and do not promote the optimisation requirement to the prominent 
184  A similar view is presented by J.-R. Sieckmann, Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990), 65.
185  Aarnio, 188.
186  Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien, 108.
187  Sieckmann, 66.
188  Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien, 108.
189  Ibid., 109.
190  Sieckmann, 77.
191  Ibid., 87.
192  Poscher, ‘Einsichten, Irrtümer und Selbstmissverständnis der Prinzipientheorie’, 65.
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position given to it by Alexy. The possibility to lay down an optimisation require-
ment in positive legal terms in virtually any norm contradicts the thesis that 
some norms are different due to their structure.193
As a reaction to such criticism, the Principles Theory has been refined 
by Alexy. He introduces a distinction between ‘commands to optimise’ and 
‘commands to be optimised’.194 Based on Sieckmann and accepting Aarnio’s 
views in part, Alexy suggests that principles are indeed commands to optimise 
which function in a rule-like fashion, i.e. optimisation is either required or not. 
However, there also exist ‘ideal oughts’, i.e. objects of optimisation.195 These 
objects are on their own level, accompanied by a command that they must be 
achieved to the highest degree possible, the optimisation command. Alexy aims 
to preserve the structural distinction between rules and principles by accept-
ing a certain rule-character of the optimisation command while simultaneously 
introducing the idea of optimisation objects, i.e. commands to be optimised. 
This is, in his perspective, linked to the dual nature of constitutional rights 
as part of their normativity, which necessarily includes a dimension of ‘ideal 
ought’.196
Poscher, however, does not accept this claim. In his view, the above 
mentioned objects of optimisation are of a non-normative nature. Commands to 
optimise can here be simply understood as rules ‘in their own right’ which can 
apply to normative objects, but just as well to defective regulations which should 
be optimised.197 There may well be general and more abstract legal norms 
within a system that can be singled out as principles, but they do not necessar-
ily result in a command to optimise. Consequently, the very foundation of the 
Principles Theory as a theory of norms appears shaky. Alexy has recognized in 
recent writing that balancing cannot be seen as the universal formula, accept-
ing subsumption and comparison of cases as valid other forms of application of 
norms.198
In conclusion, the Principles Theory’s suggested strict distinction between 
rules and principles is difficult to sustain. In particular its operation at various 
levels, i.e. as a theory of norms which simultaneously bases itself on concepts of 
norm adjudication and legal argumentation, open the distinction up to criti-
cism. It appears that without a clearly founded criterion for distinction, the legal 
order will present itself rather as a mixture of norms which feature rule-like 
and principle-like characteristics at the same time.199 Consequently, courts and 
193  Ibid., 68.
194  Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, 300.
195  Ibid., 300 (emphasis omitted).
196  Alexy, ‘Comments and Responses’, 345.
197  Poscher, ‘The Principles Theory’, 234.
198  See R. Alexy, ‘Two or Three?’ in M. Borowski (ed.) On the Nature of Legal Principles (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2010), 18, and Alexy, ‘Comments and Responses’, 345.
199  Or as A. Aarnio, Essays on the Doctrinal Study of Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 124, suggests, some 
‘flexible’ rules may have a prima facie role to play in legal discourse, while some principle-like rules may 
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tribunals as adjudicators find themselves facing the difficult task of identifying 
whether or perhaps to what extent they want to apply a certain norm as a rule or 
as a principle. If the norm-theoretic claim of the Principles Theory is, however, 
neither fully convincing in theory nor in practice, no justification for the use of 
proportionality analysis can be derived for adjudicators and our inquiry must 
examine a different level of the Principles Theory. This conclusion is bolstered 
by a look into adjudicative practice.
 C  Distinguishing Rules from Principles in Adjudicative 
Practice
According to the Principles Theory, rules are inextricably 
linked to subsumption, while principles apply by means of balancing. However, 
it is doubtful that this strict separation meets the test of practical reality. The 
rules cited in Alexy’s examples are typically very simple commands: e.g. the 
command to leave a room once a fire alarm has been triggered or the prescrip-
tion of opening hours for shops.200 Such rules do not require any discussion by 
a court, but can be applied without comprehensive legal reasoning. A different 
constellation is used to demonstrate a conflict of principles: In a case before 
the German Constitutional Court, the health of a defendant suffering from a 
cardiac condition was endangered by the prospect of having to appear before a 
court. This factor had to be weighed against the duty of the state to grant a func-
tional administration of criminal law.201 The application of such abstract norms 
requires a much more complex reasoning. This opposition of sample cases leads 
Alexy to the construction of the required differentiation between rules applied 
by simple subsumption and principles applied by complex balancing.
The choice of such examples for rules, however, reveals a highly formalistic 
conception of rules. The contrast with principles as regards their application by 
adjudication is overemphasized as a consequence.202 Application of any norm 
can combine various methods including proportionality stricto sensu as well as 
other methods. Beyond simple application as in the case of prescribed opening 
hours, norms may require clarification because they are ambiguous, vague as 
regards a specific case or simply incomplete. There is a high variety of methods 
of application, and proportionality analysis is not even commonly required as 
regards important principles of civil law.203 There seems to be more of a diffe-
rence of degree rather than a clear-cut dividing line between norms applied by 
subsumption and by balancing.
be ‘definite’ in providing a solution without the need for further arguments.
200 Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 77-78.
201  Ibid., 79-80.
202  Poscher, ‘The Principles Theory’, 236. Similarly, Hart, 263, already rejected a comparably simplistic 
view of rules asserted by Dworkin. See sceptical, however, Alexy, ‘Comments and Responses’, 345.
203  Poscher, ‘The Principles Theory’, 238.
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As an additional problem, the Principles Theory is based on circular reason-
ing. While it provides the solution to apply in a situation of conflicting princi-
ples, it is unable to state clearly when a situation qualifies as such a conflict.204 If, 
however, for an adjudicator the discovery of a principle is only the result of the 
application of conflict rules – proportionality stricto sensu – then the premises of 
the method to apply for conflict resolution only become apparent in the after-
math of the decision.205
As a theory of adjudication, the Principles Theory thus suffers from the 
overstretched distinction between two extremes – the application of rules by 
subsumption as opposed to the application of principles by balancing – which do 
not find themselves confirmed in adjudicative reality. Instead of black and white, 
adjudicators find themselves between various shades of grey, where elements of 
both subsumption and proportionality analysis can come into play.206
 D Conclusion
Consequently, the norm-theoretic side of the Principles Theory 
and its findings on proportionality analysis are valuable as an attempt to bring 
structure into the thinking on proportionality analysis. However, its overarching 
attempt to structure legal norms is not completely convincing. As long as one 
remains at the norm-theoretic level, an adjudicator finds himself or herself stuck 
with the circularity of the rules-principles distinction and the virtual impossibil-
ity of pointing towards any ex ante help to identify principles or rules. Adjudica-
tive reality, it seems, features norms which sometimes simultaneously feature 
characteristics requiring subsumption and proportionality analysis. Balancing 
vs. subsumption is thus a useful descriptive account, but it does not constitute 
the opposition that tells us most about proportionality analysis as a tool of norm 
application. In particular, it does not provide a strong justification for adjudica-
tors to engage in the difficult exercise of proportionality analysis. The picture 
becomes much richer, however, if we go one level deeper into matters and 
examine the Principles Theory at the level of argumentation and the relation-
ship between law and morals. At this stage, we learn to fully apprehend Alexy’s 
writings by opposing his model of balancing as the central element of practical 
reasoning to the opposite concept of ‘exclusionary reasons’. It is at this stage that 
204  Jestaedt, 261.
205  Ibid., 273.
206 This also becomes visible in the recent attempt by J.J. Moreso, ‘Ways of Solving Conflicts of Consti-
tutional Rights: Proportionalism and Specificationism’ (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 31, 40-41, to introduce a 
‘specificationist’ account as an alternative to proportionality analysis in the application of constitutional 
rights. Though Moreso first suggests the introduction of more categorical ‘relevant properties’ of a case 
in order to streamline the decision-making process and avoid case-by-case ad hoc balancing, he must 
admit that the very creation of such categories cannot avoid balancing and may, at the end of the day, be 
nothing more than a ‘variation’ of Alexy’s account (at 44).
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we discover both a convincing justification for judicial review combined with the 
use of proportionality and the link to judicial review itself.
 IV  Balancing vs. Exclusionary Reasons: The Justification of 
Proportionality Analysis at the Level of Moral 
Argumentation and Practical Reasoning
While the norm-theoretic level of the Principles Theory could 
not provide a definitive understanding of the justification for adjudicators to use 
proportionality analysis, a discussion of the level of moral argumentation is able 
to do so. The present section thus aims to clarify the possibilities of adjudicators 
to justify the use of proportionality analysis by setting out the level of argumen-
tation, which – in Alexy’s view – quite directly connects law and morals. Other 
views differ. For adjudicators, this matters crucially as they could be accused of 
judicial activism and law-making when engaging in moral argumentation in 
the way suggested by proportionality analysis. We explain in this section that 
proportionality analysis mirrors practical reasoning, and the debate in the latter 
field can be transferred to an adjudicator’s decision of whether or not to use 
proportionality analysis.
At the level of practical reasoning, there is some difficulty surrounding the 
notions of ‘rule’ of positive law and of ‘authority’. Put simply, if decision-making 
by individuals is generally based on weighing reasons at the level of morals, why 
should an individual defer their weighing to rules of positive law or authorities 
at all? One argument could be that there always remains an underlying exercise 
of individual balancing of reasons for the decision to defer. An opposing posi-
tion is taken by proponents of the concept of exclusionary reasons: Such a reason 
would exclude the individual’s reasons and establish authoritative force of posi-
tive law and its authorities.
Finding the concept of exclusionary reasons rather difficult to sustain, we 
conclude that for adjudicators there always remains some room to engage in a 
balancing of reasons. Instead of a clear-cut exclusion of proportionality analysis, 
we therefore suggest that there are differing strengths of the justification for 
an adjudicator to rely on proportionality analysis – which can legitimately lead 
to different applications of proportionality analysis based on the institutional 
context. This latter claim is substantiated in the next section and eventually 
leads us to the connection between proportionality analysis and judicial review.
 A  The Principles Theory and the Relationship between Law 
and Morals
As a starting point, the relationship between law and morals as 
perceived by Alexy and the Principles Theory should be clarified. The close rela-
tionship explains why proportionality analysis comes so naturally to proponents 
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of the Principles Theory, as it suggests a similar procedure for decision-making 
as that applicable in practical reasoning.
There are a number of relationships that can be perceived between law and 
morals. At one end of the spectrum, exclusive positivists refuse every connec-
tion between law and morals.207 On the opposite end, exclusive non-positivists 
require an absolute validity connection between morals and the law. Any legal 
norm which is contrary to morals is thus precluded from being legally valid.208
In his treatise on the Principles Theory, Alexy does not accord a highly 
specific position to values (Werte). In his view, the definition of a value compre-
hends the object of valuation and the criterion of valuation. The difference to 
principles lies with the deontological character of the latter: Principles tell us 
what ought to be prima facie, while values simply indicate what the best is.209 
This points us towards the non-positivist position that Alexy takes.
The Principles Theory as developed by Alexy is based on a validity relation 
between law and morals.210 Alexy suggests in this context a ‘super-inclusive’ 
non-positivist approach, where there is both a ‘classifying’ and a ‘qualifying’ 
connection between law and morals. The first concerns the validity of legal 
norms. The second, however, does not act at the level of validity, but at the level 
of correctness of a legal norm. Thus, a legal norm contrary to morals is not 
invalidated, but considered as defective without thereby losing its validity or 
character as a legal norm.211 Moral defects do not always affect the validity of a 
norm, but only if a threshold of ‘extreme injustice’ is transgressed.212
In this way, Alexy opens the law to moral principles. According to his view, 
the law necessarily213 contains a claim to correctness.214 The first order claim 
points towards the principle of justice as correct distribution and compensa-
tion – the ‘ideal dimension’.215 The existence of human or constitutional rights 
is also inextricably linked to and based on this ideal dimension and the claim 
207  See e.g. J. Raz, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 47.
208  See e.g. D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 76.
209 Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 129-133.
210  R. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice. A Reply to Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 35ff.
211  Ibid., 26.
212  Alexy, ‘The Dual Nature of Law’, 177, refers to the well-known Radbruch-formula at this point, see G. 
Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ (1946) Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung, 107.
213  As D. Patterson, ‘Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals’ (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 47, 53, demonstrates, the 
‘necessary’ features of the law according to Alexy can be divided into coercion and correctness. While 
the first features is, as Patterson correctly points out, somewhat problematic, it is the second one that is 
of higher relevance for the present study.
214  From a ‘cognitivist’ perspective, G. Pavlakos, ‘Correctness and Cognitivism. Remarks on Robert Alexy’s 
Argument from the Claim to Correctness’ (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 15, 23, recently clarified that the propo-
sitional content of norms (i.e. their claim to correctness) is independent of whether individuals assert 
such a claim at the mere performative level.
215  Alexy, ‘The Dual Nature of Law’, 171 and 174.
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to correctness.216 The second order claim to correctness concerns the reconcili-
ation of the ideal and the real. It includes the principle of legal certainty which 
requires the creation of positive law. The two principles can enter into conflict 
which again requires balancing in the form of proportionality analysis.217 This 
balancing, however, possesses several possible outcomes.218 There is, in Alexy’s 
view, room for reasonable disagreement, as long as the boundaries of the reason-
able are respected.219 In this manner, Alexy aims to weaken the consequence of 
the Principles Theory and proportionality analysis.
There is considerable criticism of this perspective. According to Alexy, in the 
field of constitutional rights the result of proportionality analysis exercised by an 
adjudicator excludes all other possible outcomes. This again potentially subjects 
every political decision to adjudication and proportionality analysis. As a conse-
quence, substantially all final decisions are transferred to judges. The role of the 
law as a general and predictable solution found in a political process is consider-
ably weakened as a consequence.220
Advancing a more positivistic account, Poscher suggests that the overempha-
sis on proportionality and the influence thereby given to moral considerations go 
too far. He is unwilling to open up the law to moral principles in the way Alex 
suggests. According to Poscher, law borrows concepts from other disciplines, 
including moral philosophy, but the borrowed concepts are translated into law.221 
Moral principles and law would thus merely share a relationship of empirical 
functionality: A legal system which disregards the moral rules of its community 
on too many occasions would become dysfunctional.222 Moreover, if such moral 
principles were correct and accepted by a community, then in any hard case a 
judicial decision would be followed by the conversion of the group losing the 
case. This, however, cannot be observed in practice. A hard case merely creates 
law, leaving moral convictions intact and offering an impartial decision which 
creates a distance between legal and moral issues.223 Arguably, the connection 
between law and morals is, however, of a different nature than e.g. the connec-
tion between law and mathematics, as moral norms could in theory decide a 
case just like legal ones, while mathematical norms typically could not.224 Their 
resemblance is thus much closer and their relationship of a different nature. In 
hard cases, a judicial decision also need not necessarily be understood as a case 
216  See in more detail on this point R. Alexy, ‘Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights’ (2012) 25 
Ratio Juris 2.
217  Alexy, ‘The Dual Nature of Law’, 174.
218  Here Alexy disagrees with Dworkin’s ‘right answer’ thesis, Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 143.
219  R. Alexy, ‘Comments and Responses’ in M. Klatt (ed.), Institutionalized Reason – The Jurisprudence of 
Robert Alexy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 339.
220  Jestaedt, 271.
221  Poscher, ‘The Principles Theory’, 223.
222  Ibid., 225.
223  Ibid., 228.
224  Alexy, ‘Comments and Responses’, 341.
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of moral conversion. This would only be the case if a one-right-answer thesis 
were upheld by the Principles Theory, a claim that Alexy does not, however, 
espouse. Moral disagreement is perfectly possible, so that the hard case exam-
ple arguably cannot successfully refute the Principles Theory’s position on the 
connection between law and morals.
The openness of the Principles Theory helps to understand why the Prin-
ciples Theory treats the exact nature of values with negligence: If the law is 
infused with moral principles, a value must not be clearly defined in legal terms. 
Its true impact will only result from the exercise of proportionality stricto sensu. 
Any legal definition and subsumption will in any case give way to the result 
of the weighing exercise in a situation of value conflict. For adjudicators, this 
perspective makes recourse to proportionality analysis easier because it suggests 
that they are authorized to engage in the moral argumentation it requires based 
on the close relationship between law and morals.
 B Exclusionary Reasons
However, the openness of law that the Principles Theory 
suggests at the level of practical reasoning remains contested. For some, the 
omnipresence of proportionality analysis would exclude any true independent 
authority for positive law; all seems to be permeated by the balancing of underly-
ing values. We subsequently assess the concept of exclusionary reasons which 
should serve at the level of practical reasoning to explain why for some scholars 
in some cases a rule should just be considered to be a rule without any need to 
weigh its underlying reasons.
In his writings on practical reasoning, Raz in particular has uttered scepti-
cism towards the omnipresence of balancing in the form of proportionality 
analysis. In his view, there must be cases of moral reasoning where balancing of 
reasons is excluded. He terms this concept ‘exclusionary reasons’. In his under-
standing, reasons are the classic motivation for acting. Exclusionary reasons 
are reasons which require not acting based on specific – excluded – reasons.225 
If there is a conflict between reasons, there must indeed be a balancing exer-
cise. Reasons for action can be understood as reasons for compliance or only 
for conformity: In the first case action must be taken with the correct reason 
in mind. In the second case, only whether the action itself corresponds to the 
reason is examined; a person might even have taken the action for the wrong 
reasons.226
Departing from the notion of reasons as reasons for conformity, Raz 
suggests that there are cases where aiming for compliance increases the chances 
of conformity; but inversely, in other cases aiming for compliance reduces the 
likelihood of conformity of action with the correct reasons. In those situations, 
there is a case for an exclusionary reason which should prohibit an individual 
225  J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 183.
226  Ibid., 179 ff.
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from acting based on a reason excluded by that exclusionary reason.227 In 
Raz’ example, a father deciding which school his son should attend could, for 
example, be guided either by his own preferences or by what he believes will be 
best for the child. If the father promises to disregard his own preferences, he 
introduces an exclusionary reason which excludes him from acting on his own 
interest. The best likelihood for acting in conformity with the son’s preferences 
is thus to exclude relevance of the other reason.228
With this technique, Raz can explain the apparent paradox of ‘rules’ and 
‘authorities’. Why would anyone follow a rule if it is only constituted by a 
compromise reached by balancing reasons? Why should an individual not rely 
directly on his or her own balancing of reasons, but instead follow the devia-
tion of a rule? In this light rules appear either as redundant if the underlying 
reasons require a certain action anyway, or unjustified if the underlying reasons 
do not.229
For Raz, ‘rules’ thus act as exclusionary reasons, because their purpose is 
to prevent individuals from trying to comply with reasons underlying the rule. 
Individuals have decided in advance and delegated authority to rules, so that 
they then follow an indirect strategy of basing their action on rules rather than 
balancing themselves the underlying, excluded reasons.230
A similar explanation is offered for the case of ‘authorities’. Authorities 
function in particular to overcome coordination problems: Similar to the case of 
rules, a trusted authority’s decision excludes underlying reasons, i.e. the need 
for an individual to judge for him- or herself whether there exists a coordina-
tion problem. Instead, coordination is secured by transferring the decision to an 
authority and by subsequently following the latter’s decision as a rule and reason 
for action instead of trying to comply with reasons oneself.231
In situations of exclusionary reasons, Raz thus underlines that no balancing 
of reasons takes place. Exclusionary reasons do not compete in weight with other 
reasons, but always win by their very nature.232
Raz division between law and morals rests on the concept of exclusionary 
reasons: The law claims authority by providing exclusionary reasons in order 
to claim authority. Through its ‘mediating’ function, it creates intermediate 
reasons to comply and thereby excludes individuals from relying on underlying 
moral reasons.233
We can therefore conclude that adjudicators who follow an approach of 
exclusionary reasons see leeway for the exclusion of full-scale proportionality 
analysis: Where a rule exists that seems to exclude certain reasons, an adjudica-
227  Ibid., 190.
228  Ibid., 186.
229  Ibid., 194.
230  Ibid.
231  Ibid., 195.
232  Ibid., 189.
233  See on the mediating function of the law Raz, Morality of Freedom, 58.
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tor does not have to weigh reasons through means of proportionality analysis. 
Rules of positive law are thus interpreted based on their wording without leeway 
for proportionality analysis if it is not expressly required by them. In the case 
of an exclusionary reasons approach to human rights, an adjudicator would 
not balance rights against public interests for interference, but instead assess 
whether action has been taken based on an excluded reason. If that is the case, 
the action is not justified by reasons. We have already briefly set out the latter 
possible application of exclusionary reasons in constitutional rights adjudica-
tion.234
There are, however, some legitimate doubts as to whether there is truly a 
possibility of fully ‘excluding’ reasons in practical reasoning: The very idea of 
the autonomy of the individual seems to run counter to such a full-scale abdica-
tion of reasoning.
 C Sceptical Views on Exclusionary Reasons
Raz’ concept of exclusionary reasons has not met with uniform 
approval. In Raz’ account, the law claims authority by providing exclusionary 
reasons. As a central point of critique, however, the concept of the exclusionary 
force of some reasons conflicts with another central concept that even Raz him-
self relies upon in other contexts: the concept of autonomy.
A central problem for autonomy arises if full exclusionary force of the law 
is adopted. An individual would thus fully abdicate their autonomy to author-
ity – here to the authority of the law. Mian suggests that one should distinguish 
between the law’s claim to exclusionary force and the validity of that claim.235 
In his view, the promulgation of a law on performing a certain action does not 
yet exclude the underlying reasons, but in itself only adds an additional reason: 
the fear of sanction. He thus introduces an additional ‘normal justification’ 
condition that must be fulfilled so the law can claim exclusionary force.236 This 
condition being satisfied, autonomy can again be reconciled with the authority 
of law in a positivistic account. The normal justification condition is fulfilled if 
a rule enables an individual to better comply with the reasons applying to him 
or her. For this purpose, the individual must assess the moral expertise of the 
authority in the concrete circumstances: Again, the individual will have to refer 
to – and balance – the underlying reasons for this purpose. Even if ‘aggregated’ 
exclusionary force were granted to the law based on a long-term submission to 
its authority by an individual, it is hard to imagine that an individual would truly 
be excluded from reassessing the higher moral expertise of the authority in indi-
234  See section II.A.i.b.
235  E. Mian, ‘The Curious Case of Exclusionary Reasons’ (2002) 15 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurispru-
dence 99, 103.
236  Ibid., 104.
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vidual cases.237 The notion of autonomy appears virtually impossible to reconcile 
with the full exclusion of balancing of reasons that exclusionary force proposes.
In the field of human rights reasoning, exclusionary reasons accounts can 
similarly be criticized based on the structure of autonomy. The problem of 
exclusionary force lies in the fact that in order to establish it ex ante, a point 
of view external to an individual’s own reasoning would be indispensable.238 
Since such an external point of view is difficult to ascertain, reflection is an 
individual’s only source to create and recognize reasons.239 With this in mind, 
deontological views of human rights are difficult to maintain. Such accounts 
in most cases adapt some vision derived from Dworkin’s trump conception of 
rights.240 Limitations on rights which are based on the public interest could in 
such an account not acquire the same status as rights because of substantive 
moral principles which – in the core of rights – exclude optimisation and mutual 
weighing. However, it can easily be argued that the exact moment of accepting 
a public interest as a reason is in itself already an instance of balancing, if even 
the operation of assigning value as a valid or invalid reason is understood as 
an exercise of ‘maximisation’, i.e. balancing within the framework of practical 
argumentation.241
As a consequence, we find the concept of exclusionary reasons unconvincing. 
For adjudicators in our discussion of proportionality analysis, this means that 
there may be some weighing of reasons that leads them not to resort to propor-
tionality analysis in the application of norms of positive law.242 However, there is 
always a weighing process to determine whether there should be proportionality 
analysis.
 D Conclusion
While the norm-theoretic claim of the Principles Theory was 
not able to provide a convincing justification for the use of proportionality 
analysis, the discussion at the level of practical reasoning has proven more fruit-
237  Ibid., 106-107. Mian suggests, however, that exclusionary reasons can be more usefully understood as 
distinguishing between the levels of deliberation and execution: In the first phase, reasons are balanced; 
in the second, a once promulgated law excludes underlying reasons in principle, unless its application is 
questioned in specific circumstances, which would then send a law back to the deliberation stage, Mian, 
117.
238  Pavlakos, 149, speaks of a ‘Kantian’ perspective of reflecting on how we reflect.
239  Ibid., 150-151.
240  See e.g. G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007).
241  Pavlakos, 136-137.
242  This, of course, is not to suggest that no weight should be given to the formal text of the law. See for a 
defence against dismissal of the relevance of legal texts because of Alexy’s findings F. Schauer, ‘Balanc-
ing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 35, 
45.
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ful. Discussing practical reasoning and the level of morals, we have discovered 
that proportionality analysis mirrors the process of balancing reasons for action 
individuals undertake. This in turn raises the question of why there are general 
norms of positive law and authorities. Individuals seem to defer their individual 
balancing decision to such institutions based on good reasons such as coordi-
nation problems or higher moral expertise of an authority. Centrally, however, 
the claim of proponents of ‘exclusionary reasons’ has not been found convinc-
ing. Such exclusionary reasons – on which rules of positive law and authorities 
would be based – should fully exclude balancing. Instead, the autonomy of the 
individual suggests that there is an inalienable exercise of balancing.
This perspective also justifies the use of proportionality analysis for adjudi-
cators: Norms of positive law may simply apply as they are set with the implicit 
balance of values they enshrine. However, there may also be cases where the 
adjudicator’s own balancing of reasons shows that there must be a further step 
to reassess the balance of values enshrined in a norm.
We described this feature of proportionality analysis before: Full-scale 
proportionality analysis allows adjudicators to weigh values which have been 
enshrined in a norm of positive law in a more abstract way. As an advantage, 
the judge is thus no longer bound strictly to the text of the law and can freely 
evaluate arguments. However, to accept the need for moral argumentation on 
this basis could lead to a judge’s authority being called into question because of 
seemingly subjective assessments of values and their weights.
The question that now remains is how adjudicators should undertake this 
balancing of reasons in order to determine to what extent they should engage in 
proportionality analysis or not. For this purpose, the subsequent section turns 
the spotlight on judicial review, its conceptual justification and its institutional 
characteristics as the elements that interplay in the decision with what intensity 
proportionality analysis is to be appropriately used. For the sake of clarity, we 
introduce the notions of pre-balancing and of models of judicial review at this 
stage. It is thus shown that the benefits of proportionality analysis may outweigh 
the costs in a model of equal representation review, but that this may be the case 
in a more limited number of situations in a model of special interest review.
 V  Proportionality Analysis and Judicial Review: Towards 
Pre-Balancing and Models of Judicial Review
Proportionality analysis possesses an institutional dimen-
sion: apart from its use by legislators it is also inextricably linked to a court or 
tribunal applying it and reviewing ‘lower level’ decisions, be they those of lower 
courts, administrative decisions or legislation. It is thus linked with the topic of 
judicial review of legislative and administrative acts. The historic development 
of constitutional adjudication in the domestic legal system of many states has 
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brought about a notable shift of power towards judiciaries,243 which is mirrored 
by the considerable interest in the Principles Theory at the level of legal theory. 
This shift of power comes, however, with increased concern about the legiti-
macy of adjudication: Should courts and tribunals be allowed to decide in the 
last instance about policy choices taken beforehand by democratically elected 
parliaments or by administrative agencies with powers often delegated by the 
legislature? Do they thereby ‘replace’ the legislator without necessarily having 
the legitimacy to do so?
As just discussed above, we can understand the use of proportionality 
analysis as the result of a balancing exercise by an adjudicator on whether or 
not to grant the law exclusionary force over the values enshrined in the law. 
We designate this balancing exercise as ‘pre-balancing’ exercise, as it precedes 
proportionality analysis weighing the substantive values at issue in a concrete 
case. We thus turn to judicial review as the institutional dimension of propor-
tionality analysis.
Initially only concerned with the level of substantive law and argumentation, 
in its later stages of development also the Principles Theory reacted to these 
concerns moving from a ‘substantial theory of legal decision-taking’ towards a 
‘theory of constitutional review’.244 However, the reflection on differences in the 
setting of judicial review has to date not moved beyond general suggestions to 
use appropriate deference. Some would even reject linking the debates on judi-
cial review and proportionality analysis altogether: Barak suggests that as soon 
as judicial review is accepted, none of the arguments present in the debate on 
this topic can be brought up again when discussing proportionality analysis.245 
In our view, because of such views an unduly uniform view on judiciaries vested 
with the authority of judicial review prevails. Presently, we thus introduce the 
idea of pre-balancing.
In terms of structure, we substantiate our claim by first discussing how the 
Principles Theory established the link between proportionality analysis and 
judicial review. The notion of formal principles used for the purpose of mark-
ing the required deference seems to require some additional fleshing out in 
this regard. As a consequence, it is suggested that closer attention must be paid 
to the context of judicial review. This context provides arguments for the pre-
balancing exercise. There is some need to also discuss descriptively the features 
of context in order to be able to fully understand these arguments; only the latter 
are, however, arguments with normative strength. Based on the contextual argu-
ments, in a pre-balancing exercise the strength of the justification of judicial 
review can be identified. Simplifying for the sake of clarity, we suggest that pre-
balancing has two somewhat typical outcomes and that these outcomes can be 
depicted in the form of ‘models of judicial review’, determining in more detail 
243  For a comprehensive account of the developments in various domestic legal orders see Stone Sweet and 
Mathews, 112 ff.
244  Rivers, ‘The Second Law of Balancing’, 169.
245  Barak, 382-383.
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how proportionality analysis is to be used. We suggest a distinction between an 
equal representation model and a special interest model of judicial review.
 A  Formal Principles, the Principles Theory and the Link 
between Proportionality Analysis and Judicial Review
Proponents of the Principles Theory have introduced the notion 
of formal principles as a tool for describing the tension between the useful-
ness of proportionality analysis in judicial review and the danger of creating 
an unduly dominant position of the judiciary with broad authority to question 
legislative choices. Other approaches have focused on why adjudicators should 
choose proportionality analysis, suggesting that the reason may lie in the 
powerful position they are vested with by the power of judicial review. Principal-
Agent Theory or the right to justification have emerged in the debate. Yet, these 
descriptive approaches still do not sufficiently explain the impact of differences 
between various settings of judicial review on the pre-balancing exercise 
whether an adjudicator should use proportionality analysis.
 i.  Formal principles, proportionality analysis and judicial 
review
Formal principles have been introduced in the Principles The-
ory’s account to bring institutional elements into the picture – in particular the 
appropriate deference of courts towards legislators. However, as the subsequent 
discussion shows, the concept of formal principles has not yet been sufficiently 
elaborated to take into consideration the specific context of judicial review. There 
are also some doubts as to why formal principles operate at the substantive level 
of balancing. According to the Principles Theory, formal principles seem to 
influence in a rather awkward way the weighing of values against each other in 
the framework of proportionality analysis.
Generally, some scholars have suggested that Alexy has neglected the 
institutional dimension in elaborating the Principles Theory, which gives 
such a strong position to judicial balancing.246 Indeed, his writings show a 
tendency to link institutional questions back to his views on deliberation and 
the argumentative role of principles. Constitutional review by a court cannot be 
legitimized by democratic election, as the legislative process driven by elected 
members of parliament. However, a different dimension of representation is 
highlighted instead: Constitutional courts are the institutions of argumentative 
representation247 and create a connection between a parliament and the people 
‘by argument’ instead of elections.248 While such representation by argument 
246  M. Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based 
Proportionality Review’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 140, 142.
247  Alexy, ‘Balancing, constitutional review, and representation’, 578.
248  Ibid., 579.
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could, as Alexy admits, run wild without limits, in fact it is indispensable that a 
majority of the people accept in the long run that the arguments deliberated by 
a constitutional court are those of the people and recognized by them as correct. 
Such discursive constitutionalism is, then, justified in its potential to overrule 
representation based on election as an ‘enterprise of institutionalizing reason 
and correctness’.249
Conceptually, this does not, however, necessarily facilitate the determina-
tion of the necessary intrusiveness of judicial review. At the mere conceptual 
level, scholars have addressed the thorny question of the appropriate standard of 
review. The latter has to be perceived in the light of the threshold of rationality 
that can be expected from the legislative or administrative decision-maker. The 
problem of second-guessing such a decision-maker can be remedied by more 
lenient scrutiny applied by the adjudicator. It has been suggested, for example, 
that the assessment should focus on complete or bounded rationality in the 
situation of the decision-maker. An adjudicator should not intervene merely 
because some abstract notion of ‘complete rationality’ or ‘bounded rationality’ 
has not been achieved. Instead, the assessment must be based on a ‘sufficientist 
reasonableness threshold’ within which the legislator’s choices remain uncon-
tested.250 To set out such a standard, however, requires a closer assessment of 
every individual situation of review. A general claim for appropriate deference is 
insufficient for this purpose.
Similarly, Barak colourfully describes the appropriate deference using the 
picture of a ‘zone of proportionality’ as the legislator’s kingdom, while the 
judge’s kingdom is to keep the zone’s boundaries intact.251 The judge typically 
derives the authority not to act with full deference to the legislative branch from 
the constitution,252 but the extent of the actual discretion in a concrete case is 
hardly more closely defined by Barak’s approach.
The proponents of the Principles Theory reacted to the challenge of defining 
and justifying the appropriate level of judicial deference. Alexy took up ideas by 
Dworkin and developed the concept of formal principles to describe the practical 
relationship between courts and legislators.253 Dworkin had already identified 
‘legislative supremacy’ as one example which prescribes that courts should pay 
deference to the acts of the legislature. Similarly, according to him ‘the doctrine 
of precedent’ requires a measure of consistency in the decisions of the judi-
249  Ibid., 580-581.
250  G. Sartor, ‘A Sufficientist Approach to Reasonableness in Legal Decision-Making and Judicial Review’ in 
G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor and C. Valentini (eds.), Reasonableness and Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 
55.
251  Barak, 417.
252  Ibid., 398.
253  R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers) (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 82.
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ciary.254 Thus, according to Alexy, a formal principle intervenes to clarify the 
distribution of competences between the adjudicative and the legislative branch.
Next to this formal principle, the ‘Second Law of Balancing’ also prescribes 
that the more important the interference with a principle is, the more certain 
the empiric premises underlying the interference have to be.255 This creates 
a ‘sliding scale of competence’ in cases of uncertainty between legislator and 
adjudicator.256
Others continued the debate by embedding formal principles into the model 
of principles, including their application in the framework of the Law of Balanc-
ing.257 Formal principles were described by Sieckmann as prima facie commit-
ments to the result of a procedure. While some persons or institutions take a 
decision within the framework of a procedure, other persons are committed to 
the results in the end.258 As to their structure, formal principles as opposed to 
substantive principles do not possess a goal to be optimised. Instead, they imply 
a commitment of optimisation for the result of a procedure. Still, the subsequent 
proportionality analysis weighing a formal and a substantive principle should 
follow the same lines as the weighing of two substantive principles.259 Formal 
principles thus possess a ‘competence element’.260 Alexy argues that formal 
principles cannot by themselves outweigh a substantive principle, but can only 
do so in combination with at least one substantive principle. This finding is 
referred to as the ‘Law of Combination’.261 Subsequently, research has suggested 
a distinction between independent and dependent formal principles.262 The 
latter demand prima facie that an authoritative decision based on proportional-
ity analysis must be accepted. An example would be the relative authority of 
decisions of the parliament. The formal principle acts as a second-order prin-
ciple here, while the two principles to be balanced could be termed first-order 
principles. Still, in the proportionality analysis all are balanced against each 
other simultaneously, the dependent formal principle weighing in on one side of 
the balance. Independent formal principles can be weighed against substantive 
principles on their own, as is demonstrated by the example of the legislature’s 
discretion to set legislative objectives.263
Some doubt has been cast on such a use of formal principles together with 
substantive principles. They mirror some of the concerns already discussed 
254  Dworkin, 37-38.
255  Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers), 418-419.
256  Rivers, ‘The Second Law of Balancing’, 170.
257  See already section II.A.iv.a. on the operation of the Law of Balancing.
258  Sieckmann, 147 ff.
259  Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien, 128.
260 M. Borowski, ‘The Structure of Formal Principles – Robert Alexy’s ‘Law of Combination’’ in M. 
Borowski (ed.) On the Nature of Legal Principles (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 29.
261  Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers), ‘Postscript’, 423.
262  Borowski, ‘Structure of Formal Principles’, 31.
263  Ibid., 35.
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earlier on the weighing of substantive principles in constitutional law.264 The 
emergence of the concept of formal principles threatens to transform even 
constitutional norms of a clear rule-character. The distribution of competences 
within a federal entity or the separation of powers are often enshrined expressly 
in constitutional law. Formal principles could unduly transform such taxative 
prescriptions into mere prima facie obligations.265 In addition, in any situation 
of proportionality stricto sensu involving formal principles, a simple law would 
be balanced against a constitutional principle without respect for the differing 
ranks and legal nature of the two.266
The use of formal principles could furthermore lead to an additional compe-
tence for the adjudicator to limit a legislator’s powers on the epistemic level. It 
is at this point that Alexy’s ‘sliding scale of competence’ raises some doubts, as 
it leaves it mostly to the adjudicator to judge the delineation of competences.267 
This criticism has in the meantime been weakened by the introduction of 
empiric and normative uncertainty into the Weight Formula and the subsequent 
establishment of normative and empiric margins of discretion for the legisla-
tor.268
Most centrally, however, it remains unclear why a competence element in the 
form of a formal principle should form part of the substantive weighing exercise 
between two substantive values.269 If the role of this competence element is 
to establish the appropriate deference to legislative decisions under review, it 
should – to return to the mathematical terms in which Alexy portrayed the 
functioning of proportionality analysis – rather act by allowing a greater variety 
of results of the balancing equation, rather than by increasing or lowering the 
weight assigned to the values at stake. Consequently, rather than introducing 
formal principles in the balance, it would appear more useful to examine their 
influence at an independent level which does not ‘distort’ the weighing and 
comparing taking place under the Law of Balancing.
Formal principles in their present form thus do not yet present a convincing 
solution to the problem of fully integrating the context of judicial review in the 
justification for the use of proportionality analysis. Other suggestions have been 
offered, but as is shown subsequently, they either do not pay sufficient attention 
to differences of situations of judicial review or have to date not taken up with 
sufficient detail the differences they seem to accept implicitly.
264  See section II.A.i.b.
265  Jestaedt, 274.
266 Klatt and Schmidt, 62.
267  M. Jestaedt, Grundrechtsentfaltung im Gesetz : Studien zur Interdependenz von Grundrechtsdogmatik und 
Rechtsgewinnungstheorie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 226 f.
268  Klatt and Meister, 138-139. See also the discussion of Klatt, Schmidt and Meister’s contributions in 
section II.A.iv.d.
269 S.-P. Hwang, ‘Verfassungsgerichtliche Abwägung: Gefährdung der gesetzgeberischen Spielräume? 
Zugleich eine Kritik der Alexyschen formellen Prinzipien’ (2008) Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 606, 
621.
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 ii.  Principal-Agent Theory and the concept of ‘trustee courts’ 
as the justification for proportionality analysis in judicial 
review
As a first account, Stone Sweet has suggested Principal-Agent 
Theory as underlying the decision of courts vested with the power of judi-
cial review to engage in proportionality analysis. This theory suggests at its 
basis that there are special costs in situations of delegation. Where a principal 
entrusts an agent with a specific task, there are costs because of asymmetric 
information between the actors. The principal incurs monitoring and compen-
sation costs, while there are also bonding costs for the agent to provide insur-
ance to the principal or principals. The latter serve to reduce the principal’s risk 
of dealing with the agent.270
Stone Sweet suggests that there should be a distinction between systems 
of legislative sovereignty and other models. In the first system, courts act in a 
small zone of discretion and their decisions can be overruled by the legislator. 
This setting would follow the principal-agent logic. In other situations, in partic-
ular constitutional courts and international courts and tribunals, the discretion 
of adjudicators is wider and the possibility to overrule its decisions ex post is 
low or virtually inexistent in view of the factual or legal circumstances. In such 
a situation, a model of ‘trusteeship’ should replace the classic principal-agent 
scheme.271 Such a trustee court possesses authority over the delegating princi-
pals. There is not so much a fear of reversal of its decisions as a sort of ‘punish-
ment’, but rather fear of non-compliance with its decisions.272 This model should 
apply, in Stone Sweet’s view, not only to the situation of constitutional courts, 
but also to other settings such as arbitration in international law.273 They all act 
in a constitutional situation of ‘structural judicial supremacy’, which creates 
a particular need for a doctrinal framework – which, in Stone Sweet’s view, is 
supplemented by proportionality analysis.274
Stone Sweet and Mathews suggest that trustee courts have ‘every interest 
in building doctrine’, with proportionality analysis providing the ‘argumenta-
tion framework’ in their view.275 They simultaneously link this construction of 
proportionality analysis with rights review and constitutional rights.276 However, 
270  M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 307.
271  A. Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’ (2002) 25 West European Politics, 
88.
272  A. Stone Sweet and F. Grisel, ‘Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to Constitution-
alization?’ in P.-M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 122.
273  Ibid., 127.
274  Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing’, 87.
275  Ibid., 87.
276  See Ibid., 88.
68
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
in their account no specific explanations are offered as to how the different 
patterns of institutionalisation of judicial review interact with the use of propor-
tionality analysis. Automatic reliance on the model of proportionality analysis 
seems, however, to neglect – as has already been suggested for the case of Alexy 
– the institutional dimension and questions such as the appropriate standard 
of review as the link between the adjudicator and the adjudicated. The model of 
trusteeship takes into account the difficulty of reviewing decisions taken by an 
adjudicator, yet fails to account for other contextual factors.
 iii.  Proportionality analysis in judicial review as a right to 
justification.
Others have moved to explain the link between judicial review 
and proportionality analysis beyond formal principles as conceptually justified: 
Kumm suggests that the function of courts engaged in judicial review should 
be understood as ‘Socratic contestation’ of the legislator’s choices rather than 
as an attempt to substitute parliament with a court.277 The problem of lack of 
democratic legitimacy of courts should consequently not be overestimated: The 
right to vote and the right to contest a legislator and to require appropriate rea-
sons for the action undertaken are complementary in his view.278 This does not 
mean, however, that a legislator is replaced by judges, as long as judges engage 
in critical questioning of the legislator’s motives rather than merely suggesting 
their own views.279 Discussing Kumm’s thesis, Alexy has confirmed that one 
can conceptualize his vision of constitutional rights as enshrining a ‘right to 
justification’.280
Yet Kumm refrains from suggesting a simple vision of how such ‘Socratic 
contestation’ ought to be institutionalized. Instead, he correctly points towards 
various ‘outcome-related’ and ‘democracy-related’ considerations in the institu-
tionalisation of the judiciary that play a crucial role.281
 B Introducing Pre-balancing and Models of Review
We have thus detected insufficient conceptualisation of the pre-
balancing exercise undertaken by adjudicators in deciding whether to use pro-
portionality analysis and how to do so. In our view, a number of factors comes in 
to bear upon this decision. For the sake of clarity, we presently suggest that there 
277  Kumm, ‘Right to Justification’. See also M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of 
Justification’ (2011) 59 American Journal of Comparative Law 463.
278  Kumm, ‘Right to Justification’, 171.
279  S. Gardbaum, ‘A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human 
Rights 78, 99, suggests with similar arguments that judicial balancing must depart from a deferential 
standard in order to ‘reduc[e] democratic tensions rather than adding to them’.
280  Alexy, ‘Comments and Responses’, 340.
281  Kumm, ‘Right to Justification’, 171-172.
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are two models according to which judicial review can operate. In each of them, 
the various considerations play out differently.
As a starting point, some scholars have already proposed a distinction 
between a substantive and an institutional level in order to discuss proportion-
ality analysis. We discuss their approach in the subsequent section. However, 
the solution found by them seems to still be based on a rather narrow vision 
of constitutional adjudication. Instead, we suggest a distinction between two 
models taking up more broadly the specific characteristics of a setting of judicial 
review: While at some points, judicial review operates to reach the best possible 
representation of the various values at issue, in other cases the setting is diffe-
rent. Rather than to aim for such representation, review focuses on one value 
with more emphasis. We briefly present these two models here, and point out 
how concrete settings of judicial review can be attributed to one model or the 
other.
 i. Splitting up the Law of Balancing
The use of formal principles in the Weight Formula, as has 
previously been concluded, rests on rather fuzzy premises. It is only in newer 
accounts that a distinction between the level of substantive principles and 
formal principles is suggested. Formal principles should thus merely intervene 
after a margin of discretion has been found because of empiric or normative 
uncertainty; they then serve to decide upon the competence to take a decision 
within that margin of discretion.282
Klatt, Schmidt and Meister have thus suggested distinguishing between a 
‘level of balancing’ and a ‘review level’ (Abwägungs- und Kontrollebene).283 The 
required standard of review on the second level may differ accordingly and does 
not depend on the first level. In the relationship between a constitutional court 
and lower courts, the more intense the interference with a constitutional right 
is, the more intense the standard of review will often be as a result. In the rela-
tionship between a first instance court and an appellate instance, there is often 
only review of legal issues, which again means that there is an epistemic margin 
of discretion for the first instance court, while there is no normative margin of 
discretion.284 The standard of review debate must therefore be separated from 
the substantive test of proportionality stricto sensu in their view.
Klatt, Schmidt and Meister’s contribution usefully keeps apart proportion-
ality analysis for substantive values and the ‘review level’, i.e. the appropriate 
standard of review which is established by considerations independent of the 
substantive values.285
282  Klatt and Schmidt, 65, Klatt and Meister, 141.
283  Klatt and Schmidt, 66-67, Klatt and Meister, 142-143.
284  Klatt and Schmidt, 69, Klatt and Meister, 146.
285  It should be noted that because of this exclusion of some elements from substantive proportionality 
analysis, for Klatt and Schmidt, 63 formal principles no longer possess the status of principles, since 
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On the review level, Klatt, Schmidt and Meister distinguish between review 
of the internal and the external justification of proportionality analysis done 
by the legislator or administrative authority under review. The review of the 
internal justification focuses on the more formal side of proportionality analy-
sis based on Alexy’s arithmetic formula of the Law of Balancing: Have all the 
relevant variables been used and been assigned values, does the resulting deci-
sion flow logically from the ‘calculation’ suggested by the previous findings? 
The review of the external justification allows adjudicators to even reassess the 
values assigned by a legislator or administrative authority, thereby replacing 
these latter’s evaluations with its own. Such review requires the adjudicator to 
claim ultimate decisional authority.286
 ii. Introducing the idea of pre-balancing
These findings are convincing as they solve the problem of the 
application of formal principles previously identified. Institutional elements 
apply at a different level and adapt the standard of review.
Klatt, Schmidt and Meister’s point of departure is a specific model of judicial 
review used for examples in their theoretical account. As the pertinent chapter 
shows,287 in Germany there is a specialized judiciary – the Federal Constitu-
tional Court – entrusted with a broad power of judicial review, i.e. adjudication 
of conflicts between rights and other constitutional values. The setting and over-
all rationale of judicial review is on finding a balance between various constitu-
tional values: fundamental rights, public interests, competences at various levels 
of the federal system.
A different situation is presented e.g. by the WTO Appellate Body.288 While 
it is the highest court adjudicating on the WTO covered agreements, its focus is 
much narrower. The rationale of dispute settlement demonstrates a clear focus 
on trade and trade-related issues.
The usefulness of Klatt, Schmidt and Meister’s contribution lies in the capa-
bility of their two-level distinction to accommodate ‘different relations of control’ 
without compromising substantive balancing and the concept of proportionality 
analysis.289 We can adopt this idea to flesh out the pre-balancing exercise. While 
Klatt, Schmidt and Meister’s focus lies on margins of discretion and issues of 
empiric and normative uncertainty in judicial review, their idea of a separate 
balancing exercise can also arguably be used as a blueprint for the pre-balancing 
of arguments emerging from the specific relationship of control in one particu-
lar situation of judicial review.
they no longer apply by proportionality analysis. They suggest that the principle of legislative supremacy 
actually applies as a rule and not a principle. See also Klatt and Meister, 141.
286  Klatt and Schmidt, 67.
287  See chapter 3.
288  See chapter 7.
289  Klatt and Meister, 146.
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We suggested earlier that there is a pre-balancing exercise undertaken by an 
adjudicator to assess whether he or she will engage in full-scale proportional-
ity analysis or rather refrain from it. There are substantially two ways in which 
the application of proportionality analysis can be fine-tuned by adjudicators. 
The standard of review, i.e. the breadth of results of a balancing exercise that is 
accepted, is one side. While this feature is well presented in the model suggested 
by Klatt, Schmidt and Meister, in practice we also observe a rather wide vari-
ety of ‘versions’ in which proportionality analysis is applied.290 Adjudicators 
effectively use the various sub-tests of proportionality analysis with shifting 
emphases; some rely heavily on necessity to reduce the use of proportionality 
stricto sensu, while others see no inconvenience in engaging in all prongs of 
proportionality analysis.
The idea of pre-balancing arguably helps in explaining these differences. 
To date, the individual features have not been sufficiently taken into account 
in explaining proportionality analysis as applied in the context of a particular 
setting of judicial review. A unifying, but also simplifying perspective has 
prevailed.
However, such a perspective which posits one version of proportionality 
analysis as the scheme to follow, runs the risk of all too easily considering other 
versions as ‘wrong’ in comparison to one ideal form of proportionality analysis. 
In the light of the setting of judicial review, however, there seem to be quite 
plausible arguments for different forms as they have evolved. Rather than thus 
considering these versions as deviations from the ‘correct’ model, we suggest 
that it is more useful to also structure the explanation and justification of these 
deviations based on the idea of pre-balancing. This can be understood as an 
addition to Klatt, Schmidt and Meister’s contribution towards fleshing out the 
notion and function of formal principles and their impact on the relationship 
between courts and legislators.
 iii.  Consequences of pre-balancing for the use of 
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
Before we turn to the arguments which are actually weighed 
during the pre-balancing exercise, there remains a need to set out in what sense 
proportionality analysis is influenced by the results of pre-balancing. To illus-
trate our proposal, we thus present two outcomes of pre-balancing which in our 
view are typical.
On the one hand, judicial review sometimes calls for broad representation 
of potentially all claims. The prime example is domestic constitutional review: 
Constitutions contain a variety of values, and also encompass the need for an 
overall balance of the competing values. However, there are also more technical, 
specialized forms of judicial review, which focus on a rather narrow legal text 
concerned with a particular topic. Treaties in international economic law are 
290 See already section II.B.ii.
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the prime example for this latter setting. Adjudicators are here called to focus 
on a rather narrow set of obligations, which encompass, but do not necessarily 
emphasize, a balance of values, with the consequence that the focus lies on one 
particular value. It should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that this 
value is to be represented as hierarchically higher, unless there is a specific justi-
fication for doing so.
These two situations are, in our view, typical outcomes of a pre-balancing 
of arguments taken from the contextual background of judicial review. Termi-
nologically, we suggest the terms of equal representation review and of special 
interest review as designations.
In the case of an equal representation model of review, the adjudicator 
is more empowered to undertake the step of weighing underlying values as 
competing arguments, because the setting of judicial review emphasizes this 
need. Proportionality analysis and its claim of non-hierarchical weighing of 
competing values can prosper in this context.
Under the model of special interest review, the normative conflict between 
values in principle also calls for a weighing exercise and thus seems to justify 
the use of proportionality analysis. However, the setting of judicial review here 
is more limited, which calls for a different approach in the use of proportional-
ity analysis; one which relies less on proportionality stricto sensu. An adjudicator 
should resolve cases primarily in examining matters based on its specific focus 
and only resort to full-scale proportionality analysis if a severe imbalance of 
values makes it indispensable.
As these models only represent typical outcomes of a pre-balancing exercise 
influenced by a multitude of possible arguments, they cannot operate as strict 
categories or enable a ‘subsumption’ exercise of types of judicial review. Further-
more, as the comparative studies will demonstrate, some regimes may even 
‘change’ their model over time.291 However, the use of models seems appropriate 
as a heuristic to present and contrast our findings in the comparative section 
more vividly.
Also, one might raise the claim against the two-model distinction that appro-
priate representation of values must always be a central priority, so that based 
on what has just been stated, proportionality analysis in its full shape is the only 
appropriate solution. This claim can only be rebutted by fleshing out what argu-
ments could actually convince an adjudicator to conceptualize their task differ-
ently because of its specific situation of judicial review. We therefore now turn to 
the arguments to be weighed in the pre-balancing exercise. Centrally, contextual 
features which help us to understand fully the situation of judicial review ought 
at this point to be kept separate from the arguments of a normative nature on 
the justification of judicial review, which will play a role in the pre-balancing 
exercise.
291  See chapter 6 on European Union law.
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 iv. The justification of judicial review
The need for a justification for proportionality analysis arises 
from its empowerment of a judiciary to review the balance of values enshrined 
in legislation. Judicial review itself is the decision that a court is entitled at all to 
review legislation, using proportionality analysis or not. Scholars have tried to 
justify the practice of a court supervising a legislator’s decisions through various 
arguments. Crucially, review is always based on the participation in the demo-
cratic process of decision-making.292 In the subsequent section, the doctrine of 
procedural democracy helps us to understand why good reasons can suggest that 
adjudicators ensure representation of special values in the democratic debate. 
As a consequence, the structure of representation of values also determines the 
appropriateness of judicial review – and as a consequence the use of proportion-
ality analysis.
For this purpose, we first explore the countermajoritarian problem. Subse-
quently, we will examine whether judicial review can be justified based on the 
institutional qualities of judiciaries. Following a different line of thought, some 
scholars have attempted to justify the practice of judicial review as part of a 
dialogue with legitimizing force. However, neither of these accounts offers truly 
convincing reasons. As a third avenue, the doctrine of procedural democracy is 
more promising. This doctrine suggests that based on the predominant concept 
of democracy, courts and judicial review serve to rectify failures of the demo-
cratic process. Such review is thus justified in those cases where values central 
to the functioning of the democratic process have been unduly neglected. It is 
based on the procedural democracy doctrine that we can subsequently flesh out 
the arguments for the pre-balancing exercise of how to apply proportionality 
analysis.
a. Judicial review and the countermajoritarian problem
The problem of judicial review at the very basis is that it could potentially 
contradict a majority decision – usually a law decided upon in a parliament. 
The ‘countermajoritarian dilemma’293 describes the difficulty inherent in the 
fact that judicial review questions the decision taken by a democratic majority. 
Adjudicators are thus constantly required to ‘simultaneously legitimate and limit 
their exercise of power’.294
Perhaps one of the best-known claims in this regard comes from Waldron. 
Assuming a well-functioning democracy, in his view there is no need for judicial 
review of legislation. However, he qualifies his findings. He only asserts such a 
rejection based on a model of functioning democratic and judicial institutions 
within a state where the members of society are committed to the ideals of the 
292  As the debate has mostly taken place in the context of United States constitutional law, a democratic 
constitutional model has always served as the starting point.
293  The term has been shaped by A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1962).
294  Bomhoff, 567.
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state and engage in reasonable debate and disagreement on rights which they 
are truly interested in.295 Judicial review of legislation may become a useful tool 
if this ideal state is not given.296
This is the starting point for more pragmatic arguments for judicial review: 
The idealistic majoritarian perception is rather simplistic and in practice 
the relationship between courts and legislators turns out to be much more 
complex.297 Democracy in general cannot truly be reduced to mere considera-
tions of majorities, but also necessarily includes the protection of some higher 
values for its own functioning. The identity and influence of such values have 
shaped other contributions to the debate. As a starting point in the penumbra 
of the Principles Theory, the idea of ‘Socratic contestation’ of legislation before 
courts has already been evoked, which suggests that the right to vote should 
be read in a complementary manner to the right to contest legislation as to 
its rationality.298 One central idea is thus the rationality of decision-making, 
which cannot be ensured merely by democratic – i.e. majority-based – decision-
making.
It is, however, unclear why courts should be the solution to this problem. We 
explore some possible arguments in the following sections.
b.  The debate on the institutional qualities of courts and legislators
Certain institutional characteristics of a process of judicial review by courts 
are typically highlighted to strengthen the claim in favour of judicial review. 
Fallon lists the central points in his defence of judicial review. In his view, 
constitutional review can perform a highly useful role by giving interests over-
looked in the legislative process a voice immediately instead of sending them to 
a process of legislative amendment in an uncertain future.299 The existence of 
constant jurisprudence on constitutional rights is also an important reminder 
for the legislator of important interests to be taken into account.300 Most 
crucially and contrary to some earlier criticism, a court proceeding to constitu-
tional review does not necessarily have to supplant the views of the legislator, 
but can operate with a certain degree of deference.301
There are, however, voices against these points. Aleinikoff suggests that 
the voicing of concern should not happen through a process of contestation of 
legislation under judicial review, but in social interaction such as the election of 
295  J. Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2005) 115 Yale Law Journal 1347, 1360.
296 Ibid., 1402.
297  K. Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 233, qualifies the majoritarian conception 
of the relationship between courts and democracy even as ‘vulgar’.
298  See section V.A.iii.
299 A. Walen, ‘Judicial Review in Review. A four-part defense of legal constitutionalism’ (2009) 7 Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 329 343.
300  Ibid., 349.
301  Ibid., 340.
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parliament.302 It also is unclear for him why a court should be able to do what a 
legislator could not do; here this would mean taking social interests represented 
by legislation and confronting such interests with interests enshrined in the 
constitution in order to reach a result based on a somehow more appropriate 
balance of the importance of both interests.303 Furthermore, since a constitu-
tional court is in most cases confronted with a value enshrined in the constitu-
tion and a much more diffuse social value enshrined in the legislation under 
review, there exists a danger that such a court will focus with inappropriate 
intensity on the less clear non-constitutional value.304 Inadequate representation 
of values could ensue.
From a technical perspective, it has been suggested that judicial decision-
making and even law-making as it regularly occurs in the use of proportionality 
analysis in judicial review is advantageous. This claim is centrally based on the 
so-called ‘many minds’ argument: legal development through case law and prec-
edent aggregates collective knowledge of many judges over time. Therefore, judi-
cial law-making is justified next to the ‘many minds’ in legislative bodies, whose 
knowledge and competence stems more from deliberation.305 However, many 
minds arguments must be qualified based on who is included in the group of 
minds; the quality of minds may decrease with the number of minds included 
and from a certain number onwards an oligarchy, e.g. in the form of an agenda-
setter, will necessarily emerge.306 Consequently, there is hardly any ground to 
suggest that generally, courts are the better decision-makers than legislators or 
vice versa.307 Ultimately, there is no single convincing answer to the question of 
whether judges or members of parliament are better suited to reconcile compet-
ing values.
Others have argued that the interaction between courts and legislators is not 
so much a competition on who is the better ultimate decision-maker, but rather 
a dialogue which in itself legitimizes judicial review.
c.  Legitimizing judicial review as dialogue between courts and legislators
In particular in Canadian constitutional law, another suggestion to bolster 
the justification of judicial review has emerged. Based on ideas of legitimacy 
through deliberative processes and dialogue, some authors have suggested that 
judicial review and its interaction with the legislative process should be under-
stood as a dialogue on constitutional values, led between the judiciary and the 
302  Aleinikoff, 993.
303  Ibid., 985-986.
304  Ibid., 989.
305  See on many minds generally C.R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the Founding Document 
Doesn’t Mean What It Meant Before (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
306  A. Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 54-55.
307  Ibid., 122, would even suggest that the best solution is a deferent judiciary combined with an active 
constitutional legislator.
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legislature.308 Judicial review should thus not be seen as the end of the conversa-
tion with the final word on the interpretation of constitutional rights, but rather 
as drawing attention towards these rights, but then putting the ball back in the 
legislator’s court. The legislator is then supposed to take the court’s findings 
into account in the future.309
However, this suggested legitimacy through deliberative dialogue remains 
conceptually difficult to accept. Even if the setting of judicial review should leave 
to the legislator sufficient leeway to later overrule or at least question the find-
ings of an adjudicator, judges must base them on their pre-existing views on the 
correct interpretation of the constitution. The benchmarks for this decision thus 
remain in place, so that even if a legislator overrules a judicial decision, the new 
law would again meet with the pre-established standards if it falls under judicial 
review. Since this means that judges necessarily have if not the last, then still a 
somewhat more weighty say, the conditions of a deliberative dialogue are hardly 
fulfilled and the justification through dialogue cannot be sustained.310
This point also casts doubt on Alexy’s view of judicial review with propor-
tionality analysis as deliberative representation of arguments, as the latter also 
seems to rest to no small extent on a similar assumption of a dialogue.311 There 
is, however, no small amount of hierarchy inherent in the phenomenon of judi-
cial review – of course depending on the institutional context and possibilities 
for the legislator to overrule judicial decisions.
At the same time, there are also constraints on the judges. Depending on 
the system of review, they will be more or less able to answer abstract or only 
concrete questions. Even if some systems have broadened the actual possibilities 
for courts’ review in practice,312 this still leaves courts at a disadvantage because 
they are constrained in setting the agenda of questions that will be asked.
The justification of judicial review as dialogue therefore seems equally 
unsatisfactory. A more promising approach focuses on the actual function of 
representation of specific values which judicial review ensures. Put simply, 
judicial review operates as a safeguard against grave neglect for specific values 
central to the functioning of the democratic process.
308  See most notably P.W. Hogg and A.A. Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures 
(Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
75.
309  K. Roach, ‘Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian 
Legislatures’ (2001) 80 Canadian Bar Review 481, 530-531. See also Barak, 466.
310  L.B. Tremblay, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue between Courts and Legisla-
tures’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 617, 643.
311  See for Alexy’s view section V.A.i.
312  See for example in United States constitutional law chapter 4 section II.D.
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d. The procedural democracy doctrine
The seminal contribution establishing the doctrine of procedural democracy 
stems from United States constitutional law.313 Discussing whether there should 
be intrusive judicial review, Ely suggested that reasonableness of democratic 
decision-making, be it at the legislative or administrative level, can be assessed 
by looking at the procedure. If there are major defects to an extent that the 
quality and legitimacy is likely to be corrupted, judicial review must intervene 
as a corrective mechanism. To assess when this is the case, Ely suggests that 
certain signs are indicative: A first sign is serious neglect for or misapplica-
tion of fundamental constitutional values, which in Ely’s view are in particular 
electoral rights or the freedom of expression as core elements of the democratic 
process.314 A second sign could be outcomes which systematically disadvantage 
the interests of specific groups, because it appears likely that such discrimi-
nation is caused by a defective procedure in which the legislator neglects the 
interests of such groups.315
Judicial review should thus act as a counterweight in such situations of 
majoritarian excess. The main idea is to protect certain fundamental values. 
However, there is disagreement as to what values should be protected and – as 
already discussed316 – whether courts are the best guardians for this purpose.
The concept of democracy and of what affects the democratic process thus 
determines what values are deemed important as a justification for judicial 
review. As the comparative assessment shows, there are different approaches: 
United States constitutional law particularly emphasizes equal treatment for 
vulnerable minorities and rights as liberties in their shield function against 
public interference.317 By contrast, the German Federal Constitutional Court also 
emphasizes its review power for socioeconomic rights and positive obligations 
under rights and even extends its review to the sphere of private law.318 Similarly, 
for the European Court of Human Rights, judicial review must also encompass 
positive obligations under human rights and even extend to the private sphere.319
Hence, positions visibly diverge on the justification of judicial review in cases 
of classic liberal fundamental rights as opposed to cases of social and economic 
rights. As an example, Fallon suggests that fundamental rights are important 
values that merit special protection, with the consequence that well-designed 
judicial review can be useful. In such cases, under-protection presents a more 
serious risk than over-protection, and consequently a system with judicial review 
313  At this point, only selected examples from the debate in United States constitutional law are presented, 
while a more comprehensive discussion is left for chapter 4.
314  J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust – A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1980), 103.
315  Ibid.
316  See above section V.B.iv.b.
317  See chapter 4.
318  See chapter 3.
319  See chapter 5.
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can be seen as advantageous.320 Walen rejects this view as over-simplistic. It 
reduces the case for constitutional review and balancing to the setting of certain 
fundamental rights facing socio-economic interests enshrined in legislation 
and implicitly suggests that the former should trump the latter.321 The central 
problem with Fallon’s case for judicial review is its foundation on a libertar-
ian perspective: Legislation is primarily perceived as a potential intrusion into 
the freedom of the individual rather than as a potential protection of rights, in 
particular socioeconomic ones. Judicial review for Fallon is thus an additional 
point of veto to ensure that there is less rather than more legislation.322 The 
focus on certain fundamental rights, however, unduly excludes other violations 
that may legitimately be perceived as similarly serious. Private violations of 
fundamental rights may just as well be seen as justifying judicial review of state 
action in the light of positive obligations incumbent upon the state.323
Next to the question of what values qualify as a justification for judicial 
review, there are also calls to exclude some values as justifying judicial review in 
all circumstances. Typically, provisions on trade, both in domestic constitutional 
as well as international economic law, provide that local regulatory autonomy 
should only be exercised to meet the needs of the public interest and not unnec-
essarily restrict trade. Proportionality analysis can be used in the framework 
of judicial review to assess whether an appropriate balance between trade and 
the opposing public interest has been found. Regan, however, has developed 
a critique of such ‘virtual representation’: With the example of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause in United States constitutional law,324 he suggests that judi-
cial review including intrusive proportionality analysis is not required in cases 
where local regulation of public interests has to be scrutinized as to whether it 
unduly restricts trade. The justification would here rest on the idea that trad-
ers as foreigners are not duly represented in the domestic regulatory decision-
making process, and therefore require virtual representation through judicial 
review. In Regan’s view, this argument cannot apply. In order to achieve effi-
ciency, representation itself is only required for all the interests within a state. If 
consumers are appropriately represented, then protectionism will not harm only 
out-of-state producers, but these consumers as well. Accordingly, their represen-
tation within the democratic institutions is already ensured and efficiency will 
be achieved as well as protectionism avoided. Conceptually, there would thus be 
no reason to represent any out-of-state producers by means of judicial review.325 
While the argument in itself can be considered valid, one may wonder whether 
320  R. Fallon, ‘The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review’ (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1693, 1699.
321  Walen, 335.
322  See on this ‘libertarian presupposition’ in Fallon’s argument M. Tushnet, ‘How Different are Waldron’s 
and Fallon’s Core Cases For and Against Judicial Review?’ (2010) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 49, 52.
323  Ibid., 61.
324  See chapter 4 on United States constitutional law for a detailed account.
325  D.H. Regan, ‘Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade within a Federal or Quasi-Federal 
System: Protectionism and Balancing, “Da Capo”’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1853, 1860.
79
chapter 2 proportionality analysis, pre-balancing and models of judicial review
a full exclusion of judicial review is warranted. There may indeed be a weaker 
claim for review if representation of consumer interests seems sufficiently 
warranted. However, there may be cases where this is not the case, and one 
could argue that where a court discovers elements of evidence pointing in that 
direction, the justification of procedural democracy may still apply. Sometimes, 
the ‘virtual representation’ of out-of-state traders in the political process may be 
ensured by the representation of local consumers. In other cases, this mecha-
nism may fail, so that again judicial review is warranted.
Summing up, the procedural democracy doctrine has thus introduced the 
idea that judicial review should operate as a corrective mechanism for defective 
democratic processes. However, arguments can be exchanged as to what values 
should be seen as important enough to justify judicial review. Put differently, 
one needs to justify how values are classified; i.e. why some are perceived as a 
more central to the democratic decision-making process, which again justifies 
intrusive judicial review in order to avoid that their neglect produces inadequate 
outcomes.
 v.  Linking the procedural democracy doctrine, pre-balancing 
and models of judicial review
The most apt justification of judicial review thus lies in the 
correction of those errors in the democratic process that interfere with specific 
values. The procedural democracy doctrine thus suggests that the strength of 
the claim of judicial review must be established by weighing arguments on what 
values must be protected with what vigour. We can now understand the varying 
strength of the justification of judicial review as also answering the question of 
pre-balancing, i.e. to what extent adjudicators are entitled to use proportionality 
analysis. The procedural democracy doctrine conceptually shows what argu-
ments are to be weighed by adjudicators during the pre-balancing exercise.
Adjudicators pre-balance the elements surrounding their setting of judicial 
review and the justification of their review power in order to determine whether 
they are operating rather in what we have designated as a model of equal repre-
sentation or in a model of special interest review.
Under a model of equal representation review, an adjudicator is required to 
pick and choose the values that appear to be most important and to adapt the 
standard of review in his or her use of proportionality analysis accordingly to 
ensure sufficiently intrusive review. Ideally, the adjudicator should also expressly 
justify what values are protected with more intrusive review and for what 
reasons, as explained in the procedural democracy doctrine.
A different situation is presented by a model of special interest review. The 
focus of review lies only on one particular value, while the appropriate represen-
tation of all values is not the main goal. Accordingly, full-scale proportionality 
analysis does not necessarily play a central role as discussed above. However, to 
justify judicial review, the adjudicator can and should still rely on the doctrine of 
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procedural democracy. The particular value singled out for protection must be 
assessed as to its relevance and need for protection in the democratic process, so 
that the intrusiveness of review can be adjusted. This can e.g. lead to a decision 
by the adjudicator to predominantly rely on necessity, i.e. a comparison with less 
restrictive alternatives, rather than full-scale optimisation under proportionality 
stricto sensu because the main importance is given to one value being repre-
sented, rather than that same value being optimised in its relationship to other 
impacted values. The value at issue does not necessarily become hierarchically 
higher.
Take the example of WTO law. If the interest to be represented is trade, a 
panel may be content to simply compare whether a particular trade-restrictive 
measure for public health purposes could also be replaced by less trade-restric-
tive alternatives. If no such alternative is brought up, the measure will pass 
review even though it does perhaps not represent the optimal ratio between 
trade and public health. If a high degree of public health protection is sought, 
there may even be virtually no alternatives, which means that the interest of 
trade is somewhat disadvantaged in comparison to the interest of public health.
At the same time, based on our previous discussion of proportionality analy-
sis and exclusionary reasons, we do not think that proportionality analysis can 
be fully excluded. Even under a special interest review model, adjudicators could 
thus argue that they will engage in full proportionality analysis because it is the 
only way to prevent non-representation of the value at issue. Still, this is likely to 
be the case less often, and often also accompanied by a less intrusive standard of 
review.
The values to be protected under the procedural democracy doctrine are thus 
central to the pre-balancing that we have proposed. However, other elements 
of the setting of judicial review are also of relevance, as they shed light on the 
values that judicial review seems to be actually about in a particular setting of 
judicial review. At this point, the assessment also needs to take into account 
empirical knowledge about legal regimes in order to better understand the 
normative arguments to be made about the values that are protected by judicial 
review.
 vi.  Normative arguments and empirical elements and the 
pre-balancing exercise
If we want to examine the use of proportionality analysis by 
different adjudicators in the subsequent comparative studies through the lens 
of pre-balancing, it is indispensable to gain a thorough understanding of the 
functionality of a particular legal regime. Judicial review is an expression of 
normative substantive values and institutional choices, all of which must be 
understood for this purpose.
To assess the values that seem to be protected by judicial review in a particu-
lar legal regime, we could simply look at legal texts. A constitution would thus 
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have a high likelihood of qualifying for the model of equal representation 
review. International treaties like a bilateral investment treaty or the WTO 
covered agreements would probably look more like a representation of one 
particular interest, therefore qualifying for the model of special interest review. 
However, arguably such a look at mere legal materials is insufficient. There has 
been a broad academic debate on ‘constitutionalisation’ of various regimes of 
international law,326 which suggests a reading of such regimes along the lines 
of domestic constitutional law and could also mean that a broader range of 
interests is to be represented in such international legal regimes. Consequently, 
rather than advocating a rather simplistic divide between domestic constitu-
tional legal regimes and others, we examine legal regimes with their broader 
context of judicial review to establish whether they qualify for one or the other of 
the two models.
A number of contextual factors play a role in helping us to understand the 
values judicial review aims to protect throughout the democratic process of a 
legal regime. We consequently suggest that the context of the setting of judicial 
review must be examined concerning various elements, depending on which are 
considered most important to provide a clear picture. The contextual features of 
judicial review are, of course, innumerable. We could take into account historical 
development. As an example, the WTO Appellate Body is perceived as the end 
point of a development of increasing judicialisation of GATT dispute settlement, 
and compared by some to a constitutional court in its powers. Should this lead 
us to assume that it belongs to a model of equal representation review? Another 
possible feature are institutional characteristics. Institutionally, arbitral tribu-
nals are ad hoc bodies whose members do not enjoy tenure comparable to judges 
in a constitutional court and who typically are experts only in the limited field 
of investment law and arbitration. Should this point towards a model of more 
specialized review?
Arguably, these features help us to understand legal regimes and their 
underlying values more broadly than a mere look at legal texts. At the same 
time, we must keep them apart from the normative arguments relevant for the 
pre-balancing. The latter arguments are the values most relevant to protection 
by judicial review. For this reason, the subsequent comparative studies distin-
guish between the context of judicial review and the justification of judicial 
review, and examine each of them in separate sections.
While the potential number of features is thus unlimited, the following 
rough, non-exhaustive breakdown can be suggested and is also used for the 
subsequent comparative studies.
As a first group of factors, historical elements come into play. Constitutional 
courts in particular are often marked by the perception of their role as it has 
developed over the course of history. Over time, different values become central 
to protection by judicial review. This also introduces a somewhat dynamic 
326  See J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).
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element into the perspective on judicial review. As an example, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court was expressly introduced for the purpose of ensur-
ing the appropriate adjudication and protection of fundamental rights and other 
constitutional values.
Second, questions of constitutional adjudication and political economy play a 
role. Courts and tribunals may perceive their role under judicial review as the 
ultimate interpretative authority. A classic example would be the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, which accordingly developed an approach that is at least 
very consistent in the form of the ‘principle of proportionality’ across the various 
fields of its activity. By contrast, adjudicators may see themselves not so much 
as constitutional adjudicators, but rather as dispute settlement bodies limited 
in their role and thus in their review competence, as the example of arbitral 
tribunals in international investment law suggests. An influential factor at this 
level is the chosen form of judicial review.327 Review can operate in a centralized 
or decentralized manner, concrete or abstract, and judgments rendered under 
judicial review can have different effects.328 There is also an influence of this 
political economy of judicial review on the underlying values and the justifica-
tion of their protection through judicial review, as will be shown.
Third, institutional factors are highly relevant. The composition of courts and 
tribunals, including questions of the tenure of judges is relevant. International 
judges may feel less competent in adjudicating an intrusive form of proportion-
ality analysis if they are not familiar with the domestic socio-economic context 
327  There is a wide range of views on the appropriate design of judicial review and the legitimate function 
of courts. Views vary as different emphasis is put on several central arguments, which mirror the proce-
dural democracy doctrine’s findings: the importance of entrusting democratically elected bodies with 
decisions, the appropriateness of judicial protection of fundamental and minority rights, the danger of 
a powerful judicial branch, the need to ensure procedural conditions of democratic legitimacy through 
adjudication and so forth, see E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Constitutional Theories of International Economic 
Adjudication and Investor-State Arbitration’ in P.-M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), 
Human rights in international investment law and arbitration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
181.
328  Generally, several types of judicial review can be distinguished based on some central features. Central-
ized review means that only one specialized court may overrule legislation, whereas in a system of 
decentralized review any court is able to do so. Concrete judicial review requires a specific case to review 
a law or administrative act against the relevant benchmark, while abstract review is not dependent on 
a case. A judgment in judicial review may have effects only inter partes or erga omnes. Even temporal 
elements can be used for distinction: Judicial review may occur before a law enters into force or ex 
post; the effects of a judgment may be purely ex nunc, i.e. for the future, or apply retroactively ex tunc. 
For an overview see A.-R. Brewer-Carías, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 91 ff. Furthermore, one can also distinguish between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms 
of judicial review: Weak forms do not have immediate legal effects such as striking down laws, but 
allow adaptation and also ultimately overruling of a court decision, while strong forms put the court in 
a position as ultimate authority. See M. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights – Judicial Review and Social 
Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 25-33.
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including the appreciation of certain values. Specialisation of adjudicators may 
also add to institutional factors pointing towards a model of special interest 
review if there seems to be a particular ‘bias’, e.g. in the case of the WTO Appel-
late Body as a ‘trade court’.329
This broader context should aid in understanding which values a legal 
regime purports to protect, i.e. under which model of review the outcome of 
the pre-balancing seems to fall. The normative character of the pre-balancing 
exercise also enables us as commentators to both suggest our own solution and 
contrast it with the solution found by the pertinent adjudicators.
Summing up, in order to ascertain whether a setting of judicial review 
should be ascribed to the model of equal representation review or of special 
interest review, we need to look at the broader context of history, political econ-
omy and institutional elements and can use the results to inform our discussion 
of the justification of review in the pre-balancing exercise, which again is based 
on our findings on the procedural democracy doctrine. This latter assessment 
should enable us to assess and criticize the actual approach to proportionality 
analysis taken by a particular adjudicator.
 C Conclusion
This section has focused in detail on the link between propor-
tionality analysis and judicial review in order to prepare the conceptual ground 
for the subsequent comparative studies. Examining proportionality analysis as 
such, we have observed that it contains the potential to provide for equal rep-
resentation of claims. At the same time, however, its application often requires 
difficult moral argumentation and is therefore contested. Its use empowers 
adjudicators to weigh directly the values underlying legal norms. This important 
power given by proportionality analysis must thus be appropriately justified.
The Principles Theory’s account of formal principles has been examined, but 
not found to be sufficiently comprehensive. Other proponents or sympathizers 
of the theory have, however, offered useful accounts: the use of principal-agent 
theory has led to the development of the ‘trustee courts’ concept, and the idea of 
a right to justification has provided an underlying rationale for judicial review as 
a sort of right to contest irrational legislation. Still, Klatt, Schmidt and Meister 
have suggested useful first steps out of the dilemma of adequate representa-
tion of the multiple versions of proportionality analysis found in adjudicative 
practice: They split up the Law of Balancing and establish a review level which is 
separated from the level of balancing where substantive weighing of values takes 
place.
Taking an additional step, we suggest that there is a pre-balancing exercise 
adjudicators undertake to decide how they are going to use proportionality 
analysis. Models of judicial review are the tool to schematise typical outcomes 
of this pre-balancing. A model of equal representation supports extensive use 
329  See on this point already section II.A.i.c.
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of full-scale proportionality analysis because the latter furthers representation 
of arguments at an a priori equal stage. Other settings of judicial review may, 
however, correspond more to a model of special interest review, where one value 
is the central reason for the very existence of judicial review. In such a system, 
proportionality analysis does not play the same role. However, it still should 
not be rejected, but should rather be used with a more pronounced reliance on 
the early stages of suitability and necessity and less reliance on proportionality 
stricto sensu.
The arguments to be weighed during pre-balancing are best explained on 
the basis of the procedural democracy doctrine. Judicial review is justified to 
different degrees by specific values’ being neglected in the democratic decision-
making process; a neglect which review purports to remedy. Discussing these 
values, weighing them as arguments, enables us to conceptualize the weigh-
ing adjudicators should undertake. To fully assess what values judicial review 
is about in a particular legal regime, we need to look beyond the legal texts and 
also assess the broader context, which includes historical, politico-economic 
and institutional features of judicial review. These non-normative elements are 
needed to engage in a more informed pre-balancing discussion of the actual 
values at issue. The subsequent comparative studies thus try to keep these two 
kinds of elements separated.
The stage is now basically set to embark on our comparative study. Neverthe-
less, there is still a need to set out the reasons for the choice of the legal regimes 
subject to comparative study. Also, the scheme of the individual chapters should 
be explained in the light of the theoretical findings so far.
 VI  The Structure for a Comparative Study on Proportionality 
Analysis and Judicial Review
Comparative studies on proportionality analysis are becoming 
ever more popular as a research topic. Earlier work has already identified some 
pitfalls of comparative studies in the field of proportionality analysis.330 There-
fore, to engage in a useful comparative study, the danger of terminological fuzzi-
ness must be remedied. This has been done in the present study by discussing 
in detail the denominations for sub-tests of proportionality analysis and propor-
tionality analysis itself.
The benefits of a comparative study for our purposes lie in the potential 
ability to explain the varying uses of proportionality analysis in various legal 
regimes in a systematic manner. With the help of the concepts of pre-balancing 
and of the two models of judicial review, it should become possible to discuss 
and compare all arguments at their appropriate level. It does not seem correct to 
observe diversity in the use of proportionality analysis through a lens of simpli-
fication and unification, which would necessarily lead us to suggest one-size-
330  See Bomhoff, 557.
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fits-all solutions and to criticize deviations as ‘wrong’ against the benchmark of 
one preferred model. Instead, the distinction of the two models of review and 
the splitting up of factors should lead us to an informed explanation of different 
uses of proportionality analysis, including criticism at the right level where inap-
propriate weight seems to have been given to some arguments.
For this purpose, we now set out the selection of the comparative studies 
and the structure of the comparative chapters that should help to put in clearer 
contrast the different approaches of proportionality analysis as applied in each 
legal regime.
 A The Choice of the Legal Regimes to be Compared
The choice of the objects of the comparative studies mainly fol-
lows the idea that a variety of situations of judicial review ought to be combined 
with a certain variety of value conflicts, so that the possible operation of pre-
balancing and the differences in outcomes in the form of the models of judicial 
review become more easily observable and can claim general usefulness beyond 
particular settings. In particular, we can examine the impact of different values 
enshrined in positive law on substantive proportionality analysis, but also on the 
level of judicial review. The value conflicts selected for comparison encompass 
classic situations of human rights conflicting with public interests, but also with 
other human rights.331 We use as examples norms of competence as well as the 
old conflict between regulatory autonomy and norms regulating trade, including 
in particular non-discrimination norms as enshrined in international economic 
law and partly in domestic constitutional law.332
Apart from diversity in the values in the adjudicated norms we also aim 
to include a variety of adjudicators and situations of judicial review to test the 
claim that the two-model distinction does not operate along the lines of domes-
tic constitutional versus international law; instead, some regimes fall into one 
category independent of their domestic or international character. Thus, the 
comparative studies include specialized courts333 and general supreme courts,334 
international335 and domestic courts, permanent courts and arbitral tribunals336 
all operating in institutional settings with varying degrees of embeddedness in 
a legal regime and varying degrees of intensity of their judicial powers.
For this purpose, based on the framework of pre-balancing and the two 
models of judicial review we examine the use of proportionality analysis in the 
331  See the respective chapters on German and United States constitutional law, on European Union law 
and on the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
332  See the chapters on German and United States constitutional law, on European Union law, on WTO law 
and on international investment law.
333  E.g. the German Federal Constitutional Court.
334  E.g. the United States Supreme Court or the Court of Justice of the European Union.
335  E.g. the WTO Appellate Body or the European Court of Human Rights.
336  The arbitral tribunals operating in international investment law.
86
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
areas of German constitutional law, United States constitutional law, the law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Euro-
pean Union law, World Trade Organisation law and international investment 
law. The breadth of the study comes, of course, to some extent at the expense of 
its depth: it is not the objective of the study to present an exhaustive insight into 
each regime. Rather, we use typical examples and well-known cases to describe 
the use of proportionality analysis and also focus on predominant arguments at 
the three levels rather than presenting each regime of judicial review in every 
possible detail.
 B The Structure of the Comparative Chapters
In order to ensure comparability of the comparative chapters, 
a somewhat uniform structure is indispensable. At the level of sections all 
chapters depart from an examination of the broader context of judicial review. 
These elements enable us to receive a preliminary impression of what objectives 
judicial review seems to pursue, which can subsequently assist in discussing 
what values are actually the core objective of protection for judicial review in a 
particular legal regime. In practice, in this section some divergence in the focus 
on particular elements is useful in explaining the lines along which proportion-
ality analysis has developed in each legal regime.
The second section assesses the justification of judicial review in the light of 
the procedural democracy doctrine, as far as the latter can be ascertained in the 
various legal regimes. It thus aims to assemble the normative arguments as to 
what values are to be protected with what intensity by judicial review.
Once the theoretical normative benchmarks have thus been set by this 
preliminary pre-balancing, a third section then confronts theory with reality. We 
assess a number of typical cases and the doctrinal debate in order to show how 
proportionality is actually applied.
Eventually, we evaluate and, where appropriate, criticize the use of propor-
tionality analysis. At various points, we benefit from our comparative focus and 
are able to suggest a look into other legal regimes for alternative solutions which 
seem to better reconcile the suggestions developed in the pre-balancing of the 
second section.
 VII Conclusion
The theoretical ground should now be well prepared for the 
construction of the comparative studies.
We have started off with a discussion of proportionality itself with the double 
aim of clarifying and establishing the terminology and describing the difficul-
ties of adjudicating proportionality analysis. Proportionality analysis offers the 
advantage of equal representation of claims and arguments, but at the same 
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time implies moral argumentation as a difficulty of adjudication. Adjudica-
tors may be subject to reproaches of judicial activism and judicial law-making 
because they are empowered by proportionality analysis to balance the underly-
ing values freely.
Proportionality analysis therefore requires a solid conceptual justification. 
For this purpose, we have first assessed the Principles Theory and its offer of 
the balancing-subsumption opposition as a justification: substantially, it claims 
that at the norm-theoretic level, we can distinguish strictly between rules and 
principles. The norm structure of principles justifies the use of proportionality 
analysis. However, the division thesis seems difficult to sustain at this level.
Aiming for a deeper understanding, we continued our exploration at the 
level of argumentation theory. It became clear that proportionality analysis and 
the balancing it involves replicates the balancing of reasons for action in practi-
cal reasoning. Opposition to the omnipresence of balancing in practical reason-
ing has formed under Raz’ concept of exclusionary reasons: some reasons would 
thus exclude balancing by excluding other reasons. If that claim is accepted, 
rules such as positive law can exclude balancing of underlying values. There are, 
however, conceptual difficulties with the account of excluded reasons, in partic-
ular since even for the process of excluding reasons a certain pre-balancing of 
exclusionary force is required and the a priori decision of exclusionary force 
would require an external point of view that a rational decision-maker cannot 
simply assume. In our view, this pre-balancing exercise of weighing is where 
adjudicators decide to what extent they will grant exclusionary force to positive 
law or decide to engage in proportionality analysis.
It is at this point that the connection to judicial review is established. Conse-
quently, we have to explain the effects of this pre-balancing exercise and the 
factors which play a role in it. To explain the effects on the use of proportionality 
analysis, we have designed two models as typical outcomes. The elements to be 
weighed are the values and the importance given to their protection as the justi-
fication of judicial review, as the findings of the procedural democracy doctrine 
suggests. For a more informed discussion, it is, however, also indispensable to 
discuss the broader, non-normative context of judicial review, in particular the 
historical development, political economy and institutional setting of judicial 
review in each legal regime. We therefore discuss these features in the first 
section of every chapter, using them as valuable information for a more thor-
ough discussion of the values to be protected under judicial review in the second 
section. Suggesting our own pre-balancing, we can then contrast our outcome 
and the model that we assign to it with the actual way in which proportionality 
analysis was used by an adjudicator.
In the case of the equal representation model, judicial review aims for the 
full representation and balance between all values. Extensive use of proportion-
ality analysis is thus justified. In the second case of a model of special interest 
representation, the setting points more towards scrutiny in the light of one 
particular value, so that tests differing from proportionality analysis are more 
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appropriate. Proportionality analysis is not excluded, but used less often. The 
main benefit of these models is a simplification to describe our findings more 
succinctly, while in practice the weighing of arguments is, of course, different in 
the context of each legal regime examined.
Based on a unified structure for the comparative chapters, we are now well 
equipped to depart on the comparative journey. As soon becomes clear, the 
outcomes of pre-balancing and their ordering under the two models do not, as 
one might expect, run along the lines of domestic constitutional and interna-
tional law, but rather separate various settings of judicial review from others 
without such obvious boundaries.
German Constitutional Law
chapter 3
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 I Introduction
While it is difficult to speak of an ‘inventor’ of proportional-
ity analysis, the most elaborate pedigree for the development of proportionality 
analysis can certainly be ascribed to German constitutional law. It is also in this 
light that historical insights are examined with particular emphasis in this sec-
tion.
These historical insights demonstrate that judicial review and the codifica-
tion of fundamental rights emerged at a late stage in German constitutional 
law, after long political struggles. As a result, the Federal Constitutional Court 
is a particularly strong institution, which facilitates the use of proportionality 
analysis, should a model of equal representation result from pre-balancing. The 
predominant status of constitutional adjudication has also been confirmed by 
doctrinal discussion, which criticized the principle of proportionality as the 
central legal test as sometimes inappropriate, but recognized it nonetheless as a 
structuring feature of the system of the Basic Law. With this favourable context 
of judicial review, we turn to the justification of judicial review in a pre-balanc-
ing exercise.
The strength of the authority of the Federal Constitutional Court has 
led to less emphasis on the debate on the procedural democracy doctrine. 
Consequently, we discover an unsatisfactory mixture of debates on the appro-
priateness of proportionality analysis and the appropriate standard of review. 
Generally, German constitutional law seems appropriate for a model of equal 
representation, as it aims to appropriately reconcile constitutional values such 
as fundamental rights with public interests. The principle of proportionality 
has been used as a fairly consistent legal test across a variety of potential topics 
in fundamental rights adjudication. In a number of fields, however, the Court 
refrains from using the principle of proportionality even though it could operate 
usefully, while a more deferent standard of review could arguably have taken 
into consideration the perceived over-intrusiveness of full-scale proportionality 
analysis.
Only in one instance does the Court seem to deviate from the model of equal 
representation review: When indirect horizontal effect is given to fundamental 
rights in private law disputes, the Court – correctly in our eyes – perceives the 
role of private law courts as following a special interest review model, in this 
case of the value of private autonomy, which already incorporates a balance of 
interests. The Court thus only intervenes with deferent use of proportionality 
analysis, thereby adapting its model of review.
We thus start off with an overview of the broader context of judicial review, 
focusing in particular on the historical developments that have led to the estab-
lishment of the Federal Constitutional Court as such a powerful judiciary. The 
subsequent discussion on the justification of judicial review and the procedural 
democracy doctrine shows the above mentioned mixture of levels of debate and 
the resulting confusion. Next, we briefly assess the principle of proportional-
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ity as a consistent judicial practice, before concluding with an outlook towards 
United States constitutional law.
 II  The Broader Context of Judicial Review in German 
Constitutional Law
In assessing the broader context of judicial review, history 
plays a central role in a legal regime as old as German constitutional law. In this 
section, we therefore discuss first how we can classify judicial review as exer-
cised by the Federal Constitutional Court today as the consequence of historical 
developments. Both the creation of systematic judicial review and the introduc-
tion and protection of fundamental rights are the results of a protracted political 
struggle, which eventually gained huge momentum after the horrors of the Nazi 
dictatorship. The newly created Federal Constitutional Court’s adjudication on 
the basis of Basic Law (Grundgesetz)1 and its catalogue of fundamental rights are 
a consequence of the perceived need to ensure appropriate representation of a 
variety of values and the protection of minorities in the democratic process.
This conclusion is reinforced by looking at the constitutional debate on 
proportionality, which perceives the latter as an indispensable, structural 
element of the Basic Law. Institutional aspects of the Federal Constitutional 
Court show that it is primarily vested with representativeness in its features, 
facilitating the use of proportionality analysis.
Concluding thus that the context of judicial review in German constitutional 
law could offer an appropriate setting for a model of equal representation review, 
we then turn to the debate on the justification of judicial review and the proce-
dural democracy doctrine to discuss pre-balancing as it could be undertaken by 
the Federal Constitutional Court.
 A  Historical Insights: The Development of Judicial Review 
and Fundamental Rights in German Constitutional Law
In the subsequent section, we note a marked change in the per-
ception of the State and its objectives as the basis of the construction of compre-
hensive judicial review based on the Basic Law after the Second World War. We 
first discuss the slow institutionalisation of judicial review, before then turning 
to fundamental rights and the use of proportionality analysis and similar tests. 
Historically, the somewhat sluggish progress on both fronts gives way to the 
institutional leap after the Second World War; a war before and during which all 
democratic institutions had so fatally failed. During this leap, we see the emer-
gence of a powerful judiciary apt to adjudicate constitutional claims on a broad 
variety of norms – among them a broad catalogue of fundamental rights.
1  All subsequent English quotes from the Basic Law are based on the translation offered by the German 
Parliament, see https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf (accessed on 6 March 2012).
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 i. The historical development of judicial review
Until the 20th century, the institutions of judicial review grew 
only slowly. Centrally, administrative review acted for a long time as a supple-
ment to constitutional review. While Weimar saw first developments of judicial 
review by higher courts, only the Federal Constitutional Court fulfilled the 
promise of fully fledged judicial review.
a.  Administrative review as a precursor of constitutional review
One starting point of judicial review was the system of administrative 
courts.2 Judicial review therefore started most prominently as administrative 
review before moving to constitutional review.
Generally, the 19th century knew no particular predominance of constitu-
tional law, the latter – like general legislation – emanating from the sovereign’s 
will. Also, the newly found trust in parliaments was difficult to reconcile with 
the awarding of a competence for difficult, highly political legal decisions to 
judges. Vigorous academic debate arose over the question of whether the concept 
of the separation of powers binds a judge to the words of a validly proclaimed 
statute or whether, inversely, such a statute requires a judge to verify its validity.3
Despite this debate, some precursors of constitutional review emerged. 
The Constitution of St. Paul’s Church, for example, had provided for a system 
of constitutional review including a power for abstract review of legislation. 
In practice, however, this legal text failed to enter into force and the procedure 
therefore never had any true impact.4 The subsequent constitution put in place 
under Bismarck knew neither a catalogue of fundamental rights nor constitu-
tional review.5
The intervention of administrative courts can thus be understood against 
the background of a lack of appropriate review of the State’s potential intrusions 
into the sphere of the individual’s liberty. Administrative courts intervened and 
developed review of administrative action as an alternative.
Politically, the introduction of administrative review first met with resistance 
from conservative forces. Liberal forces advocated such a reform of administra-
tive justice as an auxiliary means to control the executive power, because the 
parliament appeared unwilling to do so as a consequence of the reactionary 
views held by the majority of its members. However, eventually even conserva-
2  R. v Krauss, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit in seiner Bedeutung für die Notwendigkeit des Mittels 
im Verwaltungsrecht (Hamburg: Kommissionsverlag Ludwig Appel, 1955), 3.
3  K. Schlaich and S. Korioth, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht – Stellung, Verfahren, Entscheidungen (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 2010), 78 para 116.
4  A. Hopfauf, ‘Zuständigkeit des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ in B. Schmidt-Bleibtreu and others (eds.), 
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz 12 edn (Neuwied: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2011), 1887 para 7.
5  U. Scheuner, ‘Überlieferung der deutschen Staatsgerichtsbarkeit’ in C. Starck (ed.) Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht und Grundgesetz: Festgabe aus Anlass des 25jährigen Bestehens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1976), 41.
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tive forces supported the reform because it implemented a formalistic, process-
based vision of liberalism which could be reconciled with their own views.6
Newly created administrative courts thus began to review administrative 
decisions as to whether they were appropriately based on the law. As the most 
prominent and prolific actor, the Prussian Supreme Administrative Law Court 
established in 1875 soon began to elaborate a range of principles of administra-
tive law in its case law.7 However, even judges themselves initially had difficul-
ties with the task of administrative review entrusted to them. The Kreuzberg 
decision can be cited as one of the earliest and most central references to a legal 
test close to necessity. It simultaneously contains some remarks on administra-
tive review. The Court uttered doubts in an obiter dictum about the competence 
of the administrative judge to examine the relationship between ends and 
means of administrative action.8
Despite such doubts, the system of administrative courts generally helped 
to strengthen the idea that the exercise public power should be reviewed by the 
judiciary. At the same time, review remained restricted to administrative acts, 
not laws, and the benchmark for review was mostly the underlying law. Over 
time, however, administrative review, developed into a ‘functional equivalent’ 
to later constitutional review.9 In some limited cases, the administrative courts 
could review an administrative act against guarantees drawn from constitutional 
law such as property rights and individual freedoms enshrined in Prussia’s 1850 
Constitution. At least implicitly, the underlying law could therefore be measured 
against constitutional law.10 Arguments drawing on constitutional law and the 
rights enshrined therein generally became more and more common during the 
early 20th century.11
b. Constitutional Review in the Weimar Republic
The 1918 revolution and the emergence of the Weimar Republic changed 
the legal situation dramatically. The new republican constitution created a shift 
of power to the parliament and a catalogue of fundamental rights. The text, 
however, contained no basis for constitutional review of federal laws.12 Still, 
6  K.F. Ledford, ‘Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Law Court, 1876-
1914’ (2004) 37 Central European History 203, 223.
7  See Ibid., 212-214, for an overview of the establishment and work of the Supreme Administrative Court.
8  Kreuzberg Entscheidung, Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht 1882, Volume 9, 353 ff , 378. See closer on 
the case section II.A.ii.c.
9  M. Stolleis, ‘Judicial Review, Administrative Review, and Constitutional Review in the Weimar Repub-
lic’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 266, 270.
10  Ibid., 270 footnote 8.
11  See for example the overview of cases concerning the use of the Polish language by the Polish minority 
in Eastern Prussia in Ledford, 218.
12  For a detailed account of the pertinent provisions of the Weimar Constitution and the scholarly debate 
see B.J. Hartmann, ‘The Arrival of Judicial Review in Germany under the Weimar Constitution of 1919’ 
(2003-2004) 18 Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 107, 114-119.
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an intense debate soon broke out on the topic. Left-wing political forces, while 
generally in favour of the new constitution, opposed such constitutional review 
as weakening the parliament’s power. Right-wing forces, by contrast, advocated 
review because they saw in it a safeguard against a perceived left-wing rule by 
the parliament.13 Among legal scholars, anti-positivists generally spoke out in 
favour of constitutional review, while positivists were against it.14 However, the 
lines were not quite so clearly drawn: Kelsen as a positivist also advocated such 
review. In Kelsen’s view, only a body other than parliament could be entrusted to 
review general laws as to their compatibility with higher-ranking constitutional 
law. The creation of a constitutional court neither thwarted the sovereignty of 
parliament nor violated the separation of powers, because the claim that laws 
comply with the constitution was not in any way different from the general 
claim of legality, i.e. that judicial and administrative activity comply with the 
laws. Furthermore, the fact that a constitutional court would possess legislative 
powers – at least as a ‘negative’ legislator – gave expression, in Kelsen’s view, to 
a division of legislative power and ought not to be perceived as a breach of the 
separation of powers.15
Courts finally settled the issue. After some initial hesitation by the Reichsger-
icht16other courts such as the Reichsfinanzhof17 and the Reichsversorgungsgericht18 
spoke out in favour of judicial review of laws against the benchmark of the 
Constitution. The Reichsgericht followed in a decision in 1925 and took for itself 
the power of verifying whether legislation complied with the Constitution.19 
However, the decision was not to have much practical impact, as the following 
years saw the failure of the law which had been suggested to formalize consti-
tutional review. Afterwards, the massive use of executive emergency decrees 
substantially deprived parliament of most of its power in the early 1930s. Judi-
cial review became a non-issue as a consequence.20
c.  The Basic Law and the creation of the Federal Constitutional Court
A new era began with the Basic Law, as it fundamentally enshrined the idea 
of a democracy capable of defending itself against those misusing the system 
to abolish democracy. As a consequence, the primacy of constitutional law was 
13  Stolleis, 271.
14  For an instructive account of the 1926 meeting of the prestigious association of German State law 
scholars (Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer) which sparked the debate on judicial review see M. 
Friedrich, Geschichte der deutschen Staatsrechtswissenschaft (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), 324.
15  H. Kelsen, ‘Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit’ (1929) 5 Veröffentlichungen der Vereini-
gung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (Verhandlungen der Tagung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer zu Wien 
am 23 und 24 April 1928) 30, 53-54.
16  The federal Supreme Court for criminal and civil matters.
17  Supreme Court of fiscal jurisdiction.
18  Supreme Court for matters of public officials’ benefits.
19  Hartmann, 124.
20  Ibid., 126-127.
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secured more extensively than previously and a strong constitutional judiciary 
was established.21 The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 
was thus established as the ‘guardian of the constitution’.22
Summing up, the historical development is thus marked by a slow start 
leading via the somewhat circuitous route of administrative review towards true 
constitutional review. At the crossroads of the Weimar Constitution, the topic of 
judges striking down legislative decisions provoked an intense debate. Interest-
ingly, even individual positivist voices agreed with the idea of judicial review. 
The failure of the Weimar institutions then led to the introduction of a special-
ized court with the main task of safeguarding the interpretation and priority of 
the new Basic Law and its central values. 23 In light of this history, the relative 
ease with which the Federal Constitutional Court was able to impose influential 
developments in its case law – the Lüth decision being but one crucial example 
– is remarkable in comparison to other high courts that faced much stronger 
opposition such as the United States Supreme Court.24 The Court was thus also 
able to follow through with its vision of the principle of proportionality in its 
case law, which has led to a remarkably unified vision of the test in the case law 
and of the doctrine at large.
 ii. The historical development of fundamental rights
The historical development of fundamental rights describes 
changing perceptions of the State which eventually – after the democratic break-
down of the Weimar Republic and the subsequent national-socialist dictatorship 
– resulted in a paradigmatic shift that gave rise to the spread of the ‘principle of 
proportionality’. The present account shows that the introduction and codifica-
tion of fundamental rights was intertwined with the development of earlier 
forms of proportionality analysis, which shows an increasing need for better rep-
resentation of neglected values. The culmination is the introduction of the Basic 
Law and the subsequent coming of age of the principle of proportionality in the 
Federal Constitutional Court’s case law; the latter therefore being somewhat of 
an organically evolved consequence of earlier experience in fundamental rights 
review.
a.  Natural law thinking in the 17th century and the objective of the State
The very idea of fundamental rights as protection against the State could 
only come from changes in the perception of the State as such. During the 
middle ages, the perception of law as the expression of divine will for order had 
prevailed for many natural law scholars.25 In the 17th century, however, Grotius 
21  Hopfauf, 1888 para 9.
22  ‘Hüter der Verfassung’, see for an early reference a case in 1952 BVerfGE 1, 184 (195 ff.).
23  Hopfauf, 1888 para 10.
24  See chapter 4 section II.A.
25  See e.g. on the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas H. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit 4 
edn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 58.
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argued that the limitations of law were to be derived from human reason instead 
of divine will.26 Such an understanding raised the question of the foundations of 
exercise of public power by the State.
In parallel, contractual conceptions of the relationship between the State and 
the individual had developed. Pufendorf, the first holder of a chair of natural 
law in Germany, perceived all human beings as initially free. In order to protect 
themselves, they came together in communities and concluded a mutually 
binding contract as a society. By means of a further contract they subjected 
themselves to the State. Consequently, the authority of the ruler of the State was 
not only founded on this second contract, but also limited by it.27 This limitation 
was, however, not yet perceived as central to explaining the exercise of public 
power because the main purpose of the exercise of State authority remained 
external security, rather than the happiness of the individual.28
Wolff developed an understanding of the State which focused on its purpose 
of ensuring common welfare. Humans should strive for perfection, as a duty 
towards themselves, other humans and God. This obligation gave rise to rights 
to be able to perform the obligation. The creation of the State was the act of 
human beings who, individually, would have been incapable of achieving the 
objective. Consequently, the State’s overall objective had to be the furtherance of 
the common welfare; common welfare was, however, perceived as being identi-
cal with the welfare of the individual.29
As a consequence of such natural law thinking, the idea of the limitation 
of the sovereign’s power flourished, as scholars inquired both into the limits 
of the State’s action and the remaining liberty of the individual. Conceptually 
based on the natural law tenet of pacta sunt servanda the liberty of the individual 
could only be restrained by the State for the purpose of furthering the common 
welfare.30
b.  The Allgemeines Landrecht and the changing perception of the State’s objective
The set-up of the institutions and practice of law began to be influenced by 
these thoughts in the late eighteenth century. Prussia’s transformation from 
authoritative rule towards a more law-based system –  i.e. the emergence of a 
Rechtsstaat – provided a suitable scene for reflection on limitations of the public 
power such as through fundamental rights. At that time, Friedrich the Great 
ruled the country guided by the ideas of enlightened absolutism, which included 
26  H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres : in quibus ius naturae & Gentium: item iuris publici praecipua 
explicantur (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 2006), Vorrede Nr. 11.
27  S. v Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo (Leipzig 1688) (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 
chapter II para 7.
28  Ibid., chapter II para 13.
29  C. Wolff, Jus naturae (1740-1748) (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1968-1972), part I chapter I para 23.
30  S. Heinsohn, Der öffentlichrechtliche Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit – Historische Ursprünge im 
deutschen Recht, Übernahme in das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften sowie Entwicklungen im franzö-
sischen und im englischen Recht (Münster: Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, 1997), 9.
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the idea that the monarch should use his power as the servant of his state.31 
Scholars, in particular in the field of police law (Polizeirecht), took up the State 
concepts of natural law. Police law at the time encompassed most interventions 
by the state in society for purposes of public welfare and public morals. Justi 
disengaged himself from the prevailing views which equated common welfare 
as an objective with the welfare of the individual. Instead, he gave more prefer-
ence to the individual and family as influential factors for the wellbeing of a 
State as a whole.32 As a consequence, in his writings he emphasized the need 
for police laws to be strictly directed towards a purpose. In stronger terms than 
other scholars he demanded that these laws as means had to be suitable for the 
ends pursued. The judgment upon this question of suitability was, however, left 
to the sovereign.33
Friedrich the Great’s endeavours to modernize the Prussian state resulted in 
the vastest effort of legal codification of that time, the Allgemeines Landrecht. The 
previously discussed ideas found entry into the legal texts of the Landrecht.
Next to Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer and Ernst Ferdinand Klein, 
Carl Gottlieb Svarez was one of the main drafters34 of the Landrecht which 
encompassed civil law, criminal law and other rules of public law. In his earlier 
work, he had already endorsed contractual approaches to the relationship 
between the individual and the State. In particular in his lectures to the crown 
princes, which were intended to prepare the latter to rule, he taught that individ-
uals had given up part of their natural freedom to achieve ‘common happiness’ 
in a State, but that this contract not only legitimized the State, but also drew the 
boundaries of its actions.35 To settle the dilemma between public authority and 
individual freedom, he identified in his lectures an early form of proportionality 
analysis, according to which in case of doubt the freedom of the individual as a 
sort of fundamental right prevailed in a balancing exercise. Still, these prescrip-
tions were addressed as guidance for the sovereign in exercising his power and 
could not yet be read as binding legal rules; neither did Svarez think of rights of 
the individual which could be enforced before courts.36
In its codification the Allgemeine Landrecht followed the ideal of high deter-
minateness of the law and intended to repel judicial lawmaking by means of 
31  M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, ‘American balancing and German proportionality: The historical origins’ 
(2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 263, 271.
32  J.H.G. v Justi, Natur und Wesen der Staaten als die Quelle aller Regierungswissenschaften und Gesetze 
(Mitau, 1771) (Aalen: Scientia, 1969 ), para 19.
33  Ibid., paras 33 and 39.
34  For a detailed account of the three drafters see M. Albrecht, Die Methode der preußischen Richter in der 
Anwendung des Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrechts von 1794 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005), 
55-58.
35  A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73, 99.
36  Heinsohn, 25.
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legislative precision.37 Consequently, Svarez also put his early conception of 
limits on the power of the State in the text of the codification in the form of 
paragraph 10 second part 17th title:
‘It is the task of the police to take the necessary measures to maintain public 
peace, security and order and to prevent imminent danger for the public or its 
individual members.’38
Some have read this early provision as a complement to the German Rechtsstaat 
idea: State action would thus always have to be based on an explicit permission 
by a written legal rule.39 Based on the rule of the Rechtstaat, a State could only 
act based on permission; there was thus a strict limitation on the cases in which 
it could be permitted to act at all by prescribing a necessary link to a public 
objective for the subsequent intrusion into individual freedom.
However, a closer reading of the drafting process of the Allgemeines 
Landrecht casts doubts on such a straightforward understanding of the provi-
sion. An earlier version of the codification still contained an understanding of 
the State and its police powers which was much more focused on the pursuit of 
public welfare.40 With such a broad vision of police as the general furtherance 
of public welfare, written rules on the limitation of the State’s interventionist 
powers could hardly be understood as effective if the State’s very purpose was to 
be understood in such a broad and necessarily interventionist manner.
The explicit purpose of furthering public welfare was subsequently deleted 
because of fears based on the experience of the French revolution: discontent 
citizens could have based claims for revolt on such provisions.41 While some 
concrete provisions were deleted or amended, we can legitimately assume 
that the overall purpose of the Allgemeines Landrecht proclaimed in 1794 
still contained a concept of the State based on the general purpose of public 
welfare.42
37  Albrecht, 75.
38  Title 17, first section, §10 Allgemeines Landrecht: ‘Die nöthigen Anstalten zur Erhaltung der öffentlichen 
Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung, und zur Abwendung der dem Publico, oder einzelnen Mitgliedern 
desselben, bevorstehenden Gefahr zu treffen, ist das Amt der Polizey.’ (author’s translation).
39  For a differentiation from the more natural rights centred concept of the rule of law see Cohen-Eliya and 
Porat, 271 footnote 31. In their view, the notion of Rechtsstaat gives a much more central role to the State. 
There are, however, also competing views, see for an overview Ledford, 206-207.
40  See articles 77 and 79 of the Allgemeines Gesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten (1791). See also the 
precursor provision of paragraph 10 second part 17th title, paragraph 8 title 5 section III of part 1 of the 
Allgemeines Gesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten.
41  A. Schwennicke, Die Entstehung der Einleitung des Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrechts von 1794 (Frank-
furt amMain: Klostermann, 1993), 312 ff.
42  Heinsohn, 22.
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c.  19th century legal thinking and the emergence of fundamental rights and traces of 
proportionality analysis in the case law of the administrative courts
The Allgemeines Landrecht as a codification did not yet cause a paradig-
matic change in the perception of the function of police powers of the State. Its 
judicial application in early days bolsters this conclusion. 43 Only 19th century 
changes in legal and philosophical thinking led to a more limited role for police 
powers, the latter being confined predominantly to the prevention of dangers. 
As a general intellectual tendency, legal thinking moved from the earlier juris-
prudence of concepts (Begriffsjurisprudenz) towards a jurisprudence of interests 
(Interessenjurisprudenz) during the late 19th century and early 20th century.44 
The development of fundamental rights protection by means of proportionality 
analysis was certainly furthered by this change. However, even earlier a shift in 
the perception of what purpose the State should serve can be noted as a basis for 
the developments to come in the field of fundamental rights protection.
The changing perception of the State’s purpose can be traced back to the 
work of philosophers. Generally, the 19th century gave rise to a more critical 
attitude towards the faith in human reason as displayed by 18th century natural 
law thinking. Kant in particular argued that the purpose of the State had to be 
understood as the reconciliation of the freedoms with which individuals were 
born.45 Rather than furthering the overall welfare of the public, the State should 
thus promote the highest protection of individuals’ liberties. Based on such 
liberal thinking of the early 19th century, legal scholars developed more clas-
sic liberal conceptions of fundamental rights as a tool to prevent the state from 
unduly intervening in the sphere of freedom of the individual.
An important scholar, Günther Heinrich von Berg, expressly discussed the 
limits of police action. According to some views he was the first to speak of an 
obligation of proportionality for police action.46 In his opinion, police action 
could only restrict the natural freedom of individuals to the extent required by a 
legitimate purpose.47 Simultaneously, he continued to adhere to a rather broad 
view of the purpose of the State, according to which police powers encompassed 
both measures for public welfare and measures for public order, i.e. to prevent 
dangers. As a crucial difference to earlier legal thinking, however, he subordi-
43  Examining judges’ use of the norms of the Allgemeines Landrecht in the first years, Albrecht, 221, shows 
that judges tended to avoid their application altogether, falling back as often as possible on the known 
rules of the customary law of the time.
44  A. Barak, Proportionality – Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2012), 177.
45  I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten; mit einer Einleitung von Bernd Kraft (Hamburg: F. 
Meiner, 1999), second part, introduction VI.
46  K. Stern, ‘Zur Entstehung und Ableitung des Übermaßverbots’ in P. Badura and R. Scholz (eds.), Wege 
und Verfahren des Verfassungslebens: Festschrift für Peter Lerche zum 65 Geburtstag (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
1993), 168.
47  G.H. v Berg, Handbuch des Teutschen Policeyrechts (Hannover: Gebrüder Hahn, 1802-1809), Volume 1, 
89.
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nated public welfare to public order.48 Other scholars followed this tendency and 
paved the way for an ever stronger understanding of police powers as an exclu-
sively preventive concept.49 In early writings on the trade-off between public 
objectives and individual freedom, it was consequently suggested that the latter 
should prevail in case of doubt.50
The creation of a system of administrative courts51 eventually allowed 
adjudicative development of legal tests. These courts were regularly called to 
examine whether police action caused only proportionate intrusion into political 
and economic rights of individuals. In parallel, such rights were now enshrined 
in some of the constitutions of the Länder. Some early traces of proportionality 
analysis can be traced to this period, in particular in the case law of the Prussian 
Supreme Administrative Law Court.52
One well-known example is the Kreuzberg decision of 1882.53 A police ordi-
nance prohibited the construction of buildings in Berlin which could impede 
the view from and of the national monument on top of the Kreuzberg. A citizen 
filed a complaint after having been denied a building permission. The admin-
istration defended the ordinance as protecting ideal goods, in this case patriot-
ism. Finding no specific legal basis for the police’s action in this case,54 the 
Court used paragraph 10 second part 17th title of the Allgemeines Landrecht as 
the applicable provision. It distinguished between the task of furthering public 
welfare ascribed to the police and the limitation of police powers both enshrined 
in the provision.55 Based on the latter, the Court held that the regulation would 
have to be verified as to whether it was suitable to achieve the claimed objec-
tive and did not go beyond what was necessary. The Court seemed to expressly 
endorse a legal test close to suitability and necessity. However, it must be noted 
that the decision to strike down the ordinance was finally based on the lack of 
an appropriate legal basis, as it was not the business of the police to defend the 
interest of aesthetics and city planning.56
48  Heinsohn, 34.
49  See e.g. J.L. Klüber, Öffentliches Recht des teutschen Bundes und der Bundesstaaten (Frankfurt a.M: 
Andreäische Buchhandlung, 1817), para 381, who distinguishes between police for the purpose of public 
order as directly linked to the purpose of the State and welfare police which is only indirectly related to 
that purpose.
50  See e.g. F.F. v Mayer, Grundsätze des Verwaltungsrechts mit besonderer Rücksicht auf gemeinsames deutsches 
Recht, sowie auf neuere Gesetzgebung und bemerkenswerthe Entscheidungen der obersten Behörden zunächst 
der Königreiche Preußen, Baiern und Würthemberg (Tübingen 1862), 461-462.
51  See section II.A.i.a.
52  L. Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit (Göttingen: Otto Schwartz & Co., 1981), 3.
53  Kreuzberg Entscheidung .
54  Ibid., 370 ff.
55  Ibid., 376.
56  With some references to erroneous readings of the judgment Heinsohn, 56.
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Because of this, the judgment is read by some as no definite recognition 
of sub-tests of proportionality analysis in administrative review.57 Indeed, the 
subsequent case law appears divided: some rulings adopt such a similar legal 
test resembling tests of suitability and necessity while others perceive such 
intrusive review of police action as outside the administrative judge’s compe-
tence.58 The latter cases can also be understood as an expression of the often 
highly political nature of many legal disputes of the time, which concerned in 
particular prohibitions of assemblies or protests of social-democrats.59
The doctrine, however, took up the issue of proportionality analysis. 
Connecting proportionality with the activities of the police, Mayer found that 
no general law could be assumed to authorize police action beyond the natural 
threshold of proportionate prevention of dangers.60 In his work, only suitability 
and necessity appeared to be available tests.61
Some groundwork for the development of proportionality analysis as part of 
fundamental rights review was thus laid at the conceptual level as well as in the 
case law of the administrative courts. However, values of fundamental rights 
seemed to remain under-represented. Only the introduction of fundamental 
rights in the federal constitution and strengthened constitutional review paved 
the way on from these early stages.
d.  From administrative review to constitutional review: The Weimar Republic
In the early 20th century, case law of the Prussian as well as other Supreme 
Administrative Law Courts continued to use legal tests resembling subtests 
of proportionality analysis more and more frequently.62 Simultaneously, the 
doctrine added theoretical underpinning in administrative law before and after 
the First World War. Jellinek63 identified four sources of errors in police actions: 
He distinguished unsuitable, insufficient, harmful and overreaching action.64 
57  Doubtful Ibid., 41.
58  See for an extensive overview of the case law B. Remmert, Verfassungs- und verwaltungsrechtsgeschichtli-
che Grundlagen des Übermaßverbotes (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1995), 145 ff. The doctrine at that time 
distinguished between the theory of motive and the theory of necessity, see K. Friedrichs, ‚Notwendig-
keit und Zweckmäßigkeit einer polizeilichen Verfügung‘ (1909) 25 Preußisches Verwaltungsblatt 320. 
According to the first theory, administrative decisions could not be reviewed if they were based on a 
valid regulation. According to the second theory, such review was possible. It was used in particular in 
cases of overly broad prohibitions of specific behaviour.
59  See for an overview including the famous case about the theatre play ‘The Weavers’ Ledford, 219-220.
60  O. Mayer, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1895-1896), 267.
61  Hirschberg, 4.
62  Ibid., 4 footnote 20 with further references. See e.g. Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht 1904, Bd. 45, 
416 ff, 423-424.
63  For a concise discussion of Oskar von Arnstedt’s and Richard Thoma’s views as two other representa-
tives see Heinsohn, 54-55.
64  W. Jellinek, Verwaltungsrecht (Berlin: J. Springer, 1928), 432 ff. Jellinek refers back to Mayer, Svarez and 
von Berg to found his views on proportionality. He also coined the German term of Übermaß (excess).
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Overreaching action was explained in terms equivalent to a necessity test. Simi-
larly, Fleiner used the distinctive phrase that the police should not ‘use cannons 
to shoot sparrows’ to express that police action had to respect proportionality.65 It 
does not result clearly, however, whether Fleiner was already considering propor-
tionality analysis stricto sensu with this phrase. Necessity had thus strengthened 
its hold in adjudication and the related doctrine, at least as far as administrative 
law was concerned.
At the level of constitutional law, the Weimar Constitution contained a 
catalogue of fundamental rights. These ‘basic rights’ were initially only seen as 
political declarations. However, the pertinent section of the Weimar Constitu-
tion came swiftly to life in the 1923 political crisis which was mainly caused 
by inflation and the connected threat to private property.66 The very concept of 
basic rights was supported by a group of conservative, anti-parliamentarian and 
anti-positivist scholars who perceived it as a useful device to limit the powers of 
parliament.67
On the other hand, eminent scholars such as Kelsen, while accepting consti-
tutional review, rejected the concept of constitutional rights. In his view judges, 
in adjudicating such rights, would become positive lawmakers, acting based 
on a concept that could easily become a disguised entry point into the law for 
natural rights concepts.68
At the level of the case law, the newly established Reichsgericht had to back 
up its claim for substantial constitutional review. It seized the opportunity of a 
series of takings cases to strengthen its self-proclaimed power of judicial review 
by giving a strong position to property rights, although with limited practical 
impact.69 At the same time, the regional supreme administrative courts contin-
ued the tradition in the case law to protect individual rights in reviewing admin-
istrative acts.70 Proportionality analysis could arguably have played a central role 
in continuing to develop the jurisprudence of the Reichsgericht,71 but the Weimar 
Republic did not survive long enough.
Summing up, the early 20th century saw the liberal conception of the 
State gaining ground with fundamental rights being enshrined in the Weimar 
Constitution. The representation of the rights of individuals were perceived as 
sufficiently important to justify the expansion of judicial review powers. With 
65  F. Fleiner, Institutionen des deutschen Verwaltungsrechts (Tübingen 1928) 8 edn (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 
1963), 404.
66  Stolleis, 273.
67  Stone Sweet and Mathews, 104, cite Carl Schmitt as one example.
68  H. Kelsen, ‘La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution – La Justice Constitutionnelle’ (1928) 45 
Revue du droit public 197.
69  Stolleis, 272.
70  Ibid., 274. See also for references on academic debate involving proportionality analysis in the law of 
criminal procedure Hirschberg, 6-7.
71  Stone Sweet and Mathews, 104, argue in this direction comparing the situation to the Swiss Supreme 
Court which indeed took steps towards a proportionality stricto sensu test.
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the increasing weight of fundamental rights in the legal order, the use of propor-
tionality stricto sensu emerged after 1945.
e.  The coming of age of the principle of proportionality in the case law of the Federal 
Constitutional Court
Equipped with the comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights, in 
the early 1950s the Federal Constitutional Court began developing the classic 
four-pronged test of proportionality analysis. In a first decision on a compul-
sory quorum of signatures for small parties in a Land’s election law, the Court 
referred to the limits drawn by the principle of proportionality.72
The subsequent landmark case of 1958 was the Apothekenurteil. In this case 
the Federal Constitutional Court elaborated the need for a ‘balancing act’ (Abwä-
gung) between two competing social interests – in the present case, freedom of 
profession versus the proposed aim of limiting the number of pharmacies for 
the purpose of ensuring continuous high quality provision of medical supplies 
for the health of the public. The Court strongly emphasized the need to go 
beyond the constitutional text which only protected the ‘essence’ of fundamen-
tal rights73 for this purpose, then examined in great detail the public purpose 
brought forward by the Bavarian government – the alleged impossibility of 
remedying the perceived problem by other, less restrictive means – and finally 
found the law at issue in violation of the constitution.74
In subsequent case law, the Federal Constitutional Court continued to 
require the respect of the ‘principle of proportionality’ as soon as an interference 
by the State into the sphere protected by the fundamental rights of the Basic Law 
occurred.75
At about the same time, the doctrine also advanced comprehensive contri-
butions on the principle of proportionality. Rupprecht von Krauss analysed the 
principle’s role in administrative law. He established the notion of ‘proportional-
ity stricto sensu’ (Verhältnismäßigkeit im engeren Sinn) and clearly separated this 
test from necessity. Simultaneously, he laid down the need for a three-pronged 
test under the principle of proportionality, holding that a progression from 
suitability via necessity to proportionality stricto sensu was necessary. This need 
resulted from the fact that only after a necessity test could one specific measure 
be determined, which could then be subject to the weighing exercise of propor-
tionality stricto sensu.76
72  BVerfGE 3, 383 (399).
73  Article 19 (2) of the Basic Law.
74  BVerfGE 7, 377 (405, 406 ff.).
75  See e.g. on the need to respect the principle of proportionality for price stabilisation measures BVerfGE 
8, 274 (310); very comprehensive on all three stages of suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto 
sensu of the qualification requirements for craftsmen and the related restrictions on the freedom of 
profession BVerfGE 13, 97 (117 ff.).
76  R. v Krauss, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit in seiner Bedeutung für die Notwendigkeit des Mittels 
im Verwaltungsrecht (Hamburg: Kommissionsverlag Ludwig Appel, 1955), 15 ff.
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Peter Lerche took matters to the level of constitutional law in his Habilita-
tion. Based on the distinction between the sub-tests of the principle of propor-
tionality introduced by Krauß, he focused in more detail on the third subtest. 
In his view, the test would offer an additional safeguard because any measure 
could pass the test of necessity if only it was attributed a purpose broad enough 
and adapted to its effects.77 Simultaneously, he did not deny the difficulties of 
the weighing exercise intrinsic to proportionality stricto sensu. Even at this early 
stage, Lerche criticized a perceived over-stretch of the use of the principle of 
proportionality.78 Consequently, he developed a precise categorisation, in which 
he suggested that the principle should be used exclusively under Article 19 (2) 
of the Basic Law as a factor to determine the essence of a fundamental right and 
for the more general limitation of fundamental rights.79
 iii. Conclusion
As a conclusion to the historical overview, the initial under-rep-
resentation of fundamental rights and inexistent institutionalisation of judicial 
review has given way over the years to fundamental changes of perception of the 
State. Constitutional law has evolved and become the stage of representation for 
a much broader variety of values, based on the acknowledgement that the State’s 
purpose should be limited and intrusions into the freedom of the individual 
must be limited and justified. This preliminary conclusion is bolstered if we 
look more closely at the constitutional normative debate on proportionality 
analysis: In Germany, there is an intense and fruitful debate on the anchorage 
of the ‘principle of proportionality’ in the very structure of the Basic Law.
 B  Constitutional Adjudication and The Principle of 
Proportionality as a Structural Feature of German 
Constitutional Law
The present section examines the role of the principle of pro-
portionality both in doctrinal discussion and in sceptical accounts of the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s emphasis on the principle. The discussion shows that 
there is wide-spread recognition of the structural embeddedness of the principle 
in the Basic Law. This supports our understanding that contextually, judicial 
review in German constitutional law is strongly marked as aiming for the equal 
representation of a broad range of constitutional values. In a second section, 
we show that there is also criticism of the omnipresent role of proportionality 
analysis in the doctrine, but that scholars do not contradict the findings of the 
first section; rather, voices call for reduced use of proportionality analysis, but 
not for its abolishment.
77  P. Lerche, Übermass und Verfassungsrecht (Cologne: Heymann, 1961), 20.
78  See Ibid., foreword.
79  Ibid., 78 ff. and 106 ff.
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 i.  The debate on the constitutional rank of the principle of 
proportionality
The debate on the constitutional rank aims to answer the cru-
cial question whether all powers of the state are bound by the principle, in this 
case in particular the legislative power. If the latter is bound by the principle, 
control of adherence to it by courts is a logical consequence of the idea of the 
Rechtsstaat. The legislator still carries a different responsibility, because its role 
is the independent identification of regulatory objectives and the weighing of 
values and interferences. The principle of proportionality has thus been quali-
fied as to its function for the legislator as a ‘mandate to form the law’, while for 
the executive and the judiciary it simply constitutes part of their binding attach-
ment to the law.80 Still, in purely normative terms, the unity and acceptance of 
proportionality analysis in German constitutional law can be derived to a large 
extent from this debate.
We subsequently assess various contributions on how to integrate the prin-
ciple of proportionality into the structure of the Basic Law, showing thus that its 
function is linked with cornerstones of the Basic Law such as the principle of 
equality, fundamental rights and the Rechtsstaat.
a. Deriving the principle of proportionality from equality
Early views conceptually linked the principle of proportionality to the princi-
ple of equality.81 For Krauss, there was a distinction between rights to freedom 
which regulated where interferences by the State could take place and rights 
which protected freedom and regulated how interference had to be undertaken. 
The latter encompassed the principle of equality and because of its conceptually 
similar approach also the principle of proportionality.82
However, other voices contend that there are important differences in 
the rationale of both principles. It has been pointed out that in particular the 
starting point of equality must be comparison and the availability of objects of 
comparison.83 Proportionality, on the other hand, requires the decision of indi-
vidual cases regardless of comparative cases. While the principle of equality thus 
demands that the decision-maker put measures in the legal and factual context, 
the principle of proportionality calls for the adaptation of ends and means in a 
single case, independently of the comparative context.84 Conceptually, a distinc-
80  P. Kirchhof, ‘Gleichmaß und Übermaß’ in P. Badura and R. Scholz (eds.), Wege und Verfahren des Verfas-
sungslebens: Festschrift für Peter Lerche zum 65 Geburtstag (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1993), 147.
81  See also for a strong view P. Wittig, ‘Zum Standort des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes im System des 
Grundgesetzes’ (1968) Die öffentliche Verwaltung 817, 819 ff.
82  Krauss, 29. Heinsohn, 67, notes, however, that Krauss does not expressly derive the principle of propor-
tionality from the principle of equality.
83  See e.g. Hirschberg, 121 ff.
84  Kirchhof, 143.
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tion between both the principle of equality and the principle of proportionality 
thus appears sustainable.
b.  Deriving the principle of proportionality from fundamental rights
An alternative view proposes that the constitutional rank of the principle of 
proportionality can be derived from fundamental rights. Alexy’s norm-theoretic 
account has already been discussed in this regard. Beyond this norm-theoretic 
account, others have focused more closely on the wording of the Basic Law. This 
thesis, which takes various forms, is most commonly based on an early land-
mark decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court held that the prin-
ciple of proportionality was invested with constitutional rank because it resulted 
from ‘the principle of the Rechtsstaat; essentially already from the very nature of 
the basic rights, which, being an expression of the general entitlement to free-
dom of the citizen against the State, must be restricted by the public power only 
to the extent that it is indispensable for the protection of public interests’.85
Reference can also be made to the concept of human dignity in Article 1 (1) 
of the Basic Law. Human dignity is made operational by Article 2 (1) of the Basic 
Law as a general freedom of action of the individual. This maximal concept of 
individual freedom can then be used as a basis to require justification for inter-
ference by means of opposing public or private interests which are recognized by 
the Constitution.86
Others argue in favour of looking more closely at the wording of the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s case law which spoke of the ‘nature’ of basic rights. 
Accordingly, the principle of proportionality should find its foundation in the 
concept of the untouchable core of basic rights, the ‘essence’ of a fundamental 
right which is explicitly enshrined in Article 19 (2) of the Basic Law. This view 
has for example been endorsed by the Federal Court of Justice, holding that the 
‘essence’ of a fundamental right would be violated if an interference with the 
right went beyond what the reasons for the interference rendered ‘unconditional 
and compulsory’.87
However, the principle of proportionality conceptually reaches further than 
the prohibition of interference with the ‘essence’ of a fundamental right. There 
may be interferences which violate the principle of proportionality without, at 
the same time, causing such strong interference that the very core of a right is 
affected. Furthermore, the prohibition to impair the ‘essence’ of a right should 
be understood as ‘absolute’, while proportionate interference with fundamental 
rights in general constitutes only a ‘relative’ obligation.88
85  BVerfGE 19, 342 (348-349), author’s translation.
86  See e.g. A. Bleckmann, ‘Begründung und Anwendungsbereich des Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzips’ 
(1994) Juristische Schulung 177, 178, who then however opts for the rule of law as the definite basis for 
the principle of proportionality.
87  ‘[U]nbedingt und zwingend’, see BGH St 4, 375 (377).
88  See for these two arguments H. Krüger, ‘Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte im Sinne des Art. 19 GG’ 
(1950) Die öffentliche Verwaltung 597, 597 ff.
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Yet another approach bases itself on a systematic reading of the Basic Law: 
The Basic Law has thus put freedom at the top of the Constitution, with a rule-
exception system that requires interference with freedom by the State to pursue 
a public purpose and to respect a relationship of proportionality.89
c.  Deriving the principle of proportionality from the Rechtsstaat
Apart from fundamental rights, the Rechtsstaat is advanced as a possible 
conceptual ground for the principle of proportionality. Scholars have given great 
weight to the aforementioned reference by the Federal Constitutional Court 
to the ‘principle of the Rechtsstaat’90 and point towards subsequent case law 
which held that the principle of proportionality had been derived by the Court 
in earlier case law91 from the Rechtsstaat as a fundamental decision of the Basic 
Law.92 Furthermore, the Bavarian Constitutional Court had already, from 1955 
onwards, referred to the Rechtsstaat and the guarantees of fundamental rights 
of the Bavarian Constitution as the basis of the binding force for the principle of 
proportionality.93
Consequently, scholars suggested that the Rechtsstaat and its entrenchment 
in the Basic Law could on its own serve as the basis for deriving a principle of 
proportionality of constitutional status which would bind all three powers of the 
State in their action.94 Generally, this position is taken by a number of scholars, 
without however always going into detail on the notion of Rechtsstaat which 
underlies this assumption.95
The problem connected with the foundation of the vague notion of 
Rechtsstaat lies in the potential leeway of an interpreter to fill the term with 
meaning; the shape of a principle of proportionality as a requirement for the 
exercise of public powers thus depends on the specific conception of the State. 
Furthermore, the non-applicability of the principle of proportionality in several 
areas of the Constitution, beyond doubt part of the Rechtsstaat, belies attempts to 
ground the principle in the notion of the Rechtsstaat itself.96
As an example, to fill the term Rechtsstaat with meaning some have 
suggested a distinction between the subjective and objective aspects of the 
Rechtsstaat. The subjective side refers to the possibility for the individual to 
defend him- or herself against undue interference by the State or another 
89  D. Merten, ‘Der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz’ in D. Merten and H.-J. Papier (eds.), Handbuch der 
Grundrechte – Band III Grundrechte in Deutschland: Allgemeine Lehren II (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 
2009), 539 paras 37-38 with further references to various provisions of the Basic Law.
90  BVerfGE 19, 342 (348-349), author’s translation.
91  Referring here to the aforementioned Apotheken-Urteil (405, 406 ff.).
92  BVerfGE 30, 1 (20).
93  See for an overview of the case law Stern, 171-172.
94  See for recent support for this conception H. Hofmann, ‘Artikel 20 GG’ in B Schmidt-Bleibtreu and 
others (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz 12 edn (Neuwied: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2011), 685 para 73.
95  See with further references Stern, 172 and footnote 53.
96  See for a concise overview Merten, 536 paras 32 ff.
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individual, while a more objective approach would suggest that all action taken 
by the State must be taken with the public interest as an objective and must 
therefore be subject to the principle of proportionality.97 For this purpose, it is 
necessary to develop an understanding of the rule of law as aimed at substantive 
justice, with proportionality as a tool to achieve such justice.98
Based on this theory, a broad scope of application for the principle of 
proportionality would be supported: Rather than limiting the principle’s use 
to cases where measures of the State interfere with an individual’s position 
and rights, the Basic Law can be read as generally requiring all State action to 
pursue the public interest. The objective reading of the Rechtsstaat therefore 
requires weighing exercises under the principle of proportionality’s auspices 
even if State organs only have to weigh public interests against each other.99 For 
some commentators, however, unlike the situation of fundamental rights, such 
a weighing exercise is not to be undertaken by judges, but ought to be entrusted 
to parliament.100
Such a broad recognition for optimisation through the principle of propor-
tionality has been criticized as overreaching. The mandate for optimisation 
might easily become an authorisation for weighing without a clear benchmark 
and an obligation to reach the best possible result without much tangible norma-
tive content beyond empty formulas.101
d.  A reconciliatory approach: Simultaneously deriving the principle of proportionality 
from fundamental rights and the Rechtsstaat
Eventually, as a reconciliatory approach, some suggest a compromise 
between the two broad claims of deriving proportionality analysis as a consti-
tutional principle from fundamental rights or the rule of law. 102 The historical 
development of both fundamental rights and the rule of law have been inter-
twined, in particular in the history of 19th century constitutional law, where 
most debate focused on the defence against undue interference by the State. 
Consequently, both contribute their share to the conceptual rooting of a princi-
ple of proportionality in the Constitution.103 With this understanding, a limited 
reading of proportionality analysis as linked purely to the text of the Constitu-
tion, i.e. the catalogue of fundamental rights, can be overcome. This is due 
97  Bleckmann, 181.
98  See for a closer analysis of this point E. Grabitz, ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Recht-
sprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,’ (1973) 98 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 568, 584.
99  Bleckmann, 182, suggests that even here there remains a subjective side of this weighing obligation, 
because the public interests at stake can again be traced back to a ‘sum of private interests’.
100  Ibid., 182.
101  See e.g. Kirchhof, 136-137, who warns of ‘exaggerated’ expectations which constitutional law and the 
organs of the constitution face in this scenario.
102  See for a simultaneous deduction from the Rechtsstaat and the concept of fundamental rights A. 
Voßkuhle, ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit’ (2007) Juristische Schulung 429, 430.
103  Heinsohn, 72.
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to the fact that the reading together with the idea of the Rechtsstaat leads to a 
structural understanding, in which case the interference with specific private 
interests – enshrined in fundamental rights – requires, based on the Rechtsstaat, 
the respect of a principle of proportionality which can be controlled by courts. 
Simultaneously to this enlarged reading of fundamental rights, the notion of 
the Rechtsstaat is not overstretched to require a rather ominous benchmark of 
proportionate optimisation from all organs of the constitution at all times, a 
requirement that seems to unduly do away with the constitutional texts. It also 
reflects the subjective and objective dimension of fundamental rights as defend-
ing the individual, but simultaneously incorporating certain specially protected 
legal values with a spill-over force beyond the sphere of the individual. They also 
act in particular as negative competence norms limiting the legislator’s margin 
of manoeuvre and create an objective order of values capable of expanding into 
the private realm – as the Lüth decision has shown.104
e. Conclusion
The goal of the above discussion has not been to support one particular 
theory on the constitutional rank of the principle of proportionality. Rather, the 
discussion shows broad support to structurally understand the German consti-
tution as a broad system of values that requires representation of those values, 
which for many scholars happens through the constitutional status given to 
proportionality analysis. In particular theories basing the principle of propor-
tionality on the broad concept of the Rechtsstaat make it easier to understand the 
spread of proportionality analysis throughout German constitutional law: As is 
subsequently discussed, the test has not only been used in the classic opposition 
between public interests and fundamental rights as shields, but also to weigh 
public interests against each other and positive obligations under fundamen-
tal rights, socio-economic rights and fundamental rights in their private law 
dimension.
At the same time, this broad recognition of the need to appropriately repre-
sent constitutional values has not always resulted in praise for proportionality 
analysis. As the subsequent section shows, the over-reliance on the latter has 
been criticized by a number of scholars. However, as the discussion shows, 
there is hardly any rejection of proportionality analysis as such. Criticism of 
the potential difficulties of its application have been issued, but have only led to 
calls for a limited standard of review105 and not the rejection of the principle as 
such.106 The constitutional rooting that has been identified for the principle has 
104  See on these two dimensions or functions of fundamental rights S. Müller-Franken, ‘Vorbemerkung 
vor Art. 1. Allgemeine Grundrechtslehren› in B. Schmidt-Bleibtreu and others (eds.), Kommentar zum 
Grundgesetz 12 edn (Neuwied: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2011), 95 paras 11 ff. and 97 paras 15 ff.
105  See e.g. Kirchhof, 148-149.
106  Stern, 165, refers to the principle as ‘undisputed’.
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ensured that the principle is perceived as binding for the legislative, executive 
and judicial power.107
 ii. Doctrinal criticism of the principle of proportionality
The principle of proportionality began to spread further across 
the Constitution and was referred to more and more by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court and by the doctrine. This led to a backlash of doctrinal criticism 
and some meandering in the case law. The present section briefly discusses 
the general points of criticism that were advanced against the perceived 
‘overexpansion’.108
Lerche already identified the problem of an overexploitation in his early writ-
ing. His Habilitation aimed at the establishment of categories of fundamental 
rights where the principle of proportionality should apply and others where it 
should not.109 His classification was not, however, subsequently taken up by the 
judiciary; it also was rejected in the doctrine because he suggested that even for 
certain central fundamental rights, in particular Article 12 of the Basic Law on 
the freedom of profession, the principle of proportionality should not apply.110
General criticism continues to attack the massive use of the principle as a 
problem of legal thinking and legal culture at large. The excessive use of propor-
tionality analysis is perceived as provoking an ‘atomisation’ of the normative 
material of the Constitution.111 The process of weighing is denounced as irra-
tional and even references to the constitutional order as a general benchmark to 
rationalize the classification of constitutional values are rejected as futile.112
Another line of scholars denounces the loss of dogmatic thoroughness 
caused by reliance on the principle of proportionality. In the field of interference 
with fundamental rights, where the principle has been used the longest, it was 
already remarked in the late 1970s that the case law abandoned more and more 
an exact analysis of which fundamental right had been violated in a concrete 
case by what means, in order to rely summarily on the weighing exercise of 
proportionality analysis instead. The phrase of an ‘osteomalacia’ of the legal 
order was coined later, because soft ‘topoi’ arguably replaced directing norms.113
Some also seem to perceive the use of the principle of proportionality as 
intellectual laziness, whereas dogmatic work would be required to develop a 
107  Merten, 543 para 43.
108  Many use the term Überdehnung here, see e.g. Stern, 175.
109  Lerche, 140 ff.
110  Heinsohn, 68.
111  Ridder, quoted in F. Ossenbühl, ‘Maßhalten mit dem Übermaßverbot’ in P. Badura and R. Scholz (eds.), 
Wege und Verfahren des Verfassungslebens: Festschrift für Peter Lerche zum 65 Geburtstag (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 1993), 157.
112  B. Schlink, ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit’ in P. Badura and H. Dreier (eds.), Festschrift 50 
Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 460.
113  Ossenbühl, 157.
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solution for the relevant situation of value conflict. Pieroth and Schlink cite as 
an example the traditional dogmatics of legitimate expectations and the prohi-
bition of retroactive effect which come into play more and more in the test of 
proportionality stricto sensu of the Federal Constitutional Court, but which 
would in practice offer the opportunity to overcome formless balancing by rigor-
ous dogmatics.114
Much of this criticism resembles points already discussed by opponents of 
the Principles Theory. It is noteworthy, however, that criticism does not reject 
the principle of proportionality per se, but rather an over-reliance on it in a large 
variety of cases.115 Since proportionality analysis has been recognized as a seem-
ingly ‘scientific’ method of neutral representation of values, unlike in United 
States constitutional law criticism focused on its scientific attributes rather than 
on a misrepresentation of values.116 We can thus safely conclude that the general 
acceptance of the principle of proportionality in the doctrinal discourse can be 
taken as part of the context of judicial review.
 iii. Conclusion
The present section has aimed to show that the broader debate 
on proportionality analysis in German constitutional law leaves little doubt that 
constitutional adjudication using proportionality analysis is recognized in its 
function of reconciling and representing a broad range of values enshrined in 
the constitution. There are numerous voices that give constitutional status to 
the principle of proportionality based on structural features of the Basic Law. 
Furthermore, criticism attacks the use of proportionality analysis because of its 
typical difficulties as discussed earlier.117 They do not, however, question its very 
existence and use by the Federal Constitutional Court, but only denounce over-
reliance on it. As a last topic, we turn our attention to institutional features, only 
to find that the Federal Constitutional Court in itself also fulfils the require-
ments of a representative institution for judicial review.
 C  Institutional Aspects of Judicial Review in German 
Constitutional Law
The institutional features of the Federal Constitutional Court 
in our opinion point towards a strong position in the constitutional system of 
institutions foreseen by the Basic Law.
114  B. Pieroth and B. Schlink, Grundrechte 21 edn (Heidelberg: C.F.Müller, 2005), 69 para 295a.
115  As Ossenbühl, 158, also suggests, the problem does not lie in the principle as such, but rather the need 
to cut back some rank growth.
116  J. Bomhoff, ‘Genealogies of Balancing as Discourse’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 109, 127 and 
134.
117  See already chapter 2 section II.A.
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The prerogatives of the Federal Constitutional Court are far-reaching and 
exclusive: While every German judge possesses the power to review statutes 
as to their compatibility with the constitution, the competence to invalidate 
laws lies exclusively with the Federal Constitutional Court.118 A law can thus be 
brought before the Court within the framework of concrete review as a refer-
ral from a lower judge. Simultaneously, there is also the possibility of abstract 
review if there is a dispute about the constitutionality of a statute which is 
brought before the Court by the federal government, the government of a Land 
or a quarter of the members of parliament.119 The individual constitutional 
complaint gives individuals direct access to the Federal Constitutional Court – if 
all other legal remedies have been exhausted.120 The effect of a judgment on the 
compatibility of a statute with the Constitution is inter omnes.121 There are thus a 
number of ways for complaints to reach the Court.
Also, its members are experienced in domestic law and appointed based, to 
some degree, on a representative political compromise. The 16 judges on the 
bench of the Court are all fully qualified lawyers, 6 of them must come from the 
federal high courts.122 They are elected for 12 years without the possibility for 
renewal of their term. As a peculiarity, they sit in two senates that both act as 
the Court when deciding cases. This represents a political compromise between 
a model where one court with a set of fairly well-known judges – comparable 
to the United States Supreme Court123 – adjudicates cases and a model where 
this task is done by a more flexible and anonymous system of rotation, where a 
group of judges would be picked out of the whole body of judges for each case.124 
Senates of eight judges also mean that there is a possibility for stalemate, which 
is, as some suggest, based on the preference for concordant solutions over major-
ity decisions.125
Given the accessibility of the Court, its specialisation and the radiant effect 
of constitutional law and in particular fundamental rights, scholars have – not 
without reason – spoken of ‘overarching powers’ of the Federal Constitutional 
118  Article 100 (1) of the Basic Law.
119  Article 93 (1) pt. 2 GG.
120  See for a more detailed analysis of the subject J. Fedtke, ‘Drittwirkung in Germany’ in D. Oliver and 
J. Fedtke (eds.), Human Rights and the Private Sphere – A Comparative Study (London/New York: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 134-135.
121  Schlaich and Korioth, 79 para 117.
122  C. Schönberger, ‘Anmerkungen zu Karlsruhe’ in M. Jestaedt and others (eds.), Das entgrenzte Gericht – 
Eine kritische Bilanz nach sechzig Jahren Bundesverfassungsgericht (Suhrkamp, Berlin 2011), 17.
123  See chapter 4 section II.D.
124  Schönberger, 18.
125  Ibid., 19, suggests that this preference even goes back to the days of the reformation, where a compro-
mise between Catholic and Protestant factions, rather than a decision by majority, constantly had to be 
sought.
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Court.126 The Court claims high authority in the domestic realm.127 In particular 
through the Lüth decision, the Court has engaged an ‘expanding constitution-
alisation’ of the German legal system,128 which involves the Court itself as the 
ultimate authority on decisions of how to optimize constitutional values.
 D Conclusion
As the discussion of the broader context of judicial review 
shows, over the course of history institutionalisation of judicial review and codi-
fication of human rights were initially hampered over a long period by politi-
cal struggles. Then, however, the post-War period brought forward an all the 
more powerful judiciary equipped with the comprehensive text of the Basic Law 
and the multiplicity of values enshrined in it. Also, there is an intense debate 
on proportionality analysis and constitutional adjudication which has, how-
ever, hardly ever questioned the principle of proportionality as such. Criticism 
focused on its over-expansion or some of its features, while a broad discourse 
has even propagated the principle as possessing constitutional status as a virtu-
ally indispensable structural feature of the broad provisions of the Basic Law and 
the variety of values enshrined in the latter. Lastly, even the institutional setting 
of the Federal Constitutional Court provides it with broad powers, which it has 
extensively used to become the supreme authority to ensure equal representa-
tion and weighing of constitutional values. With these descriptive features in 
place, we can now engage in an informed assessment of the procedural democ-
racy doctrine as the conceptual justification for judicial review in German con-
stitutional law. It becomes clear that to a great extent, the review powers of the 
Court are based on a broad view accepting a wide variety of values as potentially 
threatened by the democratic process. This broad justification for review has to 
be qualified to some extent, however, as the Court has indeed made an effort 
to nuance the intrusiveness of its scrutiny and in particular take a different 
approach in the field of horizontal effects of fundamental rights.
126  Fedtke, 153.
127  This authority is not only claimed in domestic law, but also in relation to international courts. The rela-
tionship with the Court of Justice of the European Union is briefly addressed in chapter 6. Also, in its 
relationship to the European Court of Human Rights, the Federal Constitutional Court has emphasized 
that, although it accepts the former’s interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in principle, the ultimate test for the application of the Convention remains its 
own reading of the German Constitution, see BVerfGE 2 BvR 1481/04 of 14 October 2004 (para 62).
128  Fedtke, 153.
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 III  The Justification of Judicial Review in German 
Constitutional Law
In this section, we contrast the findings of the previous dis-
cussion of the broader context with the debate on the justification of judicial 
review. As discussed in the theoretical chapter,129 the procedural democracy 
doctrine appears to be the most fruitful approach in assessing how adjudicators 
perceive that their power of review is justified, and thus how it is to be shaped. 
In German constitutional law, we discover that the debate is not necessarily as 
vivid and explicit as that in United States constitutional law.130 Yet, we identify 
varying standards of review and applications of proportionality analysis at vari-
ous occasions. A closer examination shows that generally, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court seems to follow the ideas of the procedural democracy doctrine. 
Furthermore, in the field of effects of fundamental rights in private law, the 
Court seems to perceive its review function differently from other cases. Our 
general conclusion thus classifies judicial review in German constitutional law 
as following an equal representation review model, but qualified accordingly for 
fundamental rights in their private law dimension.
 A  General Discussion on the Appropriate Standard of 
Review
The problem of the appropriate relationship between the judici-
ary and the legislator was already discussed early on in the literature on the 
principle of proportionality. However, the debate has not progressed as far as 
in the context of United States constitutional law, where a heated debate on the 
limits of justification of judicial review is ongoing to this date.131
In Germany, early literature tried to deny that the legislator could be bound 
at all by the principle of proportionality. The perceived danger was that such 
binding force of the principle could give an undue measure of control to the judi-
ciary and would endanger the separation of powers.132 Opposing views, however, 
developed the idea that the ‘spirit of the Constitution’ could actually require the 
application of a principle of proportionality.133
Generally, there is a claim for a more intrusive standard of review in cases of 
interference with fundamental rights as values highly protected by the Constitu-
tion. The intensity of control grows with the intensity of interference. But at the 
same time, scholars constantly caution that the Federal Constitutional Court 
must be aware of its position as an instance of control and not of alternative 
129  See chapter 2 section V.B.iv.
130  See chapter 4 section III.A.
131  See chapter 4 section III.
132  O. Pohl, Ist der Gesetzgeber bei Eingriffen in die Grundrechte an den Grundsatz der Verhältnismässigkeit 
gebunden? (Cologne: Kleikamp, 1959), 119.
133  Günter Dürig, quoted by Stern, 171.
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legislator in applying proportionality stricto sensu.134 Some have also termed the 
relationship between the legislative and the judicial power in this field as being 
between the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ interpreter of the Constitution, the first 
being called to continuously foster and expand the legal order with a margin of 
discretion. The Federal Constitutional Court as the ‘second interpreter’ cannot 
take over this task of the legislator.135 The margin of discretion for a decision-
maker is thus much larger in cases where the principle of proportionality serves 
as the benchmark of control of the legislator’s action than in cases where the 
law-applying powers, the executive and judicial branch, are the focus of control. 
The legislator enjoys a margin of prognosis, appreciation and evaluation.136
Beyond these general remarks, the procedural democracy doctrine would, 
however, also require the Court to adapt its intrusiveness of review based on the 
substantive justification of judicial review – i.e. based on the values at issue and 
to what extent the Court fears failure of the democratic process which requires 
judicial review to step in for protection. We thus assess a variety of specific situ-
ations where the Court has reacted to this challenge, though not always with 
sufficiently explicit reasoning. The consequent process of adapting the use of 
proportionality analysis and the standard of review has sometimes been termed 
‘respecification’ in the doctrine.137
 B Respecification of Review and Proportionality Analysis
We can subsequently assess three different situations where the 
procedural democracy doctrine seems to have played a major role in the Court’s 
reflection on its appropriate exercise of review. Under the principle of equality, 
the reasoning mirrors that adopted by the United States Supreme Court to some 
extent.138 In the case of positive obligations under fundamental rights, the poten-
tial to restrict the legislator’s discretion has led to the use of truncated tests, 
without a pertinent justification for why a lower standard of review could not 
have achieved similar outcomes. In the case of effects of fundamental rights in 
the sphere of private law, we suggest that what the Federal Constitutional Court 
has effectively done in developing its review by means of indirect horizontal 
effect can best be explained as the recognition that in this special case, courts of 
private law are reviewing with special emphasis on one particular interest. As a 
consequence, the Court has – appropriately in our eyes – adapted its pre-balanc-
ing and thus scrutiny to this model.
134  L. Michael, ‘Die drei Argumentationsstrukturen des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismässigkeit’ (2001) 
Juristische Schulung 148, 150.
135  Kirchhof, 148.
136  See Merten, 543 para 45 and 544 para 47 with further references to case law.
137  The term of ‘respecification’ (Respezifizierung) for this process was coined by Schmidt-Assmann (quoted 
in Ossenbühl, 163).
138  See chapter 4 section III.A.
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 i.  The procedural democracy doctrine and the variable 
standard of review under the principle of equality
The Federal Constitutional Court’s reflections on the required 
intrusiveness of scrutiny are observable mostly in the case law on the principle 
of equality. Under this principle, the Court adapts its scrutiny by distinguish-
ing two situations in which the standard of review becomes stricter. It should 
be noted that in principle, the Court has for a long time only relied on a loose 
verification of suitability before adopting a new formula which appears to come 
closer to an application of more fully-fledged proportionality analysis. It can be 
shown that the German discussion to some extent takes up the ideas of proce-
dural democracy, but in essence revolves around whether full-scale proportional-
ity analysis should be used. In fact, we suggest that the standard of review with 
which to apply proportionality analysis could be the more essential question.
The standard for violation was initially arbitrariness: to treat fundamentally 
same matters in an arbitrarily different way or to treat fundamentally diffe-
rent matters in an arbitrarily equal way.139 The scrutiny of such arbitrariness 
(Willkürkontrolle) consists in searching for reasonable explanations for a measure 
which result from the nature of the matter or other objective reasons.140 With 
the countless different characteristics of matters, to define sameness under such 
a loose standard of review must as a result prove impossible, and only a focus on 
differences and their weight proves conceptually feasible.141
The door towards a more comprehensive reasoning on the justification of 
differentiations and differential treatment has been opened with the adoption 
of the ‘new formula’ in the Federal Constitutional Court’s case law of the early 
1980s.142 A continuum between rather loose and rather strict control has been 
developed in the case law and should mirror the discretion of the legislator. The 
stricter control effectively comes close to the principle of proportionality. 143
Two situations can be highlighted in the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
case law. First, differentiations based on characteristics which are closely tied to 
persons and difficult to change by an individual are treated with closer scru-
tiny, because they can be understood as similar to the prohibited criteria for 
differentiation under the specific prohibitions of discrimination of minorities 
enshrined in Article 3 (3) of the Basic Law.144 These are to be distinguished from 
mere differential treatment based on factual circumstances.145 Cases of indirect 
139  See e.g. BVerfGE 1, 14 (52).
140  See e.g. BVerfGE 7, 305 (315).
141  See also Michael, 152.
142  BVerfGE 55, 72 (88).
143  The development is concisely summarized in BVerfGE 88, 87 (96-97).
144  Article 3 (3) of the Basic Law lists less favourable treatment based on the criteria of sex, descent, race, 
language, geographical origin, belief, religious or political views and handicaps as prohibited.
145  See e.g. on certain delays of preclusion in procedural law which apply differently to the same party at 
different stages of the procedure, BVerfGE 55, 72 (89).
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discrimination which arise in the process are again subject to a more strict 
control as far as a certain group of persons who suffer differential treatment 
can be clearly identified.146 The control is less rigid if the concerned persons can 
adapt to the regulation by adopting a certain conduct to avoid negative conse-
quences.147
Second, differential treatment which causes interference with constitutional 
rights to freedom is also assessed more strictly. The discretion of the legislator 
is thus reduced if by treating persons in a different manner it simultaneously 
interferes with other constitutionally granted positions.148
In both situations, it has been suggested that the full version of the principle 
of proportionality should apply.149 The safeguard against arbitrariness otherwise 
applicable under the principle of equality comes down to a mere test of suit-
ability. As a reaction, in the later case law, the further steps of proportionality 
analysis are applied by the Court, though not always systematically. Some confu-
sion emerges in particular as regards the separation between the principle of 
proportionality applied in the case of interference with a fundamental right and 
a parallel potential breach of the general principle of equality.150
With these observations in mind, it can be suggested that the battle seems to 
be taking place on the wrong front. There is arguably a plausible claim that the 
discretion of the legislator to differentiate in legislation should not be restricted 
too heavily. However, the solution could be not so much the refusal of full 
proportionality analysis under the principle of proportionality, but rather an 
adaptation of the standard of review, as the example of United States constitu-
tional law shows.151 Through such a weaker standard, review would only ques-
tion the legislator’s discretion if a threshold of plausibility in the differentiation 
has been transgressed. United States constitutional law distinguishes different 
‘tiers of scrutiny’, under which the intrusiveness of review is adapted to the case 
at issue.152 More intrusive scrutiny is triggered by differential treatment based 
on ‘suspect classifications’, which go back to the ideas of procedural democracy. 
German constitutional law seems to react similarly by identifying situations 
where differential treatment is based on characteristics that can hardly be 
changed and seem to identify and disadvantage a particular group beyond the 
146  See e.g. on the differential treatment of social security contributions for certain kinds of salaries in 
comparison to others which cause differential treatment between groups of employees, BVerfGE 92, 53 
(69).
147  BVerfGE 55, 72 (89).
148  See e.g. the exclusion of students from unemployment benefits which interferes with their right to 
property as regards the contributions paid to the unemployment insurance, BVerfGE 74, 9 (24-25).
149  See for further references Michael, 153 footnote 56.
150  See e.g. the rather obscure analysis in BVerfGE 88, 87 (96-99).
151  See for the distinction between the debate on ‘balancing’ and on the appropriate standard of review 
chapter 4, sections III and IV.
152  See in detail chapter 4 section III.A.iii.
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groups already expressly identified as particularly vulnerable in Article 3 (3) of 
the Basic Law.153
The second prong of procedural democracy suggests that failure of the 
democratic process as the justification for intrusive review can not only be 
observed in outcomes that disadvantage specific groups, but also in outcomes 
that disadvantage particular values. In United States constitutional law, there 
is a tendency at this point to emphasize rights closely connected to the demo-
cratic process, such as the right to free assembly or the freedom of expression.154 
The case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court shows far more 
breadth here. Violation of any other constitutionally protected position, i.e. any 
fundamental right,155 requires closer scrutiny. Thus, for the Court a violation of 
fundamental rights is more broadly a sign of failure of the democratic process 
that justifies judicial review, with no limitation on particular groups of rights as 
in the United States’ example.156
Summing up, the Federal Constitutional Court seems to follow similar lines 
of thought in the case law on equality as the United States Supreme Court. The 
distinctions just discussed have also been generally welcomed in the doctrine.157 
However, there is an unfortunate overlap between the debate on whether full-
scale proportionality analysis should be used and the debate on the intrusive-
ness of review.158 Separating both issues could, in our view, produce the useful 
result that proportionality analysis would be used as conceptually defensible 
solution, while a carefully selected and well-argued standard of review ensures 
appropriate discretion to the legislator’s need to differentiate in legislation. 
There is in particular hardly a fully convincing suggestion why the principle of 
equality should fall outside the realm of equal representation of values before 
the judge that proportionality analysis suggests. The equal representation review 
which predominantly seems to be followed by the Court is a convincing solution 
in the light of these arguments.
153  See on the structure of Article 3 of the Basic Law section IV.A.
154  See chapter 4 section III.A.
155  See e.g. BVerfGE 92, 53 (69).
156  Compare chapter 4 section III.A.ii.
157  See for further references Pieroth and Schlink, 108 para 444.
158  See also in this light misguided criticisms of comparisons with the system of tiers of scrutiny in United 
States constitutional law. See e.g. W. Heun, ‘Artikel 3 GG’ in H. Dreier (ed.) Grundgesetz Kommentar 
2 edn (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 246 para 28, who rejects the use of proportionality analysis 
because the tiers of scrutiny in United States constitutional law in his view would only mirror the 
prohibited classifications codified in Article 3 (3) of the Basic Law. This view does not accord any atten-
tion to differences in the standard of review, which is the main feature of the debate in United States 
constitutional law rather than the discussion on full proportionality analysis or ‘balancing’. Neither 
does it take into account that the Federal Constitutional Court has – just like the United States Supreme 
Court – proven flexible in the identification of vulnerable groups and has thus gone beyond the text of 
Article 3 (3) Basic Law, mirroring the findings of the procedural democracy doctrine.
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 ii.  The case of positive obligations for the State derived from 
fundamental and socioeconomic rights: The procedural 
democracy doctrine and the Untermassverbot
Early on the German doctrine had developed the concept of two 
functions of fundamental rights, as protecting the individual from interference 
by the State and as obliging the State to protect individuals from interference 
through other private entities.159 While it remains disputed whether the prin-
ciple of proportionality can be applied to assess whether the State’s measures 
satisfactorily fulfil the duty of protection at stake, at least conceptually, the two 
functions can of course be understood as complementary: The State as the 
protector of liberty must not unduly interfere with this liberty, which is granted 
by the respect of the principle of proportionality. At the same time, however, it 
must not go below a certain threshold of protection for freedom.
Some have suggested that the principle of proportionality could effectively 
be applied in the same manner for duties of protection.160 Others, however, have 
contended that a standard of its own should apply. This principle, referred to as 
Untermassverbot, can be more clearly based in the Constitution than the princi-
ple of proportionality itself as Übermassverbot. In particular, the former can be 
based in the nature of the duties of protection of fundamental rights and the 
explicit codification of Article 19 (2) of the Basic Law, which prohibits all impair-
ment of the ‘essence’ of a fundamental right.161
As soon as positive action by the State is required, the application of propor-
tionality analysis in judicial review meets with the reproach of unduly restrict-
ing the discretion of the legislator. In German constitutional law, the situation of 
positive obligations and of socioeconomic rights requiring positive action by the 
State have led in principle to two lines of case law. We can observe reluctance to 
engage in full-scale proportionality analysis. The procedural democracy doctrine 
could, however, to some extent justify, as in the previous case of the principle of 
equality, an adaptation of the standard of review rather than the abandonment of 
proportionality analysis as such.
A first line of cases suggests judicial control based on whether measures 
taken by the legislator are ‘sufficient for an effective and adequate protection’ of 
the endangered right.162 A second line emphasizes the need to give an appro-
priate space for deliberation and decision to the parliament and reduces the 
159  The German terminology has developed the notion of Untermaßverbot (prohibition of inadequate action) 
in contrast to the often used Übermaßverbot (prohibition of excessive action), see in particular C.-W. 
Canaris, ‘Grundrechte und Privatrecht’ (1984) Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 201, 228.
160  See for a representative of this so-called congruency thesis (Kongruenzthese) K.-E. Hain, ‘Der Gesetzge-
ber in der Klemme zwischen Übermaß- und Untermaßverbot?’ (1993) 108 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 
982.
161  See in particular J. Dietlein, ‘Das Untermaßverbot, Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungschancen einer 
neuen Rechtsfigur’ (1995) Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 131, 136.
162  BVerfGE 88, 203 (254, author’s translation).
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control of the judiciary. As a consequence, a violation is only found if the State’s 
organs have not acted at all or if their action is ‘evidently insufficient’ in order 
to achieve the objective of protection.163 A last line of case law seems to combine 
the two standards and asks both for ‘adequate and effective protection’, while 
a violation will only be found if the State’s authorities have not acted at all or if 
the measures taken are ‘evidently insufficient’.164 Scrutinizing newer legislation 
on the minimum subsistence level, the Court has again applied the ‘evidently 
insufficient’ standard to find violations only where certain statistical models for 
calculating payments had been deviated from without justification.165
Reading this case law, some understand the stricter standard as similar to 
the principle of proportionality, only exchanging the middle step of necessity 
with a need to look for ‘effectiveness’: Alternatives would thus be measures 
which grant more effective protection, but cause only the same degree of inter-
ference with another fundamental right or constitutional value.166 The problem 
is, however, the apparent absence of a third level of proportionality stricto sensu 
which is not reflected in the case law to date.
Conceptually, in the situation of duties to protect derived from fundamental 
rights the benchmark of control goes beyond the means-ends control of specific 
legislative measures and assesses in more breadth whether a mandate of protec-
tion enshrined in the Constitution has been fulfilled adequately by the legisla-
tor.167
Other views have thus suggested that a different test operates for the case 
law on positive obligations. The second step of the test should be a test looking 
for an ‘already sufficient’ minimum of protection. A measure must thus not 
remain below the required level of protection, while the State has the right to 
realize a right to a higher degree unless another fundamental right is violated by 
such action.168 As an example, sometimes a State must sanction certain viola-
tions of the law by means of criminal law for the sake of deterrence.169
Summing up, the situation of duties of protection derived from fundamental 
rights has raised claims in the doctrine to extend the principle of proportional-
ity as a benchmark of control for constitutional review. Parts of the doctrine as 
well as the Federal Constitutional Court have, however, opted for a different, 
less intrusive test based fundamentally on the argument that more discretion 
163  See in particular BVerfGE 56, 54 (80-81, author’s translation).
164  BVerfGE Beschluß vom 27041995 AZ 1 BvR 729/93, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, 2343 (author’s 
translation).
165  BVerfGE 125, 175 (225-226).
166  Michael, 151.
167  Dietlein, 136. It appears remarkable that even some proponents of the Principles Theory whose initial 
reflex was to adhere to the congruency thesis seem to eventually embrace a distinction between two 
different legal tests, see M Borowski, Grundrechte als Prinzipien 2 edn (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2007), 150 
ff.
168  Merten, 564 para 85.
169  Ibid., 565 para 89.
122
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
must be granted to the legislator in fulfilling its duties of implementation of the 
protection of a fundamental rights.
On the one hand, claims to respect the discretion of the legislator are 
convincing in the light of the latter’s complex task to coordinate and reconcile a 
variety of constitutional and public values. Constitutional review can here only 
remain a final, loose check.
However, it remains unclear why deviation from the principle of propor-
tionality should occur if a lower standard of review could achieve the same. In 
particular, taking as the baseline the procedural democracy doctrine, it is diffi-
cult to see why a failure of the democratic process could not occur in the field of 
positive obligations and thus justify judicial review by means of proportionality 
analysis. In German constitutional law, this view is bolstered by the seemingly 
comprehensive set of fundamental rights whose neglect appears to be a prob-
lematic failure of the democratic process in the eyes of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court.
Indeed, one can argue that the strength of the justification of judicial review 
is less strong in the field of positive obligations. However, we suggest that it 
reveals a rather classic, nearly libertarian conception of fundamental rights 
and judicial review as defensive shields if such review by means of full-scale 
proportionality analysis is only accepted for the classic case of interference by 
the public power with the individual’s sphere of liberty. Positive obligations may 
be just as relevant for the appropriate protection of fundamental rights as tools 
ensuring the smooth functioning of the democratic process. It appears difficult 
to grasp why there could not be a problem of disproportionate realisation of a 
fundamental right by the legislator. To take up the earlier example, if criminal 
sanctions are taken e.g. to protect the right to privacy, such sanctions could 
simultaneously have a substantial impact on other public interests or rights – 
e.g. the freedom of expression. A test consisting of a reduced version of the prin-
ciple of proportionality appears incapable of appropriately taking into account 
the second interest. Proportionality analysis applied with a sufficiently lenient 
standard of review, however, could arguably remedy the problem.
Summing up, again a more explicit distinction between the standard of 
review and the use of proportionality analysis could resolve a number of prob-
lematic features in the case law and more consistently represent pre-balancing 
and the procedural democracy doctrine. Again, substantially there is hardly any 
convincing reason why departure from the model of equal representation review 
should lead to a rejection of full-scale proportionality analysis. Systematic use of 
the standard of review should be sufficient to ensure discretion for the legislator.
 iii.  The procedural democracy doctrine, judicial review and 
the effects of fundamental rights in private law
In a landmark decision, the Federal Constitutional Court has 
set out the radiating effect that fundamental rights possess even beyond the 
123
chapter 3  german constitutional law
vertical relationship between the individual and the public power. The present 
section first briefly sets out the theories of direct and indirect horizontal effect 
of fundamental effects in private law, before turning to the question of the pro-
cedural democracy doctrine and the appropriate model of review. We conclude 
that private autonomy as the central pillar of private law suggests that a model of 
special interest review is more appropriate.
a. Theories of horizontal effect in German constitutional law
The question has arisen whether and to what extent fundamental rights may 
also protect individuals from interference by other individuals. If the principle of 
proportionality is closely linked to fundamental rights, this could also extend its 
reach beyond public into private law.
Generally, the idea of such horizontal effect of fundamental rights (Dritt-
wirkung) was first developed in the field of labour law by Nipperdey, who argued 
that it should apply to grant equal pay for men and women.170 Scholars support-
ing this idea argued that the changing societal landscape led to situations where 
individuals were in a situation of inequality of power and dependence which 
required protection through fundamental rights, including from intervention 
by other private actors. Certain fundamental rights, depending on their content, 
thus should also apply in private relationships as the expression of principles 
that should always be valid in a well and justly ordered society.171
The problematic consequence of such an approach of direct horizontal effect 
is that in private law, the legal position of every individual and their freedom is 
thus limited because of the compulsory respect for others’ fundamental rights. 
Leisner has suggested that a distinction between two situations of private law 
should be drawn: On the one hand, in the field of contracts contractual freedom 
remained unharmed, because contracts could be understood as a waiver of 
fundamental rights protection. Outside the law of contracts, however, no similar 
construct could be used, and a collision of fundamental rights becomes unavoid-
able. More special fundamental rights and rights granted without derogations 
should prevail over other fundamental rights in such situations.172
Sceptical scholars have insisted, however, on the fact that fundamental rights 
apply according to the express wording of the Basic Law between the individual 
and the State.173 Furthermore, a virtually unlimited number of collisions of 
fundamental rights would be caused in private relations at every occasion, 
leading to an enormous amount of necessary weighing operations, implying 
wide-spread use of the principle of proportionality.174 Again others have argued 
170  H.C. Nipperdey, Grundrechte und Privatrecht (Krefeld: Scherpe, 1961), 13 ff.
171  Ibid., 20 ff.
172  W. Leisner, Grundrechte und Privatrecht (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1960), 384 ff.
173  Article 1 (3) of the Basic Law.
174  H.-J. Papier, ‘Drittwirkung der Grundrechte’ in D. Merten and H.-J. Papier (eds.), Handbuch der Grun-
drechte – Band II Grundrechte in Deutschland: Allgemeine Lehren I (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2006), 1339 
para 18.
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that the general right to freedom as enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Basic Law 
includes the right not to use one’s rights in private relations, which is in addition 
pointed out by certain norms of private law that prohibit particularly disadvanta-
geous contracts and would be pointless if fundamental rights applied directly in 
a horizontal manner.175 Furthermore, the application of the principle of propor-
tionality would result in a much more restrictive standard and would heavily 
limit contractual freedom.176 In addition, the application of proportionality 
analysis is criticized as it would lead to a reduction of legal certainty in private 
law generally. The result of the weighing exercise required by each and every 
single of the many possible collisions between fundamental rights would be 
unpredictable.177
With these points in mind, Dürig has suggested an alternative thesis. In his 
view, fundamental rights should apply with indirect horizontal effect. Funda-
mental rights thus apply in the relationship between individuals only indirectly, 
because they include a right to autonomy which may derogate from fundamental 
rights and is shaped in the form of a special law – private law – which primarily 
applies between individuals. The respect for the outer boundaries of fundamen-
tal rights is granted by the general clauses of private law which are applied with 
the guarantees of fundamental rights in mind, thereby assuring the autonomy 
of private law and simultaneously the conceptual unity of the legal order as a 
whole.178
Although these theories were developed with a focus on contract law, courts 
subsequently took them up in virtually all fields of private law. The Federal 
Court for Labour Matters (Bundesarbeitsgericht) under Nipperdey as its first 
president endorsed the theory of direct horizontal effect in its case law as early 
as 1954, arguing that certain fundamental rights could bind private employers 
as part of the ordre public of the legal order.179
The Federal Constitutional Court, on the other hand, took a different posi-
tion in the 1957 landmark decision in Lüth and adopted the thesis of indirect 
horizontal effect. It held that a civil court judgment can violate the fundamental 
right to free speech if the relevant general clause of the accepted principles of 
morality was interpreted without taking due account of the special value of this 
fundamental right.180 As suggested by Dürig, private law must thus be inter-
preted against the background of fundamental rights, but without them having 
direct horizontal effect.
175  G. Dürig, ‚Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung‘ in T Maunz (ed.) Vom Bonner Grundgesetz zur Gesa-
mtdeutschen Verfassung: Festschrift zum 75 Geburtstag von Hans Nawiasky (Munich: Isar Verlag, 1956), 
158 ff., for example points at Article 138 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) in this respect.
176  Ibid.
177  Papier, 1340 para 20.
178  Dürig, 176 f.
179  BAGE 1, 185 (193).
180  BVerfGE 7, 198 (212).
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Indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights has thus over the years 
become dominant in the case law as well as legal doctrine and has effectively 
extended the reach of the principle of proportionality to private law.181
b.  The procedural democracy doctrine, fundamental rights and private law
Bringing the procedural democracy doctrine into the picture, one may 
wonder whether and how the principle of proportionality should be extended 
to the sphere of private law. The question for the Federal Constitutional Court 
is therefore what failure of the democratic process it can tackle by means of its 
review in the sphere of private law, where a priori only private individuals inter-
act. Centrally, the system of private law and of courts adjudicating private law 
matters is institutionally separated from the constitutional realm, insofar as the 
latter only addresses vertical citizen-state relationships.
As scholars have underlined, the principle of the separation of powers would 
be seriously compromised if, for example, direct horizontal effect of fundamen-
tal rights is accepted. As a matter of competence, the legislator is the designer of 
the legal order of private law and is therefore required to take the necessary deci-
sions by weighing fundamental rights. By applying fundamental rights directly, 
this power would effectively be transferred to a large extent to the judiciary, as it 
would then be the judge who has to execute the same weighing decision again 
in every single case.182
The problem of judicial review at this stage was already identified by the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Lüth: Should intrusive proportionality analysis 
be adopted here to scrutinize whether appropriate space has been attributed to 
fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court could become – contrary 
to its position as a specialized court as designated by the Constitution183 – an 
extraordinary instance of review for all private law cases. To avoid this scenario, 
the test adopted asks only whether the civil court has in its judgment correctly 
recognized the relevance and scope of a fundamental right and weighed it 
against the interests of the claimants.184 In a number of subsequent cases, the 
Federal Constitutional Court continuously applied the reasoning of Lüth and 
struck down private law judgments. The Court generally used the principle of 
proportionality, but with a lenient standard of scrutiny: it seems to only strike 
down judgments of other courts if arguments based on fundamental rights had 
been left aside or erroneously used by courts.185 In all cases, however, the Court 
181  Papier, 1342 para 24. Even the Federal Court for Labour Matters abandoned the thesis of direct horizon-
tal effect in its later case law and started to follow the Federal Constitutional Court’s line of reasoning, 
see Papier, 1343 para 26.
182  Papier, 1341 para 21.
183  See Fedtke, 133.
184  BVerfGE 7, 198, (214). See Schlaich and Korioth, 177 para 281, on the self-restraint of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court when reviewing judgments of other specialized courts.
185  The Court held, for example, that in advertising cases the law against unfair competition had not been 
applied with due regard to the freedom of expression of companies or had prohibited advertising with 
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left no doubt that it aimed not to reassess the balance found in the framework 
of private law, but simply aimed at sanctioning courts that had not undertaken 
the effort to use the margin of discretion granted by general clauses to correct 
imbalances in the light of fundamental rights.
The solution of using the principle of proportionality but combining it with 
a rather low standard of review seems convincing if the division of labour in the 
legal system is taken into account appropriately. The application of fundamental 
rights in itself may justify the use of proportionality analysis and gives some 
teeth to the argument for judicial review. Procedural democracy is thus, in the 
eyes of the Court, also to be understood as extending to violations of fundamen-
tal rights in the private sphere. Indeed, it appears difficult to sustain that private 
actors cannot cause interferences with fundamental rights that could require the 
intervention of the Federal Constitutional Court. However, two aspects must be 
taken into account: First, the Federal Constitutional Court acts here as a review 
instance for other courts. Second, the main balancing exercise for competing 
values has already been undertaken by the creation of the system of private law 
in itself, which also includes the realisation of competing public interests.186 
The choice of a deferent standard of review can thus be justified as in principle 
empowering the Federal Constitutional Court to intervene in extreme cases, 
while leaving the resolution of conflicts primarily to the sphere of private law, 
respectful of the idea of private autonomy.187
For the situation of private law, the Federal Constitutional Court has thus 
accepted that private law courts act under a special interest review model, which 
aims to uphold private autonomy as the balance of fundamental rights created 
by the legislator. Consequently, it has adapted its own scrutiny to special interest 
review, only intervening by means of proportionality analysis if a truly severe 
imbalance has occurred.
 C Conclusion
A number of reflections on judicial review have marked the way 
in which the principle of proportionality has been applied by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court. The present section has aimed to channel these concerns into 
the spectrum suggested by pre-balancing and the procedural democracy as the 
justification of judicial review. Indeed, next to general remarks on the standard 
of review between different courts, it was also shown that the use of proportion-
ality analysis seems to react to the strength of the justification of judicial review. 
As an example, stricter review takes place under the principle of equality if 
discrimination for specific minorities based on immutable characteristics takes 
place; as the procedural democracy thesis suggests, this indicates a failure of the 
insufficient reasons, see BVerfGE 102, 347 (362) and BVerfGE 107, 275 (284 f.).
186  See M. Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the 
Constitutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 341, 362-363.
187  Fedtke, 153. See also Kumm, 364-365.
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democratic process. Generally, while the doctrinal debate has unduly focused 
on whether full proportionality analysis should be used, the more appropriate 
concern should arguably be the appropriate standard of review. There is hardly 
any reason to deviate from the model of equal representation review found when 
examining the broader context of judicial review.
A different situation is present for the review in cases of horizontal effect 
of fundamental rights. Here we found the justification of judicial review to 
be weaker because the Federal Constitutional Court only intervenes at second 
level after the system of private law and other courts have already intervened to 
resolve a conflict. Consequently, we have suggested that the solution found by 
the Court appropriately reflects a model of special interest review, where only 
a severe imbalance of values reaching the threshold of virtual neglect for one 
fundamental right can lead to intervention of the Court.
 IV The Principle of Proportionality
The present section sets out in detail the way in which propor-
tionality analysis has been used by the Federal Constitutional Court. We have 
found that generally, the context of judicial review in German constitutional law 
is conducive to the use of proportionality analysis, and also a pre-balancing exer-
cise speaks out in favour of its use under a model of equal representation review. 
Only in the field of fundamental rights in private law does the predominance 
of the interest of private autonomy call for a different approach. Accordingly, we 
agree with the Court’s comprehensive assessments of proportionality set out in 
the subsequent section.
As a starting point, we assess fundamental rights norms in the Basic Law, 
before showing how the Court has interpreted them by developing the ‘principle 
of proportionality’ in its classic form.
 A Fundamental Rights in the Basic Law
The Basic Law contains a catalogue of fundamental rights in 
its title I. The perhaps most classic example is offered by the rights to freedom. 
Such rights grant a certain amount of autonomy to the individual and require 
that interference by the State be justified to some extent. There are special 
rights to freedom such as the freedom of faith and conscience,188 freedom of 
assembly189 and association190 or the right to property and the protection against 
expropriation.191
188  Article 4 of the Basic Law.
189  Article 8 of the Basic Law.
190  Article 9 of the Basic Law.
191  Article 14 of the Basic Law.
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Some rights are coupled with an express provision on restrictions. As a typi-
cal example, Article 8 reads in full:
Article 8
[Freedom of assembly]
(1) All Germans shall have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed with-
out prior notification or permission.
(2) In the case of outdoor assemblies, this right may be restricted by or pursu-
ant to a law.
The provision lays down one value, the fundamental right to freedom of assem-
bly, while providing only for restrictions based on a law. As another example, 
this also applies to the general right to personal freedom in Article 2 of the Basic 
Law which operates in a subsidiary manner to the more special freedoms.192 The 
provisions on fundamental rights of the Basic Law generally do not spell out 
in more detail how interference with fundamental rights may occur. There is 
neither a list of public interests which could justify interference nor a provision 
that would spell out a requirement of proportionality. There are, however, also 
rights without an express reference to restrictions. Article 4 (1) of the Basic Law 
reads for example:
Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philo-
sophical creed, shall be inviolable.
In spite of the absence of an express possibility for restrictions, it is assumed 
that a coherent and unitary reading of the Constitution requires that limitations 
(Schranken) on such rights must also be possible.193 A similar reasoning thus 
applies across the various rights.
Beyond the individual provisions on specific rights, Article 19 of the Basic 
Law provides generally for the ‘restriction of basic rights’ that any law interfer-
ing with rights must apply generally and not only to an individual case; it must 
also indicate which right is affected.194 Furthermore, the ‘essence’ of a basic 
right must not be affected.195
A slightly different situation is presented by the principle of equality 
enshrined in Article 3 of the Basic Law. It spells out general equality before the 
law,196 prescribes equal treatment of men and women197 and prohibits differen-
tial treatment based on specific grounds.198 Under the principle of equality, not 
192  See on the subsidiary application of Article 2 of the Basic Law BVerfGE 21, 227 (23).
193  See e.g. Michael, 150.
194  Art 19 (1) of the Basic Law.
195  Article 19 (2) of the Basic Law.
196  Article 3 (1) of the Basic Law.
197  Article 3 (2) of the Basic Law.
198  Article 3 (3) of the Basic Law.
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all differential treatment is prohibited. Rather, differential treatment must be 
based on objective grounds.
As a third category, fundamental rights may also result in obligations for 
the State to protect certain interests. Article 2(1) of the Basic Law for example 
provides for comprehensive protection of the right to life. Not only are certain 
interventions by the State prohibited, but duties are also imposed on the State 
to create conditions which favour e.g. the birth and upbringing of children, in 
order to prevent abortions.199 In these cases entailing positive obligations of 
the State, the value conflict is marked by the fact that the State has to weigh its 
possibilities to further one value against its actual technical and financial capaci-
ties.
 B The classic form of the principle of proportionality
Examining the use of the principle of proportionality, we redis-
cover the classic four-pronged scheme that was initially set out as the ‘prototype’ 
of proportionality analysis. As has previously been shown in the discussion of 
the justification of judicial review, there is a lot of emphasis on the applicable 
legal test in German constitutional law, but insufficient discussion is dedicated 
to the appropriate standard of review.
 i. Determining legitimate objectives
The initial classic concept of the principle of proportionality 
applies to the limitation of fundamental rights by legislative, administrative or 
judicial measures; it is thus a ‘limitation of limitations’ (Schranken-Schranke).200 
If, for example, a judge is called to apply the principle, as a starting point the 
means and the purposes of a law in question have to be determined carefully. 
Individual means should be examined separately, while the multiple purposes 
most regulation pursues are relevant for each examination of an individual 
measure.201 It must also be determined to what extent certain regulatory pur-
poses receive specific emphasis in the law, e.g. by means of an obligation to 
protect or further a purpose enshrined in constitutional law.202 For basic rights 
without an explicit possibility of derogation by means of laws, only colliding con-
stitutional law can justify interference. As not all constitutional policy objectives 
are laid down in the formal Constitution, it is often suggested that one ought to 
199  See e.g. BVerfGE 88, 203 (259).
200 Michael, 148.
201  L. Michael, ‘Grundfälle zur Verhältnismässigkeit’ (2001) Juristische Schulung 654, 655.
202  As an example, Article 20a of the Basic Law codifies as a policy objective the protection of nature and 
animals. By contrast, Article 22 (2) of the Basic Law which determines the colours of the national flag 
does not in itself create a policy objective to protect the flag, BVerfGE 81, 278 (293).
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use a wider notion of ‘material’ constitutional law, which includes non-written 
public interests and purposes.203
As an example, in one case, the Court had to deal with the claim that the 
crafts code unduly restricted the freedom of profession, because it made access 
to certain professions conditional upon the successful completion of an appren-
ticeship and the relevant exams. The Court held that the State could indeed 
open access to the crafts and leave it to the free market to sort out less able 
competitors to the benefit of good craftsmen. However, it chose not to do so and 
introduced the crafts code pursuing the goal of protecting the reputation of the 
profession, in order to make sure that incompetent persons could not take up a 
craft and damage the reputation of the profession in the first place.204
 ii. Suitability
The first step of suitability only excludes measures which in no 
way further any of the regulatory purposes that have been previously identi-
fied. Even a partial positive effect on one pursued purpose is sufficient. Simul-
taneously, an erroneous prognosis by the legislator on the expected effect of a 
measure falls within the margin of discretion and does not render a measure 
unsuitable.205
In the case of the crafts code mentioned above, the Federal Constitutional 
Court explained that the code’s requirements could be accepted as suitable 
because it strengthened the need for the individual to acquire the skills and 
knowledge necessary to exercise a profession, a need that would also exist inde-
pendently of state regulation in the individual’s self-interest.206
 iii. Necessity
The subsequent step, the test of necessity, incorporates two 
prongs. First, it must be assessed whether an alternative measure can be identi-
fied that causes a weaker interference with the fundamental right at issue or an 
interference with a weaker protected area.207 An alternative measure can be a 
milder form of the original measure, but it must in any case achieve all the pur-
poses of the original measure at least to the same extent. Even if there appears 
to be a much less restrictive measure available that would result in only a small 
loss in the achieved benefit, such a measure cannot qualify as an alternative.208
203  Müller-Franken, 108 para 45.
204  BVerfGE 13, 97 (115).
205  See e.g. BVerfGE 30, 250 (263).
206 BVerfGE 13, 97 (116).
207  Michael, ‘Grundfälle I’, 656-657, names as one example an interference with the general right to free-
dom in Article 2 (1) of the Basic Law instead of an interference with a specific right to freedom from the 
catalogue of fundamental rights.
208  See for a comprehensive analysis e.g. BVerfGE 81, 70 (90 ff.).
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In the case of the crafts code, the less restrictive measure of allowing very 
specialized professional profiles was suggested, with the idea that such profiles 
could then be accessible with less extensive apprenticeship and examination 
requirements. However, the Court found that a certain latitude in the definition 
of the crafts professions and the related professional requirements was indis-
pensable, which could justify to some extent over-reaching examination require-
ments.209
 iv. Proportionality stricto sensu
The third step of proportionality stricto sensu allows a weigh-
ing of costs and benefits. At that point, the legislator must carefully weigh the 
relationship between the competing constitutional values, a process which 
has been described as ‘gentlest balance’ (schonendster Ausgleich)210 or ‘practical 
concordance’ (praktische Konkordanz)211. For the collision the mutual interfer-
ence of constitutional values must thus be limited as far as possible to give the 
most scope to both for all persons concerned in the circumstances of the case. 
If it is unavoidable, the circumstances of the case should determine which value 
has to step back.212 The test fundamentally evaluates interests, but does not – 
unlike the previous stage – compare with alternative measures.213 Generally, 
the exercise includes an abstract assessment of the values at issue, a concrete 
assessment of the intensity of the interference with the fundamental right and 
the conflicting value and a third step of weighing which questions whether the 
relationship between means and ends can be considered as adequate in the light 
of the previous assessments.
Sometimes it has been suggested that an additional test of individual 
reasonableness applies within the framework of the principle of proportionality. 
Such a test would delineate the outer line of proportionality and inquire whether 
an unacceptable burden is being imposed on one person.214
In the case on the crafts code, the Federal Constitutional Court denied that 
the requirements of the final examination were disproportionate; the inclusion 
of business-related skills in the subjects of the examination was indispensable 
for future self-employed craftspersons. Furthermore, statistics showed that only 
a small number of individuals failed the exam in practice.215
209 BVerfGE 13, 97 (117-118).
210  See on this formula P. Lerche, ‘Stil und Methode verfassungsrechtlicher Entscheidungspraxis’ in P. 
Badura and H. Dreier (eds.), Festschrift 50 Jahr Bundesverfassungsgericht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2001), 349 with further references.
211  K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 
1995), para 72.
212  The landmark case in this regard is the Lebach decision, see BVerfGE 35, 202 (225).
213  Michael, ‘Grundfälle I’, 657.
214  Merten, 558-559 paras 75-76.
215  BVerfGE 13, 97 (118-119).
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 C Exclusion of the principle of proportionality
It should be noted that there are cases where the principle 
of proportionality has been excluded. In the so-called ‘renegade’ case, a law 
provided that a civilian airplane could be shot down if it had been hijacked by 
terrorists to be used as a weapon, taking into account the likely death of the 
passengers taken hostage. The Federal Constitutional Court based its reasoning 
in particular on the fact that by such a measure the State treats the passengers 
as mere objects for the purpose of saving the lives of others, which fundamen-
tally contradicts the concept of human dignity enshrined in Article 1 (1) of the 
Basic Law together with the right to life in Article 2 (2) of the Basic Law.216 This 
highest constitutional value could not be made subject to the weighing exercise 
suggested by proportionality analysis.217
 D Conclusion
The section has briefly examined the principle of proportional-
ity as the form in which proportionality analysis is applied in German constitu-
tional law. Based on the broadly worded provisions in particular on fundamental 
rights of the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court has indeed put into 
practice its judicial review following the model of equal representation review, 
extensively using proportionality analysis in the form of the principle of pro-
portionality. The previous section has pointed out why we largely assign the 
German setting of judicial review to the model of equal representation review. 
As a result, the widespread use of proportionality analysis to its fullest extent 
comes as no surprise.
 V Evaluation and Conclusion
This first comparative study on German constitutional law 
serves to gauge our instruments of comparison. It features a rather broadly 
accepted practice of proportionality analysis by the generally accepted author-
ity of the Federal Constitutional Court. Going into more detail, however, some 
first criticism can be levelled against the state of the case law, in particular if we 
compare it with the reasoning in United States constitutional law, which proves 
216  BVerfGE 115, 118 (152 ff.). It should be noted that the Court left open the question of whether under 
certain limited circumstances, a duty to sacrifice oneself can exist for the individual in the case of an 
attack directed at the polity at large and the destruction of the public order of law and freedom (at 159).
217  See on the intense doctrinal debate surrounding the decision H. Hofmann, ‘Artikel 1 GG’ in B. 
Schmidt-Bleibtreu and others (eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz 12 edn (Neuwied: Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, 2011), 119 para 19. On a possible theoretical justification for this exclusion of proportionality 
stricto sensu see chapter 2 section II.A.i.b.
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somewhat more insightful on the topic of the justification of judicial review 
through the procedural democracy doctrine.
The Federal Constitutional Court has effectively weakened or intensified its 
scrutiny in each case under the equality clause, mirroring to some extent the 
procedural democracy doctrine. However, the Court has not accompanied the 
flexibility of its standard of scrutiny with sufficient explanation of its reasoning.
Generally, fragmentation prevails in the use of proportionality analysis 
beyond the field of fundamental rights as shields. In the latter field, a unified, 
consistent and convincing practice of proportionality analysis has emerged. 
However, under positive obligations and socioeconomic rights, the debate on the 
Untermassverbot has led to the rejection of proportionality analysis instead of to a 
clearer, better argued choice of the appropriate standard of review.
On the other hand, in the case of horizontal effect of fundamental rights, 
the Court deserves more praise: It has set out well the reasons why it applies 
proportionality analysis, but only with due deference based on private autonomy 
and the relevant balance of values that should only be upset through its review 
in cases of severe under- or non-representation of particular fundamental rights.
It becomes apparent that the Court has not yet fully overcome a view that 
predominantly perceives fundamental rights as shields against public interfer-
ence. This perspective is unconvincing, in particular in the light of the substan-
tial amount of provisions of the Basic Law that prescribe a broader view of 
fundamental rights which includes their socioeconomic dimension and positive 
duties upon the State.
Summing up, the Court has thus not fully realized the potential of its 
model of equal representation review. The subsequent chapter on United States 
constitutional law shows that more comprehensive reasoning on the procedural 
democracy doctrine is a helpful tool; yet it forewarns us of a different danger 
currently not present in German constitutional law: In United States constitu-
tional law, categorisations and particular levels of scrutiny have developed into 
a system that seriously restrains the Supreme Court in its analytic capacities. In 
German constitutional law, as some have pointed out, it does not even necessar-
ily matter that much which precise right is being infringed, since the scrutiny 
under the principle of proportionality ends up being so similar.218
218  See sceptical voices on this point discussed in section II.B.ii.
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 I Introduction
The most noticeable difference in a comparison of German 
constitutional law and its rather uniform principle of proportionality with the 
parallel case law in United States constitutional law is fragmentation. There 
seem to exist two separate, though sometimes overlapping debates in United 
States constitutional law, which also influences the structure of this chapter. 
On the one hand, there is intense debate on the level of scrutiny, based on the 
procedural democracy doctrine. On the other hand, there is debate as to whether 
the Supreme Court should use ‘balancing’ as a loose form of proportionality 
stricto sensu1 at all. The scepticism towards balancing is partly based on concerns 
about the institutional capacities, but predominantly on the fear of an under-pro-
tection of rights.2 The historical context and the strong perception of rights as 
shields against undue public interference have a constant impact on the Court’s 
case law. While in German constitutional law fundamental rights and judicial 
review establishing appropriate protection of rights has been a slow fight to, 
in United States constitutional law the same two pillars were established early, 
with constitutional debate following different lines as a consequence. It is in this 
comparative angle that historical elements play an important role and are thus 
also emphasized in this chapter in the same way as in the previous one.
United States constitutional law presents a variety of conflicts of values. For 
the present chapter, two main areas have been chosen because of the intense 
debate surrounding ‘balancing’ as a legal test in both of them. We assess funda-
mental rights review and the Dormant Commerce Clause as a provision which 
protects inter-state trade. In assessing the justification of judicial review in the 
second section, we find that the Dormant Commerce Clause provides a useful 
example of special interest review which is in contrast to the situation of equal 
representation present under fundamental rights review. Although the Supreme 
Court seems to take a rights-based view of the Clause, it has subsequently estab-
lished a rather rigid system of categorisation where ‘balancing’ only plays a role 
in a limited number of cases.
For the review of fundamental rights we conclude that the Supreme Court 
operates under a model of equal representation review just like the German 
Federal Supreme Court, but has found a different way to pre-balance the 
arguments resorting from the context of judicial review. Under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, review tends more to follow a model of special interest 
review. Categorisation has, however, led to some rigidity in the scrutiny which 
leads to unfavourable representation of the competing values of trade and regu-
latory autonomy.
1  See on the definition of balancing already chapter 2 section II.B.ii.
2  See insightful on this point M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, ‘American balancing and German proportion-
ality: The historical origins’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 263, 276.
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 II  The Broader Context of Judicial Review in United States 
Constitutional Law
The central phenomenon of the case law in United States 
constitutional law is fragmentation. We subsequently aim to flesh out the claim 
that the Supreme Court – much more than the German Federal Constitutional 
Court – sees itself confronted with political contestation of its authority and the 
reach of its review function. For this purpose, the history of judicial review, the 
continuing debate on its features and the institutional setting of review by the 
Supreme Court are assessed in closer detail. These features in our eyes do not 
justify a different use of proportionality analysis, but can merely explain the 
prevailing fragmentation, which we assess critically in the last section.
The historical insights show a continuous movement between strong asser-
tions of authority by the Supreme Court followed by contestation from the other 
institutions of the constitutional system. However, in light of the incomplete text 
of the Constitution, the Court has had to engage in far-reaching interpretative 
struggles to broaden the scope of rights protection.
The resulting debate on the appropriateness of judicial review continues to 
this date, despite the fact that institutional features would bolster the conclusion 
that the Supreme Court is generally well equipped for a use of proportionality 
analysis.
 A  The Emergence of Judicial Review in United States’ 
Constitutional History
Judicial review in the United States began with vagueness. 
Because of the excesses of British Parliament, American colonies developed a 
degree of scepticism against uncontrolled parliamentary supremacy as known 
from the British constitutional system.3 As a consequence, the American con-
stitutional system put more trust in legal texts right from the start, which led 
to the adoption of a written constitution as a more powerful constraint on the 
power of Congress.4 The written form raised the question of who should be in 
charge of interpreting the text.
 i. The early advent of judicial review
Judicial review is understood by some as a logically connected 
step, since the drafters of the Constitution rejected other mechanisms of control 
over the legislator.5 Views opposed to judicial review, however, feared that a 
3  D.A. Farber and S. Sherry, Judgment Calls – Principle and Politics in Constitutional Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 13.
4  Ibid., 14.
5  S.B. Prakash and J.C. Yoo, ‘The Origins of Judicial Review’ (2003) 70 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 887, 982.
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court, given the power of judicial review, might become dangerous as it would 
inevitably seek to accrue its powers at the expense of the other institutions.6
As a consequence of such profound disagreement, the actual words in the 
Constitution dedicated to the Supreme Court and judicial review remained 
sparse: Article III Section 2 of the Constitution states that the ‘judicial power 
shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution’. 
Yet, it also gives power over cases arising under the ‘laws of the United States’ 
generally. A second textual foundation can be found in the supremacy clause of 
Article VI, Section 2. The text declares that the Constitution and federal law as 
made ‘in pursuance thereof’ are the supreme law of the land. It then states that 
‘judges in every state’ are bound by this clause. There is thus no clear textual 
basis holding that the Supreme Court is invested with a power of judicial review 
as the ultimate authority over constitutionality of federal and state law. This 
vagueness has led to an ongoing debate over judicial review.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 which created the Supreme Court did not clarify 
to which extent the new court would use its potentially wide jurisdiction and 
powers. The new court itself only slowly started working, with about fifty deci-
sions during its first decade.7
Marshall as the new Chief Justice seized the opportunity of the case of 
Marbury v. Madison to hand down a landmark decision on the question of 
judicial review.8 The case was received with substantial criticism and threats to 
impeach at least one justice, but subsequent judicial restraint helped in navigat-
ing these troubled waters to slowly accustom the other branches of government 
to the new role claimed by the Supreme Court. Similar criticism re-emerged 
against the Court after its decision in the Dredd Scott case,9 where it held that 
Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery in various territories of the United 
States.10
 ii.  Continuous contestation of the Supreme Court’s review 
function
After the Civil War, the Court took up with more vigour the 
task of scrutinizing regulation of economic affairs. Based on prevailing busi-
ness-friendly attitudes among the justices, the Supreme Court used intense 
scrutiny in its fundamental rights review and struck down many laws. Funda-
mental rights’ foundation and reach was increased by the use of substantive due 
6  See for an insight into these ‘anti-federalist’ voices opposed to ‘federalist’ views M.J. Faber, Our Federal-
ist Constitution – The Founder’s Expectations and Contemporary American Government (El Paso: LFB 
Scholarly Publishing, 2011), 150 ff.
7  L. Baum, The Supreme Court 10 edn (Washington: CQ Press, 2010), 20.
8  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See for a closer discussion of the legal arguments section II.C.i.
9  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
10  See on these turbulences R.G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 5 edn (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), 62-63.
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process.11 This strengthening of review provoked increasing opposition by the 
federal legislator, whose extension of powers the Court had previously supported 
with a rather low-profile use of its review powers. In 1937, Roosevelt responded 
to the repeated attacks on his plans of socio-economic legislation under the 
New Deal with the ‘court-packing plan’. This law aimed to add more justices 
favourable to Roosevelt’s plans for socio-economic regulation to the Court.12 In a 
manoeuvre often referred to as the ‘switch in time that saved nine’, the Supreme 
Court prevented this plan and reversed its case law. It introduced varying 
degrees of scrutiny for individual categories of fundamental rights problems, 
effectively upholding from then onwards most socio-economic regulation under 
the New Deal.13
Eager to assert its authority, the Court did not refrain from bold statements. 
As an example, it held in Cooper that based on Marbury ‘the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has 
ever since been respected by this Court and the country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system’.14
Yet, not all other branches of government or commentators were willing to 
accept the ultimate interpretative authority of the Constitution. Later years, in 
particular the 1960s, saw a Court mainly occupied with the development and 
protection of civil liberties.15 In its series of clashes with the other branches of 
government, particularly in the aftermaths of the decision in Roe v. Wade, the 
Supreme Court faced massive opposition. In this decision a limited right to 
abortion during the first trimester of a pregnancy had been found to be part of 
the right to privacy enshrined in the Constitution. The Republican party started 
to openly pursue a strategy of using future appointments of Supreme Court 
justices with the clear aim of creating a majority to overturn Roe v. Wade.16 The 
result has been an increasing politicisation of the appointment process and a 
conservative shift in the views represented among the Supreme Court justices, 
although perhaps not as strong a shift as some may have hoped for.17
 iii. Conclusion
To conclude, an introductory overview of the establishment of 
judicial review in United States constitutional law leaves one with the impres-
sion of a pendulum swinging between strong, assertive positions taken by 
the Court and subsequent judicial restraint or change of direction because of 
11  See section II.B.i.
12  Baum, 22.
13  Prakash and Yoo, 895. See section III.A.ii. on the tiers of scrutiny and the decision in Carolene Products.
14  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) at 19.
15  As perhaps the landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) should be mentioned 
here.
16  McCloskey, 188-189.
17  Baum, 24.
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opposition by the public, doctrine or political institutions. The Supreme Court 
constantly faced such opposition, which has even gone as far as to various plans 
to change the composition of the Supreme Court to reduce its power or enable 
reversals of its jurisprudence. The Court departed from a fairly weak textual 
basis to construct its authority. In particular, it had to engage in extensive 
interpretative endeavours to both extend the number of rights protected under 
United States constitutional law and ensure the recognition of fundamental 
rights by both the state and the federal level. Contestation can be understood 
in light of these practically law-making interpretations to which the Supreme 
Court had to resort.
 B  Completing the Constitution: Interpretative Strategies 
towards a More Inclusive Model of Equal Representation 
Review
Two controversies plagued the drafting process of the United 
States Constitution. As a starting point, dispute arose as to whether a list of 
fundamental rights should be drafted, in particular because of the effect of an 
exhaustive listing which would potentially exclude the protection of other rights. 
Second, the drafters disagreed as to whether such a list should apply only to the 
federal government – seen as a bigger threat by some – or also to state govern-
ments. The resulting incompleteness had to be filled by the Supreme Court. The 
use of the concepts of the doctrine of incorporation and of unenumerated rights 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court was willing to engage in an almost law-
making interpretation in order to ensure that constitutional values are appropri-
ately represented in its review.
 i. Unenumerated rights
During the drafting of the Constitution, debate arose on 
whether an explicit Bill of Rights should be included in the text or not. Federal-
ists such as Hamilton were in favour of fundamental rights, but suggested that 
the Constitution as it was – without a special Bill of Rights – already enshrined 
them; an explicit list of rights might actually end up limiting the possibility 
to protect other rights not mentioned in such a list.18 Eventually, however, the 
Ninth Amendment was adopted together with what is commonly referred to as 
the Bill of Rights in 1791. The Amendment stated that the ‘enumeration [...] of 
certain rights [,] shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people’.
A number of rights are thus explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 
Among others, the Bill of Right most prominently protects the freedom of 
18  Faber, 250-251.
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speech, of the press, of assembly19 and the free exercise of religion, the latter 
combined with a prohibition of an establishment of one religion by the federal 
public power.
The Ninth Amendment has been ‘studiously avoided’ by the Supreme 
Court despite parties’ reliance on it on various occasions,20 but it is the concep-
tual basis of the protection of values which are not explicitly enshrined in the 
Constitution.21 The Court noted early that some vital interests – property, life 
and freedom of persons – found no explicit protection under the Bill of Rights. 
It eventually found a basis for the protection of such rights in the clauses on due 
process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively. The Supreme 
Court thus developed the concept of substantive due process.
a.  Substantive due process and the protection of non-written interests as rights
As early as in 1798, Justice Chase already suggested striking down a state 
law based very broadly on the spirit and underlying principles of the Constitu-
tion without linking his claim to one specific limitation on government power.22 
On several occasions, the case law relied on unwritten principles to protect 
rights such as property.23 However, sceptical scholars pointed out that the writ-
ten Constitution should represent the supreme will of the people and primarily 
be relied upon, and that according to the idea of police powers, legislation not 
forbidden by the written constitution should be presumed to serve the public 
good.24 At this stage, the Bill of Rights was only applied routinely to the federal 
government,25 so that the Constitution’s enumerated rights seemed unavail-
able to be invoked against state action. As a consequence, state courts turned to 
state constitutions and in particular the due process clauses contained therein 
to review state legislation, in particular in cases where the protection of private 
property was at stake.26
19  It should be noted that the text gives a right ‘of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances’, so that a right to assembly had to be derived based on support-
ing other constitutional provisions, see section II.B.i. on the doctrine of substantive due process.
20  K.T. Lash, ‘Three Myths of the Ninth Amendment’ (2007-2008) 56 Drake Law Review 875, 875.
21  See for the classic reading R.E. Barnett, ‘The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says’ (2006) 85 
Texas Law Review 1, 13-14. For a federalist reading according to which the amendment simply grants 
freedom to the peoples of the various states to recognise rights in their constitution and laws see Lash, 
887 ff. A third view would only recognize judicially unenforceable rights under the Amendment, see on 
this point L.G. Sager, ‘You Can Raise the First, Hide behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth – But What 
on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amemdment’ (1988) 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review 239, 251-252..
22  See Chase’s opinion on a property restricting state law in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) at 388.
23  E.S. Corwin, Liberty against Government: The Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1948), 58.
24  Ibid., 173.
25  Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243 (1833) at 250-251.
26  Corwin, 174.
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Only the Fourteenth Amendment created a textual basis for review of state 
legislation against fundamental interests. Such review was not uncontested, 
since the only meagre textual basis was the due process clause of the Amend-
ment.27
The Supreme Court thus had to base its review on a finding that the viola-
tion of a fundamental right not explicitly laid down in the Constitution would 
violate due process. In the seminal decision of Allgeyer, the Court struck down a 
state law prohibiting the conclusion of insurance contracts with companies not 
licensed in that state. It held emphatically that liberty to contract as enshrined 
in the Fourteenth Amendment ‘embrace[s] the right of the citizen to be free in 
the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live 
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue 
any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts 
which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful 
conclusion the purposes above mentioned’.28 For about four decades, the Court 
relied on the doctrine of substantive due process to protect economic rights.
The concept of substantive due process has been vividly criticized, some 
pointing towards its virtually oxymoronic phrasing.29 The Lochner line of case 
law gave rise to particularly vivid controversy. As Holmes put it in his dissent, 
the concept of liberty of contract set out in the case seemed based on a strong 
presumption of laissez-faire capitalism.30 But concern about Lochnerian review 
also grew particularly strong because of the high number of laws which the 
Supreme Court began striking down based on unenumerated rights. Some 
claimed that the Court was simply making these rights up.31
At the same time, the Lochner era was also the time of the emergence of 
substantive due process to protect other civil liberties.32 In defence of Lochner, 
27  The Slaughter-House Cases had effectively made the Privileges and Immunities Clause virtually inopera-
tive, see subsequent section II.B.ii.a. on the latter clause. There are still indications that the latter inter-
pretation is doubted in the case law and some suggest that the Privileges and Immunities Clause would 
have the potential to protect unenumerated economic rights often perceived as insufficiently protected. 
Anonymous, ‘Case Notes: Fourteenth Amendment – McDonald v. City of Chicago’ (2010) 124 Harvard 
Law Review 229, 237. See on the under-protection of economic rights section III.A.ii.
28  Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) at 589.
29  See J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust – A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 18, who refers to the use of substantive due process as ‘green[ing] pastel redness’.
30  See closer on the scrutiny and standards of review in the so-called Lochner era subsequently section 
III.A.ii.
31  The Court held in roughly 160 cases between 1899 and 1937 that statutes were unconstitutional, see 
B.F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law (Boston: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1942), 154. Still, 
some authors contend that one should not forget that on the whole more laws were upheld then struck 
down, L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 2 edn (Mineola N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988), 567 note 2.
32  See e.g. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) at 399, where the Due Process Clause is held to protect 
a freedom which includes ‘the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
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some have thus pointed towards the inconsistency that some critics would 
denounce the very same resort to substantive due process by the Supreme Court 
in Lochner, but would applaud it in cases where fundamental rights preferred by 
them were at stake.33
b.  Contestation of the results of the doctrine of substantive due process
The flexibility of the doctrine of due process led to a situation where the 
distinction between an enumerated right and an unenumerated right partly 
inspired by constitutional provisions became blurry in some cases. The right 
to assembly as an example seems partly enshrined in the Constitution, but not 
in words as an independent right, but linked to the right to petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances. In Hurley, the Court upheld a right to assemble 
for expressive purposes without clearly stating whether it was applying substan-
tive due process or deriving the right from existing rights provisions of the 
Constitution.34
Even more contentious results were achieved in cases where a fundamental 
right was recognized and defended by the Supreme Court in the absence of truly 
pertinent provisions in the Bill of Rights. The right to privacy is perhaps the 
most prominent example.35 Perhaps as a reaction to criticism of the concept of 
unenumerated rights, there is at times notable confusion in the case law as to 
the very notion of the right to be protected and the competing public interest.36
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’
33  D.N. Mayer, Liberty of Contract – Rediscovering a Lost Constitutional Right (Washington: Cato Institute, 
2011), 116.
34  Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
35  In the landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) at 484-486, on a state law prohibit-
ing the use of contraceptives by married couples, the lead opinion established a right to privacy derived 
from the Bill of Rights. The concurring opinion by Harlan, which only later became more influential, 
suggested, on the contrary, that the Due Process Clause could enshrine such a right on its own without 
reliance on the Bill of Rights, see Griswold v. Connecticut at 499-500. As one of the perhaps most conten-
tious decisions of the Supreme Court’s history, the Court subsequently decided that the right to privacy 
as developed in previous jurisprudence was ‘broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy’, though subsequently limiting this right as not absolute, see Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) at 154. See for one well known sceptical account of the decision J.H. Ely, ‘The 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade’ (1973) 82 Yale Law Journal 920.
36  Referring to the right to privacy as a ‘liberty interest’ rather than a right, the Court seemed at some 
points willing to protect it with less vigour, before it returned to a virtually similar treatment in later 
case law, compare here Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) at 520 to Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) at 278. There was also some confusion as to 
the opposing value to the right to privacy: While in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court required a ‘compel-
ling state interest’ to justify abortion regulations, see Roe v. Wade at 155, it later introduced a weaker test 
whether an ‘undue burden’ was imposed by abortion regulation on a woman’s decision, see Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) at 874.
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In the field of unenumerated rights the Supreme Court has thus used its 
power carefully but with massive impact to recognize and defend fundamental 
rights beyond the narrow circle of rights expressly set out in the Bill of Rights. It 
has construed the Constitution as a system protecting a broad number of values 
and aimed to reconcile these values. Similar to the subsequently examined case 
of the doctrine of incorporation, the safeguards erected by the text of the Consti-
tution seemed insufficient and required judicial intervention and creativity. 
Despite the constant attempts by Supreme Court justices to underpin their case 
law with doctrinal foundations, the reproach of judicial activism was a constant 
companion of the case law37 and a constant reminder of the contested power of 
the judiciary in the United States constitutional system. In our view, this contes-
tation is the reason for the fragmented development of fundamental rights case 
law which we observe in later sections.
 ii. The doctrine of incorporation
The Bill of Rights only addresses the federal government. The 
Supreme Court thus developed the doctrine of incorporation, which describes 
the process by which a fundamental right formerly only addressing the federal 
level also becomes active as a protective safeguard against the states.
a.  The narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
Initially, the judiciary refused to enforce the Bill of Rights against state legis-
latures.38 The Fourteenth Amendment adopted in the aftermaths of the Civil 
War, however, directly addressed the states, requiring them not to abridge the 
‘privileges or immunities of citizens’, not to ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law’ and to grant all persons in their jurisdic-
tion the ‘equal protection of the laws’.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause presented a first opportunity. This 
clause could arguably provide an adequate textual basis to incorporate the 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights as obligations imposed on the states. The 
similar clause in Article IV of the Constitution had been construed previously 
as extending the protection of fundamental rights to non-state citizens, prohibit-
ing the state from discriminating against them.39 When first asked to interpret 
the new privileges and immunities clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged Article IV and the previous construction. Then, 
however, it gave a very narrow reading to the clause, holding substantially that 
the clause only prohibited states interfering with a limited number of nationally 
37  See for an example of a vigorous dissent by Scalia Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) at 955, 
reproaching his colleagues for having undertaken a ‘policy-judgment-couched-as-law’.
38  Barron v. Baltimore at 250-251.
39  See the Corfield case as described in M.C. Dorf and T.W. Morrison, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law 
– Constitutional Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 192-193.
146
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
granted rights such as the right to demand protection abroad or to travel to the 
national capital.40
b. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
With the narrow reading given to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the 
Supreme Court resorted to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states. As a consequence, the 
Supreme Court had to rely on the doctrine of substantive due process in this 
field as well.
Some suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole should be read 
in light of the historical objective to make the safeguards deemed necessary to 
constrain federal power also binding on the states’ powers. As a consequence, 
the Bill of Rights as a whole would become incorporated through the Amend-
ment.41 Instead, the Supreme Court opted for a step-by-step approach, finding 
that some rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights may also be safeguarded against 
action by the states, because otherwise a ‘denial of due process’ would arise.42 A 
right would thus be recognized based on whether it fell within the ‘concept of 
ordered liberty’43 or whether it was sufficiently ‘fundamental’.44 The Supreme 
Court had to walk a tightrope to avoid all too personal or moral judgments in 
recognizing which rights fulfil the threshold of being incorporated through 
this due process test.45 As a result of continuous incorporation, most of the Bill 
of Rights has in the meantime been incorporated against the states, since the 
Court looked consistently in the Bill of Rights for guidance when assessing 
potential rights against states.46
The incorporation of enumerated rights was yet another difficult interpreta-
tive enterprise imposed on the Supreme Court because of the sparse textual 
basis given by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has developed a similar, 
flexible, case-by-case method of incorporation for unenumerated rights. It asked 
whether they fulfilled the requirements set out previously, while simultaneously 
moving towards a more culturally coloured formula of rights that were ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’.47
Summing up, the Supreme Court extended the scope of protection of the 
rather weak textual foundations of fundamental rights protection in United 
States constitutional law considerably. Again, we note the Court’s willingness 
40  In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) at 77-78.
41  See explicitly Black dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) at 72-73.
42  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) at 99.
43  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) at 325.
44  Ibid. at 327.
45  As already observed by S.H. Kadish, ‘Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication – A Survey 
and Criticism’ (1956-1957) 66 Yale Law Journal 319, 327.
46  Duncan v. Louisiana, 319 U.S. 145 (1968) at 147-148.
47  See e.g. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) at 503.
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to fully unfold the potential of the Constitution to represent a broad number of 
values, this time taking into account the federal structure of the United States.
 iii. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s development of the doctrines of unenu-
merated rights and of incorporation extended the Court’s fundamental rights 
review power. The Supreme Court worked hard to enlarge the number of rights 
protected under the Constitution and to ensure that rights are protected both 
at the federal and the state level. In its generally convincing case law, a broad 
variety of values is thus weighed against each other under the Court’s review. 
However, the far-reaching interpretations of the Court also opened its case 
law up to criticism. To no small extent, the fragmented development that we 
perceive in the subsequent sections scrutinizing the case law goes back to this 
constant contestation.
There are, however, more than just disagreements in the substantive law 
with the Court. In academic debate, scholars also continue to question the func-
tion and extent of judicial review from an institutional point of view.
 C  The Continuous Debate on Judicial Review and the 
Appropriate Institutional Balance under the Constitution
We subsequently assess the various aspects of the debate on 
judicial review. The purpose is not to reassess the strength of the justification 
of such review; rather, a picture of the arguments opposed to the Court should 
emerge and clarify why the Supreme Court perceived the need to resort to rule-
like adjudication and to refrain at many occasions from balancing solutions. It 
is in particular the breadth of the debate which is impressive as compared with 
German constitutional law.
 i.  The text of the Constitution and the arguments in 
Madison v Marbury
The central question is whether and based on which reasons 
the Supreme Court should have the ultimate power to construe the Constitution. 
This ultimate interpretative authority enables the Supreme Court to strike down 
a state law or a law passed by Congress by means of its power of judicial review 
because it finds the law in violation of its understanding of the Constitution. 
The power of judicial review can be answered easily in the case of state laws: the 
need for a central judicial power lies here in the avoidance of having a different 
reading of the Constitution in every state, which would run counter to the objec-
tive of the Constitution ‘to form a more perfect union’.48
48  See on this point already O.W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt and Brace and Co., 
1920), 295-296.
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Review of federal laws is, however, more difficult to justify. At this point, two 
lines of attack can be distinguished. First, the arguments used in Marbury have 
been challenged as an unsatisfactory basis for judicial review. Second, there 
exist conceptual criticisms of judicial review.
Based to a large extent on Hamilton’s views in a Federalist article,49 Marshall 
had developed three major arguments in Marbury to establish that the Supreme 
Court should be empowered to judicial review against the benchmark of the 
Constitution and to strike down laws passed by Congress.50 These three argu-
ments rest, however, on shaky foundations, as is subsequently shown.
First, he suggested that the Court must possess these powers because of the 
written character of the Constitution. In absence of judicial review, the legisla-
tor would be free to ignore the provisions of the Constitution.51 However, the 
mere written form of the Constitution can just as easily be understood as a mere 
effort of codification to retain one original text. Also, an adjudicative mechanism 
is not an indispensable condition for a legal text to unfold binding force.52
Second, in Marshall’s view the supremacy clause required that courts be 
generally enabled to set aside laws that violated the Constitution. Apart from 
obvious cases of violation, this judicial power would also include cases where the 
court itself had to interpret the Constitution to establish whether a law violated 
it, as ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is’.53 For Marshall, the Supreme Court was thus the ultimate inter-
pretative authority of the Constitution. Marshall’s idea that supremacy requires 
judicial review seems deficient, as the mere higher rank enjoyed by the Consti-
tution may give a clear power to strike down laws that obviously violate the 
Constitution; however, it leaves the question open as to whether the Supreme 
Court is entitled to impose its own reading as authoritative in cases where there 
is no one obvious understanding of the Constitution.54
As a third argument, he based his views on the broad powers given to federal 
courts in Article III, finding it unlikely that the Constitution ‘should not be 
looked into’ when courts used this power.55 The Constitution’s text is, however, 
not perfectly clear, so that Marshall’s arguments on Article III and VI assume 
rather broadly that the power to hear cases arising under the Constitution 
includes full judicial review.56 To conclude, the ambiguity of the constitutional 
49  A. Hamilton, ‘The Judiciary Department’ (1788) The Federalist No. 78.
50  A few years later it also claimed the power to review state acts, Baum, 20.
51  Marbury v. Madison at 176.
52  Dorf and Morrison, 24.
53  Marbury v. Madison at 177.
54  See in particular sceptical on this point J.B. Thayer, ‘The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law’ (1893) 7 Harvard Law Review 129, 152.
55  Marbury v. Madison at 179.
56  H. Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’ (1959) 73 Harvard Law Review 1, 3 ff., 
developed the argument that in a hypothetical scenario where Congress had not used its power to create 
federal courts, the Supreme Court would be the only instance of appeal and therefore would necessarily 
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provisions and several unconvincing arguments in Marbury have left ample 
room for debate.
 ii. Conceptual contestation of judicial review
There is, furthermore, also a more conceptual debate on 
judicial review next to the one strictly based on the text of the Constitution. 
One could also question the higher institutional competence of courts to decide 
questions under judicial review that a legislator has already tried to tackle. It 
could thus be claimed that if the method for resolution of hard cases is the same 
in judicial as well as legislative decision-making – i.e. one proceeds to voting – 
there is no obvious reason why unelected judges should vote rather than elected 
representatives of the people.57 In the extreme, one could thus question whether 
there should be judicial review at all.
Less extreme proposals focus on the appropriate degree of deference that the 
judiciary owes to the legislator. A typical suggestion is to leave Congress leeway 
as one legitimate interpreter of the Constitution. In such a scenario, judicial 
review means that the Supreme Court would only intervene to strike down a 
federal law if it finds the interpretation given to the Constitution by the legislator 
sufficiently unreasonable.58
Others embrace such deference, but with some caveats added for specific 
situations: for fundamental rights essential to responsible democratic decision 
making such as the freedom of speech, press or assembly, judicial review should 
be more strict in order to ‘err on the side of less regulation’ in cases of doubt.59 
Alternative proposals would limit judicial review of the decisions of other 
branches of government on structural provisions of the Constitution such as 
federalism or the division of powers.60
The central difficulty with judicial review was coined by Bickel in a seminal 
work as the counter-majoritarian problem: since judicial review implies striking 
down legislation reached by a majority, there is a tension with the democratic, 
majority-based decision-making process.61 Structurally, judicial review also 
possess – based on the text of the Constitution – the power to review such decisions by state courts. Yet, 
this suggestion cannot account for judicial review of federal laws.
57  J. Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2005) 115 Yale Law Journal 1347, 1391-1392.
58  Typically, this is referred to as ‘Thayerian deference’, after the early and perhaps most prominent 
proposal by Thayer, 152.
59  M.J. Perry, Constitutional Rights, Moral Controversy, and the Supreme Court (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 180-181.
60  See generally J.H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration 
of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980).
61  A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1962).
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implies the idea of a bias towards more freedom of the individual, as the Court 
is not capable of producing legislation, but only of striking it down.62
To justify judicial review, scholars have thus pointed towards the need to 
protect certain fundamental interests in particular in situations where the 
majority decides to interfere with them. The classic case are rights which protect 
minorities. Because of their security of tenure and the general task of securing 
equality, courts are often perceived as ideal guardians of such rights which are 
vulnerable to the normal majority-based democratic process.63
Over the course of history, however, the Supreme Court did not stand up 
to this task on several occasions, while Congress championed the defence of 
the rights of minorities.64 Still, there is still merit in the claim of strengthen-
ing minority rights by judicial review in light of the rather crude assumption 
underlying the counter-majoritarian objection. The latter opposes ‘majoritarian’ 
decision-making by the other institutions to judicial intervention by judicial 
review. Yet, reality is nowhere near that simple: in the United States constitu-
tional system, the Senate’s claim to represent the people truly in a majoritarian 
manner is unpersuasive, while the presidential elections have several times 
led to a victory of a candidate despite his receiving only a minority of the votes. 
Constituencies for all the institutions vary substantially. Majoritarianism is thus 
only one central, but not the cardinal rule in the Constitution.65
Constitutional reality is thus rather a complex interaction of the various 
branches than the clear-cut situation of majority-based decision-making by the 
legislative power as opposed to the judiciary. The doctrine has thus focused on 
the appropriate interpretation of rights in the Constitution to justify judicial 
intervention as a protective safeguard for specific constitutional values.
 iii. The procedural democracy doctrine as a middle ground
In his seminal contribution, Ely suggested finding a happy 
medium between total deference to the legislator and all too intrusive scru-
tiny under fundamental rights by the judiciary. According to the procedural 
democracy doctrine judicial review should ensure that in principle, deference is 
given to democratic decision-making procedures, unless it is claimed that the 
62  R. Fallon (Jr.), ‘The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review’ (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1693, 
1705-1706.
63  See e.g. L.H. Tribe, God save this honorable court : how the choice of Supreme Court justices shapes our 
history (New York: Random House, 1985), 20.
64  See L. Fisher, Defending Congress and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 
104-105 with examples.
65  Farber and Sherry, 25. In more closely examining the decision-making process for federal legislation in 
the United States, some scholars have suggested that to pass a law requiring the assent of the House of 
Representatives, the Senate and the President is in fact just as difficult as to require a supermajority in a 
unicameral parliamentary system, see J.M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent – Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 234 ff.
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democratic process was corrupted because fundamental rights had not been 
respected. This would be the case if the political process was malfunctioning or 
if one particular group of society was constantly excluded because of prejudice.66 
Review is thus perceived as rather process-based and requires varying standards 
of review depending on the right at issue. A court must decide what rights are 
linked to the democratic process. The variety of values pursued by the Constitu-
tion renders it difficult to suggest judicial review in some and deference in other 
cases, as even deference may again unduly privilege certain interests in a way 
similar to the initial counter-majoritarian problem.67
Ultimately, the debate on judicial review led to suggestions that the Supreme 
Court, despite its power of review, does not necessarily have the final word on 
constitutional issues.68 Against such ‘strong form’ review, one could construe a 
model of ‘weak form’ review where the highest judiciary’s interpretation of the 
constitution can be overruled in the short-term by a legislative, constitutionally 
qualified majority instead of only granting onerous overruling by the judiciary 
itself.69
 iv. Conclusion
The debate on judicial review has led from sharply opposing 
views into the intricacies of the political constitutional system of the United 
States. A number of arguments demystify any strong case against judicial review 
such as the counter-majoritarian problem. Yet, neither is there a clear-cut case in 
favour of a court to ensure the protection of minority rights. The battle lines in 
the meantime seem to be drawn along questions of how to use judicial review in 
specific situations, while hardy any scholar seriously questions anymore whether 
there should be judicial review at all.70 The continuous debate and constant 
questioning of the Supreme Court’s role as an interpreter of the Constitution 
have left their mark on the development of the case law. There was a fragmented 
development of review under various categories of rights. Furthermore, the 
66  Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 101 ff.
67  J.E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2006), 19 ff.
68  Scholars noted that the Supreme Court’s decisions are on various occasions effectively overridden 
by legislative efforts, see for examples Baum, 204; on other occasions, the case law is voluntarily 
disregarded by legislative or administrative measures to get the Court to reconsider its precedent, see 
Dorf and Morrison, 36. The Court insisted that it remained its own power to define the substance of 
fundamental rights, striking down Congressional legislation that challenged earlier Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) at 519.
69  M. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights – Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Consti-
tutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 33-34. This proposal could also operate as 
a sequence, giving all actors time to accustom themselves to weak judicial review and gain experience 
before moving to more intrusive strong review, see Tushnet, 263-264.
70  Farber and Sherry, 31.
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notable scepticism towards ‘balancing’ by the judiciary is also stronger than e.g. 
in German constitutional law, a scepticism which was often phrased in insti-
tutional terms. If we compare the situation of the Federal Constitutional Court 
in Germany, there is criticism of its decisions on many occasions, but no such 
fundamental scepticism towards its very review function.71 Arguably, only in 
such a more accepting climate could the principle of proportionality emerge as 
the dominant legal test. We find these factors an explanation, yet no satisfactory 
justification for the resulting case law, as is subsequently discussed. Before that, 
we also note that the hesitance of the Supreme Court to use balancing appears 
particularly remarkable since it is well equipped for its role of equal representa-
tion review, as the subsequent section shows.
 D  Institutional Aspects of Judicial Review and the Supreme 
Court in United States Constitutional Law
The Supreme Court stands for a peculiar system of judicial 
review. As an important point, the Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdic-
tion and no specialized constitutional court. Consequently, it had to adapt its 
standard of review to a very diverse set of contexts. However, its features point 
towards a powerful, well-equipped Court that could successfully engage in pro-
portionality analysis in our view.
Quite some elements point towards a powerful position of the Court. The 
nine justices72 are appointed for life tenure73 and are usually lawyers of high 
merit with distinguished careers in private practice, academics or public 
service.74
Also, in matters of jurisdiction the Supreme Court possesses large powers. 
Next to the rather rare number of situations of original jurisdiction, it mainly is 
in charge of a broad appellate review power75 and possesses significant control 
over its docket, i.e. what cases are heard.76 Having decided which cases to hear, 
the Court then possesses discretion as to whether it would like to give a case full 
consideration or whether it only remands the decision, giving some guidance to 
the lower court on how to reconsider the case.77
71  See chapter 3 section II.B.ii.
72  Note that long before the mentioned ‘court-packing plan’ there have been several changes in the number 
of Supreme Court justices before the present day number of nine was reached in 1869, Baum, 11.
73  See sceptically on this ‘anomaly’ Sanford Levinson, in McCloskey, 284. In an extreme case, a change of 
view in the Supreme Court would require it to wait until judges die or retire, as constitutional amend-
ment or impeachment of judges have proven as hardly feasible in practice, Tushnet, 22.
74  See for an overview of the present Supreme Court justices’ backgrounds Baum, 52-53.
75  See for more details Ibid., 7-8.
76  Farber and Sherry, 119. The case load of the Court is not overwhelming, with currently about 80 deci-
sions rendered per year, see Baum, 69.
77  Baum, 106-107.
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In deciding cases, the Court has a broad scope to express its views. Judg-
ments are discursive in United States constitutional law, with the option for 
judges to sign a majority opinion, to join concurring opinions, but also for 
minority judges to express their views in dissenting opinions.78 This allows for 
a wide variety of viewpoints to find themselves represented; it is common that 
earlier concurring or dissenting opinions become the stepping stone for new 
adjudicative developments and case law reversals.
By contrast, one could argue that the Court’s power seems somewhat 
restricted since in theory the Supreme Court can only decide concrete cases, 
while there is no system of abstract review.79 A system of constitutional advisory 
opinions exists in some state constitutions, but not for the Supreme Court.80 
Also, the Constitution in principle vests all courts with the power of judicial 
review, which gives review a decentralized structure and makes the Supreme 
Court only the highest, but not the only court to be able to set unconstitu-
tional legislation aside.81 As a consequence of the limitation to the decision of 
concrete disputes, some have developed the concept of strong ‘departmentalism’, 
which suggests that the solution of a question of constitutionality found by the 
Supreme Court is strictly limited to the case at issue. As a consequence, all other 
political actors as well as voters remain free to adhere to different interpretations 
and advocate them to change the Supreme Court’s interpretation.82 Yet, in real-
ity the exercise of review by the Supreme Court developed beyond mere concrete 
review and functionally operates comparable to a system of abstract review, 
answering broadly to constitutional questions brought before it even in cases of 
facial challenges.83 There appears to be broad consensus that the Supreme Court 
operates in what is at various points referred to as a ‘special functions’, ‘public 
rights’ or ‘law declaration’ model.84
Summing up, the Supreme Court seems in theory well-positioned for even 
intrusive judicial review and the use of full-scale proportionality analysis. The 
justices are familiar with the constitutional legal system, enjoy life tenure and 
have control over their docket.
78  See in more detail Ibid., 112-113.
79  See Article III of the Constitution on federal judicial power, which only extends to ‘cases and controver-
sies’.
80  See for a sceptical account of such advisory opinions M.A. Topf, A Doubtful and Perilous Experiment – 
Advisory Opinions, State Constitutions, and Judicial Supremacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
81  B.J. Hartmann, ‘The Arrival of Judicial Review in Germany under the Weimar Constitution of 1919’ 
(2003-2004) 18 Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 107, 110-111.
82  See e.g. E.I. Meese, ‘The Law of the Constitution’ (1986-1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 979, 985, who 
argues for a distinction between the binding effect of constitutional law including decisions by the 
Supreme Court and the Constitution itself.
83  M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 347 ff.
84  See for an overview R. Fallon (Jr.), and others, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System 6 edn (New York: Foundations Press, 2009), 73-75.
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 E Conclusion
Judicial review in United States constitutional law is marked 
by the early beginnings of substantive review powers exercised by one supreme 
judicial authority and simultaneously by the constant contestation of such 
important powers. Despite rather vague constitutional language, the Supreme 
Court established its position of judicial review very early. However, critics 
denounced judicial review by the Supreme Court as a potential disturbance of 
the appropriate balance between the various branches of government under 
United States constitutional law. The central point of debate was the question 
of who ought to have the final word on the interpretation of the Constitution. 
Debate on the appropriate role and scope of judicial review has thus been 
ongoing ever since, focusing sometimes more on the concrete foundations as 
interpreted in Marbury, sometimes more on conceptual foundations such as 
the counter-majoritarian problem of judicial review or the purported need for 
judicial review to defend the rights of minorities disadvantaged and excluded 
from the democratic decision-making process. In its fundamental rights juris-
prudence the Court has met the criticism of engaging in judicial law-making, 
because it developed the doctrines of incorporation and of unenumerated rights 
to complete the number of rights protected and make them operational against 
the states next to the federal government.
Two notable developments can be better understood with this knowledge. 
First, there is a remarkably fragmented development concerning the standard 
of review, which is influenced by the contestation of the Court’s authority and 
the discussion of the procedural democracy doctrine. Second, there is a nota-
ble reluctance by the Court to engage in balancing, i.e. the ultimate stage of 
proportionality analysis, which goes back to the debate on the appropriateness 
of judicial review and also draws arguments from this debate. This can explain 
features of the case law, but does not, in our view, accurately justify them.
Turning now to the normative assessment of arguments surrounding 
pre-balancing and the justification of judicial review, we note in the subse-
quent section that there is a particular perception of fundamental rights which 
predominantly perceives them as crucial safeguards against public interference, 
i.e. in their function as shields. From this stems a rather low importance given 
to horizontal effects.
This perception is also a decisive reason for the widespread reluctance to 
engage in balancing observed in United States constitutional law. Balancing 
is not only contested based on the perceived lack of legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court, but also because there is fear of under-protection of rights. Contrary to 
our findings on fragmentation, these arguments seem based in a particular 
normative conception of rights and thus arguably justify a different approach to 
proportionality analysis.
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 III  The Justification of Judicial Review in United States 
Constitutional Law
In the present section, we first focus on the justification of 
judicial review for the protection of fundamental rights. The Court’s case law 
and the doctrinal discussion provide rich insights into how review is perceived. 
Yet, we note at this stage that there is strong fragmentation, caused by the case-
by-case development of the case law and the constant contestation of judicial 
review. Also, we note the particular perception of fundamental rights when 
assessing that there is only very limited development in the field of horizontal 
effects of fundamental rights in United States constitutional law. Arguably, a 
model of equal representation is the result of pre-balancing, although some 
justified differences to e.g. German constitutional adjudication exist.
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, review seems to follow the model of 
special interest review. There continues to be disagreement as to whether the 
procedural democracy doctrine requires intrusive or rather deferent scrutiny 
under the clause.
 A  The Procedural Democracy Doctrine and Fundamental 
Rights Review: The Development of Tiers of Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has tailored the solutions to cases as they 
crossed its path following a case-by-case approach of categorisation of the appro-
priateness of scrutiny. The case law under the Equal Protection Clause is partic-
ularly insightful, as it was under this provision that the Court began developing 
the tiers of scrutiny and the procedural democracy doctrine. In the Supreme 
Court’s view, certain violations of rights thus deserve more intrusive scrutiny 
than others. Despite the sometimes rigid categorisation of cases that followed, it 
can be welcomed that the Supreme Court has set out in more detail than e.g. the 
German Federal Constitutional Court85 the reasoning upon which it based its 
application of different degrees of scrutiny. Remarkably, the Supreme Court did 
not adapt its review power to the cases of positive obligations under fundamen-
tal rights, socioeconomic rights and the horizontal effect of fundamental rights 
in a manner similar to the German Federal Constitutional Court.86 The prevail-
ing conception of rights as shields prevented the Court from giving such effects 
to rights. We find the latter different conception of rights more convincing as a 
justification than the fragmented and overtly rigid development of the tiers of 
scrutiny.
85  See chapter 3 section III.B.i.
86  See chapter 3 sections III.B.ii and III.B.iii.
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 i. Equal protection in United States constitutional law
The United States Constitution was drafted before the back-
ground of an irreconcilable conflict on slavery. The Constitution thus did 
not contain a general equality clause, and it was only post Civil War that the 
Fourteenth Amendment introduced in its first paragraph the Equal Protection 
Clause. In the run-up to the Civil War the Supreme Court had already found 
that Congress had no power to restrict slavery or confer citizenship on African 
Americans in the badly reputed Dredd Scott case.87 But equality did not only 
play a role in cases of racial discrimination. During the Lochner era, several 
laws were also overturned by the Supreme Court based on the Equal Protection 
Clause. Then, there was a remarkable shift in the case law of the Court at the 
time of the New Deal.
 ii.  Carolene Products, procedural democracy and the system 
of tiers of scrutiny
After years of constant intense scrutiny of the Lochner era,88 the 
Supreme Court reversed its jurisprudence in the seminal Carolene Products case. 
It loosened its scrutiny of socioeconomic regulation.
From this case onward, the Court developed a system of varying degrees of 
scrutiny based substantially on what was later described by Ely as the doctrine of 
procedural democracy. For most socioeconomic regulation, the Court decided to 
apply only a lenient test of rationality, which comes down to a deferent assess-
ment of suitability.89 In later cases, the Court itself admitted between the lines 
just how weak this assessment could turn out.90 Some fears arose on whether 
there could be ‘underenforcement’ of the Equal Protection Clause.91
However, simultaneously to this weakening of the intrusiveness of review, 
the Supreme Court introduced the need for a ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ 
in the well-known footnote four of the decision. This more searching inquiry 
was to take place in cases where the political process failed to protect ‘discrete 
and insular minorities’ from prejudice.92 The notion of ‘discrete and insular 
87  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) .
88  See closer on Lochner section IV.A.ii.
89  See e.g. New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), where the Court merely asserted whether the objec-
tive brought forward for a classification was ‘legitimate’ and accepted the regulation as it ‘rationally 
further[ed]’ the purported objective.
90  See e.g. the Court’s statement in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) at 487, holding that 
the law at issue ‘may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature, 
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.’
91  L.G. Sager, ‘Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms’ (1978) 91 Harvard 
Law Review 1212, 1212, suggests that the lenient review constitutes a judgment about the possibility to 
enforce such provisions rather than an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
92  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) at footnote 4.
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minorities’ has been subject to criticism, as prejudice also operates against other 
groups, so that ‘anonymous and diffuse’ groups have been suggested as perhaps 
more adequate.93 The Court thus narrowed down its presumption of constitu-
tionality in certain cases, leading to a more intrusive standard of review.
For enumerated and unenumerated fundamental rights, the Court subse-
quently developed a heightened standard of review, so-called strict scrutiny, as 
opposed to the normal scrutiny which is often referred to as minimal scruti-
ny.94 The more stringent standard involves a shift of the burden of proof to the 
state government having to justify a measure, requires the establishment of a 
‘compelling state interest’ and ‘narrow tailoring’ of the regulation to the interest 
identified.95
Not all of these intensifications of the standard of review were new. The 
requirement of narrow tailoring had already been present in the ‘police powers’ 
cases during the Lochner era, while the shift in the burden of proof was noth-
ing other than the reversal of the presumption of constitutionality for socio-
economic legislation that had emerged in Carolene Products.96
Strict scrutiny including the ‘compelling state interest’ requirement devel-
oped only in the early years after the Cold War out of a controversy over the 
appropriate scrutiny to protect freedom of speech as enshrined in the First 
Amendment.
The Court was deeply divided between two factions, one favouring a rather 
low protection of freedom of speech and the other preferring high protection for 
the right. The dispute was often presented to confront pro-balancers and ‘abso-
lutists’.97 Only towards the end of the 1950s did the latter group have a major-
ity in the Court98 and was it able to further the ‘compelling state interest’ test 
as set out for example in Sweezey v. New Hampshire. The majority in this case 
relied on narrow grounds to decide the case, noting, however, that even if much 
more fundamental reasoning had been required, they could not conceive a ‘state 
interest’ proper to justify the restriction at issue.99 Low protectionist Frankfurter 
reacted with a separate opinion containing an explicit balancing test.100 He 
93  B. Ackerman, ‘Beyond Carolene Products’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 713, 731-732.
94  The designation ‚strict scrutiny‘ has been adopted after similar language of the Supreme Court in the 
two decisions in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944).
95  S.A. Siegel, ‘The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny’ (2006) 48 American 
Journal of Legal History 355, 359-360.
96  Ibid., 360.
97  S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 468, 470.
98  See in detail on the factions and changes in membership within the Supreme Court Siegel, 362-363.
99  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) at 251.
100  Frankfurter, concurring in Ibid. at 267.
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referred to the interest using the term ‘compelling’.101 Only in later case law did 
the same term became a tool for ‘absolutists’ to restrict the use of balancing.
In Gibson, the Court struck down a speech-restrictive measure holding that 
the record was insufficient to show an ‘immediate, substantial, and subordinat-
ing state interest’.102 In Sherbert, a case on the free exercise of religion, the Court 
held that under a compelling state interest, only the ‘gravest abuses’ could be 
understood, which ‘endanger[ed] paramount interest’.103 By emphasizing the role 
of the ‘compelling state interest’, a hierarchy in favour of fundamental rights 
could be achieved, while at the same time justices in favour of high protection of 
freedom of speech were also able to avoid balancing.
 iii. The proliferation of the system of tiers of review
Once established, the standard of strict scrutiny proliferated in 
all areas of enumerated and unenumerated fundamental rights. Yet, criticism 
of the different tiers of review for different rights already arose in the 1970s, the 
system being perceived as oversimplifying matters, while in reality the Supreme 
Court applied a whole ‘spectrum of standards’.104 Strict scrutiny had also shown 
itself as ‘“strict” in theory and fatal in fact’, leading to a high number of laws 
failing to meet its high standard.105
The Court introduced an intermediate standard of scrutiny to refine the 
system of tiers of scrutiny. This standard first emerged in the case law under 
the Equal Protection Clause, under which the system of tiered review had also 
been adopted by the Court.106 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the 
Court would uphold a measure if it was ‘substantially related’ to the achieve-
ment of ‘important government objectives’. 107 Attempts to form a uniform 
standard by Justice Marshall were short-lived.108 In the early 1980s, again several 
cases departed from the system of tiers of scrutiny, which led commentators to 
predict a breakdown of a system that was ‘fundamentally flawed and destined 
101  Ibid. at 262.
102  Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963) at 551.
103  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) at 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
104  Marshall, dissenting in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) at 98.
105  G. Gunther, ‘Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection’ (1972) 86 Harvard Law Review 1, 8.
106  See J. Shaman, ‘Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny’ (1984) 45 
Ohio State Law Journal 161, 163 and footnote 23 for further references.
107  See e.g. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) at 197. In Craig v. Boren, the Court found statistical evidence 
produced by the state unconvincing to support a differentiation in terms of sex for the legal drinking 
age as pursuing the objective of traffic safety.
108  In Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) at 95, Justice Marshall formulates for the 
majority: ‘As in all equal protection cases, however, the crucial question is whether there is an appropri-
ate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.’
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to collapse’.109 In Rostker v. Goldberg, Congress had allowed the registration and 
conscription of men, but not of women despite the more comprehensive request 
by the President. The Supreme Court had to choose between the minimal scru-
tiny applicable for military statutes and intermediate scrutiny for equal protec-
tion cases. It decided the case based on both standards,110 insisting that the 
levels of scrutiny should be respected. The reasoning reveals somewhat involun-
tarily the potential shortcomings of a strict categorisation into tiers of scrutiny. 
The Court held that if the levels of scrutiny were not respected, they could 
become ‘facile abstractions used to justify a result’ and that mere ‘labelling’ of 
the decision under scrutiny could not ‘guide a court to the correct constitutional 
result’.111
In a variety of cases, the Court effectively adapted its scrutiny to the case 
at issue, examining minimal scrutiny cases with more vigour,112 giving more 
deference in intermediate scrutiny cases113 and exempting some cases from 
strict scrutiny.114 As a consequence, scholars already called for a uniform and 
consistent approach in the mid 1980s, a call that has recently been comple-
mented with the suggestion to use proportionality analysis as a ‘more stable, 
principled alternative’.115 The use of proportionality analysis is a useful sugges-
tion, but mixes two debates: as we have shown, the debate on ‘balancing’ takes 
place based on different considerations, while here the appropriate level of 
discussion should focus on the standard of review. While the use of proportion-
ality analysis itself is a useful suggestion, the tiers of scrutiny should rather be 
replaced by an appropriately sliding scale of the standard of review rather than 
mere proportionality analysis as the applicable substantive test. The problem of 
rigidity seems to stem from the Court’s technique of categorization, which again 
is based, in our view, on the constant fear of contestation of its authority noted in 
the first section of the chapter.
The overview over the development of the standard of review shows an inex-
tricable intertwinement between the interpretative test applied, the burden of 
proof and the standard of review. The Supreme Court juggled all these elements 
to build a legal test, aiming for a set of clearly defined categories. In practice, 
109  Shaman, 163.
110  See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) at 79, finding the law ‘not only sufficiently, but also closely’ 
related to the claimed purpose.
111  Ibid. at 69-70.
112  See e.g. the strict review of the legislative motive in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973) at 534-535.
113  See e.g. the Court upholding a criminal statute which made only males liable for statutory rape, Michael 
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
114  See e.g. the Court tailoring an exception to strict scrutiny under the right to travel for a statute that 
rendered abandonment of a child a misdemeanour, but a felony if the parent left the state, Jones v. 
Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
115  A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘All Things in Proportion? American Rights Doctrine and the Problem 
of Balancing’ (2011) 60 Emory Law Journal 101, 164.
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however, the complexity of the cases rendered such clear categories an unwork-
able concept. Yet, it remains commendable that the early findings on procedural 
democracy in Carolene Products have acted as a catalyst for the development of 
tiers of review, which then have spread throughout all fundamental rights. At 
the same time, the exact importance of rights for the democratic process itself 
has not always been clarified by the Court. We can perceive a somewhat neglect-
ful treatment of positive obligations, socioeconomic rights and the potential 
horizontal effect of rights in the Court’s review. As suggested, this stems from 
the particular view of rights predominant in United States constitutional law. 
In itself, however, this view seems able to justify normatively different uses of 
proportionality analysis, much more so than the categorization of the tiers of 
scrutiny which seem based somewhat on non-normative fears.
 iv.  Deferent review of fundamental rights in the dimensions 
of positive obligations and horizontal effect
There is a remarkable absence of a number of features of 
fundamental rights review in the United States constitutional system in com-
parison with the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. With-
out expressly basing itself on the procedural democracy doctrine, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court developed extensive review in the fields of positive 
obligations arising under fundamental rights, of socioeconomic rights and also 
– though qualified by the setting of special interest review as discussed with 
the example of the Lüth case – of horizontal effect of fundamental rights.116 By 
contrast, there is hardly any comparable development in United States constitu-
tional law. Two points can be distinguished for this purpose.
First, as noted there is a marked tendency in United States constitutional 
law towards more sympathy for political rights in their defensive function. This 
can be shown on the one hand by the fact that economic and social rights which 
would require positive action are not enshrined in the Constitution and gene-
rally observed with suspicion. Some scholars in United States constitutional law 
are highly sceptical of socioeconomic rights, because in their perception positive 
obligations entail over-restrictive constraints on the legislator, and would inevi-
tably lead to severe conflict between branches of government.117 Also, there is a 
suspicion going back to the times of Lochner whether the state should have any 
positive duties at all, although the New Deal reforms seem to have somewhat 
embraced the modern regulatory state.118
116  See generally chapter 3 section III.B.iii.
117  See e.g. F.R. Cross, ‘The Error of Positive Rights’ (2001) 48 UCLA Law Review 857, 887.
118  See insightful on this point C.R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and 
Why We Need It More Than Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 61 ff. Newer accounts suggest that 
in fact a large share of the scepticism is due to the perception that rights review always comes down 
to ‘strong’ review leaving hardly any leeway to the legislator, while a weaker form of review could be 
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Second, the Court insists with remarkable vigour on the doctrine of state 
action. As some suggest, this insistence is best explained by the uneasiness with 
which the United States’ constitutional system has actually accepted the trans-
formation into a regulatory, social democratic state with positive duties on state 
authorities.119 As a consequence, since the early Civil Rights Cases, violations of 
fundamental rights caused by private individuals have constantly been exam-
ined by the Supreme Court under the angle of whether there was state action. 
There was development within the doctrine of state action. Private entities such 
as companies were found to have infringed fundamental rights when they exer-
cised what amounted essentially to government functions,120 but not for example 
for the mere fact of operating in a situation of monopoly.121 But there was no 
paradigmatic change comparable to the Lüth decision in German constitutional 
law to coat private law extensively with judicial review based on proportional-
ity analysis or another similar legal test, neither under a theory of direct nor of 
indirect horizontal effect.
As a paradigmatic case, in Shelley v. Kraemer the Court accepted a claim 
that racially discriminatory private covenants among house owners had been 
enforced by private courts. The discriminatory action by the private house 
owners had thereby been transformed into state action subject to scrutiny by the 
Supreme Court.122 If this loose link was found sufficient, a broader number of 
private interactions could have come under judicial review because of the possi-
bility to enforce dubious private obligations by the public court system. However, 
the Court subsequently narrowed down the potential applicability of its findings 
and continues to uphold a division between the public and private spheres, the 
latter not being subject to judicial review despite the difficulty of drawing a clear 
boundary.123
In the United States constitutional system, the predominant conceptualisa-
tion of fundamental rights is uncomfortable with far-reaching positive duties of 
the State. The same applies to obligations imposed on private parties through 
fundamental rights. As a consequence, the Supreme Court has not extended 
its review under the procedural democracy doctrine to these dimensions of 
fundamental rights. There is, however, hardly an argument to counter such a 
view of rights as embedded in a constitutional system as a whole. Rather, this 
perception seems to be itself part of the normative substantive constitution and 
can thus be accepted as an argumentative justification for a different standard of 
review for constitutional rights adjudication.
successfully combined with the concept of social and economic rights before moving to more intrusive 
review, see Tushnet, 256.
119  Tushnet, 181.
120  Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
121  Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
122  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
123  See closer on the aftermaths of Shelley v. Kraemer M.D. Rosen, ‘Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly 
Decided? Some New Answers’ (2007) 95 California Law Review 451, 458 ff.
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 v. Conclusion
The discussion on the procedural democracy doctrine as the 
justification for judicial review has substantially bolstered our view of funda-
mental rights review as generally following the model of equal representation 
review. The Supreme Court set out the reasons why it scrutinizes violations of 
fundamental rights more intensely in some cases than in others in a commend-
ably explicit manner. The early findings under the Equal Protection Clause were 
extended to other fundamental rights. Remarkably, however, the Court did not 
extend its review to positive obligations or the horizontal effect of fundamental 
rights. These dimensions seem to play no predominant role justifying judicial 
review, which seems in our view based on the predominant conception of fun-
damental rights as shields against public intervention in United States consti-
tutional law. While the categorization of the tiers of review seemed somewhat 
unjustified, this latter perception of rights seems an appropriate argument in 
the pre-balancing process based on which the Court could legitimately decide 
not to extend its review and use of proportionality analysis in a manner compa-
rable to the German Federal Constitutional Court.
 B  Elements of The Procedural Democracy Doctrine and 
Judicial Review under the Dormant Commerce Clause
The case law under the Dormant Commerce Clause oscillates 
between a more categorical excluded reasons approach and a resort to balanc-
ing in order to solve questions of even-handed measures. The main reason for 
the different interpretative approaches, which also lead to varying standards 
of review, can be found in disagreement on how to conceptualize not only the 
Dormant Commerce Clause as a norm, but also its underlying justification for 
judicial review.
 i. The Dormant Commerce Clause as a competence norm
As part of the complex regime regulating federalism in the 
Constitution, the Commerce Clause prescribes that ‘[the Congress shall have 
power] to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, 
and with the Indian tribes’.124 In the early case law, the Court had to elaborate 
on the extent of the power of Congress itself before truly turning to the restric-
tive side of the clause on regulatory powers of states.125 In Gibbons v. Ogden, the 
Court found that the power of Congress under the clause was very broad and 
included measures targeting commercial exchange with even only indirect inter-
124  Article I Section 8 Clause 3 of the Constitution.
125  M. Lawrence, ‘Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework’ 
(1998) 21 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 407.
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state impact.126 This power was, however, not fully exclusive.127 As the conflict 
between the state and the federal law in the case was very clear, no further clari-
fication of the states’ powers was given.
In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh, the Court held that states were 
authorized to regulate commerce in the form of police powers until federal 
pre-emption occurred. Federal courts would supervise this exercise of compe-
tence.128 Apart from the express power given to Congress, the Commerce Clause 
was, however, silent on the extent of regulatory powers of the states which 
influenced trade, but did not directly regulate it. The Supreme Court was thus 
called to interpret the scope of regulatory powers remaining with the states in 
light of this ‘dormant’ side of the Commerce Clause.129 The Court had to decide 
what power to regulate remained with the states, while preventing protectionist 
measures from unduly hindering inter-state commerce.
Our suggestion is that the Dormant Commerce Clause justifies judicial 
review including the use of proportionality analysis – but only in rare cases 
and with the use of due deference, as review should follow a model of special 
interest review. The special interest at stake is the avoidance of protectionism. 
We assess the various accounts on the justification of review under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to bolster this suggestion.
 ii.  Competing conceptual readings of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause
Theoretical accounts often point back to the ideas contained in 
footnote four of Carolene Products: They suggest that review should be based on 
the idea that some interests – here out-of-state traders – are not adequately repre-
sented in the political process and should therefore be defended by the Court in 
its review.130 Others oppose such views and suggest that the aim of the Clause is 
to protect economic union rather than personal rights.131
If the procedural democracy doctrine is endorsed, it is still not clear what 
exact ‘right’ of traders is protected. In part of the case law, there seems to persist 
the view that by means of judicial review traders as out-of-state interests ought 
126  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), 189 ff.
127  Ibid., 209-210. States might, according to the Court, pass some laws regulating commerce insofar as 
they would neither interfere with nor be contrary to federal legislation.
128  Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829). It should be noted that scholars disagree as to 
whether proportionality analysis was used in the case or not, T.A. Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943, 950.
129  The origin of this term was traced back to a statement by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 
according to which the power to regulate interstate commerce ‘can never be exercised by the people 
themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant’.
130  See e.g. M. Tushnet, ‘Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1979) Wisconsin Law Review 125, 125.
131  See e.g. R.B. Collins, ‘Economic Union as a Constitutional Value’ (1988) 63 New York University Law 
Review 43.
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to be allowed to claim a substantive right of access to local markets. As an 
example, the decision in C&A Carbone v. Clarkstown can be understood in this 
light.132 Despite the fact that both local and out-of-state operators were excluded 
by the regulation at issue, the Supreme Court found the measure discriminatory 
and struck it down. The Court thus seemed to suggest that non-local economic 
operators must possess a right to access the local market.
According to Ely, contrary to such a substantive perception, the right granted 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause can only be understood as procedural in 
nature. The clause erects a system of ‘virtual representation’, which links out-of-
state interests to local interests and political representation.133 Since, for example, 
a state cannot tax out-of-state traders higher than local traders, the latter simul-
taneously represent the out-of-state interests in their struggle for no unreason-
able tax burden through their own political representation in the state.134
There are, however, voices who doubt the usefulness of such an analysis. The 
centrality of reasoning on interest group participation in the political process 
led Chief Justice Rehnquist to complain in one of his dissents on the over-
reliance on process-based views in the use of judicial review under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: ‘Analysis of interest group participation in the political pro-
cess may serve many useful purposes, but serving as a basis for interpreting the 
dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them.’135
More substantive criticism has been uttered by Regan.136 In his view, out-
of-state traders do not require virtual representation through intrusive judicial 
review under the Dormant Commerce Clause, because they are already repre-
sented in the local political process through consumers. Local consumers can 
engage in lobbying at the local level in cases of inefficient, protectionist regula-
tion, if such regulation imposes an unreasonable burden not only on out-of-state 
traders, but also on them.137
However, a full rejection of the justification of judicial review through the 
procedural democracy doctrine as a consequence seems exaggerated. In fact, 
Regan’s findings certainly call for a careful adaptation of the standard of review 
and a careful use of proportionality analysis. In particular, the use of balancing 
is likely to be required only rarely. However, we suggest that pre-balancing these 
arguments suggests that review should follow the lines of a model of special 
interest representation. There may be cases of severe imbalance between the 
values of trade and of regulatory autonomy, which require rebalancing. Judicial 
review should thus be examined as to its justification on a case-by-case basis.
132  See the subsequent discussion of the case in section IV.B.ii.
133  Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 83.
134  Ibid., 84.
135  Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) at 215.
136  See already chapter 2 section V.B.iv.d.
137  D.H. Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause’ (1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 1091, passim.
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The usefulness of this suggestion is bolstered if we look at cases like West 
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.138 Against the background of a non-discriminatory 
tax on milk wholesalers, whose receipts were subsequently used to subsidize 
local milk producers, the Supreme Court turned to analyse the political process 
to justify its review. Through the combination of measures, in-state interests had 
been ‘mollified’139 and were not reliable as safeguards in the legislative process to 
lobby unreasonable regulation. Consequently, stricter review failed the measure 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Lenient review would have arguably 
ignored the fact that local representation of one value had been reduced by the 
measure itself.
 iii. Conclusion
Summing up, the continuing dispute on the appropriate 
justification of judicial review under the Dormant Commerce Clause has not 
produced one single solution. As a consequence, over the years the Court has 
developed a rather crude categorical distinction between discriminatory and 
non-discriminatory measures combined with a fairly superficial use of balanc-
ing. In the discussion of balancing, we thus aim to suggest a less categorical and 
more flexible approach which gives more weight to various stages of proportion-
ality analysis and even balancing, as far as appropriate under a model of special 
interest review.
 C Conclusion
For the review of fundamental rights in United States consti-
tutional law the Supreme Court has developed and discussed the procedural 
democracy doctrine in detail as the justification of its review. Overall, its find-
ings make a plausible claim supporting a model of equal representation review 
as the outcome of pre-balancing. The extension of a system of tiers of scrutiny 
throughout fundamental rights jurisprudence has been criticized by some as 
over-categorical and unable to operate in practice. While there may be some 
merit to these claims, we observed as a commendable feature that the debate 
focused on the appropriate standard of review and was not overshadowed by 
the discussion on whether or not to use balancing. The confusion in the case 
law caused by such a mixture of two debates has already been shown with the 
example of German constitutional law.140 In the German case, the rejection of 
proportionality analysis in some cases based on considerations of procedural 
democracy overshadowed the question of the appropriate standard of review. 
However, we also note some peculiarities and shortcomings in United States 
constitutional law. In particular, the fragmentation of the tiers of review may 
138  See a closer discussion of the case in section IV.B.iii.
139  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy at 200.
140  See chapter 3 section III.B.i.
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be appropriately explained by the context of the Supreme Court’s contested 
authority, but it does not seem justified in a normative manner. Contrary to 
this finding, the fact that review remains limited in fields of positive obligations 
and horizontal effect of fundamental rights seems justified by the normative 
perception of rights as shields against public interference. Contestation of the 
Court’s authority and fear of under-protection of rights are again central to the 
subsequent section. The debate on balancing is marked by a specific perception 
of judicial balancing – i.e. as weakening the protection of rights – which does 
not seem normatively justified. However, as a fortunate consequence of the 
fragmented debate, this battleground remains to some extent separated from the 
discussion of the system of tiers of scrutiny.
In the case of the Dormant Commerce Clause, we argued that the Court’s 
pre-balancing should result in a model of specialized interest review, which thus 
calls for specific justification of the appropriate standard of review and a reduced 
role given to balancing. In the case law and the doctrine, there are competing 
positions. A full rejection of review by scholars like Regan, however, seems exag-
gerated in our view. Consequently, we observe an unfortunate fragmentation in 
the case law discussed in the subsequent section, which all too strictly distin-
guishes between cases of discrimination and non-discriminatory measures, the 
role of balancing thereby being unduly reduced.
 IV ‘Balancing’ in United States Constitutional Law
Based on our findings in the previous two sections, pre-bal-
ancing suggests to different results: fundamental rights review operates under 
a model of equal representation review, while under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause a model of special interest review is more appropriate. At the same time, 
debate on the justification of judicial review can be observed as remarkably sepa-
rate from the one on the use of balancing. This division also informs the present 
section.
Under fundamental rights review, contrary to the situation in German 
constitutional law141 rights had been enshrined in the Constitution and judi-
cial review been established from the beginning. However, changes in legal 
thinking were the necessary point of departure for the emergence of balanc-
ing. As a central feature of the debate, balancing is perceived as a technique 
which weakens rights in their shielding function against interference based on 
public interests. This predominant view, together with institutional concerns 
which go back to the contestation of the function of judicial review exercised 
by the Supreme Court, produced a fragmented jurisprudence, where balancing 
is sometimes embraced, but on other occasions firmly rejected. We find these 
features rather unconvincing, as they do not seem to be based on truly norma-
tive concerns capable of forming arguments in the pre-balancing exercise.
141  See chapter 3 sections II.A.i and II.A.ii.
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Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, we found some inconclusive debate 
on the justification of judicial review. This uncertainty about the true nature of 
the Clause also influenced the use of balancing. Over the years a strict dichot-
omy of discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures was developed by the 
Supreme Court. Only for the second category does the Court resort to a rather 
superficial balancing – mostly in favour of regulatory autonomy. The rigidity of 
the distinction and its consequences can thus be criticized in the light of our 
suggested pre-balancing.
 A  Balancing and Fundamental Rights in the United States 
Constitution
Fundamental rights are codified in a fairly incomplete manner 
in the United States Constitution. Substantial interpretative work had to be 
dedicated by the Supreme Court to make them operational and also to somewhat 
complete a list of rights found to be insufficient for the concerns of a moderniz-
ing regulatory state.142 Having put great efforts in construing a full-scale system 
of fundamental rights protection based on a rather tenuous textual basis, the 
Court seemed generally motivated by a classic reading of fundamental rights 
as shields against public interference. This reading, while in itself a legitimate 
perception of rights, also provoked scepticism towards weighing rights against 
public interests, a process which seemed to weaken the predominant nature of 
rights. Changes in legal thinking influenced the Supreme Court and made it 
abandon an early, highly categorical approach. At some points, ‘balancing’ was 
indeed applied to fundamental rights. But contrary to the example of German 
constitutional law, there is no overall recognition that the Supreme Court should 
actually balance.
The piecemeal strategy followed by the Supreme Court in developing the 
case law can be observed in the field of balancing. Notably, the very development 
of the idea of balancing is only the consequence of changes in legal thinking, 
but then follows the lines of fragmented case law under various fundamental 
rights provisions. We can contrast this impression with the fairly unitary princi-
ple of proportionality developed in German constitutional law.143
 i. Changes in Legal Thinking in the Early 20th Century
The very starting point for legal tests going beyond pure 
subsumption had to be progress in legal thinking. During the 19th century, 
the Supreme Court exhibited a formalistic, categorical approach to adjudica-
tion of the Constitution and in particular the fundamental rights enshrined in 
it.144 Preeminent scholars of that time also strongly advocated formalist ideals. 
142  See section II.B.
143  See chapter 3 section IV.
144  See e.g. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
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Langdell described law and its interpretation as a virtually scientific exercise of 
deduction, based on the ideas that the law was determinate, systematized and 
autonomous.145
Already towards the end of the 19th century, these thoughts met increasing 
criticism from other scholars. Holmes suggested perceiving the law as a tool 
to achieve social ends rather than as a mere exercise of logical deduction. As a 
consequence, applying legal rules would come with the delineation of compet-
ing rights or interests, including weighing. Distinctions of degree were more 
appropriate than clear-cut conceptions of absolute rights. He warned against a 
mathematical conception of law where everything could be logically deducted 
from ‘some general axioms of conduct’.146
In a similar vein, Pound argued that the scientific character of law should 
be understood in a more instrumental manner, as a ‘means’.147 The overall 
objective had to be a sociological legal science whose principles adapted to the 
‘human conditions they are to govern’ and not the other way round.148 Pound 
set out perhaps the most explicit account of judicial balancing in the sense of 
proportionality stricto sensu in a 1921 paper, outlining a broad number of ‘social 
interests’ that should be realized to the highest extent possible with the lowest 
sacrifice to the others.149
Cardozo underlined in his writings that it was judges who created law150 and 
that there could be no general ritualistic application of an inflexible set of rules. 
Instead, such formalistic examinations had to be limited to certain areas, while 
on many occasions a more balanced approach using several methods of inter-
pretation and application were required for a satisfactory solution.151 The law’s 
application by the judge was shaped by the judge’s intuitions, assumptions and 
prejudices.152
American realism launched the next attack on formalism. Realist scholars 
argued that there was judicial creation of law, that law should be perceived as a 
means of pursuing social ends and that the rule to be interpreted could not be 
considered as the only factor which led to the final decision.153 Law in itself and 
the decision reached by legal interpretation was in their view not at all based on 
logic, but rather on a set of arguments to make a legal solution appear plausi-
145  See for a more detailed account T. Grey, ‘Langdell’s Orthodoxy’ (1983-1984) 45 University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review 1, 6-11.
146  O.W. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law (1897)’ (1996-1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991, 998.
147  R. Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (1908) 8 Columbia Law Review 605, 605.
148  Ibid., 609.
149  Published later as R. Pound, ‘A Survey of Social Interests’ (1943) 57 Harvard Law Review 1, 39.
150  B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), 10.
151  B.N. Cardozo, Lebendiges Recht (The Growth of the Law, 1924) (Munich: Biederstein, 1949), 40.
152  Ibid., 49.
153  For a good overview of realist arguments, see K.N. LLewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism – Respond-
ing to Dean Pound’ (1930-1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1222, 1236-1238.
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ble, while it was in reality based on intuitions, political views or psychological 
factors.154
The outcome of these intellectual battles was a general turn towards more 
pragmatism, according to which legal rules should be valued more as to their 
consequences. Consequently, scholars should avoid over-restrictive analytical 
studies.155
 ii.  From Lochner to Carolene Products: the persistence of 
categorisation and definitional approaches
Whereas the controversy between formalists and progressives 
emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, the Supreme Court took its 
time in noting and truly implementing the newer ideas of weighing interests. 
A categorical, definitional approach to the adjudication of fundamental rights 
cases remained predominant despite crucial changes in the actual protection 
and scrutiny of fundamental rights that occurred during the first decades. 
While categorical approaches served to protect economic fundamental rights in 
particular, balancing came up at a period where that protection was significantly 
weakened, as we show below. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that balanc-
ing was criticized as unduly weakening rights by commentators who disagreed 
with the ongoing changes in fundamental rights protection.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Court turned to an ever stronger 
focus on certain economic constitutional rights which it defended with particu-
lar vigour. Lochner v. New York constituted one of the landmark decisions which 
lent its name to the era.156 Relying on the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court struck down the labour law of the state of New York 
which had prescribed maximum hours of work per day and week for employees 
in bakeries. The Court stated that the central question asked should be whether 
this was ‘a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the 
State, or [...] an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the 
right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts 
in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the 
support of himself and his family’.157 This passage was followed by a rather 
categorical approach to interpreting the notion of police powers.158 The resulting 
bias favouring the right to freedom of contract is omnipresent in the judgment. 
154  See in particular J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930) (London: Stevens, 1949). See on the parallel 
to the German Free Law Movement J. Herget and S. Wallace, ‘The German Free Law Movement as the 
Source of American Legal Realism’ (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 399, 422.
155  Aleinikoff, 957-958.
156  Lochner v. State of New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
157  Ibid. at 56.
158  See for similar non-balancing readings of Lochner also Aleinikoff, 951, or Ely, ‘Roe v. Wade’, 941.
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The Court – or rather a close majority159 – rejected any justification based on 
public health, as bread would be baked in the same fashion independent of the 
working hours of bakers, while the latter would need no specific protection as 
a profession and should be free to contract their labour under conditions they 
so chose.160 There was disagreement also in the lower courts as to whether 
baking should qualify as a profession dangerous to the health of individuals. 
For the majority, this also meant that the health of bakers as individuals was an 
excluded justification, since otherwise a law could go to any length to protect 
such an uncertain interest; they found thus that ‘the limit of the police power 
ha[d] been reached and passed in this case’.161
A more fact-based weighing exercise akin to proportionality stricto sensu was 
undertaken by three dissenting justices, who declared the law a reasonable mea-
sure in light of the state of research on work-related health risks and a compari-
son with working hours regulations for bakers in other countries.162 Categorical 
reasoning coexisted thus with a more flexible balancing approach.
Next to the Lochner line of case law, as mentioned earlier the Supreme 
Court also started to use substantive due process as a means to protect other 
civil liberties.163 It again relied predominantly on categorical approaches, as the 
example of Meyer v. Nebraska shows. In this case, a statute prescribed English as 
the only teaching language combined with a prohibition to teach living foreign 
languages at school before students had passed the eighth grade. The aim was 
to promote civic development by teaching to students primarily English and 
American ideals and also to protect children’s health by not forcing them to 
learn a foreign language at young age. The Court held that the means adopted 
‘exceed exceed the limitations upon the power of the State and conflict with 
rights’ of the plaintiff.164 To underline this point, the Court, however, did not 
weigh competing interests, but instead explained the limits of the state’s powers 
using examples of matters that still fell within these powers, such as requiring 
English as a teaching language or drafting a curriculum for the schools. By 
contrast, a regulation such as the one at stake could only be taken in situations 
of emergency; the justification of protecting a child’s health was excluded as a 
reason based on the evidence.165
Still, the majority of cases focused on the defence of economic rights. The 
legacy of Lochnerism was mixed, although the case itself soon faced acerbic criti-
159  Lochner was the result of a 5-4 vote, with some indications that the other dissenting opinion by Justices 
Harlan, White and Day was initially written as the majority opinion, D.E. Bernstein, ‘Lochner v. New 
York: A Centennial Retrospective’ (2005) 83 Washington University Law Quarterly 1469, 1496-1497.
160  Lochner at 57.
161  Ibid. at 58.
162  Ibid. at 70-71.
163  See section II.B.i.a.
164  Meyer v. Nebraska at 402.
165  Ibid. at 402-403.
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cism.166 In some important decisions, the Court continued to protect predomi-
nantly economic freedoms such as liberty of contract and property rights. It 
struck down laws that prohibited employers from forbidding to their employees 
to join unions, thereby weakening the union movement.167 On the other hand, 
in a number of cases laws for labour market reform were upheld by the Court, as 
in the case of Muller v. Oregon basing itself on categorical thinking such as the 
difference between sexes as justifying legislation protecting female workers.168
Categorisation thus became an important tool for the Court for both 
economic and non-economic liberties, supporting in general a nearly libertar-
ian, anti-regulatory agenda. In the landmark case of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 
minimum wage legislation for female employees was invalidated.169 The case 
epitomizes the categorical approach taken by the Court towards substantive due 
process review of constitutional rights. The majority of judges found that free-
dom of contract had to be perceived as the ‘general rule’, while restraint could 
only be the ‘exception’.170 Consequently, the Court listed the possible exceptions 
to the rule and tried unsuccessfully to fit the law at issue in the category of police 
powers measures.
However, economic thinking had already abandoned the sceptical stance 
towards socioeconomic regulation which was still maintained in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, and the Great Depression of the end of the 1920s left the Court 
even further out of touch with reality. The Court’s intense review clashed with 
the new socioeconomic regulation adopted under President Roosevelt’s New 
Deal initiative.171 With the Lochner approach becoming virtually untenable, 
the Supreme Court – after several new appointments, including Benjamin 
Cardozo172 – reversed case law like Adkins.173
In the seminal decision of Carolene Products, the Court developed a 
‘presumption of constitutionality’174 in favour of socioeconomic legislation. It 
held that ‘the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless, in light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assump-
166  See e.g. L. Hand, ‘Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day’ (1908) 21 Harvard Law Review 495, 
502-503. Pound also suggests Lochner as one instance of mechanical jurisprudence, see Pound, 
‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’, 616.
167  See e.g. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
168  See e.g. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) on women’s working hours.
169  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
170  Ibid. at 546.
171  See concisely on Roosevelt’s various regulatory initiatives Sunstein, 41 ff.
172  See on these changing majorities and minorities on the Court’s bench in detail Bernstein, 1510-1511.
173  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also for an important earlier decision rejecting 
the imposition of a particular economic vision on the states through the Due Process Clause Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
174  United States v. Carolene Products Co. at footnote 4.
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tion that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience 
of the legislators.’175 Examination of the ‘rational basis’ of legislation would thus 
be the future test, as the starting point of the development of tiers of scrutiny. 
However, as indicated in the famous footnote four of the decision, the presump-
tion of constitutionality would operate in a more narrow fashion in cases where 
‘prejudice against discrete and insular minorities’ could seriously curtail the 
political process which normally protected them, which would then require a 
‘more searching judicial inquiry’.176 At the same time, the era was also marked 
by the emergence of balancing approaches. Consequently, in United States 
constitutional discourse there is a mixture between the often perceived under-
protection of economic fundamental rights resulting from the paradigmatic 
change of Carolene Products and the emergence of balancing. Balancing is thus 
rejected conceptually as necessarily entailing the weakening of rights protec-
tion.177
The early 20th century was marked by an emphasis on the defence of 
economic rights, which was subsequently overturned in the landmark Carolene 
Products decision. Categorical approaches seem, however, to have been used 
detached from this paradigmatic change in how rights should be protected. 
Carolene Products should rather be understood as a concern about the over-
protection of economic rights, combined with a potential problem of under-
protection of important civil liberties, which formed the basis of footnote 4.178 
The consequence was the varying standards of scrutiny discussed previously.179 
In our view, the link between balancing and Carolene Products should not 
necessarily be made, because an understanding of balancing as a reaction to 
the overemphasis on economic rights in the Lochner era appears a simplistic 
conclusion.180 As shown, the Supreme Court used similar categorisation-based 
reasoning in other fundamental rights cases. Arguably, for some justices the 
limits of categorisation as a tool of rights adjudication became visible more 
generally beyond a particular category of fundamental rights and led to attempts 
to introduce more flexible weighing tests. Issues of the justification of judicial 
review and the debate on balancing ought to be kept deliberately separate in this 
light. The comparative experience of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
also testifies amply to the fact that reliance on proportionality analysis did not 
cause under-protection of fundamental rights.
The scepticism towards balancing, however, continued in doctrinal comment 
and the case law. This conceptual scepticism as well as scepticism of the insti-
tutional aspects of balancing by the Supreme Court produced fragmented case 
175  Ibid. at 152.
176  Ibid. at footnote 4. See section III.A.ii.
177  See on this accusation of a social progressive agenda being necessarily pursued by the use of balancing 
J. Bomhoff, ‘Genealogies of Balancing as Discourse’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 109, 129.
178  Stone Sweet and Mathews, 129-130.
179  See section III.A.ii.
180  As correctly emphasized by Bernstein, 1508-1509.
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law, where balancing continues to be sometimes accepted, but fiercely rejected 
in other cases.
 iii. The emergence of balancing
Balancing made its appearance in constitutional jurisprudence 
following the example of ‘wild clover, not poison ivy’.181 In a variety of the cases 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s that also served to develop the various levels of 
scrutiny, the Court weighed objectives brought forward by states as to whether 
they could qualify as sufficiently important, depending on the level of scrutiny 
that was sought.182 In Schneider v. State, faced with a prohibition on distributing 
leaflets in order to prevent littering and keep the streets clean, the Court held 
that ‘the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circum-
stances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of 
the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights’.183 Balancing thus followed 
the strictness of the tiers of review, as can be seen in the early freedom of 
speech cases which applied a more speech protective weighing than from 1949 
onwards.184
Elements of weighing consequently spread throughout constitutional law, 
used for example to recognize new rights and simultaneously limit new burdens 
on states, or to lessen the impact of the choice of a particular tier of scrutiny.185 
Balancing as used in United States constitutional law is thus hard to assess with-
out taking into account the system of tiers of scrutiny developed over time.186
Balancing has faced constant criticism and has thus not been applied con-
sistently. Much of the criticism against proportionality stricto sensu relates to the 
already discussed methodological difficulties for the judiciary. Another group 
of critics, however, perceived balancing not as a safeguard against absolute 
conceptions of rights, but instead pointed to the reduced protection for rights 
that it might enshrine. In the debate on balancing in freedom of speech cases, 
Frantz argued that the weighing test applied assured ‘little, if any, more freedom 
of speech than we should have had if the First Amendment had never been 
adopted’.187 If constitutional protection would only prescribe protection as appro-
priate in a particular case after weighing all competing considerations, there 
seemed in his view hardly any specific protection given by the Constitution.
A less comprehensive criticism is applied by critics who suggest that balanc-
ing should not be rejected outright, but rather limited to certain areas of 
181  Aleinikoff, 963.
182  Compare also the emergence of balancing under the Dormant Commerce Clause in Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), discussed in the subsequent section IV.B.i.
183  Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) at 161.
184  See J. Fallon, Richard H., ‘Strict Judicial Scrutiny’ (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review 1267, 1288-1289.
185  See for an insightful overview Aleinikoff, 969-971.
186  As discussed in section III.A.iii.
187  L.B. Frantz, ‘The First Amendment in the Balance’ (1962) 71 Yale Law Journal 1424, 1448.
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constitutional law. Pildes suggests that in a variety of situations, rights should 
be understood as ‘structures’, which require no balancing against interfer-
ence. Rather, a structure conception perceives rights as spaces of freedom into 
which interference is only allowed based on specific reasons.188 Judicial review 
must therefore not engage in balancing, but inquire into the purpose of public 
intrusion into the sphere of a right, and reject the latter if it is based on excluded 
reasons.189
The debate on the use of balancing has continued not only in the doctrine, 
but also in the case law. As one constant opponent to balancing by the judiciary, 
Justice Scalia pronounced profound disagreement with the approach of balanc-
ing. In one case, he wrote that balancing would use a scale analogy in an inap-
propriate manner, as both interests were simply ‘incommensurate’, and balanc-
ing was tantamount to comparing ‘whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy’. In his view, the task of weighing interests should be 
left completely to Congress.190
In the more recent decision of District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia 
again crossed swords with Justice Breyer over a potential balancing test under 
the Second Amendment. The case recognized an individual right to bear arms 
and struck down a law banning handguns in the home. Scalia suggested that 
the amendment was the ‘product’ of an interest balancing, and that no new 
weighing could thus be undertaken by the judiciary. To use such an approach to 
establish a constitutional right could not be permitted, as a ‘constitutional guar-
antee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional 
guarantee at all.’191 Contrary to the majority’s position, Breyer, writing for a 
minority of four, contended that such a ‘“proportionality” approach’ had already 
been applied in various contexts of the Court’s case law and could produce 
useful results in combination with appropriate deference.192
 iv. Conclusion
The use of balancing in United States constitutional law is 
marked by particularly strong fragmentation and persistent attempts of catego-
risation. Balancing emerged in the case law, but remains contested to this day, 
which is based in particular on the idea that rights would not be sufficiently 
protected under a balancing approach. This prolongs the rather sceptical stance 
taken towards public interests and socio-economic regulation in much of United 
188  See already chapter 2 section II.A.i.b.
189  R.H. Pildes, ‘Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law’ (1993-1994) 
45 Hastings Law Journal 711, 724.
190  See Scalia, dissenting, in Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888 (1988) at 898.
191  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 U.S. 2783 (2008) at 2821.
192  Ibid. at 2852. See for a more detailed analysis of this reference to proportionality M. Cohen-Eliya and I. 
Porat, ‘The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The Proportionality Approach in American Constitu-
tional Law’ (2009) 46 San Diego Law Review 367, passim.
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States constitutional doctrine, which seems to persist even after the Caroline 
Products turnaround in the Court’s case law, and seems to be caused to no small 
extent by the parallel development of tiers of scrutiny and balancing. As has 
been shown in the chapter on German constitutional law, however, an automatic 
inference that balancing weakens rights seems largely overstated. Rather, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’s constant reliance on the principle of 
proportionality has led to a more predictable and consistent approach to funda-
mental rights adjudication. This approach also manages to operate without the 
omnipresent tendency of categorisation, which treats cases in a very different 
manner based on which rights category they belong to. We therefore find the 
scepticism towards balancing unconvincing based on our earlier pre-balancing.
 B Balancing and the Dormant Commerce Clause
As discussed, the case law under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause oscillates between a more rights-based conception of the clause and a 
more categorical approach based on excluded reasons. Under the first concep-
tion, balancing the effect of regulation on trade against the purported benefits 
of regulation plays a predominant role. Under the second conception, the Court 
looks for indications that a measure should be qualified as protectionist and 
therefore as based on an excluded reason. The older case law shows vacillation 
between the two poles, while later a division was introduced into measures 
causing facial discrimination – which are virtually always excluded as protec-
tionist – and incidental restrictions of commerce, where a balancing test is 
used. Generally, it is suggested that no predominant role must necessarily be 
played by full-scale proportionality analysis, as we have found review under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause to follow a model of special interest representation 
review. However, the division undertaken by the Court arguably seems to some 
extent over-restrictive and reduces the role of balancing to a mere rubber-stamp 
for measures found to be non-discriminatory. We therefore venture to suggest a 
more flexible approach which falls more in line with our result of pre-balancing, 
a model of special interest review.
 i. Early developments before the two-tier framework
The starting point for legal tests under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause seemed to be a very vague form of balancing. In Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court held that in the absence 
of measures taken by Congress, states should be able to regulate aspects of 
inter-state commerce which were so local as to require diverse treatment, while 
aspects which required a uniform rule should be regulated by Congress.193 The 
criteria for implementing this local-national distinction were not set out. As a 
193  Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
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consequence, the doctrine shows division on what test actually applied in this 
case.194
Later, after the civil war, a high number of traders sought to challenge 
state legislation which imposed a burden upon inter-state commerce under the 
Commerce Clause.195 While the Cooley distinction could be rather easily applied 
in cases of purposefully discriminatory measures favouring local interests, in 
many other cases matters were not as clear.
On closer examination, the test applied seemed to be somewhat akin to 
necessity. In cases such as Railroad Co. v. Husen, state regulation for public 
purposes such as health protection, public order or public morals was in prin-
ciple accepted, but then struck down because the measure at issue went beyond 
what was ‘absolutely necessary’ for the protection of the state interest at stake.196
At the same time, a rights-conception of the clause emerged. The Court 
started to emphasize that a constitutional right to free trade for the individual 
could be derived from the Commerce Clause. It did so most notably in Minne-
sota v. Barber, holding that a regulation prescribing in-state health inspections 
ignored ‘the right which the people of other States have in commerce between 
those States and the State of Minnesota’.197 In the language of Reid v. Colo-
rado, this ‘right’ seemed to move in the direction of an individual right. The 
Court found that while the trader certainly had a right under the Commerce 
Clause, the state was still entitled to protect important interests, granted that 
the ‘measures employed to that end do not go beyond the necessities of the case 
or unreasonably burden the exercise of privileges secured by the Constitution 
of the United States.’198 Despite such indications of rights-based thinking and 
unreasonable burdens as a potential starting point for proportionality analysis, 
the Court took a different direction. It developed a distinction based on state 
measures having a direct effect on inter-state commerce,199 which were found 
in violation of the Commerce Clause, and measures having merely an indirect 
effect,200 which could be accepted.201
Justice Stone found the distinction between indirect and direct effect on 
commerce unpersuasive and suggested instead a broader test resembling balanc-
ing which should consider ‘all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of 
the regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the actual 
194  See, e.g. reading the case as ‘balancing’ C.L. Black, Perspectives in Constitutional Law (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1970), 34. See for a contrary view L. Henkin, ‘Infallibility under Law: Constitutional 
Balancing’ (1978) 78 Columbia Law Review 1022, 1027-1028.
195  Stone Sweet and Mathews, 119.
196  Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877), 471.
197  Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890), 329.
198  Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902), 151.
199  See e.g. DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Seabord Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
200 See e.g. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 456 (1888); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 
453 (1911).
201  See generally Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 408.
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effect on the flow of commerce’. This balancing would then lead to a conclusion 
on whether a regulation concerned local interests and would not infringe the 
‘national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce’.202 The doctrine in 
the late 1930s also argued that despite the seemingly formal approach taken by 
the Court, in reality a balancing process was actually taking place, so that the 
Court should also state openly that it was applying a test akin to proportionality 
analysis.203
In Southern Pacific v. Arizona, a case concerning the regulation of the 
permissible length of trains for safety reasons, the Court thus adopted a weigh-
ing exercise. It found a ‘substantial obstruction to the national policy proclaimed 
by Congress, to promote adequate, economical and efficient railway transporta-
tion service’.204 The justification of public safety brought forward by the state 
seemed unpersuasive, as shorter trains also raised safety concerns. Conse-
quently, the Court held that ‘[t]he decisive question is whether, in the circum-
stances, the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and 
casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest 
in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede 
it and subject it to local regulation which does not have a uniform effect on the 
interstate train journey which it interrupts’.205 Dissenting Justice Black argued 
that the Court should not impose itself as a ‘superlegislature’ and had in the 
present case thrown together two entirely different causes of danger to evaluate 
the safety effect of the state’s legislation, thereby unduly restricting the latter’s 
regulatory powers.206
The apparent tendency towards balancing was subsequently cut short by 
the introduction of a two-tier framework in the case law. On the one hand, state 
regulation that discriminated against inter-state commerce was found invalid 
by the Court unless a justification could meet a rather high threshold. On the 
other hand, merely ‘incidental’ restrictions of interstate commerce were subject 
by the Supreme Court to a balancing test weighing the local interest against the 
national one. As has already been explored, this distinction can be explained by 
the impossibility of agreeing on one specific reading of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.207 Still, this explanation is in our view no convincing justification for the 
rigidity of the case law and the abstention from using proportionality analysis 
and its sub-tests more extensively.
202  Stone, dissenting in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania at 44.
203  N.T. Dowling, ‘Interstate Commerce and State Power’ (1940-1941) 27 Virginia Law Review 1, 21-22.
204  Southern Pacific v. Arizona at 774.
205  Ibid. at 775-776.
206 Ibid., 789-791.
207  See section III.B.ii.
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 ii. Discriminatory measures under the two-tier framework
In the first line of cases, the doctrine suggested focusing on 
protectionist intent in state laws.208 The Court has not done so explicitly. Instead, 
it seems to rely on a number of factors, the effect of a measure and possible 
alternatives playing a crucial role, to identify the true purpose – and its potential 
protectionist character. As was put in one decision, a statute can discriminate 
facially, purposefully or in practical effect.209 A wide notion of discrimination is 
thus embraced,210 which seems, however, problematic in light of the highly diffe-
rent treatment accorded to the categories of discriminatory and non-discrimina-
tory measures.
In a classic decision the Court struck down a prohibition on the sale of milk 
not processed at approved pasteurisation plants which were placed close to 
Madison and inspected by local public health authorities. A local ordinance with 
higher standards of public health protection than the national standards applied 
to the Chicago plants at issue in the case. In its decision, the Court relied mainly 
on the fact that ‘reasonable and adequate alternatives’ were available such 
as inspection of the other factories by Madison’s own officials including the 
imposition of costs on the controlled facility. As a consequence, a discrimina-
tory burden ‘not essential’ for the protection of local health interest had been 
imposed.211 Yet, in the dissenting opinion the lack of analysis as to whether the 
alternatives suggested could truly grant the same high level of public health 
protection was deplored, as it led to a de facto superiority of the right to traffic in 
commerce over the power of the people to protect the quality of milk.212
In another public health-related decision, the Court found that a New Jersey 
statute prohibiting the import of waste originating from other states for public 
health and safety reasons was invalid. The Court held that it did not need to 
decide whether the ultimate purpose was protectionism or public health protec-
tion, because the ‘evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as 
legislative ends’.213 Protection of the environment could here, however, only be 
achieved through restriction of the flow of all waste. There had been no claim 
made that waste had to be disposed of ‘as soon as and close to its point of genera-
tion as possible’.214 With the problems related to waste emerging only after its 
208  See Regan, 1112 ff.
209 National Association of Optometrists & Opticians Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Brown 567 F3d 521 (9th Cir 2009) at 
525.
210  In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon 511 U.S. 93 (1994) at 99, 
the Supreme Court held that ‘“discrimination” simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-
of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’
211  Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) at 355-356.
212  Justice Black, dissenting, in Ibid., 359-360.
213  City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) at 627.
214  Ibid. at 630.
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disposal, New Jersey was thus not allowed to distinguish between out-of-state 
waste and local waste under the Commerce Clause.
A finding of discrimination thus led the Court in most cases to declare state 
legislation invalid, based on the fact that some sort of strong effect on out-of-
state economic actors could not easily be explained by other reasons. Only in 
very few cases can a justification be successfully brought forward by a state. In 
Maine v. Taylor, the Court allowed import restrictions on live baitfish into Maine 
because of uncertainty surrounding the potential introduction of a parasite 
living on out-of-state baitfish into the ecosystem of Maine. Strong evidence 
supported in the Supreme Court’s view the legitimate reasons for Maine, apart 
from the origin of fish, to regulate out-of-state fish differently.215
In cases of discriminatory effect, the Court started to operate a shift of the 
burden of proof based on a sliding scale of the impact on out-of-state traders 
compared to that on local traders. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertis-
ing Commission the Court struck down a prohibition on the sale of closed apple 
containers bearing any grade mark except a national or non-graded mark. The 
effect of the measure was to exclude apples from out-of-state apple growers who 
packed their apples in containers with their own state grade marks. The mere 
fact of legislation furthering ‘matters of legitimate local concern’ such as health 
or consumer protection was insufficient, if in practice a discriminatory effect 
was caused. In the present case, this happened through the non-recognition of 
Washington’s successful state grading system and the forced ‘down-grading’ 
of out-of-state apples.216 With discriminatory effect being found, the burden of 
proof shifted to the defending state to justify its measure ‘in terms of the local 
benefit’ and the ‘unavailability of non-discriminatory alternatives adequate to 
preserve the local interests at stake’.217
Finding discrimination has, however, not always proven obvious. In C&A 
Carbone v. Clarkstown, the Court declared invalid a flow control ordinance for 
waste as facial discrimination against out-of-state operators. This ordinance 
operated as a local processing requirement, in the sense that it required all non-
recycable waste to be processed at a particular transfer station at a higher rate to 
ensure the economic viability of the facility.218 The facility was privately operated, 
but was scheduled to subsequently revert to municipal ownership. Two opin-
ions contended that the measure was non-discriminatory, as it excluded both 
out-of-state and local waste operators from business. Justice O’Connor’s concur-
ring opinion held that the ordinance should be handled as an even-handed 
measure, but struck it down because of its disproportionate impact on interstate 
commerce in relation to the local benefits.219 By contrast, Justice Souter, joined 
by two other justices, dissented because the entity in question simply spread 
215  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) at 152-153.
216  Hunt v. Washington Apple Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1997) at 351-353.
217  Ibid. at 354.
218  C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) at 391.
219  Ibid. at 401.
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the burden for a traditional government task among all local generators of trash 
rather than disadvantaging competing private actors unequally; in his view, 
there was thus no concern under the Commerce Clause at all.220 Later case law 
overturned the classification of a similar measure as discriminatory.221
The strictness of scrutiny has also not always resulted in a very balanced 
examination of measures, as the example of extraterritorial effect of measures 
shows. Most extraterritorial measures have been placed in the category of 
discriminatory measures. The Supreme Court thus found it inadmissible that 
a local law ‘directly’ regulate out-of-state transactions.222 The stricter scrutiny 
applicable to discriminatory measures should thus apply to regulation that 
attempted to ‘control conduct beyond the boundary of the state’.223 In recent 
case law, this strict approach led to the rejection of measures adapting locally 
standards of production which are also applicable to imported products. Under 
a California emission reduction scheme, a ‘lifecycle’ analysis of biofuels took 
account of greenhouse gas emission throughout the whole cycle of produc-
tion of such fuels. Since the scheme penalized out-of-state producers in order 
to force them to adopt production methods resulting in lower emissions, a 
lower court found that the scheme impermissibly attempted to ‘control conduct 
beyond the boundary of the state’.224 Classified to fall under strict scrutiny 
as a discriminatory measure, the scheme did not withstand judicial scrutiny, 
because although it pursued the fight against global warming as a legitimate 
objective, the defendants could not discharge the heavy burden of proving that 
no non-discriminatory alternatives were available. The lower court conceded 
that the non-discriminatory alternatives suggested by the plaintiffs could be 
considered ‘less desirable’, but still decided in favour of the plaintiffs.225 More 
careful scrutiny would have probably been available had the measure been clas-
sified as non-discriminatory. The strict division between discriminatory and 
non-discriminatory measures thus also shows its shortcomings in the case of 
220  Ibid. at 411.
221  See United Trash Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 127 U.S. 
1786 (2007) at 1796-1797. The Court stated that the Commerce Clause could not control the decision of 
voters on whether government or private actors should provide waste management services, in particu-
lar since the costs caused by the ordinance would be borne by voters themselves. A law simply favouring 
local government could be directed at many purposes apart from protectionism, and the responsibility 
of protecting health, safety and welfare of citizens set government apart from private enterprises. A 
plurality of judges then upheld the ordinance based on a balancing test, while in a concurring opinion 
another justice suggested to give up the entire Dormant Commerce Clause application as it was based 
only on mere ‘policy considerations’, see United Trash Haulers at 1798 and Justice Thomas’ dissent at 
1802-1803, respectively.
222  Brown-Forman v. N.Y. State Liq. Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) at 583.
223  Healey v. Beer Inst. 491 U.S. 324 (1989) at 336-337.
224  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene US District Court for the Eastern District of California, 
Order on preliminary injunction motion (29 December 2011) at 20.
225  Ibid. at 23.
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measures of extraterritorial effect, where the categorisation as discriminatory 
leads to much stricter and in most cases fatal scrutiny for extraterritorial effects. 
As subsequent chapters show, a more balanced approach to extraterritoriality is 
possible and has been developed in EU law and WTO law.226
Summing up, scrutiny under this tier has thus been strict and has struck 
down most measures. The Court seems to be looking for the excluded reason of 
protectionism, using for this purpose definitional approaches to what consti-
tutes discrimination and subsequently an often very strict necessity test. The 
latter test has in early decisions not always respected the level of protection 
sought for by states as discussed, and has imposed a considerable burden of 
proof on the defending state.
Arguably, this categorical approach appears difficult to defend if classifica-
tion into the first category nearly always means that a measure is struck down, 
while balancing as available for non-discriminatory measures nearly always 
results in a decision favourable to the state measure. The highly categorical 
approach by the Supreme Court can here be contrasted with the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, which under the case law on trade-restrictive measures 
as restrictions to internal market freedoms has created a more flexible system 
of justifications. Despite other shortcomings, the CJEU’s approach scrutinizes 
measures in detail as to their proportionality without putting them as strictly 
into categories.227
 iii.  Non-discriminatory measures under the two-tier 
framework
In contrast to the intrusive scrutiny for discriminatory mea-
sures, an ‘incidental’ burden on inter-state commerce remaining below the 
threshold of facial discrimination leads to lenient judicial review of state laws by 
means of a balancing test under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The landmark case which established balancing under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause for even-handed regulation was Pike v. Bruce Church. In this 
case, the Court held that ‘[a]lthough the criteria for determining the validity 
of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the 
general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: where the statute regulates 
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.’228 The resulting balancing exercise has generally been administered in 
a manner rather more favourable to state regulatory autonomy.
The line between discrimination and non-discrimination has not always 
been easy to draw, in particular in cases of rather limited discriminatory effects. 
226  See chapter 6 section IV.C. and chapter 7 section IV.A.iv.c.
227  See chapter 6 section III.C.i. on the broad scope given to internal market freedoms in EU law.
228  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) at 143.
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In such cases of weak discriminatory effects, the Supreme Court thus reverted 
to a balancing test as if a non-discriminatory measure was at stake. The Court 
upheld a Minnesota prohibition on nonreturnable milk containers made of plas-
tic in light of a very weak discriminatory effect. Plastic producers were predomi-
nantly out-of-state operators, while Minnesota pulpwood producers could benefit 
to some extent from the permission to use pulpwood-based nonreturnable 
carton milk containers. But the burden on one industry to the advantage of 
another was not ‘clearly excessive’ in light of the ‘substantial state interest’ of 
environmental protection, to safeguard natural resources and combat problems 
of solid waste disposal.229 Alternatives such as promoting recycling or banning 
nonreturnables were either not equally effective or more burdensome.230
Another problem is the unclear scope of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
An example is given in subsidies cases. In the seminal West Lynn Creamery, 
Inc. v. Healy, a state imposed a sales tax in a non-discriminatory manner on all 
milk wholesalers, while the money then went into a fund used to subsidize local 
milk producers. Confronted for the first time with a challenge of a subsidy, the 
Court dodged a general reply as to the admissibility of state subsidies as such.231 
It found the combined measures unconstitutional, however,  holding that the 
political process in the state could no longer be trusted, since other than in the 
case of a non-discriminatory tax, one of the important interests groups in the 
state had been ‘mollified’ by a subsidy and could not be trusted to lobby against 
legislative abuse.232 The Court underlined that the Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence was not so rigid that it could not react to the form in which a state created 
barriers to trade.233 Sceptical views accompanied this perceived extension of the 
reach of the Commerce Clause.234
 iv. Conclusion
Summing up the case law under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the picture is again marked by fragmentation. The difficulty in decid-
ing whether a rather substantive rights-based perspective or a more definitional 
vision of a prohibition of protectionism should be adopted led to inconsistent 
case law. As based on our suggestion that the Dormant Commerce Clause calls 
for special interest review as the result of pre-balancing, the difference between 
the two tiers of scrutiny is not watertight and not convincing in all cases, but 
leads to considerable differences in terms of outcome. This causes concern, as 
the example of the treatment of extraterritorial measures has shown. In fact, 
229  Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) at 474-475.
230  Ibid. at 475.
231  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy at 199 footnote 15.
232  Ibid. at 200.
233  Ibid. at 201.
234  See e.g. D.T. Coenen, ‘Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1998) 107 Yale Law 
Journal 965, 1002.
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inspiration from legal regimes such as EU law could be fruitful, as here more 
emphasis has been put on the justification stage rather than  on fighting the 
battle on the front of discrimination. The problem in United States constitu-
tional law is, again, the contestation of balancing, which leads to the latter’s 
reduced role under the Dormant Commerce Clause. A middle level of scrutiny 
e.g. for measures which seem to discriminate in their effects could e.g. rely to 
some extent on proportionality analysis and neither strike all measures down 
based on the strict necessity inquiry nor merely rubber-stamp them by balanc-
ing superficially as suggested by the Pike test. Scepticism of balancing is in our 
view no legitimate argument in pre-balancing to justify the current categorisa-
tion.
 V Evaluation and Conclusion
Evaluating the approach of the Supreme Court, we note that 
pre-balancing yields two different results. For fundamental rights review, the 
Court ought to pursue a model of equal representation review, while under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, a reduced role for proportionality analysis follow-
ing a model of special interest review seems more appropriate.
Still, some points of criticism remain remarkably similar. The central 
notion to describe the Supreme Court’s case law is fragmentation. The initial 
section has shown that despite the strong institutional setting of the Supreme 
Court, the latter has remained contested in its authority and its review func-
tion throughout its turbulent history as a central player of United States consti-
tutional politics. While it therefore took great care to develop the doctrine of 
fundamental rights and make them enforceable against the federal and the state 
level and expand the number of rights, the Supreme Court has at the same time 
not found a coherent form of rights adjudication. The case-by-case approach has 
on the one hand led to the remarkably explicit development of various tiers of 
scrutiny based on the procedural democracy doctrine, which can be applauded 
in comparison to the rather obscure case law of the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court on the same matter.
However, at the same time the fragmented approach leads to very diffe-
rent levels of protection for different rights, the comparably low protection of 
economic rights being but one example in this regard. The impossibility of find-
ing a consistent approach to rights adjudication is aggravated by the Supreme 
Court’s virtually systemic scepticism of balancing, which is not only caused by 
doubts on the institutional capacities and legitimacy of the latter, but also by 
the particular view of rights predominant in the United States constitutional 
system. In comparison, it does not appear that the authority of the Federal 
Constitutional Court or the protection of fundamental rights has suffered severe 
damage from the continuous and consistent adjudication of rights by means of 
proportionality analysis over various decades. These elements are not convinc-
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ing as a justification for the fragmented results in the case law. The perception 
of rights as shields which leads to less intrusive review in the field of positive 
obligations and effects of fundamental rights in the private sphere, however, can 
usefully be integrated into pre-balancing as a normative conception of funda-
mental rights in its own right.
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, fragmentation has been caused 
by the impossibility to agree on an exact reading of the clause. The model of 
special interest review we would suggest as the outcome of pre-balancing relies 
on balancing in rare cases, with other steps of proportionality analysis coming 
in before. In the Supreme Court’s case law, however, most of the burden is 
borne by the initial distinction between discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
measures. Discriminatory measures are subject to strict scrutiny including a 
very restrictive necessity test which they fail in most cases. For non-discrimi-
natory measures, the balancing test applied seems to be rather superficial. As 
the example of measures with extraterritorial effects has shown, this distinc-
tion is difficult to sustain in judicial practice and leads to over- and under-
inclusiveness. A middle level of scrutiny for measures with some, but not very 
clearly discriminatory effect could become a useful tool. Again, the scepticism 
of balancing which has reduced the test for non-discriminatory measures to a 
rubber stamp seems overrated and does not appropriately justify the effective 
reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to use balancing.
The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms
chapter 5
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 I Introduction
With the present section, we turn to examine regimes of 
international and – in the case of EU law – supranational law. Arguably, the 
same assessment based on pre-balancing and the two-models distinction that 
has guided us up to this point can also be applied to such legal regimes. In our 
discussion of the context of judicial review, however, some emphases shift. His-
tory was a predominant factor in the two chapters on domestic constitutional 
regimes. While the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) or the older treaties underlying EU law date back to the mid-
20th century, in comparison we do not detect streams of legal thought so influ-
ential on the use of proportionality analysis in fundamental rights adjudication, 
and thus dedicate less space to the historical insights. By contrast, other contex-
tual elements start to play a more important role, as they distinguish typically 
international legal regimes from domestic constitutional ones. In particular, the 
institutional setting and the political economy of dispute settlement systems 
become more relevant.
As an example, international judges and arbitrators are often less familiar 
with the socioeconomic and domestic legal context of a measure and conse-
quently feel less well equipped to review a measure with proportionality analy-
sis. Some adjudicative instances may represent domestic views here better than 
others, if we compare, for example, the European Court of Human Rights to 
the average tribunal in international investment law. Reluctance to engage in 
proportionality analysis may find its roots here.
As to the political economy of dispute settlement, international dispute 
settlement systems often provide a different setting of access to adjudication 
and different remedies as compared with domestic constitutional adjudication. 
The WTO system only offers state vs. state dispute settlement and provides a 
particular form of remedy in the form of an authorisation of trade retaliation. 
By contrast, the Court of Justice of the European Union resembles much more 
a national court with the variety of remedies and the strong power to influence 
domestic law in a much more direct manner. Again, the perspective of a judici-
ary on its own review may explain the use of proportionality analysis. In both 
cases, however, we must keep apart to what extent elements explain the use of 
proportionality analysis and to what extent the latter is actually justified because 
of normative arguments relevant for the pre-balancing exercise.
These aspects are thus considered in more detail in the following, without 
abandoning the basic structure of our comparative studies. The main point to 
be shown is that pre-balancing and in particular the model of equal representa-
tion are fully applicable to an international setting, here the European Court 
of Human Rights. The latter is called in its review to represent and reconcile a 
variety of human rights and public interests, and even though there are some 
conceptual differences in the context of judicial review compared to domestic 
constitutional or supreme courts, this mandate remains similar. As one consid-
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eration to be examined, the rationale of subsidiarity has caused debate as to 
whether the Court should provide general guidelines or rather case-specific 
solutions – a debate known as opposing ‘constitutional’ to ‘individual’ justice as 
possible functions of the Court’s review.
The comparison with domestic regimes, however, does not stop at this level. 
Examining the justification of judicial review, we find that in its development of 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court somewhat more clearly sets out 
the reasons and the resulting intrusiveness for the exercise of its review powers. 
It does so more clearly than the German Federal Constitutional Court, more 
akin to the United States Supreme Court. However, its broader view of the justi-
fication of judicial review based on procedural democracy again renders it more 
similar to the German situation; higher protection is granted to rights even with 
a less obvious connection to the democratic process and also to rights in their 
dimension as positive obligations and in relations between private parties.
In assessing the ‘fair balance’ test as the Court’s use of proportionality analy-
sis, again the German example comes to mind. There is no reluctance to engage 
in full-scale proportionality analysis comparable with the scepticism towards 
balancing demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court. On the contrary, 
we even observe a somewhat worrying over-emphasis on the ultimate prong of 
proportionality stricto sensu which is not clearly warranted in our view.
 II  The Broader Context of Judicial Review under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms
The European Court of Human Rights as a quasi-constitutional 
international court is called to adjudicate on a broad range of fundamental 
rights, and to reconcile them with public interests. The broader context of judi-
cial review allows us to refine this picture. History and the debate on individual 
vs. constitutional justice show that within the use of proportionality analysis by 
the Court, there are debates on how to achieve a balance between case-sensitive 
solutions and general guidelines, a balance which must respect the mandate 
of subsidiarity of the Court as well as the problem of an overburdened judicial 
system. The institutional context shows a remarkably well-established represen-
tation of views of the concerned Convention state. The intense use of propor-
tionality analysis can be explained by this last feature, while the rationale of 
subsidiarity can also be read as influencing pre-balancing and the justification 
of judicial review. The practical problem of an overburdened system, however, is 
only difficult to conceptualize as a normative element with potential to appropri-
ately influence pre-balancing and the use of proportionality analysis.
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 A The Origins of a Permanent Court of Human Rights
The history of judicial review by the European Court of Human 
Rights is marked by humble beginnings and disagreement as to the exact path 
of development that a regional human rights regime should take. The coming of 
age of the Court transformed the Convention into a veritable bill of rights, which 
explains the strong emphasis on proportionality analysis that we note in the sub-
sequent discussion of this chapter. At the same time, institutional reform could 
not keep pace with the enlargements of the Council of Europe and a problem of 
systemic overload emerged, which helps us to understand the criticism of the 
highly case-sensitive approach to proportionality analysis taken by the Court.
 i.  Slow beginnings and conceptual disagreements on the 
ECHR
The fundamental idea prevailing during the negotiations of 
the ECHR was to provide a safeguard against totalitarianism.1 The situation was 
predominantly marked by the context of the end of the Second World War and 
the danger perceived in the rising tensions of the Cold War, so that Spaak once 
joked that the most important contributor to the emergence of the Council of 
Europe was Joseph Stalin.2 The ECHR was thus meant to function as a guar-
antee that states could not undercut a certain minimum standard of protection 
for rights felt to be essential to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of 
law. For this purpose, drafters envisaged a standstill obligation concerning the 
level of rights protection already achieved3 and a system of centralized judicial 
enforcement including binding judgments.4
Disagreements between fervent advocates of strong human rights protec-
tion and more reserved advocates who feared an activist court with an all-too 
open docket led to a watered-down compromise being signed in 1950. The 
right to individual petition as the central bone of contention was only put in a 
protocol for states to ratify at their own discretion, leaving only a dispute settle-
ment system between states that many judged unlikely to be of much practical 
use.5 At the same time, states had to accept the jurisdiction of the new court by 
1  E. Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights – From Its Inception to the Creation of 
a Permanent Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6, speaks of an ‘alarm bell’.
2  E. Bates, ‘The Birth of the European Convention on Human Rights – and the European Court of 
Human Rights’ in J. Christoffersen and M.R. Madsen (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights 
between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 18.
3  See today’s Article 53 ECHR.
4  L. Wildhaber, ‘Rethinking the European Court of Human Rights’ in J. Christoffersen and M.R. Madsen 
(eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 205.
5  Bates, Evolution of the ECHR, 9. As Wildhaber, 208, notes, not much more than 20 such complaints 
have reached the Court on the whole.
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means of an express declaration, so that the court was not yet established when 
the Convention entered into force in 1953.6 This slow start and initially gloomy 
perspective for the new human rights instrument was accompanied by an 
expression of only fairly shallow interest by the academic community.7
The system for individual complaints came into life in 1955. It required 
applicants to first exhaust all domestic remedies8 before they could address 
their case to the European Commission of Human Rights established in 1954. 
This ‘quasi-judicial, quasi-political’ body would look at matters, and provide a 
report in which it could conclude to refer the matter to the then non-permanent 
Court, which was eventually established in 1959.9 Only when seized through 
the Commission or in inter-state cases by a state or the state of an alleged victim 
could the Court use its powers to declare that there had been a violation and 
award ‘just satisfaction’.10 From the beginning, the Committee of Ministers was 
charged with the task of supervising the implementation of the rulings of the 
Court in party states.11
After the slow institutional start of the Convention system, the Court experi-
enced a period of rather low profile, referred to by a commentator as the ‘sleep-
ing beauty’ years.12 There were only few cases brought before the Court, which 
was even ‘out of business’ between 1960-65.13 Up until the mid-1970s, the Court 
not only received very few applications, but also tended to approach cases with 
high deference, balancing its scrutiny rather in favour of ‘legal diplomacy’ than 
tackling the ECHR party states too directly.14
 ii. The coming of age of a European Bill of Rights
With the 1970s, however, a number of cases were brought 
before the Court which, based on their content, could also have formed the 
object of a complaint before a domestic constitutional court.15 The Convention, it 
was argued, came of age as a veritable European Bill of Rights.16 In light of such 
opportunities, the Court abandoned its stance of deference and found violations 
6  Bates, ‘Birth of the ECHR’, 37.
7  Bates, Evolution of the ECHR, 9-10.
8  Article 35 (1) ECHR.
9  Bates, ‘Birth of the ECHR’, 35.
10  Ibid., 38.
11  See Article 46 (2) ECHR.
12  Frowein, quoted in Bates, Evolution of the ECHR, 10-11.
13  M.R. Madsen, ‘The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court: From Legal Diplomacy to 
Integrationist Jurisprudence’ in J. Christoffersen and M.R. Madsen (eds.), The European Court of Human 
Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 51.
14  See for an overview of such early cases Ibid., 48 ff.
15  Bates, Evolution of the ECHR, 17, points out that this was due to the fact that no large-scale violations of 
human rights could be expected from the principally Western European party states of the ECHR.
16  Ibid., 16.
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of the Convention in a number of cases despite the sometimes disputed politi-
cal or social context in the relevant party state.17 Cases like Marckx v Belgium 
required the judges to strike a balance between the public interest and indi-
viduals’ fundamental rights in a setting familiar from domestic constitutional 
courts, despite the subsidiary nature of the Court’s intervention.18 Furthermore, 
since increasingly legislation also became the target of applicants, pressure 
mounted on party states to change their domestic laws after a judgment by the 
Court had been rendered.19
The reasons for the paradigmatic change in the jurisprudence of the Court 
have been sought in empirical studies on the judges sitting on the bench. But 
in light of no major changes at that level they are probably rather found in the 
larger historical background of increasing progress of the global movement 
promoting the respect of human rights.20
In the 1980s, the system of individual petition continued to pick up speed, 
turning the Commission into a de facto court of first instance with hardly any 
role left for the Committee of Ministers and raising first fears that the system 
might require reform lest it become clogged up.21 The 1990s brought increasing 
recognition of the ‘constitutional’ role of the Court, which showed both in the 
writings on the ECHR22 as well as in the case law. As an example, in Loizidou 
v Turkey, the Court famously referred to the Convention as a ‘constitutional 
instrument of European public order’.23 After lengthy debate, the proposals for 
reform culminated in Protocol 11, which was still largely drafted as an agree-
ment amongst ten party states before the enlargement by the Central and 
Eastern European countries. The protocol abolished the Commission and estab-
lished the Court as a permanent institution, aiming to speed up proceedings in 
order to reach a final judgment faster without sacrificing the quality of the legal 
decision.24
 iii. An overburdened Court and efforts of reform
The enlargement of the Council of Europe subsequently 
opened the floodgates even further. The debate on necessary reforms did not 
therefore stop after the entry into force of Protocol 11 in 1998, but continued 
17  Madsen, 51, speaks of the ‘rise of the integrationist court’.
18  Marckx v Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A, No 31, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 330.
19  Bates, Evolution of the ECHR, 18.
20  Madsen, 55-57.
21  Bates, Evolution of the ECHR, 20.
22  See e.g. R. Ryssdal, The Future of the European Court of Human Rights (Public lecture given at King’s 
College, London, Centre of European Law, 22 March 1990) (Strasbourg: Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme, 1990).
23  Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 23 March 1995, Series A, No 310, (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para 
75.
24  Bates, Evolution of the ECHR, 21.
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with the drafting and the adoption of Protocol 14. Among other issues Protocol 
14 creates a possibility for single judges to declare cases inadmissible that are 
clearly without merit, allows committees consisting of three judges to rule in 
repetitive cases where well-established case law exists and permits the dismissal 
of a case as inadmissible under certain conditions if there has been no signifi-
cant disadvantage.25 Next to these attempts to increase the performance of the 
Court by giving it more discretion not to admit cases, repeated failure to comply 
with judgments can now potentially be sanctioned by the Court’s Grand Cham-
ber with suspension or even expulsion from the Council of Europe.26
The systemic crisis of overload has, however, not been resolved by Protocol 
14. There continues to be a huge backlog of cases, despite a decade of ‘muddling 
through’ by the Court.27
It is before this seemingly gloomy background of an overburdened system 
that the debate on the future function and role of the Court must be understood. 
This background is no normative argument capable of being weighed in the 
pre-balancing exercise, but influences our reading of the rationale of subsidi-
arity in the protection of human rights. Over the years, the Court has relied on 
proportionality analysis under its ‘fair balance’ test to provide relief in a case-by-
case manner. Sceptical commentators, however, have started to call for a more 
predictable test which provides more general guidelines instead of focusing 
on aspects of individual cases. This claim is better understood if we assess the 
debate on the role of the Court between the provision of ‘individual’ or rather 
‘constitutional justice: as providing relief in every individual case or rather as 
laying down guiding minimum standards of protection for national authorities 
and courts. As is shown subsequently, this debate carries with it arguments 
used to influence the justification of judicial review and accordingly the use of 
proportionality analysis.
 B  The Debate on the Role of the Court as a Provider of 
Individual or Constitutional Justice
As has been demonstrated, over the years the Court has been 
incapable in terms of its institutional competence to cope with the transfor-
mation of the Convention from a limited safeguard mechanism against a slip 
into totalitarianism into a full-blown European Bill of Rights. The continuous 
problem of a growing backlog of undecided cases has led to a heated debate on 
the future of the Convention’s system of human rights protection which already 
dates back to before the adoption of Protocol 14. The central question is how the 
25  See for a concise overview of the Protocol’s main points A. Lester, ‘The European Court of Human 
Rights after 50 Years’ in J. Christoffersen and M.R. Madsen (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights 
between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 105.
26  Ibid., 107.
27  Wildhaber, 223, presents some concise numbers of the exponential increase in applications submitted 
and the corresponding backlog of pending cases.
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subsidiarity rationale of the Court should operate. With individuals having to 
exhaust domestic remedies before they can raise a complaint under the Conven-
tion, it remains unclear whether the Court should function as a further instance 
of appeal focused on providing justice for each case or whether emphasis should 
be put on more the provision of constitutional justice, i.e. general guidelines 
beyond the individual case.
 i. The competing positions
On the one hand, several judges,28 civil society29 as well as a 
‘majority’ of academics30 have refused more restrictive admissibility criteria 
as endangering the Court’s authority and have supported the position that the 
Court should continue to grant ‘individual justice’. This means that individual 
petition should, as far as possible, be maintained in order to give each individual 
access to the Court. In particular, suggestions to introduce a procedure akin 
to the certiorari procedure of the United States Supreme Court were vigorously 
rejected.31
By contrast, the then-president of the Court, followed by some practitioners32 
as well as academics,33 proposed to review the Court’s function as essentially 
a provider of ‘constitutional justice’. A more ‘realistic’ approach should admit 
that individual application could not be an end in itself, but that instead fewer 
rulings delivered more rapidly and setting out sufficiently clear principles would 
be able to better support the rule of law and democracy in Europe.34 The number 
of cases that the Court should decide ought thus to be limited.
A broader ‘constitutionalisation’ discourse has somewhat clouded the 
picture.35 Still, several arguments can be made both in favour of individual and 
constitutional justice as the predominant role to be ascribed to the Court.
28  See J. Casadavell and others, ‘Pour le droit de recours individuel (Annex 3)’ in G. Cohen-Jonathan and C. 
Pettiti (eds.), La réforme de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003).
29  See on the role of non-governmental organisations R. Harmsen, ‘The Reform of the Convention System: 
Institutional Restructuring and the (Geo-)Politics of Human Rights’ in J. Christoffersen and M.R. 
Madsen (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 131.
30  See Ibid., 130, with further references.
31  Lester, 114.
32  P. Mahoney, ‘An Insider’s View of the Reform Debate – How to Maintain the Effectiveness of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights’ (2004) 29 NJCM-Bulletin 175.
33  See e.g. S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights : Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
34  L. Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2002) 23 Human 
Rights Law Journal 161, 164.
35  See e.g. A. Stone Sweet, ‘Sur la constitutionnalisation de la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme’ (2009) 80 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 923. Sceptical on this development S. 
Hennette-Vauchez, ‘Constitutional v International? When Unified Reformatory Rationales Mismatch 
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 ii. Arguments in favour of individual justice
As a starting point, the actual ability of the Court to provide 
constitutional justice could be limited. The very nature of the ECHR is based on 
rather broad standards achieved by a weighing process during the very draft-
ing and negotiation of the Convention. To put these standards into practice, the 
Court cannot escape using concrete elements of a case to take a decision, so that 
to some extent its findings are always case-bound.36
Another argument made against the function of constitutional justice of 
the Court is the restricted possibility for the Court to give advisory opinions. 
The Court is only entitled to give such opinions if the questions contained are 
not related to ‘the content or scope of the rights or freedoms’ defined in the 
Convention.37 The Court, consequently, can only provide answers to questions 
on the interpretation of the Convention rights if a concrete case arises, while the 
advisory opinion function is restricted to narrow institutional questions.38
Also, the review function of the Court is in principle not abstract, but limited 
to concrete cases. Early on, the Court itself stated that it would not engage in 
abstract review.39 On the other hand, this position has not been upheld consis-
tently, as in other cases the Court held that its ‘judgments in fact serve not only 
to decide those cases brought before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, 
safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contribut-
ing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as 
Contracting Parties’.40 The Court was thus willing to adjudicate cases although 
some newer elements of the case at issue could have permitted it to refrain from 
its task.41
 iii. Arguments in favour of constitutional justice
One central argument against a pure ‘individual justice’ 
approach is the subsidiarity rationale underlying the whole of the Convention 
system. The Court has consistently recognized its institutional and norma-
the Plural Paths of Legitimacy of ECHR Law’ in J. Christoffersen and M.R. Madsen (eds.), The European 
Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 152-153.
36  J. Christoffersen, ‘Individual and Constitutional Justice: Can the Power Balance of Adjudication Be 
Reversed?’ in J. Christoffersen and M.R. Madsen (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between 
Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 189-190.
37  Article 47 (2) ECHR.
38  Christoffersen, 188.
39  In De Becker v Belgium, 27 March 1962, Series A, No 4, (1962) EHRR 1, para 14, the Court refused to 
decide in the abstract because the relevant law had been changed and no longer interfered with the 
applicant’s rights in the manner that had given rise to his claim.
40  Ireland v United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A, No 25, (9179-1980) 2 EHRR 25, para 154.
41  In Karner v Austria, 24 July 2003, (2004) 38 EHRR 528, para 26, e.g. the applicant’s death did not 
hinder the Court.
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tive limitations as an international court that was not called to replace national 
authorities, but simply review them as a subsidiary mechanism of enforce-
ment for the minimum standards enshrined in the Convention.42 The margin 
of appreciation doctrine is the most central expression of this philosophy. The 
Court exercises restraint on various grounds; it does so in the case of fact assess-
ments by national authorities, or generally because of legitimacy concerns based 
on the nature and quality of domestic procedures or decision-makers; lastly, the 
Court also exercises some normative restraint.43 The exact contours of this last 
normative restraint are, however, part of the subject of the dispute on where the 
Convention system should be going.
Procedurally, it is difficult not to read the reforms instituted by Protocol 14 
as an indicator that the future role of the Court is likely to be more restricted. 
Said reforms not only point in the direction of efficiency, but also create a 
power to dismiss cases as inadmissible if no ‘significant disadvantage’ has been 
suffered.44
There is thus an undeniable and arguable move towards constitutional 
justice. In the literature, there have been daring proposals of institutional inno-
vation such as a Supreme European Court of Human Rights.45 In light of likely 
resistance to such bold moves, other authors emphasize that renewed empha-
sis has to be placed on the national level. The Convention has always received 
a national reading at the level of implementation as soon as the party states’ 
authorities had to put the Court’s findings into practice.46 In the future, the 
Court must thus accept a ‘legitimate’ level of pluralism at the national level.47 
It has been argued that reflections on where the Convention is going require a 
less ‘systemic’ and more ‘environmental’ thinking, because the system must be 
understood in the various political environments in which it actually operates.48 
National authorities should again become the focus of attention, and should be 
encouraged to use their independent powers and resources as part of the struc-
ture of human rights protection under the Convention.49
On the other hand, this very acceptance of the relevance of the national 
level entails that the adjudicative solutions found by the Court must reconcile a 
42  Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium (Belgian Linguistics), 9 
February 1967, Series A, No 6, (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para 10.
43  See Christoffersen, 184.
44  Article 35 (3) b ECHR.
45  P. Mahoney and J. Sharpe, ‘The Legacy of Carlo Russo: Creation of a Supreme European Court of 
Human Rights’ in T. Scovazzi, I. Papanicolopulu and S. Urbinati (eds.), I diritti umani di fronte al giudice 
internazionale – atti della giornata di studio in memoria di Carlo Russo (Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 2009).
46  Hennette-Vauchez, 145.
47  Christoffersen, 197.
48  Harmsen, 142. See also generally L. Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’ (2008) 19 Euro-
pean Journal of International Law 125.
49  Christoffersen, 181-182.
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decision for the concrete case with a certain level of abstraction in the general 
findings in order to establish some more generally applicable principles. Recent 
case law shows such efforts,50 but we also find contestation by some judges and 
commentators who criticize the Court for a rather unsatisfactory reasoning as a 
result of this process.
Summing up, the debate over the future role of the Court seems anything 
but closed, although the account after the introduction of Protocol 14 seems to 
be leaning towards the more limited, constitutional function. This conclusion 
suggests that an all-too flexible adjudication is not justified, since more general 
standard-setting is also central to the adjudicative function of the Court. This 
does not question, in our view, the use of proportionality analysis. However, it 
may influence the way in which the justification of judicial review by the Court 
is read. As a consequence, the precise way in which proportionality analysis is 
used may require adaptation. For the moment, the system still functions under 
the rationale of individual justice, which explains, in our view, the particular, 
highly case-specific use of proportionality stricto sensu in the case law discussed 
below.
 C  Institutional Aspects of Judicial Review under the 
European Convention on Human Rights
Institutional aspects of judicial review under the Convention 
mainly support the possibility of frequently resorting to proportionality stricto 
sensu, because the features of the Court render it suitable for engaging in such 
balancing exercises. In particular, the composition of the Court embodies and 
ensures representativeness of the views of party states in each case. The mecha-
nism of sanctions points towards the similarity with domestic constitutional 
courts.
 i.  The European Court of Human Rights as a representative 
court
The European Court of Human Rights is an international 
adjudicative body, yet in its composition it aims to reflect the diversity of the 
continent. It has thus been called a ‘quasi-Constitutional Court sui generis’.51 
50  In EB v France, 22 January 2008, (2008) 47 EHRR 21, French authorities had rejected the adoption of a 
child by a lesbian woman based on the lack of a paternal referent and the rather ambiguous commit-
ment of the woman’s partner towards the adoption. The majority developed a theory of ‘contamination’, 
by which the reference to the paternal referent as a reference to the applicant’s sexuality should be 
understood as an illegitimate ground that contaminated the entire decision (para 80). Several dissenting 
judges rejected the decision as to its result, finding the contamination thesis not sufficiently connected 
to the facts of the case (see dissenting opinion of Judge Costa, joined by Judges Türmen, Ugrekhelidze 
and Jočienė, paras 7-8).
51  Wildhaber, ‘Rethinking the ECtHR’, 227 (emphasis in original);  Wildhaber, ‘Constitutional Future’, 
161. As Wildhaber notes, a recent influx in cases on the appropriate protection of the right to property 
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Each party state sends one judge to the Court.52 Candidates are elected by the 
Parliamentary Assembly from among three candidates suggested by the state, 
which leads to an effective representation of the professional groups of academ-
ics, former high court judges and high-ranking public servants on the bench 
– despite the fact that states had previously rejected entering into an obligation 
to ensure such representativeness of professional groups – without too much 
control by the state over who gets elected.53 The qualification requirements of 
‘high moral character’, ‘qualifications required for appointment to high judicial 
office’ or ‘recognised competence’ have been of central importance in this regard 
since the early days of the Convention.54 There were at some points doubts about 
the independence of judges55 because of anecdotal evidence of politically moti-
vated reappointments and non-reappointments during the phase when judges 
held office for a renewable six-year term.56 However, Protocol 14 introduced a 
non-renewable term of office of nine years as a reaction.57
The Court sits in various formations: single judges, committees of three 
judges, chambers of seven and the Grand Chamber composed of seventeen 
judges.58 In setting up these various sections, their composition must be 
‘geographically and gender balanced and shall reflect the different legal systems 
among the Contracting Parties’.59 This leads to a highly complex system of 
distribution of judges across the various formations, as additionally in practice 
a fair distribution of workload has to be achieved.60 There is also a mechanism 
for appointing an ad hoc judge in cases where the judge of the nationality of a 
state before the Court is not sitting in the competent formation.61 The diver-
sity achieved seems to have operated effectively. Empirical evidence suggests 
that hardly any strong national or geopolitical bias can be evidenced in judicial 
decision-making behaviour.62 Instead, a common judicial legal culture has 
emerged.63 There exists a division between more ‘activist’ judges and judges 
could even lead to the Court becoming a ‘quasi-Supreme Administrative Court of Europe’, Wildhaber, 
‘Rethinking the ECtHR’, 228.
52  Article 20 ECHR.
53  See with some numbers E. Voeten, ‘Politics, Judicial Behaviour, and Institutional Design’ in J. Christof-
fersen and M.R. Madsen (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 64.
54  Bates, ‘Birth of the ECHR’, 37.
55  Lester, 108-109.
56  Voeten, 67.
57  See Article 23 (1) ECHR. See also Lester, 103.
58  Article 26 (1) ECHR.
59  Rule 25 (2) Rules of the Court.
60  N.-L. Arold, The Legal Culture of the European Court of Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 
55.
61  Article 26 (4) ECHR.
62  Voeten, 71 and 74.
63  Arold, 159.
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preferring ‘restraint’ exercised by the Court,64 but this balance seems to be shift-
ing increasingly in favour of the first position.65
The judgments of the Court also reflect a deliberative, diversifying approach. 
While deliberations are secret, judges have the opportunity to write concurring 
and dissenting opinions to the judgment.66
It can be concluded that both in terms of composition and of adjudication, 
the Court reflects a high degree of representativeness. It remains an inter-
national court with a certain level of aloofness from the concrete domestic 
context.67 Still, the Court is well equipped for balancing if we compare it for 
example with the WTO Appellate Body. The latter aims to represent the views of 
the WTO membership of 153 countries as far as possible through a judicial body 
of seven members, of which only three adjudicate a concrete dispute.
 ii. Sanctions under the Convention
As an international tribunal, the Court cannot rely on remedies 
comparable to a domestic constitutional court. No law is struck down or declared 
invalid as a result of the Court’s review. Instead, Article 41 ECHR foresees the 
possibility for the Court to afford ‘just satisfaction’ to the injured party. Propos-
als during the drafting stage which aimed at giving the Court the power to 
influence domestic law similar to a constitutional court had been rejected from 
the start.68 Next to monetary compensation, the Court can, however, also award 
other individual measures such as the reopening of domestic proceedings, and 
general measures typically requiring a change in legislation in a state.69 Still, 
essentially the Court’s judgment is only enforced by supervision of the Com-
mittee of Ministers, i.e. by political means.70 In recent years the Parliamentary 
Assembly has also intensified its monitoring on the execution of judgments in 
order to increase political pressure on repeatedly non-compliant states.71 The 
possibilities of sanctions in such cases are limited and can only take the form of 
suspension of membership or expulsion from the Council of Europe or a new 
procedure introduced by Protocol 14 which allows the Committee of Ministers to 
64  See Voeten, 66, with examples, who points out that professional background is highly relevant for the 
attitude adopted by individual judges.
65  Ibid., 69.
66  Article 45 (2) ECHR. See also Arold, 64-65.
67  A fact of which the Court is well aware, as the subsequent discussion on the institutional dimension on 
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation shows, see section III.B.ii.
68  Bates, ‘Birth of the ECHR’, 39.
69  F.G. Jacobs, R.C.A. White and C. Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights 5 edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 57-58.
70  Article 46 (2) ECHR.
71  E. Lambert-Abdelgawad, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 2 edn (Stras-
bourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2008), 59 ff.
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bring a state before the Court to receive a declaration of failure to fulfil obliga-
tions under the Convention.72
Despite such weak ultimate enforcement, at least in their rationale sanctions 
can definitely be read as pointing towards the nature of the Court as the inter-
national counterpart to a constitutional court. In practice, non-compliance is an 
increasing problem, and the impression is that some countries simply buy their 
way out of violations of the Convention. Still, the theoretical aim of the Conven-
tion seems to be – without too much doubt on this matter – that members 
comply with the judgments of the Court.
Summing up, for an international court, the Court is equipped to a remar-
kable degree with tools of representativeness and sanctions. Its willingness to 
engage in evaluating under proportionality stricto sensu can be understood in 
light of its suitable institutional features and the rather clear institutional ratio-
nale, which very closely resembles that of a domestic constitutional court.
 D Conclusion
Judicial review under the Convention resembles domestic 
constitutional fundamental rights adjudication, although nuanced through the 
international institutional setting. As we discuss subsequently, the Court relies 
broadly on proportionality stricto sensu in its case law, but excludes strict test-
ing of necessity. Some explanations for this approach have been found in this 
section. The heavier reliance on proportionality stricto sensu to the detriment 
of necessity seems to be most reasonably explained by the rationale of judicial 
review of individual as opposed to constitutional justice. The increasing case 
load over time presented the Court with the question of whether to try to provide 
solutions to individual cases based on their specific circumstances in its judg-
ments, or to provide ‘constitutional solutions’ in the sense of broader, principled 
decisions which may take into account less the individual circumstances, but set 
out more rigid and generalized guidelines. The debate on the future role of the 
Court is ongoing, but the general tendency continues to be case-by-case balanc-
ing. The consequent reliance on proportionality stricto sensu has been confirmed 
examining the institutional features of the Court’s review. The Court is well 
equipped in the diversity and representativeness of its membership, but also 
in terms of the rationale of its sanctioning mechanism, which despite frequent 
practical failure at least in theory appears strongly geared to induce future 
compliance with the Court’s rulings. In this regard the European Court of 
Human Rights distinguishes itself from other international adjudicative bodies 
examined in the later sections.73 Still, it must now be examined to what extent 
these explanations can usefully be translated into normative justifications for 
judicial review which bolster the particular use made of proportionality analy-
sis. For this purpose, we turn to pre-balancing and the justification of judicial 
72  Article 46 (4) ECHR.
73  See the different rationale pursued by international investment tribunals in chapter 8 section II.C.
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review and discuss the appropriateness of intrusive review under different rights 
enshrined in the Convention.
 III  The Justification of Judicial Review under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms
The European Court of Human Rights is in a different position 
than a domestic constitutional or supreme court in its justification of judicial 
review. The very idea of the Convention system is to provide an additional, 
subsidiary safeguard system for the protection of human rights. However, we 
can observe similar conceptual justifications in the case law as already observed 
in German and United States constitutional law. As the setting of the Court as 
an international judiciary complicates the picture, the Court had recourse to the 
tool of the margin of appreciation doctrine to elaborate its choice of a standard of 
review adapted to each individual case.
Due to a very broad concept of what rights justify judicial review in both a 
horizontal and vertical dimension, the Court extended its review to positive obli-
gations and the horizontal effect of fundamental rights. Similar to the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights was 
required adapt its review to a setting where sufficient leeway had to be granted 
to domestic authorities in particular courts. At the end of the day, the use of 
proportionality analysis by the European Court of Human Rights is convincing, 
but we remain unsatisfied as to the particular treatment of necessity in some of 
the case law.
 A  Conceptualizing the Justification of Judicial Review under 
the European Convention on Human Rights for the 
European Court of Human Rights
The question of the appropriate intrusiveness for the Court’s 
review of the domestic authorities’ decisions becomes all the more pressing in 
the institutional setting of the Convention, where there is no true parliamentary 
assembly or other body which could overrule an interpretation once given.74 The 
Court emphasized its role as a safeguard for the functioning of democracy to 
justify its review.
It defined its position towards democracy along the lines of a broader concep-
tion of democracy. In the Court’s view, ‘democracy does not simply mean that 
the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position’.75 For the Court, its review thus constitutes part of the system 
74  Arold, 50.
75  Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark, 11 January 2006, (2008) 46 EHRR 572, para 58.
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of protecting democracy in overcoming the latter’s potential majoritarian bias. 
At the same time, some judges have expressed discomfort with all-too intrusive 
review of the decision-making process at national level.76 The Court’s mission is 
thus less appropriately defined narrowly as a defender of the democratic pro-
cess comparable to United States constitutional law. The effective activity of the 
Court has consistently been devoted to the refinement of the substance of the 
Convention rights more generally rather than to countering overall challenges to 
democracy in Convention states.77
Occasionally, some have read statements into the case law of the Court as 
fulfilling a role of ‘virtual representation’ of the interests of foreigners.78 In a 
takings case where non-nationals complained of being disadvantaged in terms 
of compensation, the Court held that there could indeed be a problem because 
‘[...] non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nation-
als, they will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its 
authors nor have been consulted on its adoption.’79 However, the typical role 
for the Court is not to represent foreigners neglected in the domestic demo-
cratic process. Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is one reason for 
a complaint, but not the only or a typical one; the Convention also provides for 
protection of rights of the nationals of a state against that state. Even in the 
above mentioned decision, the Court’s statement were linked to its search for 
‘legitimate reasons’ for a distinction between foreigners and nationals in terms 
of the burden each group had to carry under the contested regulatory regime for 
compensation.80
The attributes of a ‘democratic society’ are a crucial benchmark for the 
Court in assessing when the discretion towards domestic authorities should 
be overcome and a violation should be found. In reading the preamble of the 
Convention, the Court has emphasized ‘a very clear connection’ between the 
Convention and democracy, as it suggests for the furtherance of its goals an 
‘effective political democracy’ combined with a ‘common understanding and 
observance of human rights’.81 The Court thus seems to understand its judicial 
76  In the case of Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2), 6 October 2005, (2006) 42 EHRR 849, para 79,  the Court 
discussed and criticized even the parliamentary debate before the adoption of the law under review, as 
the competing interests at stake had not been appropriately balanced. Judges Tulkens and Zagrebelsky 
wrote in their concurring opinion (see para 7) that the Court would put itself on ‘slippery terrain’ when 
two sources of legitimacy, the Court and the national parliament, met, in particular since the Court 
often referred in its case law to the margin of appreciation given to domestic authorities in the imple-
mentation of the Convention rights.
77  Wildhaber, ‘Rethinking the ECtHR’, 226.
78  See the tribunal in the investment law case Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED, SA v. United Mexican 
States ICSID Case No ARB/AF/00/2, Award (29 May 2003), para 122, further discussed in chapter 8 
section III.B.
79  James and others v. United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, Series A, No 98, (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para 63.
80  Ibid.
81  United Communist Party of Turkey and others v Turkey, 30 January 1998, (1998) 26 EHRR 121, para 45.
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review as a necessary complement to protect democracy. As a result, we observe 
in the subsequent section that certain rights connected with the democratic pro-
cess are indeed protected by more intrusive scrutiny. However, the Court also 
protects other rights in such a manner, e.g. where intimate aspects of private life 
are concerned. Furthermore, the Court also began early on to discuss positive 
obligations under the Convention rights and the horizontal effect of Conven-
tion rights. Summing up, pre-balancing under the Convention seems to point 
towards an outcome following the model of equal representation, with a wide 
range of rights protected comparable to the range of rights protected in domestic 
legal regimes like German constitutional law.
 B The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine
Based on wide-spread use of proportionality analysis as a conse-
quence of the pre-balancing discussed above, the Court developed a systematic 
approach to determining the intrusiveness of its review. It continued to rely 
on full-scale proportionality analysis, but clarified, based on specific reasons, 
why there should be differences in the intrusiveness of review. The margin of 
appreciation doctrine should balance out the perceived inconsistency between 
judicial review under the Convention as a necessary component of safeguarding 
domestic democracy and the call for deference based on the Court’s position as 
an international court.
The uneasiness on the appropriate degree of deference both on the side 
of interpretation and the side of national application and interpretation of the 
Convention is perhaps the central underlying rationale along which the margin 
of appreciation doctrine has developed. This doctrine having been developed in 
the case law without concise textual basis in the Convention,82 there has been 
continuous confusion as to its exact operation.83
Early on, the very idea of the discretion given to national authorities by the 
margin of appreciation raised concerns on whether the idea of universal human 
rights would be threatened and the promise of defence of minority rights 
against excesses of majorities in democracies would be defeated.84 The highly 
casuistic use of the concept has also led to claims that the margin of apprecia-
tion effectively led to high unpredictability, amounting to a threat to the rule of 
law.85
82  G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 80.
83  See for an older overview of the comprehensive case law Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation 
and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp: Oxford University Press, 
2002).
84  E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 843, 844.
85  J.A. Brauch, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004-2005) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 113.
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Letsas usefully suggested distinguishing between the use of the margin as a 
substantive and a structural concept, meaning that in the first case the Court is 
limiting the scope of the right at issue with the effect of not accepting a claim of 
violation, while in the second case the Court refuses to review intrusively a deci-
sion taken by national authorities.86 This breakdown is to some extent mirrored 
here to set out the substantive and the institutional dimension of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.87
 i.  The substantive dimension of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine
There are substantially two elements based on which the Court 
decides how wide a margin should be granted to the party state. First, the nature 
of public interests and rights plays a central role. The doctrine is applied in a 
somewhat complex manner, so that some have argued that by adding a ‘layer of 
uncertainty’, what the Court actually uses is not a clear legal test but rather ‘a set 
of highly imprecise justificatory strategies’ that can be made fruitful in different 
manners by the Court in each case.88 Nonetheless, some general trends in the 
case law can be identified. For certain public interests, the Court thus grants a 
greater margin of discretion, the classic example being public morals.89 At the 
same time, if the activities concerned by an interference relate e.g. to the ‘most 
intimate’ aspects of the right to private life, review is more intrusive.90 As a 
consequence, as McHarg puts it, ‘the margin of appreciation varies not only in 
relation to different exceptions, but in relation to the same exceptions in different 
contexts’.91
The same can be observed for rights closely related to the democratic pro-
cess. In describing its understanding of democracy, the Court insists in particu-
lar on the value of pluralism, e.g. for the free expression of ideas and opinions or 
the free exercise of religious beliefs,92 but also generally ‘tolerance and broad-
86  G. Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705, 
706.
87  J. Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011) 17 European Law 
Journal 80, 108 ff., usefully suggests a different breakdown of the arguments underlying the application 
of the margin of appreciation. In her view, the Court acts based on the ‘common grounds’ argument, 
the ‘better placed’ argument and the ‘importance of the affected  right’ argument. For our present 
purposes, a twofold distinction along substantive and institutional arguments appears, however, better 
suited.
88  A. McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal 
Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 62 The Modern Law 
Review 671, 688.
89  Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, Series A, No 45, (1982) 4 EHRR 149, para 52.
90  Ibid.
91  McHarg, 688 (emphasis in original).
92  See e.g. Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v Turkey, 13 February 2003, (2003) 37 EHRR 1, paras 89 ff.
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mindedness’.93 This leads to strict review in cases where the freedom of expres-
sion and the freedom of assembly and association are restricted, the latter in 
particular as regards the formation of political parties.94
As a second element, the Court looks for the existence of a European consen-
sus on moral questions before engaging in intrusive review. The discretion 
for matters of public morals can also be understood through this lens. Only if 
there exists common ground for a decision does the Court feel legitimized in 
using intrusive judicial review, while subsidiarity calls for deference to national 
authorities in the opposite case.95 To ascertain such a European consensus is 
often a challenging task; the Court’s decisions were thus criticized at various 
occasions as merely following temporary tendencies or insufficiently justifying 
its findings.96
Broader in its setting than the mere democratic process doctrine, the Court 
thus feels justified to claim authority for judicial review both as protector of 
rights against intrusions into intimate aspects of individuals as well as a setter 
of common European standards.
 ii.  The institutional side of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine
This broader claim for justified judicial review is countered by 
the recognition of the Court of the limited institutional capacities of an interna-
tional court. In its view, as it held in Handyside v United Kingdom, ‘[b]y reason 
of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, 
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge 
to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the 
“necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them’.97 The second 
dimension of the margin of appreciation doctrine thus gives the Court leeway to 
manoeuvre through the difficult waters of its relationship with national authori-
ties.
The Court has recognized that national authorities merit deference in cases 
where complex technical assessments had to be undertaken.98 Similarly, the 
nature of the national institution under review plays a role. The Court indicates 
that it grants some deference to court judgments as interpretations of national 
93  Dudgeon v United Kingdom, para 53.
94  See with further references to case law Gerards, 112-113.
95  See e.g. Handyside v United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, Series A, No 24, (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 737, para 
47.
96  See Gerards, 109 footnote 195 with further references.
97  Handyside v United Kingdom, para 48.
98  See e.g. for the case of natural disaster prevention Budayeva and others v Russia, 20 March 2008, Appli-
cation No 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, para 135.
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law99 as well as to judicial interpretations that assess the proportionality of 
national measures with domestic constitutional rights.100
 iii. Conclusion
The Court operates to some extent based on the ideas also 
represented by the procedural democracy doctrine, as could be shown above. 
However, it found that its review was a necessary component of democracy as a 
broader notion, which meant that its review went beyond strong protection given 
only to a limited number of rights directly linked to the democratic process. 
It seems that the Court reads its mandate to protect fundamental rights very 
broadly, as can be shown subsequently by looking at the case law on positive 
obligations and horizontal effect of fundamental rights. This solution – propor-
tionality analysis combined with an express discussion of the standard of review 
– appears highly appropriate in the light of the number of rights protected in 
the Convention and the comprehensive reading that the Court has given to them 
and its own role for the protection of democracy in the European Convention 
party states.
 C  Judicial Review under the Convention and Positive 
Obligations
At first glance, the Convention seems to focus predominantly 
on political and liberal rights and to be the limitation of state action interfering 
with such rights. Yet, this picture is soon shown to be too simplistic. In a first 
move examined subsequently, there has been growing recognition that beyond 
mere refraining from interference, human rights as enshrined in the Conven-
tion could require a state to become active. This movement accompanied the 
increasing abandonment of older typological distinctions between categories of 
rights. The recognition of positive obligations reminds us of the development in 
German constitutional law. Interestingly enough, there is, however, no similar 
rejection of proportionality analysis as observed in the German case.101 Unfor-
99  See e.g. Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 13 July 2004, (2006) 42 EHRR 522, para 59, where the Court 
held that it would have to exercise ‘the European supervision incumbent on it’ also in private law 
cases, but only if the relevant court’s interpretation of a legal act appears ‘unreasonable, arbitrary or [...] 
blatantly inconsistent’ with Convention rights. Also, in Garcia Ruiz v Spain, 21 January 1999, (2001) 31 
EHRR 22, para 28,  the Court emphasized that it was in principle ‘not its function to deal with errors 
of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court’ unless a violation of Convention rights could be 
found.
100  In A and others v United Kingdom, 19 February 2009, (2009) 49 EHRR 29, para 184,  the Court held that 
it would ‘in principle’ follow a judgment given by the House of Lords on the question of proportionality 
of the detention of an applicant unless a misinterpretation of the Convention or a ‘manifestly unreason-
able’ conclusion drawn by the national court could be shown.
101  See chapter 3 section III.B.ii.
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tunately, however, there is also no clarifying discussion as to what standard of 
review should accompany the extension of proportionality analysis to the field of 
positive obligations. We can contrast this with United States constitutional law, 
where hardly any case law at all has addressed positive obligations or horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights in light of the particular perception of rights pre-
dominant in this legal regime.102 The European Court of Human Rights adopted 
a much broader and effectively convincing reading of Convention rights unhin-
dered by a comparably limited perception of rights as in the United States’ case.
 i.  The changing doctrinal perception of Convention rights: 
towards positive obligations
As early as in the 1970s, the initial concept of dividing human 
rights into political and liberal or civil rights as opposed to social and economic 
rights had come under fire, as such a division tended to view the former as 
‘negative’ rights and the latter as ‘positive’ rights.103 Conceptually, this division 
seemed ever less appropriate. In 1980, a new terminology was suggested by 
Shue, suggesting that obligations for states encompassed ‘to avoid depriving’, ‘to 
protect from deprivation’ and ‘to aid the deprived’.104 This terminology was then 
rephrased and introduced as the classic tripartite typology used today which 
describes obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.105 This typology aimed to 
overcome attempts of categorisation which could not stand the test of practice, 
where all rights seemed to contain a variety of obligations for states. One scholar 
colourfully suggested perceiving human rights obligations as ‘successive waves 
of duties’.106
This development has also found its corollary in ECHR related doctrine, 
where positive obligations are argued to be part of what states signed up to 
under the Convention. Early on, the doctrine suggested a distinction between 
treaties of and treaties on human rights: The first category would create indi-
102  See chapter 4 section III.A.iv.
103  See e.g. under the ECHR the Court in Airey v Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A, No 32, (1979-1980) 
2 EHRR 305, para 26: ‘Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, 
many of them have implications of a social or economic nature. The Court therefore considers, like the 
Commission, that the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of 
social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no 
water-tight division separating that sphere from the field covered by the Convention.’
104  H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistance, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), 52.
105  See in particular the report prepared by Asbjørn Eide The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 of 7 July 1987. See also A. Eide, ‘Realization of Social and Economic Rights 
and the Minimum Threshold Approach’ (1989) 10 Human Rights Law Journal 36, 37.
106  J. Waldron, ‘Two Sides of the Coin’ in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 25.
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vidual rights, while the second would only create governmental obligations.107 
A limited reading ought to be the result in the case of the Convention, as it is 
commonly designated as the European Convention on Human Rights; but the 
French title108 and also the official title ‘European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ support the argument that the 
notion of protection ought to be understood in a broad manner, as potentially 
encompassing a broad number of types of measures states are obliged to take.109 
Article 1 ECHR provides a further argument bolstering a broad mandate for 
protection resting on party states. The provision requires that states ‘shall secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined’ in the 
Convention.110 The Court used this provision to suggest that the Convention 
contains a ‘network of mutual, bilateral undertakings’ and ‘objective obligations’ 
benefitting from ‘collective enforcement’, which also required state authorities 
to act if e.g. breaches occur at subordinate levels of the administration.111 Argu-
ing in favour of the imposition of duties by socioeconomic rights, some would 
also use a substantive reading of the notion of ‘effective political democracy’ 
enshrined in the Preamble in order to suggest that socio-economic rights and 
corresponding positive obligations for states are justified as necessary to secur-
ing participation in such a democracy.112 The method of ‘effective’ interpretation 
of rights was another reason for the Court to recognise positive obligations for 
states under rights even if such obligations were not explicitly laid down in the 
wording of the Convention rights.113
 ii. The emergence of positive obligations in the case law
These doctrinal enlargements of the obligations for states 
contained in the Convention were accompanied by increasing recognition in the 
case law that state obligations went beyond merely refraining from interference. 
The Court was ‘quite ahead of its time’,114 already recognising in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s positive obligations for states in a number of situations. States 
107  P. Drost, Human Rights as Legal Rights: The Realization of Individual Human Rights in Positive Interna-
tional Law 2 edn (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1965), 174.
108  Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales (author’s emphasis).
109  D. Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 11.
110  I.E. Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights – The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 276;  see also Xenos, 10.
111  Ireland v United Kingdom, para 239.
112  Koch, 273.
113  Early observed by J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human 
Rights (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 102-103. See also confirming this point A.R. 
Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 221.
114  Xenos, 22.
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were thus obliged e.g. to enact appropriate administrative measures to ensure 
that a legal bond is created between an unmarried mother and her child based 
on the latter’s birth,115 to provide for a legal possibility for separation which was 
also practically accessible in terms of procedure116 and to introduce effectively 
deterrent criminal sanctions for certain crimes violating human rights as a 
corollary to an insufficient civil law remedy.117
Since then, positive obligations have been found under virtually all Conven-
tion rights. The classic examples often mentioned are obligations to ensure 
deterrence from violations caused by private parties by means of criminal sanc-
tions and obligations to ensure the accessibility of legal procedures. Further-
more, under the freedom of expression the Court held that a state could be 
obliged to protect a threatened journalist,118 or to grant legal assistance to defen-
dants in proceedings concerning defamation claims.119 Under the prohibition of 
discrimination among persons in their enjoyment of Convention rights in Arti-
cle 14, the Court held that states were subject to an obligation to differentiate in 
their treatment of individuals if the latter were effectively in different circum-
stances.120 Under the right to property, the Court found a positive obligation for 
the state to take measures in the presence of known dangerous circumstances.121
 iii.  The standard of review and proportionality analysis in the 
case law on positive obligations
Based on its early recognition that the safeguard of Convention 
rights may impose positive duties on states as well as obligations to abstain from 
interference, the Court found that similar principles were applicable in both 
situations.
In Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom, the Court thus confirmed earlier 
findings and summed up that the ‘applicable principles’ were ‘broadly similar’, 
which meant that in both contexts a ‘fair balance’ had to be struck between the 
interests of the individual and of the community.122 The margin of appreciation 
doctrine also applies in principle to situations of positive obligations.123
115  Marckx v Belgium .
116  Airey v Ireland .
117  X and Y v Netherlands, 26 March 1985, Series A, No 91, (1986) 8 EHRR 235. The doctrine could just 
barely keep up with these developments, see a general proposal for the relevance of rights violations by 
private parties only issued later in A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), 343.
118  Özgür Gündem v Turkey, 16 March 2000, (2001) 31 EHRR 49, paras 42-43.
119  Steel and Morris v United Kingdom, 15 February 2005, (2005) 41 EHRR 403, para 95.
120  Thlimmenos v Greece, 6 April 2000, (2001) 31 EHRR 411, para 44.
121  Öneryildiz v Turkey, 30 November 2004, (2005) 41 EHRR 325, para 136.
122  Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom, 21 February 1990, (1990) 12 EHRR 355, para 41.
123  Rees v United Kingdom, 17 October 1986, (1986) 9 EHRR 56, para 37.
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In the literature, some have welcomed the development of a seemingly paral-
lel test, while others showed less enthusiasm. Some have simply emphasized 
the need for flexibility in adjudicating positive obligations, that would not lend 
themselves to categorical approaches. A broad ‘reasonableness’ standard would 
thus be more useful.124
There may, however, be more concrete problems with this approach. The 
Court indicated that e.g. in cases of positive obligations under Article 8, the 
aims mentioned in that provision’s second paragraph ‘may be of a certain 
relevance’.125 Although the legitimate aims mentioned in the various provi-
sions of the Convention thus seem, in their phrasing, aimed at the situation of 
interference with a right, in practice they should, in the Court’s view, also play 
a role for positive obligations. Yet, as the Court’s language indicates, the list is 
not perceived as exhaustive, and in practice a broad range of ‘general interests’ 
is accepted as a justification for the state to counterbalance the required positive 
action to ensure a right.126
Another conceptual problem lies in the strict distinction of individual as 
opposed to community interests suggested by the Court. In the case of positive 
obligations, in light of the principle of equality in most situations such obliga-
tions apply to a larger number of persons, and may be considered justified not 
only for the individual as his or her right, but in a more general interest as 
well.127
It has thus been correctly remarked that it is difficult to assess what margin 
of appreciation is applied by the Court, but also that the very admission of 
‘general interests’ does not always meet a certain threshold of importance, as is 
required in cases of negative duties for states.128 In the case of positive obliga-
tions, in many cases more expertise and exhaustive discussion could be required 
as to the negative impact on an individual, which is much harder to establish 
than in typical cases of public interference with a right.129
Claiming to act for the sake of coherence of the case law, some voices on the 
bench and in the doctrine suggested fully merging positive and negative obliga-
tions, abandoning any distinction between the two concepts.130 This approach 
could remedy the problem of an abstract, potentially large number of ‘general 
124  Koch, 289.
125  Rees v United Kingdom, para 37.
126  See already early sceptical C.J. Forder, ‘Legal Protection Under Article 8 ECHR: Marckx and Beyond’ 
(1990) 37 Netherlands International Law Review 162, 179.
127  Xenos, 148.
128  Ibid., 61-62.
129  Ibid., 62.
130  See Wildhaber, concurring opinion in Stjerna v Finland, 25 November 1994, (1994) 24 EHRR 195; P. van 
Dijk, ‘’Positive Obligations’ Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are the States Still 
the ‘Masters’ of the Convention?’ in M. Castermans-Holleman, F. van Hoof and J. Smith (eds.), The Role 
of the Nation-State in the 21st Century : Human Rights, International Organisations and Foreign Policy : 
Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 25.
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interests’ which qualify for the ‘fair balance’ test and which render unpredict-
able both the margin of appreciation and the proportionality assessment under 
the ‘fair balance’ test. An extensive discussion of the importance of such general 
interests as well as of the applicable margin of appreciation could, however, 
already arguably do a lot of work.
 iv. Conclusion
The early admission of positive obligations by the Court and 
the discussion in the doctrine led to the adoption of proportionality analysis. 
However, despite intense debate on the topic, there continues to be no clarity as 
to the appropriate standard of review. While the Court – correctly  in our view 
– extended its use of proportionality analysis to the sphere of positive obliga-
tions, it has paid insufficient attention to justifying its exercise of review. Instead 
of thus only focusing on the characteristics of interference with a right in the 
framework of the ‘fair balance’ test, the Court would be better advised in pure 
positive obligation cases to attach more importance to the justification for review 
and the appropriate standard of review. Some have suggested without providing 
concrete details that for this purpose the Court should assess the ‘democratic 
limit’ of the Convention in the respective case in prescribing positive obliga-
tions.131 Apart from the ‘qualitative’ element of whether a positive obligation 
arises under the respective right, regard would also have to be paid to the ‘quan-
titative’ element, i.e. the measure’s costs, their distribution and the number of 
potentially concerned individuals.132 This could be the first useful contribution 
to judging the result of proportionality analysis in a more lenient way, i.e. with 
a less intrusive standard of review. A solution as in German constitutional law, 
where the very use of proportionality analysis has been called into question,133 
does not, however, seem warranted, since the model of equal representation 
does not appear fundamentally changed.
 D  Judicial Review and Convention Rights in the Private 
Sphere
Potential horizontal effect of Convention rights was similarly 
discussed in the doctrine as early on as positive obligations.134 The German 
131  Xenos, 147.
132  Ibid., 163 ff.
133  See chapter 3 section III.B.ii.
134  See for an early suggestion e.g. M.-A. Eissen, ‘La Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et 
les Obligations de l’Individu: une Mise à Jour’ in R. Cassin (ed.), Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber III: 
Protection des Droits de l’Homme dans les Rapports entre Personnes Privées (Paris: Pédone, 1971). Others 
followed, suggesting that in any event more and more countries were adopting the concept of horizontal 
effect in their national constitutional orders, see A. Drzemczewski, ‘The European Human Rights 
Convention and Relations between Private Parties’ (1979) 26 Netherlands International Law Review 163.
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example of the Lüth decision immediately comes to mind.135 The European 
Court of Human Rights could pre-balance the various arguments in a similar 
way or reach the conclusion that the specific setting of judicial review under 
the Convention would call for a different approach. Effectively, the Court chose 
a path not too far from the German Federal Constitutional Court. In our view, 
this seems appropriate, although the reliance on proportionality analysis 
seems vague at some points, as the subsequent case law shows. In the German 
example pre-balancing led the German Federal Constitutional Court to the 
conclusion that the outcome resembled a model of special interest representa-
tion. Horizontal effect of fundamental rights arguably changes the situation of 
review, because private law is the object of review and the central value of the 
latter is private autonomy. Since we found the position taken by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court convincing, there are no grounds for adopting a 
different stance for the European Court of Human Rights. There should be no 
full-scale rejection of review as under a strict division thesis between public and 
private law. Judicial review should arguably be based – as in the German case – 
on a model of special interest review, giving due deference to private autonomy 
and relying on proportionality analysis only in cases of a severe imbalance of 
values. Discussing doctrine and case law, we find that the solution found by 
the Court convincing to a large extent, as it is in conformity with the broad and 
radiating perception of Convention rights generally taken by the Court in justi-
fying its judicial review. At the same time, the use of proportionality analysis is 
accompanied by appropriate deference.
 i.  The justification of review in light of indirect horizontal 
effect of Convention rights
Direct horizontal effect seems unthinkable under the Conven-
tion as it would effectively require a full-scale institutional overhaul to create a 
remedy against private parties. Indirect horizontal effect imposing structural 
limitations on the leeway of private law seems more feasible. Yet, important 
questions remain. In the German case, indirect horizontal effect was strongly 
based by the Federal Constitutional Court on the value of developing one’s own 
personality, which is the cornerstone of the Basic Law. Only, it is hard to find 
such a central value in the enumeration of rights in the Convention to justify 
similarly structural constraints imposed by the European Court of Human 
Rights and to serve as a benchmark of constitutional balance.136 Still, to some 
extent, indirect horizontal effect remains a tempting proposal for some because 
of the judicial institutional mechanism which allows the introduction of rights 
135  See chapter 3 section III.B.iii.
136  See on German constitutional law M. Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional 
Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 341, 
348.
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claims into a debate in the absence of or before parliamentary debates.137 It also 
facilitates overcoming the persisting, but only poorly arguable public-private 
distinction present in fundamental rights adjudication.138
The Court reacted with pragmatism: it continued to extend the doctrine of 
positive obligations. Furthermore, it also insisted on a duty of national authori-
ties to interpret private law instruments in a manner compatible with Conven-
tion rights, thereby extending the reach of the latter rights to areas of law 
‘traditionally thought of as distant from human rights adjudication’.139 It held 
that in private litigation, a violation could only arise where the national courts’ 
assessment of the facts or interpretation of domestic law was ‘manifestly unrea-
sonable or arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the fundamental principles 
of the Convention’.140 The Court underlined that in theory it was not asked to 
settle disputes of a ‘purely private nature’, but that it could not remain passive in 
exercising its ‘European supervision’ in such cases.141 It had to intervene as soon 
as a national court’s interpretation of a legal act of private law or an administra-
tive practice appeared ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory or, more broadly, 
inconsistent with the principles underlying the Convention’.142 Some criticized 
this approach as interfering too much with private autonomy and private law.143 
Yet, it should be noted that private law must undeniably be limited to some 
extent by the guidelines of public law, human rights standards being part of the 
latter.144 At least to date, the Court seems to have been exercising its review func-
tion with due concern for the role played by public authorities and with restraint 
in order to sanction only severe interferences with human rights caused by 
private actors, leaving little doubt that there is no far-reaching control of acts of 
private persons.
137  Xenos, 45.
138  Again in the German context Kumm, 359-360.
139  D. Spielmann, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights – The European Court of Human Rights’ 
in D. Oliver and J. Fedtke (eds.), Human Rights and the Private Sphere – A Comparative Study (London/
New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 464.
140  Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, para 46.
141  Ibid., para 59.
142  Ibid. (author’s emphasis). See also more recently Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 16 Decem-
ber 2008, Application No 23883/06, para 33.
143  O. Cherednychenko, ‘Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human Rights?’ 
(2006) 13 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 195, 207, noting the potential negative 
effect on predictability of private law because of ‘ubiquitous’ Convention rights.
144  Xenos, 38.
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 ii.  The standard of review and proportionality analysis in the 
case law on conflicts between private parties
Generally, the Court has also adopted the ‘fair balance’ test for 
the field of private party conflicts. Two constellations provide good examples to 
discuss the Court’s approach.
The first case is the obligation imposed on domestic courts not to inter-
pret instruments of a private law nature in a manner blatantly contrary to the 
Convention’s principles. In Pla and Puncernau v Andorra, the Court examined 
the interpretation of a will as to whether it constituted discrimination under 
Article 14 in combination with Article 8 ECHR. The interpretation of the high-
est instance in Andorra excluded adopted sons from inheritance based on the 
text of the will which only mentioned ‘sons’ and based on the historical context 
of the will in the year 1939. A distinction as established by the Andorran court 
would be found discriminatory if there was no ‘objective and reasonable justi-
fication’, no ‘legitimate aim’ or no ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’.145 Most likely 
based on the absence of any legitimate aim, the Court felt competent to inter-
vene despite its purported deferent approach to domestic court interpretations 
of private law, where the understanding and knowledge of ‘local legal traditions’ 
played an eminent role.146 In the present case, although ‘very weighty reasons’ 
would have been required to justify a difference in treatment because of the 
birth out of wedlock, no such reason could be discerned.147
The ‘fair balance’ test developed by the Court in vertical cases was also 
extended to conflicts between private interests enshrined in rights, effectively 
‘horizontalizing’ the Court’s approach.148 In the von Hannover v Germany case, 
the Court had to weigh the protection of private life against the freedom of 
expression in a case concerning an injunction granted by a national court which 
prevented the publication of photos of a celebrity in magazines.
In von Hannover v Germany, the Court had to examine the balance struck by 
domestic courts in interpreting domestic law on the publication of pictures of a 
prominent individual in magazines. According to the Court, in the situation of 
conflict between two individuals’ rights, a ‘fair balance’ between individual and 
community interests had to be struck and a margin of appreciation applied to 
the state’s authorities decisions.149 Repeating some general principles of its case 
law on the conflict between the freedom of expression and the right to private 
life, the Court then engaged in a rather informal weighing exercise. It empha-
sized that the applicant was part of a reigning family, but did not hold public 
145  Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, para 61.
146  Ibid., para 46.
147  Ibid.
148  S. van Drooghenbroeck, ‘L’horizontalisation des droits de l’homme’ in H Dumont and others (eds), La 
responsabilité, face cachée des droits de l’homme (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005), 376.
149  von Hannover v Germany, 24 June 2004, (2005) 40 EHRR 1, para 57.
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office, which meant that the press’ role as a ‘watchdog’ was not given and there 
was no public right to be informed relating to her private life as could be the 
case for public officials.150 The aim of the publication of pictures only being the 
satisfaction of the ‘curiosity of a particular readership’, it could not contribute to 
a general debate.151 Performing thus a proportionality assessment on one side of 
the balance, the Court concluded that the freedom of expression only deserved 
narrow interpretation.
By contrast, the context of the pictures, which implied the harassment of 
figures of public interest, and the manner of the pictures being taken, i.e. with-
out consent or knowledge, pointed towards a severe interference with the right 
to privacy.152 As a consequence, the Court disagreed with the German courts’ 
interpretation of domestic law which had allowed the publication of the pictures 
based on the finding that the applicant was a ‘figure of contemporary society 
“par excellence”’ and could not rely on her right to privacy unless in secluded 
places out of the public.153
The case law seems in fact to grant appropriate deference and the Court 
only intervenes because of severe imbalances between the conflicting rights. 
However, the justification for review given by the Court relies, in both cases, 
mainly on the fact that domestic court decisions merit some deference. The topic 
of review of private law acts receives only insufficient attention. In comparison, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court in Lüth showed awareness of the 
danger of transforming its regime of review unduly by granting indirect hori-
zontal effect.154 The European Court of Human Rights here reaches acceptable 
results which seem to follow a model of special interest review, but the reason-
ing for the result provides only insufficient evidence on the justification of judi-
cial review. Recent case law emphasized again rather enigmatically that it would 
require ‘strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts’, but 
then insisted – at some points with alarmingly little discretion for the domestic 
court – on the use and acceptance of its own criteria by domestic courts for the 
pertinent balancing exercise.155
150  Ibid., paras 62-64.
151  Ibid., para 65.
152  Ibid., para 68.
153  Ibid., paras 74-75.
154  See chapter 3 section III.B.iii.b.
155  Von Hannover v Germany (no. 2, Grand Chamber decision), 7 February 2012, Applications nos 40660/08 
and 60641/08, para 107. While in this case the ‘fair balance’ struck by domestic courts was accepted, 
in Axel Springer AG. v Germany (Grand Chamber decision), 7 February 2012, Application no 39954/08, 
para 110, the Court reviewed very closely the various elements of the balancing undertaken by domestic 
courts and consequently found a violation of the Convention as it disagreed with some of them.
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 iii. Conclusion
In the case law on private party conflicts, the Court again had 
recourse to its ‘fair balance’ test. It has thus introduced some indirect horizon-
tal effect of Convention rights. While in principle the result conforms to the 
suggested pre-balancing resulting in a model of special interest review, a closer 
look at the case law reveals that the reasoning on the justification of review and 
the required deference is insufficient. While the Court referred only broadly to 
its ‘European supervision’ even in private law cases, its justification for review 
seemed to focus more on the need to defer to courts as domestic institutions 
than to the central interest of private autonomy at stake. Recent case law thus 
shows very close scrutiny at some occasions, which does not seem appropriate in 
the special interest setting of review at issue.
 E Conclusion
There is some room for praise and some for criticism of the 
European Court of Human Right’s discussion of its own justification of review. 
Over the years, the margin of appreciation doctrine has become a comprehen-
sive system of justificatory strategies to identify the appropriate standard of 
review. Its use may not always be as systematic as desired. Some commentators 
therefore deplored that the margin of appreciation could provide the Court with 
leeway to avoid explaining fully the criteria it applies to particular problems, 
potentially leading to erroneous or biased balancing exercises.156 However, it is a 
commendably comprehensive attempt to explain pre-balancing and the justifica-
tion of judicial review in the form of reasoning on the standard of review to be 
used, which cannot be found in such detail in the case law of other courts.
Of course, the Court generally faces a more difficult challenge as an interna-
tional court. The institutional dimension of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
can be commended as a useful tool. For some other rights, however, more 
discussion as to the justification for intense review through the Court could has 
proven useful.
It thus remains to some extent in the dark why a very broad variety of rights 
require intense scrutiny in the eyes of the Court, the latter having left matters at 
the stage of broad references to its concept of democracy as linked with its own 
review function.
One could also wish for more extensive justification of judicial review in 
other fields. In the case law on positive obligations, such reasoning remains 
rather scarce. In the jurisprudence on private law cases, the Court seems to 
reach convincing results similar to the one found by the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court in its Lüth decision, but its reasoning as to why it follows deferent 
review based on a model of special interest review remains unfortunately terse.
156  Lester, 112, points to examples of case law on the conflict between the freedom of expression and the 
right to protect one’s reputation, the latter having been overemphasized in his view.
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In any event, the criticism must be qualified to some extent in light of 
subsequent chapters on the Court of Justice of the European Union or invest-
ment tribunals, which show that in comparison, the European Court of Human 
Rights offers quite extensive reasoning on the justification of its review func-
tion.
 IV  The ‘Fair Balance’ Test in the Case Law under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms
Proportionality analysis plays a central role in the interpreta-
tion of the Convention rights by the Court. Yet, it operates in a different manner 
from what has been identified as the somewhat classic four-pronged version in 
German constitutional law, the ‘principle of proportionality’.157 Assessing the 
case law, we find a particular legal test, the ‘fair balance’ test. We start with an 
examination of different possibilities of interpreting the Convention and find 
that so far the Court refused a deontological reading. We thus find that exclu-
sion of balancing or proportionality stricto sensu is rare in the case law under the 
Convention. Relying on full-scale proportionality analysis, the Court developed 
a somewhat peculiar emphasis on the ultimate prong, while it rejected apply-
ing the test of necessity strictly. We have already found an explanation for the 
emphasis on proportionality stricto sensu in the form of the paradigm of indi-
vidual justice pursued by the Court. At the normative level of the justification 
of judicial review, however, we have found no particular argument supporting 
the peculiar use of necessity. In so doing, the Court seems to unduly change the 
structure of proportionality analysis, while in our view a change of the standard 
of review could have provided a better solution.
 A  The Interpretation of the Convention: Between 
Deontological and Balancing Approaches
The Court had the task of deciding what interpretative methods 
should apply to the broadly worded provisions of the Convention. Effectively, the 
Court has opted for a flexible approach of various interpretative principles that 
are applied together and sometimes weighed against each other. Voices in the 
doctrine suggested a more deontological reading of Convention rights which 
excludes balancing and adopts excluded reasons approaches; but the case law 
has so far only given limited weight to these ideas. As the justification of judicial 
review suggested by the Court appeared convincing to us, this solution of weigh-
ing also seems appropriate as a result of pre-balancing.
157  See chapter 3 section IV.B.
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 i. Weighing interpretative principles and doctrines
There is no adherence to one single, clearly identifiable canon. 
The Court elaborated a number of constitutional principles in its case law, 
proportionality being prominent among them.158 The controversy between 
judges favouring ‘individual’ and ‘constitutional’ justice did not produce major 
divisions among judges,159 so that the Court interpreted the Convention using 
a number of interpretative doctrines in a rather discretionary fashion.160 The 
omnipresence of balancing, here between the various doctrines of interpreta-
tion, was forcefully described as ‘doing justice and fairness through a vision of 
reasonableness’.161 Specific doctrines which can also be considered hallmarks for 
the construction of the Convention’s provisions include evolutionary interpre-
tation162 and an interpretation which renders rights ‘practical and effective’.163 
The first doctrine has led to continuous and – in the case of human rights – 
nearly unavoidable adaptation of interpretation of rights over the years; at the 
same time, practically no weight has been given to historical interpretation of 
the Convention.164 The doctrine of evolutionary interpretation also implied the 
identification by the Court of common standards accepted by a majority of party 
states as a benchmark of consensus.165 The tool of consensus combined with evo-
lutive interpretation helped the Court to overcome the limits of consent of state 
parties.166 At the same time, the doctrine of ‘practical and effective’ rights was 
158  Lester, 102.
159  Harmsen, 131.
160  See for a scheme of interpretative doctrines J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity 
and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 
66.
161  Wildhaber, ‘Rethinking the ECtHR’, 213.
162  See the Court’s famous statement on the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ which had to be inter-
preted ‘in light of present-day conditions’, Tyrer v United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, Series A, No 26, 
(1979-1980) 2 EHRR 1, para 30. See also on the ‘in the light of current society’ doctrine first accepted in 
Marckx v Belgium  Arold, 39.
163  Already in the Belgian Linguistics case, para 3, the Court referred to the concept of effet utile, before 
embracing the characteristic formula in Airey v Ireland, para 24.
164  See generally R. Bernhardt, ‘Rechtsfortbildung durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschen-
rechte’ in S. Breitenmoser and others (eds.), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law – Liber 
Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Zurich: Dike, 2007). For one of the rare historical approaches see the 
separate opinion by Judge Fitzmaurice in Golder v United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, Series A, No 18, 
(1979-1980) 1 EHRR 524.
165  See on this point Letsas, Theory of Interpretation, 76-77.
166  See for a good overview of sceptical voices on this topic K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the 
Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 
1730.
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used to ensure that rights were not granted merely in an ‘illusory’ or ‘theoreti-
cal’ fashion.167
Sceptics denounced the use of such a variety of interpretative maxims in 
no particularly ordered fashion as deeply problematic.168 As one solution, Greer 
seeks to introduce more clarity suggesting that the Court should use three 
principles of interpretation as predominant: the rights principle requiring the 
protection of Convention rights by the national Courts and the ECtHR; the 
democracy principle safeguarding that public interests or collective goods may 
be pursued by democratically accountable non-judicial public bodies at the 
national level; and the priority to rights principle, which in his view – based on 
the text of the Convention – systematically grants priority to the protection of the 
rights enshrined in the Convention over collective goods.169 He does not reject 
balancing as such,170 but the central task of the Court is to provide a definitive 
interpretation of rights and public interests. As a consequence, there can be 
no role for the margin of appreciation at the level of interpretation, but only for 
the application of Convention rights by national authorities.171 This critique to 
some extent joins the earlier findings on the controversy between individual and 
constitutional justice: in finding solutions the Court must thus be careful not to 
focus too much on the facts of a specific case, but also develop general guide-
lines of behaviour.172
 ii.  Deontological approaches to rights and excluded reasons
Even more profound challenges to the Court’s approach 
question the very use of full-scale proportionality analysis. Letsas mounts a 
sophisticated attack on the ‘piece-meal’ development of ECHR law caused by 
this approach, suggesting that the moral principles underlying the norms of 
the Convention must be applied in an equal and consistent fashion. Research 
167  Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 56. Some judges have recently advanced the ‘standstill’ or ‘cogwheel’ 
theory that an extensive rights interpretation should no longer be able to be reversed and restricted by 
the judiciary unless a manifest mistake has been made, which would correspond to the principle of non-
regression to protect acquired rights (Judge Casadevall partly dissenting in Gorou v Greece, 20 March 
2009, App 12686/03, ECHR 2009-nyr). Such attempts have been observed with scepticism because 
of the possibility of erroneous interpretations, the need to leave some leeway to democratic decision-
making at national level and the restriction to the margin of manoeuvre of the Court itself this could 
entail, see Wildhaber, ‘Rethinking the ECtHR’, 216.
168  See generally S. Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 405.
169  Ibid., passim.
170  In fact, in his view the terminological battle seems overrated, see S. Greer, ‘”Balancing” and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law 
Journal 412, 423.
171  Ibid., 423-424.
172  See already section II.B.
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of consensus or the margin of appreciation offends the values of legality and 
equality in his view.173 The values underlying the ECHR being predominantly 
liberal egalitarian principles, this would effectively lead to a technique of reason-
blocking in adjudicating the rights under the ECHR. The Court should not 
submit rights to balancing exercises, but instead identify and reject impermissi-
ble considerations for government interference such as paternalistic reasons – a 
classic approach based on excluded reasons.174
As a matter of fact, however, the interpretation of the Convention remains 
to this date largely based on balancing exercises. As was discussed at an earlier 
stage,175 resort to moral values such as Letsas’ liberal egalitarian principles 
would require assessing these principles from an external point of view; such 
a point of view is, however, not given unless Letsas’ particular reading of the 
Convention is accepted. The Court’s reading of the Convention including posi-
tive obligations and some horizontal effect, however, goes far beyond the limited 
reading Letsas suggests, and was arguably convincing.176 It therefore appears 
problematic to suggest an exclusion of proportionality stricto sensu and the adop-
tion of an excluded reasons approach to interpretation.
The case law also mirrors low enthusiasm for excluded reasons approaches. 
Proportionality analysis was indeed excluded in the case of absolute rights.177 A 
close look reveals, however, that at the same time there was some interpretative 
work to do to define the very scope of the rights which involved some balancing 
akin to proportionality analysis.178 The Soering v United Kingdom case provides 
an example under the right not to be tortured or not to be inhumanly or degrad-
ingly treated or punished.179 The Court found that all circumstances of the 
case and the inherent balance in the Convention between the general interest 
of the community and the protection of the individual’s rights had to be taken 
into account to interpret the notion of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.180
The express provision that seems to allow adjudication based on excluded 
reasons has also seen only little development. Article 18 of the Convention 
prescribes that restrictions on rights permitted in the Convention ‘shall not be 
173  Letsas, Theory of Interpretation, 124.
174  Ibid., 13.
175  See chapter 2 section IV.C.
176  See sections III.C. and III.D.
177  See e.g. Ahmed v Austria, 17 December 1996, (1997) 24 EHRR 278, paras 40-41. More recently Saadi v 
Italy, 28 February 2008, (2009) 49 EHRR 730, para 139, referring to suggestions to use proportionality 
stricto sensu as ‘misconceived’.
178  Greer, European Convention, 233.
179  Article 3 ECHR.
180  Soering v United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A, No 161, (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 89. As another exam-
ple, to reach the required level of severity, the Court accepted as an aggravating factor negative remarks 
on an applicant’s lifestyle based on racism, see Moldovan and others v Romania, 12 July 2005, (2007) 44 
EHRR 302, para 111.
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applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed’. 
The requirement imposed is thus that no other, illegitimate purposes are 
pursued behind the guise of a justification falling within the ambit of the 
express limitations. The clause can thus be seen as a prohibition to act based on 
excluded reasons. It can only apply together with the alleged violation of another 
Convention right.181 Since bad faith cannot be presumed, the Court imposed 
procedurally a substantial burden of proof on an applicant to show that a state 
is actually pursuing a ‘hidden agenda’, in which case the presumption of good 
faith could be rebutted. For this purpose, the applicant must ‘convincingly’ show 
that the aim alleged by authorities or ‘reasonably inferred’ from the context of 
the measure was not the true aim.182 Only in rare cases was a violation of Article 
18 ECHR found, e.g. in a case where criminal proceedings and detention were 
misused by the government as a strategy of intimidation during commercial 
bargaining.183
Summing up, the introductory discussion of interpretative methods 
witnessed the predominance of proportionality reasoning in the Court’s read-
ing of the Convention. Relying on a broad canon of interpretative principles, 
the Court was not open to suggestions of a more deontological reading of the 
Convention rights. Even in adjudicating absolute rights, the Court seems to 
admit some balancing in establishing the scope of the prohibition of an absolute 
right. Excluded reasons thinking as suggested by Article 18 ECHR only played a 
minor role. The Court thus consistently relied on proportionality analysis, devel-
oping the ‘fair balance’ test for this purpose.
 B The ‘Fair Balance’ Test
Similar to the German Federal Constitutional Court,184 the 
European Court of Human Rights has developed one particular legal test and 
applied it – as has already been indicated in the discussions on positive obli-
gations and horizontal effect of Convention rights – across the Convention’s 
various situations of rights review. Contrary to other human rights instruments 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,185 no general limitation 
clause was integrated into the Convention.186 The individual rights and free-
181  Gusinskiy v Russia, 19 May 2004, (2005) 41 EHRR 281, para 75.
182  See for such language the recent example in Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 31 May 2011, Application No 
5829/04, para 255.
183  Gusinskiy v Russia, para 76.
184  See chapter 3 section IV.B.
185  See Article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948: ‘In the exercise of his rights 
and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’
186  As J. Christoffersen, ‘Straight Human Rights Talk – Why Proportionality does (not) Matter’ (2010) 
55 Scandinavian Studies in Law 11, 14, notes, the exact reasons for the non-inclusion of such a general 
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doms are thus defined in detail in the Convention, which, to the dismay of some 
commentators, was not always sufficiently taken into account by the Court.187 
Similar to German constitutional law and as an advantage over the discussed 
fragmented structure of United States constitutional law,188 a fairly consistent 
test has developed across fields.
 i. The structure of the rights norms of the Convention
The classic opposition between rights and their limitations can 
perhaps best be depicted using the rights enshrined in Articles 8 to 11. Article 
8 enshrines everyone’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondences, Article 9 the ‘right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion’, Article 10 the ‘right to freedom of expression’ and Article 11 the 
‘right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association’.
The Convention expressly sets out the limitations of each respective right. In 
earlier doctrine and in some reports by the Commission, ‘inherent’ limitations 
of the Convention rights were also discussed.189 In Golder v United Kingdom, the 
Court, however, rejected the notion explicitly and held that a state had to find 
a justification within the express derogations of the Convention for any inter-
ference with a Convention right.190 Still, there remains case law and doctrinal 
views that suggest that sometimes, the Court relies on proportionality analysis 
at the level of delineating a right, which comes down to inherent, non-written 
limitations.191
The public interest justifications set out in the Convention can thus be 
considered exhaustive, despite the fact that the broad formulations are still 
subject to interpretation. As a starting point in its analysis, the Court will always 
verify the legal basis of any interference. In the framework of express limita-
tions, the Convention requires a legal basis for any interfering measure; restric-
tions must be ‘in accordance with the law’ or ‘prescribed by law’.192 In practise, 
this does not necessarily entail expression in the form of written codification as 
clause cannot be identified in the travaux préparatoires. However, the drafting history gives some hints: 
It was in particular the British experts that insisted on very detailed definitions of the rights in the 
Convention during the Senior Official’s Conference in June 1950, while other experts – notably the 
French – had argued in favour of a rather broad ‘enumeration of rights’ style, see Bates, Evolution of the 
ECHR, 88-89.
187  Greer, European Convention, 232.
188  See chapter 4 section V.
189  See J.E.S. Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights 2 edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 232-233.
190  Golder v United Kingdom, para 44.
191  See with further references Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 80.
192  There is no difference between the two formulas, as the Court clarified in Sunday Times v United 
Kingdom, 26 April 1979, Series A, No 30, (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 245, para 45. Also, in the French version 
‘prévue[s] par la loi’ is used in all cases.
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witnessed in the case of common law systems, but requires a certain accessibil-
ity and foreseeability of the legal anchorage.193
The central requirement for limitations is phrased equally in all provisions: 
limitations must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This was the basis for 
the development of proportionality analysis under the ‘fair balance’ test in the 
case law of the Court.
 ii. The individual prongs of the ‘fair balance’ test
Generally, the Court developed a rather comprehensive test 
encompassing practically all the various stages of proportionality analysis, but 
gave priority to a flexible, horizontal version which does not exclude measures 
at various stages, but tries to assess in a holistic fashion whether a ‘fair balance’ 
between competing interests was struck. A variety of problems were identified 
under the various prongs of this ‘fair balance’ test. Proportionality analysis is 
commonly accepted as a description of what the Court actually does, but some 
argue that no ‘clear or coherent rationale’ underpins the Court’s case law on 
the classic example provisions of Article 8 to 11 of the Convention.194 At various 
stages scholars criticized the Court, sometimes refusing proportionality analysis 
as such, sometimes merely suggesting some fine-tuning at the level of indi-
vidual subtests. We find the overall use of proportionality analysis convincing, as 
it corresponds to our perception of review under the Convention as based – after 
pre-balancing the relevant arguments – on an equal representation model, but 
also find some of the features of the ‘fair balance’ test doubtful.
a. Identifying legitimate aims
The express limitations list specific permitted legitimate aims. The lists 
diverge, but to some extent the Court interpreted some notions more broadly to 
ensure that in fact a similar group of public interests is available as a justifica-
tion for states.195 The typical interests enshrined are national security,196 public 
safety,197 the prevention of disorder or crime198 and public order,199 the protection 
of health or morals200 and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.201 
There are some rather specific interests listed under various provisions. Under 
the right to respect for private and family life, the interest of economic well-
193  See e.g. Ibid., paras 47 and 49.
194  Greer, ‘”Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights’, 424.
195  See for some examples Jacobs, White and Ovey, 315.
196  See e.g. Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR.
197  Articles 8-11 ECHR.
198  Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR.
199  Article 9 ECHR.
200 Articles 8-11 ECHR.
201  Articles 8-11 ECHR.
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being of the country is specially listed, as is the protection of the reputation of 
others under the freedom of expression.
Broader circles of legitimate aims were identified under other rights. 
Under the right to property, the lack of an exhaustive list of legitimate interests 
prompted the Court to define what interests are eligible in its case law. The 
Court held that states enjoy a margin of appreciation for the definition of such 
legitimate interests.202 In a variety of cases, the Court thus accepted interests 
such as the protection of forests,203 environmental protection204 and the protec-
tion of a country’s cultural and artistic heritage.205
The Court was thus rather generous in its interpretation of the states’ 
purported objective of measures, sometimes finding them as falling under a 
legitimate aim without necessarily clarifying which exact aim.206 In rather rare 
cases the Court used a ‘narrow’ interpretation of limitations as exception provi-
sions to reject legitimate aims proposed by governments, such as the protection 
of ‘cultural traditions and historical and cultural symbols’ of a country.207
b.  Sceptical voices on the delimitation of rights and public interests
As one of the central criticisms of proportionality analysis as used under 
the Convention, the Court undervalues the separation between the stages of 
delimitation of rights and public interests and the subsequent stage of limita-
tion of a right.208 A more careful distinction and definition of public interests is 
suggested, which comes with the suggestion of excluded reasons thinking by 
other commentators.209
Tsakyrakis criticizes the Court’s use of proportionality analysis in several 
cases as trying to avoid open moral reasoning despite the fact that such reason-
ing was unavoidable.210 In his view, in a number of cases the Court accepts 
considerations as public interests that should not be admitted, because they 
simply enshrine paternalistic moral judgments by majorities that do not deserve 
to compete on an equal basis with rights claims.
In Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, a movie depicting religious characters 
in a manner potentially degrading to believers had been seized and confiscated 
based on Austrian criminal law. When the cinema complained about a viola-
202  Beyeler v Italy, 5 January 2000, (2001) 33 EHRR 1224, para 112.
203  Z.A.N.T.E. – Marathonisi AE v Greece 6 December 2007, Application No 14216/03, (2007) ECHR 1398, 
para 50.
204  Theodoraki and others v Greece, 11 December 2008, Application No 9368/06, para 60.
205  Beyeler v Italy, para 112.
206 In Nnyanzi v United Kingdom, 8 April 2008, (2008) 47 EHRR 461, para 76, the Court held that the 
‘maintenance and enforcement of immigration control’ could constitute a legitimate aim.
207  Sidiropoulos and others v Greece, 10 July 1998, (1999) 27 EHRR 633, paras 37-38.
208  Christoffersen, ‘Straight Human Rights Talk’, 12.
209 S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 468, 492-493.
210  Ibid., 474.
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tion of its freedom of expression, the Court examined only in a very summary 
manner what should qualify as a public interest on the other side of the balance. 
The Court accepted that the behaviour of the Austrian authorities pursued the 
permissible rationale of the ‘protection of rights of others’ enshrined in Article 
10 (2) of the Convention, because the predominantly Catholic population of 
the region Tyrol where the cinema was based had a right ‘not to be insulted in 
their religious feelings by the public expression of views of other persons’.211 
Emphasizing the importance of freedom of religion, the Court underlined 
that members of a religion also had to accept criticism and the denial of their 
beliefs by others, but that the state had a responsibility to ensure the peaceful 
enjoyment of beliefs. As a consequence, certain methods of opposing or deny-
ing beliefs could inhibit others in their freedom of religion, and a state could 
consider it necessary to take measures to repress such conduct judged incompat-
ible with the freedom of religion of others.212 In the present case, the ‘respect 
for the religious feelings of believers’ could ‘legitimately be thought to have 
been violated’ by the provocative pictures of the movie, which could amount to a 
‘malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance’ as a feature of democratic society.213
For Tsakyrakis, a right to have one’s religious feelings protected is all too 
easily accepted without the necessary reflection about what ambit such a right 
could and should have. Instead of asking whether such a right should extend 
to the public screening of a movie which people can choose to see or not, the 
contextual elements of the confiscation are examined only at the stage of balanc-
ing, what Tsakyrakis calls the ‘principle of definitional generosity’.214 Even 
though the minority in the case did not accept the existence of a right, it held in 
a similar display of definitional generosity that to have one’s religious feelings 
qualifies as a legitimate public interest. Again, for Tsakyrakis, this seems inad-
missible, as a public interest in this case could only be the views of the Catholic 
majority215 – the sort of majoritarian rule which has made the protection of 
minority rights a necessity in the first place.
Khosla contends that the Court’s approach in cases like Otto-Preminger-
Institut v Austria was based on the margin of appreciation doctrine, which led 
the Court as an international adjudicator to defer to domestic authorities’ judg-
ment in situations where no European consensus could be identified.216 Conse-
quently, the margin of appreciation caused the definitional generosity. Whether 
one accepts Tsakyrakis criticism ultimately depends on whether it is accepted 
that under a pure proportionality analysis approach, the Court would also be 
211  Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, 20 September 1994, Series A, No 17, (1994) 19 EHRR 34, para 48.
212  Ibid., para 47.
213  Ibid.
214  Tsakyrakis, 480.
215  Ibid., 481.
216  M. Khosla, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?: A reply’ (2010) 8 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 298, 302-303.
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willing to exclude certain purposes as illegitimate. Khosla seems to think so, as 
becomes clear in his confirmation of some of Tsakyrakis’ critique.217
If this feature is thus accepted by both authors, a common core of criticism 
becomes clear. The Court does not discuss with sufficient intensity this first 
important stage of establishing what should enter the balance or not. However, 
such exaggerated definitional generosity is not an inherent and necessary 
component of the ‘fair balance’ test, but simply an erroneous application of 
a legal test.218 No conceptual argument speaking out against the test can be 
derived from this criticism, but merely a call for caution.
c. Suitability
Generally, the two prongs of suitability and necessity play a rather subordi-
nate role in the case law of the Court.219 This is mostly based on the subsidiary 
nature of intervention by the Court: To a large extent, questions of suitability 
and necessity have already been considered by domestic courts before a case 
comes before the Court at all,220 which again leads the Court to apply its margin 
of appreciation doctrine to grant deference to the assessments by domestic 
courts.221
The Court has not provided one clear interpretative test with clearly distin-
guishable features in its case law to determine this first aspect of the relation-
ship between ends and means.222 Sometimes, the Court referred to furthering a 
‘pressing social need’223 or providing ‘relevant and sufficient reasons’.224
In a test as weak as suitability, authors correctly pointed out that the true 
matter is not so much some formulation in the case law. The link between 
norms and facts – in this case future facts in the form of intended consequences 
of a measure – being the fundamental feature at dispute, the burden of proof 
is of much higher interest.225 However, the Court neglected this feature and no 
clear approach has arisen from the case law to date.226 The Court has adopted 
the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in cases of severe interferences 
217  Ibid., 305. Khosla argues that Tsakyrakis’ example of the protection of ‘Eskimo haters’ would neither 
qualify as a public interest nor a right, since it would be excluded from the outset from proportionality 
analysis as no legitimate purpose.
218  S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?: A rejoinder to Madhav Khosla’ (2010) 8 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 307, 310, however, insists on the fact that the use of propor-
tionality analysis inevitably obscures the actual moral reasoning on which the Court’s decisions are 
based.
219  Tsakyrakis, 474.
220  Greer, ‘”Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights’, 433.
221  Khosla, 303.
222  Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 164.
223  See e.g. Dudgeon v United Kingdom, para 51.
224  See e.g. Handyside v United Kingdom, para 50.
225  Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 165.
226  Greer, European Convention, 259.
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with the particularly protected rights to life and the prohibition of torture in 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.227 This standard is, however, not generally 
used throughout the case law, so that in fact one may rather speak of a ‘prepon-
derance of evidence’ standard in practice.228 It appears that the more important 
a right is considered, the more solid the factual evidence to support interference 
has to be.229 The Court itself criticized the lack of solid evidence brought forward 
by some governments to show that a contribution towards an alleged legitimate 
interest is achieved.230 In the future, more attention paid to this early step of 
the test and the factor of evidence could lead to more predictability and more 
coherent adjudication. It could make sense to borrow the formula of an interme-
diate standard of proof as recognised in United States’ law which asks for ‘clear, 
convincing and cogent’ evidence.231
d. Necessity
Some point out that proportionality analysis in the classic, three-pronged 
understanding may be the wrong description for what the Court is doing. Earlier 
doctrine referred to the Court’s case law as the inquiry into whether the ‘least 
intrusive’ means had been used.232 Actual case law, however, shows a different 
picture. The test applied under the necessity prong is a far cry from a strict 
assessment of less restrictive alternatives.233 This development, in our view, has 
no parallel in the two domestic constitutional legal regimes examined so far.
In a variety of cases, the Court has explicitly rejected the assertions of appli-
cants that a measure should be held to be a violation on the basis that less intru-
sive alternatives had existed. In James and others v United Kingdom, the Court 
explained that no test of strict necessity should be read into the relevant article 
of the Convention, but that the availability of alternatives could only be one 
factor ‘along with others’ to assess whether reasonable means had been chosen 
in order to strike a fair balance.234 For the Court, there were thus ‘boundaries’ 
within which the legislative choice should be accepted and where the Court 
was not entitled to say whether the ‘best solution for dealing with the problem’ 
had been found.235 Further reviews of case law show that in a number of cases, 
alternatives have been examined by the Court, but only as part of the holistic 
227  See e.g. Ireland v United Kingdom, para 161, where the Court accepts this standard suggested by the 
Commission.
228  Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 176.
229  See Christoffersen, ‘Straight Human Rights Talk’, 34.
230  See e.g. Hatton and others v United Kingdom, 2 October 2001, (2002) 34 EHRR 1, paras 100-102.
231  As suggested by Greer, ‘”Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights’, 432.
232  Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication’, 409.
233  Christoffersen, ‘Straight Human Rights Talk’, 36.
234  James v. United Kingdom, para 51.
235  Ibid.
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examination of a ‘fair balance’ and not as a threshold step to be passed to enter 
the final stage of proportionality stricto sensu.236
In the Hatton saga, the Grand Chamber even explicitly disagreed with the 
previous chamber decision on that matter. The latter had assessed the govern-
ment’s lack of measures to counter noise pollution caused by an extension of 
night flight hours of Heathrow Airport as an interference with an environmen-
tal right. The right to sleep was seen as part of the right to privacy and family 
life. The chamber held that no right balance could have been struck ‘in the 
absence of a prior specific and complete study with the aim of finding the least 
onerous solution for human rights’.237
The Grand Chamber did not take up this suggestion, but instead found that 
the measure at issue was of a general nature, which should lead to a margin of 
appreciation leaving to the state ‘a choice between different ways and means 
of meeting’ the obligation to give due consideration to the interests at stake.238 
The Court, as in other cases, seemed to base its rather limited test on a mixture 
between the ECHR obligations and its own institutional position, holding that 
its ‘supervisory function being of a subsidiary nature’, the latter was ‘limited 
to reviewing whether or not the particular solution adopted can be regarded as 
striking a fair balance’.239
In other cases, the Court leaned towards less restrictive means as part of the 
overall assessment as to whether a fair balance had been struck because domes-
tic law pointed towards such alternatives. Under Article 2 of the Convention on 
the right to life, the Court referred in Simsek and others v Turkey to ‘less life-
threatening methods’ for the purpose of quelling a riot and dispersing a crowd 
than direct shots at demonstrators, such as tear gas, water cannons or rubber 
bullets. It did so, however, based on Turkish legislation which allowed the use of 
firearms by the police only in ‘limited and special circumstances’.240
The Court has thus refrained from imposing necessity in a strict sense as 
a central component of its fair balance test. While some suggested that from 
the 1990s onwards the case law relied increasingly on necessity,241 in reality the 
Court seems to use the test of alternatives only as part of the holistic weighing 
exercise.
Christoffersen explains this peculiar feature of the ‘fair balance’ test on 
normative grounds. In his view the obligations under the Convention provide 
merely for a minimum standard to be safeguarded for the protection of rights. 
According to him, there is, however, no simultaneous requirement to find the 
most efficient solution in the sense of the least onerous means for a right. As a 
236  See extensively Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 114 ff.
237  Hatton and others v United Kingdom, para 106.
238  Hatton and others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber decision), 8 July 2003, (2003) 37 EHRR 28, para 
123.
239  Ibid.
240  ŞimŞek and Others v. Turkey, 26 October 2005, Application No 35072/97 and 37194/97, para 108.
241  Arai-Takahashi, 129.
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consequence a narrow circle of violations of Convention rights exists where less 
restrictive means, if available, must be chosen, while in a wider circle of mere 
interference with the right various means with different degrees of interference 
may legitimately be taken by a party state.242
While in principle this explanation seems acceptable to distinguish between 
different uses of necessity, its normative justification is less obvious. It remains 
unclear how the Court under its flexible horizontal use of necessity distin-
guishes between situations where the least restrictive solution must be found 
and where more leeway should be granted. To reject a strict necessity test 
acknowledges some of the difficulties of adjudicating necessity. It is indeed 
difficult to assess the exact contribution of a measure towards a public interest 
and to compare this contribution with alternatives. But the Court could simply 
point out these difficulties in the case law, rather to reject necessity as such. 
The potentially useful contribution of a necessity test to identifying one mea-
sure in comparison with others is lost, which puts even more emphasis on the 
last prong of proportionality stricto sensu. From the point of view of a paradigm 
of individual justice as discussed previously, this may not cause a problem. In 
terms of predictability and the systematic operation of proportionality analysis, 
it certainly does. It remains difficult to understand why necessity could not be 
combined with recognition of the limited epistemic resources of the Court, but 
still be applied as far as feasible as a threshold to the ultimate stage of propor-
tionality stricto sensu.
e. Proportionality stricto sensu
The ‘fair balance’ test puts most of its weight on this ultimate stage. It thus 
comes down to a very open-ended weighing exercise, which allows for the repre-
sentation of all interests and arguments at stake – which seems in line with the 
general justification of judicial review found after the pre-balancing exercise in 
our view. However, predictability is also low, and the earlier prongs of the ‘fair 
balance’ test have suffered in practice from less thorough elaboration because of 
this special weight on the ultimate balancing exercise. Some more predictability 
comes from particular features that the Court routinely examines in its balanc-
ing exercise under specific rights. This can be demonstrated with the example 
of compensation as a factor in expropriation cases. The reliance on proportional-
ity stricto sensu is, however, remarkable, and is also expressed in a rather limited 
reading by the Court of the ‘essence’ of rights which would in theory exclude the 
‘fair balance’ test.
The Court developed both a substantive and a procedural side of the ‘fair 
balance’ test. As an example, in Hatton and others v United Kingdom, the Grand 
Chamber first assessed how the domestic authorities gave relative weight to 
the interests at stake.243 The Court accepted the authorities’ reliance on statisti-
cal data to assess the sleep interference, on the rather vague allegations that 
242  Christoffersen, ‘Straight Human Rights Talk’, 24-25.
243  Hatton and others v United Kingdom (Grand Chamber decision), para 125.
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economic benefits would ensue from increased night flight frequency and on the 
fact that house prices had not significantly changed, which meant that residents 
could actually leave the area without financial loss, as part of the interference 
with the right.244 It then turned to procedure, finding that the measures had 
been accompanied by appropriate studies and assessments before their introduc-
tion and had continually been sufficiently communicated to the public.245
This very flexible test is complemented by elements that are assessed in situ-
ations of violation of specific rights. Under the right to property, compensation 
has become a central element in assessing whether a deprivation of property can 
be considered compatible with the requirement of striking a fair balance. In the 
Holy Monasteries v Greece case, the Court summarized its views that compen-
sation was ‘material’ to assessing whether a fair balance had been struck, in 
particular as to whether no ‘disproportionate burden’ has been imposed on the 
applicant.246 Taking property without paying an amount ‘reasonably related to its 
value’ would thus ‘normally’ be considered disproportionate, whereas payment 
of no compensation at all could only be found justified ‘in exceptional circum-
stances’.247
The emphasis on balancing under the ‘fair balance’ test also becomes visible 
in the Court’s conception of the ‘essence’ of rights. Early on, the Court devel-
oped the idea that there could be some core element of a right that could not 
be interfered with. In the Belgian Linguistics case, it held that the ‘substance of 
the right to education’ must never be injured.248 The language in the case law, 
however, did not always choose its terms carefully, so that in a number of cases 
the ‘fair balance’ test is applied to the ‘substance’ of a right just in the usual 
way, while the Court simply seems to imply that a rather serious interference 
is at stake.249 Overall, despite some references to the core, substance or essence 
of rights, the Court seems to subject a right in its full scope to the ‘fair balance’ 
test in its case law, which excludes an absolute conception. As an example, in F. 
v Switzerland, the Court held that a waiting period for remarriage constituted a 
measure that ‘affected the very essence of the right to marry’ and was ‘dispro-
portionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.250
Only in a limited number of cases was an absolute conception of an essence 
of rights accepted:251 In cases where absolute rights and other Convention rights 
overlap, the scope of overlap with the absolute right leads to an exclusion of the 
244  Ibid., paras 125-127.
245  Ibid., para 128.
246  Holy Monasteries v Greece, 9 December 1994, Series A, No 301, (1995) 20 EHRR 1, para 71.
247  Ibid.
248  Belgian Linguistics case, para 5.
249  See e.g. Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, Series A, No 52, (1983) 5 EHRR 35, para 
60, where the Court held that the ‘very substance of ownership’ was affected by certain property restric-
tions.
250  F. v Switzerland, 18 December 1987, (1987) 10 EHRR 411, para 40.
251  See Christoffersen, Fair Balance, 155 ff.
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‘fair balance’ test. In M.C. v Bulgaria, the Court thus found an overlap between 
the right to effective respect for private life under Article 8 and the prohibi-
tion of inhuman or degrading treatment in Article 3 of the Convention.252 As a 
consequence, a positive obligation arose for the state to ensure effective deter-
rence against grave acts of ill-treatment such as rape even if administered by 
private individuals. The Court underlined the absoluteness of protection at stake 
holding that ‘[w]hile the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 
in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is in principle within the 
State’s margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts such as 
rape, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, 
requires efficient criminal-law provisions’.253 It therefore appears that ‘efficient’ 
criminal law provisions are indispensable, even without a proportionality based 
assessment under the ‘fair balance’ test.
 C Conclusion
Based on the various human rights norms enshrined in the 
Convention, the Court developed a fairly consistent, though searching test for 
whether a ‘fair balance’ has been struck between competing rights or interests. 
The pervasiveness of proportionality analysis is notable, as the interpretative 
methods of the Court have emphasized flexibility and balancing, while excluded 
reasons and deontological readings have to date not truly been retained in the 
case law. This correlates with our suggestion to perceive judicial review under 
the Convention as substantially similar to domestic fundamental rights adjudi-
cation despite the international law setting.
The particular form of the ‘fair balance’ test is marked by the absence of 
a true necessity test, with substantive reliance instead on the last prong of 
proportionality stricto sensu. We observed with some concern that the reluctance 
to engage in necessity seems only partly justified by the subsidiary nature of 
Convention rights; a concern that could arguably be better tackled openly in 
the case law by accepting that the comparison of alternatives must necessar-
ily remain a sometimes rough estimation. Heavy reliance on the last prong of 
proportionality analysis has led, in our view, to a very case-specific method of 
decision-making, which may correspond to the paradigm of individual justice 
discussed earlier. At the same time, however, it lacks an appropriate normative 
justification and caused in practice neglect for the earlier stages of proportional-
ity analysis, a shortcoming whose consequences were demonstrated in cases 
such as Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria.
252  M.C. v Bulgaria, 4 December 2003, (2005) 40 EHRR 20, para 153.
253  Ibid., para 150.
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 V Evaluation and Conclusion
As an overall conclusion, the use of proportionality analysis 
is in principle convincing under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Deontological approaches were suggested in the doctrine, but could not offer a 
convincing reading of the Convention. Rather, pre-balancing seemed to point 
towards an outcome following an equal representation model, with the exception 
– as in the case of German constitutional law – of fundamental rights review in 
the private sphere.
Examining the descriptive elements surrounding judicial review by the 
European Court of Human Rights, the debate over individual and constitutional 
justice appears most remarkable. It has also left its mark on the actual case law. 
Proportionality analysis has become somewhat synonymous with the flexibility 
of the jurisprudence, with heavy reliance on balancing at the stage of propor-
tionality stricto sensu. At least institutionally, the Court has the advantage of 
being representative to engage intensively in such proportionality analysis.
As to pre-balancing, many parallels between the European Court of Human 
Rights and the German Federal Constitutional Court can be observed. In 
particular, a somewhat comparable approach to the broad justification of judicial 
review was taken for a number of rights both in their dimension as shields, but 
also in the field of positive obligations and horizontal effect. Like the United 
States Supreme Court, in some cases the European Court of Human Rights 
justified more intrusive review for some rights with its role as a safeguard for 
democracy because of the importance of such rights for the democratic process. 
Beyond this narrow argument, however, other rights similarly led the Court to 
intensify its scrutiny under the margin of appreciation doctrine. On this basis, 
we concluded that the European Court of Human Rights has a similarly broad 
understanding of human rights as the German Federal Constitutional Court; 
it perceives them as relevant in various dimensions and based on more than 
their relationship to democratic process. The development of case law on the 
horizontal effect of human rights bolsters this point, although we found that the 
justification of its review power by the Court is not always satisfactorily prudent.
A second feature that again appears comparable to German constitutional 
law is the use of a fairly consistent legal test, the ‘fair balance’ test, across all 
Convention law. As a less satisfactory feature, the discussion of the margin of 
appreciation in the Court’s case law is also not always as extensive and system-
atic as it seems to some extent in United States constitutional law under the 
procedural democracy doctrine.
As a striking feature of the ‘fair balance’ test, the European Court of Human 
Rights has refused to engage in a strict inquiry of necessity as part of the test. 
No convincing normative justification for this approach could be found. While 
administering a necessity test under the subsidiary system of protection created 
by Convention rights is admittedly a difficult task, the horizontal form of the 
‘fair balance’ test and the heavy reliance on proportionality stricto sensu lead to 
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very case-by-case based adjudication. More weight on the prong of necessity 
seems not only more appropriate in the light of the suggested pre-balancing 
exercise, but could furthermore help to grant more guidance for future cases 
and to reduce unpredictability. This again would be more in tune with an 
emerging stronger paradigm of constitutional justice as the predominant task of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Due deference should rather be adminis-
tered under the margin of appreciation doctrine than through rejection of neces-
sity, because necessity could arguably serve as a useful threshold in the process 
of proportionality analysis.
European Union Law
chapter 6
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 I Introduction
With European Union law, we enter a somewhat hybrid field. 
As the subsequent overview shows, in principle the strong focus on economic 
integration places judicial review EU law in the field of a model of special 
interest review at first glance. Yet matters are more complex than that: looking 
at the context, we understand that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has been described on various occasions as a constitutional court with a 
broader range of values to be represented by its review. But there remain doubts 
as to whether it has fully assumed the role of a fundamental rights adjudicator.
The discussion of pre-balancing and the justification of judicial review 
reinforces this preliminary impression. While fundamental rights review has 
emerged in EU law and continues to play an ever-increasing role in the case 
law, there is a notable difference to the much stricter standard of review applied 
for reviewing Member States’ measures under the internal market freedoms 
enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Only recently has a somewhat more coherent standard of review for funda-
mental rights emerged. In comparison to the courts examined so far, we thus 
observe an outcome of pre-balancing resulting in a much less pronounced role 
for the model of equal representation review. However, as another development, 
horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms has emerged and reminds us in its 
effect of the efforts of the German Federal Constitutional Court to establish 
fundamental rights review in its horizontal dimension. However, the justifica-
tion of this extension of judicial review is more difficult to ascertain.
From these perceived imbalances in pre-balancing, there also results a some-
what uneasy use of proportionality analysis. Despite the strong textual basis of 
a ‘principle of proportionality’ with which the CJEU can operate, in practice we 
observe a remarkable gap between the theoretical will to engage even in propor-
tionality stricto sensu and a heavy reliance on a strict necessity test in practice. 
The result is an often undue over-representation of the interest of economic 
integration to the detriment of regulatory autonomy of the Member States.
Finally, it should be noted that providing an overview on proportionality in 
EU law is no simple task, not because of a lack of sources, but rather because of 
the abundance of proportionality language. The ‘principle of proportionality’ 
can be found in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the TFEU, in secondary 
legislation and, as a consequence, in a huge amount of case law.
It is thus indispensable to pick and choose for this presentation, which has 
accordingly focused on the common topics of EU competences, internal market 
freedoms and fundamental rights as the most frequently cited in relation to 
questions of proportionality analysis. Still, this should not mean that the concept 
plays no role in other areas of EU law.
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 II  The Broader Context of Judicial Review in European 
Union Law
Looking at the broader context, we receive a first impression 
of judicial review by the Court of Justice being rather focused on the specific 
interest of economic integration. Throughout its history, the Court has used the 
powers attributed to it by the Treaties to foster its interpretative authority. To 
some extent, it has established cooperation with the national courts, but gene-
rally insisted on its predominant position as one central player in the develop-
ment of the EU internal market as the key project of economic integration. 
There has indeed been discussion on the role of the Court as a constitutional 
court, which would point towards review for the purpose of protecting a more 
diverse range of values. However, the integrationist bias of the CJEU remains, 
in our view, remarkable. A look at the institutional features of the Court bolsters 
this conclusion and also shows that the Court itself is rather poorly equipped to 
engage in full-scale proportionality analysis.
 A The History of Judicial Review in European Union Law
There are a number of steps that have led to the dominant 
position taken by the CJEU in the EU’s legal order. We note that while creating 
its unique interpretative authority, the Court has at various points also relied 
on national courts and their cooperation, but always emphasized its ultimate 
authority as the central pillar of the integration project of the internal market. 
This authority is central to pursue the project of economic integration underly-
ing the EU.
 i. Construing an autonomous legal order – The early days
The Treaty establishing a European Coal and Steel Community 
already entrusted a Court of Justice with the mission to ensure that the law was 
observed ‘in the interpretation and application of this Treaty’.1 From these early 
beginnings onwards, the Court was also granted the responsibility to give ‘pre-
liminary rulings’ on the validity of Community acts.2
Subsequently, the Court embarked on a journey to construct a highly 
autonomous legal order located somewhere between the coherence and clear 
hierarchies of a domestic legal order and international law. It did so by ruling 
first that, in general, based on ‘the spirit, the general scheme and the wording’ 
of the European Economic Community Treaty the latter’s provisions could be 
given direct effect, which enabled individuals to invoke the rights enshrined in 
EU law in proceedings before national courts.3 Only shortly after this first step, 
1  Article 31 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty.
2  Article 41 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty.
3  Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse adminis-
tratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1, 12. See on the case and the history surrounding it B. De Witte, ‘Direct 
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the Court used another preliminary reference by a national court to establish 
the primacy of EU law over domestic law. The Court held that EU law enjoyed 
primacy, which meant in practice that national judges should set aside conflict-
ing national law and apply the norms of EU law, thereby going beyond the role 
played e.g. by international law in countries with a dualist tradition.4
Through these two crucial decisions, EU law became a potential source of 
rights and obligations in a variety of domestic proceedings, which strengthened 
the role individuals and national courts were to play in this new legal order. 
When the legislative development of the European Economic Community 
suffered from slow progress and inaction by the political institutions in the 
1970s and early 1980s, the Court intervened on a variety of occasions, fuelled by 
cases coming from individuals in Member States, and gave an important impe-
tus to the continuous development of the legal order.5 In giving direct effect to 
some Treaty provisions, for example, the Court managed to overcome the legisla-
tive inertia which had failed to produce the secondary legislation necessary to 
achieve important goals in the field of the internal market.6
 ii. The Court’s relationship with other courts
Not only individuals, but also national courts proved crucial 
in the process of development of the legal order for the Court. The procedure 
of preliminary reference gives national courts the opportunity to ask the Court 
about the interpretation of EU law as well as about the validity of secondary EU 
law. For the highest national courts, the possibility to ask the Court becomes 
an obligation in order to secure the uniform application and interpretation of 
EU law. Through several important cases, the Court has clarified the pertinent 
treaty provisions on the subject in order to establish some elements of decentral-
isation and give back some authority to national courts, but at the same time to 
maintain central prerogatives in its own hands.7 It found that in some circum-
stances, the highest courts would not have to submit questions on the interpre-
tation of EU law if these questions were materially identical to questions already 
Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of 
EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 326-327.
4  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. See on this ‘internal primacy’ of EU law before the national 
judge De Witte, 329. For a sceptical account of EU law as not being fundamentally different from inter-
national law, see O. Spiermann, ‘The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the 
European Community Legal Order’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 763.
5  See famously J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2412 on 
‘normative supranationalism’ against the background of a failure of ‘decisional supranationalism’.
6  P. Craig, ‘Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution 
of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 52-53.
7  See on the judicial politics of this ‘incomplete jurisdiction’ T. Tridimas, ‘Constitutional Review of 
Member State Action: The Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction’ (2011) 9 International Jour-
nal of Constitutional Law 737.
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answered by the Court or if the correct application of EU law was obvious and 
beyond doubt according to certain criteria.8 As to questions on the validity of EU 
secondary law, however, the Court insisted in a later decision that only the Court 
itself as a central instance could rule on that point.9
These decisions have not remained undisputed. Some have suggested that 
the CILFIT criteria were open to abuse by national supreme courts willing to 
avoid a preliminary reference.10 The monopoly established by the Court in Foto-
Frost has not met universal approval either.11 Yet, this case law and the subse-
quent ‘codification’ by the Member States during treaty revisions have arguably 
made the Court the central instance of validity and of interpretation of EU law, 
although it had to juggle cooperative horizontal efforts as in CILFIT along with 
more hierarchical solutions as in Foto-Frost to achieve this position. To secure 
its position, the CJEU has also used the leeway given to it in the framework of 
the preliminary reference procedure to only partly answer questions and send 
cases back to national courts for them to decide upon highly context-specific 
matters for which the Court feels that the latter are better suited. This act may 
in some cases lead to an answer for the national court which seems unsatisfac-
tory or incomplete after the time and costs invested in the preliminary reference 
procedure, but at the same helps time to achieve a balance between the authority 
of the CJEU and the necessity of accommodating, at this lower level, the views of 
national courts themselves, thereby easing potential tensions.12
The CJEU also defended its monopoly as the ultimate interpreter of EU 
law at the international level. This interpretative monopoly can be contrasted 
e.g. with the situation of United States constitutional law, where ‘interpretative 
pluralism’ appears to be much more accepted at least in doctrinal discussion.13 
8  Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT e Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministero della Sanità [1982] ECR 3415, paras 14 ff.
9  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v HZA Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, paras 15 ff.
10  D. Sarmiento, ‘CILFIT and Foto-Frost: Constructing and Deconstructing Judicial Authority in Europe’ 
in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 196. For A. Stone Sweet, 
‘The Juridical Coup d’État and the Problem of Authority: CILFIT and Foto-Frost’ in M.P. Maduro and L. 
Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary 
of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 207, uncooperative national courts would hardly be 
influenced in any way by the criteria introduced in a preliminary ruling. Indeed, in the Köbler case, the 
CJEU introduced state liability for such abusive avoidance of the preliminary reference procedure by the 
highest national courts, see Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239.
11  On the critics’ arguments see P. Craig, ‘The Classics of EU Law Revisited: CILFIT and Foto-Frost’ in 
M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on 
the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 190. See also various Advocates’ 
General opinions suggesting that in cases where a materially identical decision has been taken earlier 
by the Court, national courts should not be obliged to refer a question to the Court, Sarmiento, 198.
12  See on this point also T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 2 edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 240.
13  D. Halberstam, ‘Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend’ in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past 
and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty 
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When the establishment of another court, staffed partly with CJEU judges and 
called to interpret substantially parallel norms to EU law, was planned for the 
signing of an association with the European Free Trade Area partner countries, 
the CJEU intervened and found this undertaking incompatible with its own 
prerogatives.14 The CJEU did not hold that there was no possibility to subject 
the EU to the jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals per se, but that the 
overlap of interpretative authority was the main problem.15 The possibility of 
being subject to another court is also exemplified by the planned accession of 
the EU to the Council of Europe, which brings with it the formal authority of the 
European Court of Human Rights over the CJEU under the ECHR.16 Next to the 
emphasis on its interpretative authority over EU law, in recent case law the CJEU 
also started to emphasize the problem of accountability of such an international 
court or tribunal.17
Summing up, the CJEU has steadily and constantly built its role as the auton-
omous and ultimate interpretive authority of EU law. The need for cooperation 
with national courts has played a constant role in the CJEU’s development. Yet, 
the CJEU has retained its authority as the only final interpreter and the only 
court able to hold that EU secondary law may be invalid. The main justification 
is the role to defend EU law as an autonomous base for the economic integration 
project of the EU. There has, however, been discussion as to the nature of the 
CJEU as a constitutional court, which could influence which values should be 
seen as the central justification for its review.
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 31, thus opposes ‘interpretative pluralism’ in US constitutional law to 
the ‘systems pluralism’ of EU law where international systems such as the ECHR, the EU legal system 
and the Member States legal systems interact.
14  Opinion 1/91 Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European 
Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR 
I-6079.
15  Ibid., paras 40-42.
16  See also on this point A. Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca 
(eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 153. There are a number of 
arguments on the advantages and drawbacks of accession, succinctly set out by R.C.A. White, ‘The 
Strasbourg Perspective and its Effect on the Court of Justice: Is Mutual Respect Enough?’ in A. Arnull, 
P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays in Honour of Sir Francis 
Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 149-150. Advocates of accession tend to emphasize 
philosophical points such as the entailed strengthening of the core values of the EU. Opponents, on the 
other hand, tend to take a more practical approach and generally claim that the case law of the CJEU 
already respects the standards set by the ECtHR, while accession would add to the problem of overload 
the ECtHR is facing currently (as already discussed in chapter 5 section II.A.iii.).
17  See Opinion 1/09 Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court Opinion of 8 March 
2011, not yet reported, paras 74-76 and 84-87.
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 B  The Court of Justice of the European Union as a 
Constitutional Court
The constitutionalism debate in EU law dates back quite long 
in time.18 In an often-quoted sentence in the Les Verts judgment, the CJEU has 
referred to the Treaty itself as the ‘basic constitutional charter’, which is the 
basis of judicial review of the Member States’ and EU institutions’ action in a 
community ‘based on the rule of law’.19 It has been correctly warned against 
using the label of constitutionalisation in an inflationary manner, in particular 
as the concept of what is ‘constitutional’ seems ‘protean’ and open to a variety of 
meanings.20 Yet, the CJEU exhibits various characteristics that can explain its 
designation as a constitutional adjudicator. At the same time, the present section 
also demonstrates that the rationale of economic integration remains alive as a 
central motive for the CJEU’s activities.
 i.  ‘Constitutional’ elements of the Court and its review 
function
One argument often made in favour of seeing the Court in a 
constitutional perspective, is that there is a wide variety of legal remedies for 
addressing the Court, which enables the latter to pronounce itself on the inter-
pretation and validity of EU law in a variety of contexts and to review both the 
action of Member States and EU institutions.21 Next to the previously mentioned 
procedure of preliminary reference, an action for annulment can be brought 
by Member States, institutions, but also private individuals if certain require-
ments are met.22 An action can be brought because of inaction of institutions 
or in order to engage the non-contractual liability of the EU, to name only some 
18  See for an early analysis F.G. Jacobs, ‘Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitu-
tional Court?’ in D. Curtin and D. O’Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community 
and National Law: Essays for the Hon Mr Justice O’Higgins (Dublin: Butterworth, 1992). See also Stone 
Sweet, ‘Court of Justice’, 132, who refers to constitutionalisation as the ‘grand narrative’ in the scholarly 
literature on European integration. See for further references I. Pernice, ‘Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: 
Primacy of European Law’ in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 
52 footnote 26.
19  Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 35.
20  N. Walker, ‘Opening or Closure? The Constitutional Intimations of the ECJ’ in M.P. Maduro and L. 
Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary 
of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 334.
21  See also A. Arnull, The European Union and Its Court of Justice 2 edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 33.
22  See on the well-known difficulties of granting access to the action for annulment T. Tridimas and S. 
Poli, ‘Locus Standi of Individuals under Article 230(4): The Return of Euridice?’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeck-
hout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs 
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possibilities.23 The Court can thus interpret EU law, declare it invalid, pro-
nounce itself on non-contractual liability or state what limits EU law imposes 
on national law.24 At the same time, there remains much to criticize about the 
actual access to justice for individuals in EU law and the internal coherence of 
remedies.25
The rather special methodology of interpretation used by the CJEU is also 
noted as a feature pointing towards the specificity of the EU’s constitutional 
adjudicative arrangement. Since the Treaties are composed of rather broad provi-
sions and phrased in a highly functional manner focusing on general objectives 
and policy goals, the CJEU has continuously employed a remarkably teleologi-
cal and contextual approach to the interpretation of Treaty provisions.26 Yet, the 
objectives of the Treaties are marked by economic considerations, the internal 
market being among the central ones.
Perhaps with greater certainty, the constitutional character of the Court’s 
adjudicatory function can be based on the power of delimitation of competences. 
The Court uses this power to delineate areas of competence between the EU 
institutions in a horizontal manner and between the EU and its Member States 
in a vertical manner.27 In its history, the Court vigorously guarded these powers 
against encroachment28 and made ample use of them to equilibrate powers 
among the various EU institutions. As an example, this happened in the litiga-
tion battle opposing the Council and the European Parliament.29 But the Court 
also made use of these powers to restrain domestic regulatory autonomy of the 
Member States in favour of economic integration in the internal market under 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 89. The Treaty of Lisbon has amended the law partly, although 
the effects of this amendment remain yet to be fully appraised.
23  See e.g. A.H. Türk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Cheldenham: Edward Elgar, 2009), 171 ff. and 239 ff.
24  The CJEU has always formally respected the limits of its jurisdiction in preliminary reference proce-
dures and held at a number of occasions that it only interpreted EU law and not national law, which was 
for the national court to apply. See for the exception of national law making EU law norms applicable in 
the national legal order Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi v Belgian State [1990] ECR I-3763.
25  See K. Lenaerts, ‘The Basic Constitutional Charter of a Community Based on the Rule of Law’ in M.P. 
Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 
50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 309 ff.
26  Arnull, 621, who points towards important cases of ‘constitutional’ dimension where the Court has 
relied on elements such as the ‘spirit’ or ‘system’ of the Treaty to reach a solution, see e.g. Les Verts, para 
25.
27  Lenaerts, 298-299.
28  See again Opinion 1/91, para 35, where the CJEU argued that a court for the new European Economic 
Area Agreement could not be created if it was given the task of adjudicating upon the notion of 
‘Contracting Parties’ of the new agreement, because this entailed an impermissible interference with 
the CJEU’s own powers to adjudicate upon the exact delimitations of competences within the EU.
29  See for an overview J.-P. Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law 
Review 383.
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the various provisions on the fundamental freedoms, construing these freedoms 
broadly for this purpose.30
As another notable argument in favour of a perspective of a constitutional 
court, the Court also enjoys broad powers to adjudicate upon the limits of its 
own jurisdiction. The increase of EU law – in particular secondary law – to 
interpret and review, but also developments such as horizontal effect of certain 
general principles31 have increased the influence of the CJEU and its opportu-
nities to construe EU law and ensure its application.32 Member States codified 
most developments of the case law during treaty revisions or at least refrained 
from openly rewriting the Treaties in a manner opposite to the CJEU’s find-
ings.33 The impression of a system of constitutional stability is thus reinforced 
by the politics of the legislative system, which renders reversals of the CJEU’s 
judicial developments very difficult.34
 ii. The adjudication of fundamental rights
The Court also assumed the task of ensuring the respect for 
fundamental rights in the framework of its review powers. After some initial 
hesitance to review EU measures based on their compatibility with fundamental 
rights,35 the Court began in an obiter dictum of 196936 and a seminal decision 
of 1970 to subject EU measures to such scrutiny.37 For this purpose, the Court 
introduced fundamental rights as part of the general principles of EU law, a 
source of law for which it would draw inspiration from the constitutional tradi-
tions of the Member States. Among observers applauding this development, for 
some the CJEU established itself even as a veritable ‘Supreme Court’ of the EU, 
engaged in ‘nation-building’ through the defence of fundamental rights.38
30  See section III.C.i.
31  See section III.D.
32  See for a sceptical view e.g. P.L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy – Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 275. Lindseth prefers to perceive the CJEU predominantly as 
a administrative adjudicator who ought not to be allowed to define the boundaries of its own jurisdic-
tion.
33  Stone Sweet, ‘Court of Justice’, 132.
34  Lindseth, 255.
35  See the early case law discussed in A. Tizzano, ‘The Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays in 
Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 126.
36  Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v Stadt Ulm – Sozialamt [1969] ECR 419, para 7.
37  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermit-
tel [1970] ECR 1125, para 4.
38  T. Tridimas, ‘Primacy, Fundamental Rights and the Search for Legitimacy’ in M.P. Maduro and L. 
Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary 
of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 103.
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As a next step, the CJEU also began to review Member States’ measures 
which were implementing EU law as to their respect of fundamental rights.39 
While welcoming this development, observers have, however, become worried 
when the Court subsequently found that even in the case where they devi-
ated from EU law – e.g. under the derogations from fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in the Treaty – Member States were bound by fundamental rights. 
The Court insisted in this case on ensuring the respect of fundamental rights in 
the framework of its review power.40 Jacobs convincingly argued that the review 
for the respect of fundamental rights in such cases ought not to be exercised 
by the CJEU, but by national constitutional courts or the ECtHR in order not to 
unduly overwrite national standards of protection of fundamental rights.41 It can 
legitimately be argued that the CJEU is not a specialized human or fundamental 
rights jurisdiction, but simply a court of general jurisdiction on EU law with an 
incidental power of review in cases where fundamental rights are at issue.42
The extension of the CJEU’s powers of review was answered with contesta-
tion by national courts. Under the leadership of the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court, several supreme judiciaries in Member States have held that they 
would retain the ultimate say on whether the EU had overstepped its powers, 
either by acting beyond the powers conferred upon it or by giving insufficient 
protection to fundamental rights.43
39  Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf  v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609, para 22.
40  Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileórassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-2925, 
paras 42-44.
41  F.G. Jacobs, ‘Wachauf and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in EC Law’ in M.P. Maduro and L. 
Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary 
of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 137-138, noting that the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has also not taken up the formula found by the Court in the ERT case, while codifying the find-
ings in Wachauf. See similarly sceptical M. Kumm, ‘Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold and the New 
Human Rights Paradigm’ in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 
117, noting that the CJEU, ‘charged with monitoring practically everything’, might end up not ‘monitor-
ing anything’ well.
42  As rightly emphasized by B.-O. Bryde, ‘The ECJ’s Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – A Milestone in 
Transnational Constitutionalism’ in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law 
– The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010), 125.
43  See closer on the well-known ‘Maastricht’ decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court and 
for other references on other constitutional courts Z. Kühn, ‘Wachauf and ERT: On the Road from the 
Centralised to the Decentralised System of Judicial Review’ in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The 
Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 161 and footnote 104. On the case law of national constitutional courts 
examining the appropriateness of the level of protection of fundamental rights granted in the EU see 
with further references Tizzano, 137.
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Summing up, one can thus identify a legitimate claim to broadly represent 
a variety of values, including fundamental rights, under the CJEU’s review. 
However, put in practice there remains the difficulty that the Court’s jurisdic-
tion must arguably remain focused on EU law. Some substantially constitutional 
features can easily be identified for the CJEU and would further that case. 
However, the integrationist predisposition of the Court is also omnipresent. The 
CJEU’s tasks of adjudicating upon competences and upon its own jurisdiction 
typically are present in the case of a constitutional court. Fundamental rights 
review, however, is strongly marked by the rationale of economic integration 
around which EU law is structured and which shapes the questions put to the 
Court as well as the answers given by the latter. The extension of review into 
national law deviating from EU law triggered rejection in the doctrine. National 
courts also reacted by keeping for themselves the ultimate word on EU law’s 
authority and limits. It therefore remains to be seen how the Court itself justi-
fied its review. As one further matter, the institutional features of the CJEU do 
not necessarily favour the use of full-scale proportionality analysis.
 C  Institutional Aspects of Judicial Review by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union
Two elements appear particularly striking. Whereas we have 
suggested that a number of reasons vest the Court with the aura of a quasi-
constitutional court, a closer look at the representativeness of the members of 
the Court and the formal aspects of judgments casts severe doubt on ideas of 
representation of a broad variety of claims, and thus of values.
First, in terms of membership, the CJEU is staffed with one judge per 
Member State. However, the underlying idea is not so much that of represent-
ing the Member State in a proceeding through a judge, but to ‘infuse’ the Court 
with the various legal cultures present among the Member States and to simul-
taneously strengthen the acceptance of the Court’s authority in the Member 
States.44 As a consequence, in the composition of chambers there is currently no 
need to have a judge from the Member State whose legislation is under scrutiny. 
There have been proposals to adopt this model, substantially drawing inspira-
tion from the European Court of Human Rights for this purpose.45 The main 
purpose is therefore to have an autonomous court ruling on EU law, but one 
not necessarily familiar in detail with the socio-economic and legal context in a 
Member State. Weight is thus given to the ‘representation’ of the integrationist 
and unifying rationale of EU law over the representation of regulatory autonomy 
of a Member State.
44  Arnull, 8.
45  K. Schiemann, ‘The Functioning of the Court of Justice in an Enlarged Union and the Future of the 
Court’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays in 
Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12.
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As a second issue, the way in which judgments are drafted similarly empha-
sizes unity of opinion at the cost of deliberative features. The CJEU issues 
collegiate judgments. Deliberations are secret and only one judgment, drafted 
in a collective effort, is issued. To some extent, the form of collegiate judgments 
ought to ensure uniformity of opinion given by the Court and simultaneously 
reduce the concerns on independence of judges.46
However, as another effect of collegiate judgments, in terms of style the 
CJEU’s judgments tend to be rather short and not always coherently or exten-
sively reasoned expressions of legal opinion. The form of judgments remains 
ill-suited to encompass the lengthy reasoning and weighing of arguments that is 
required for complex proportionality assessments.47 Often, the role of the Advo-
cate General who provides a more extensive exposition of the legal arguments of 
the case is thus emphasized as indispensable to fill lacunae of judicial reason-
ing.48 There have been debates as to whether separate and dissenting opinions 
should be permitted. The synthesizing force of EU law, however, weighed in 
heavily against more discursive styles and in favour of collegiate judgments.49
Consequently, the discussed institutional features of the CJEU seem only 
partly suited for an engagement in proportionality analysis. These features 
emphasize in particular the need to ensure unitary representation of the inte-
grationist rationale of EU law and discourage case- and Member State-specific 
solutions.
 D Conclusion
During the assessment of the broader context of judicial review, 
we have found some features pointing towards the CJEU as a constitutional 
court asked to represent a wider range of values. In particular, the increas-
ing relevance of review in light of fundamental rights comes to mind. On the 
other hand a historical overview shows the central tendency of the CJEU to 
establish itself as the highest interpretative authority of EU law, with the aim of 
strengthening the unifying, integrationist rationale of EU law. Despite efforts 
of cooperation with national courts as implementing instances of EU law, the 
main responsibility e.g. to invalidate secondary EU law remains with the Court. 
Institutional features also point away from discursive representation of a broad 
number of values. The composition of chambers as well as the form of collegiate 
judgments shows that the main concern is the representation of the interest of 
economic integration, which requires unanimous decisions taken based on a 
46  Judges as well as advocates general are appointed for a renewable term of six years. Some suggested that 
a non-renewable appointment for twelve years would be more appropriate, see Arnull, 11.
47  See for a similarly sceptical view Kumm, 117.
48  Schiemann, 15.
49  See Arnull, 11-12, who points, in addition, to the early days of the European Economic Community as a 
reason for the single judgment rule, because at that time the Court had to establish its authority and did 
not want to appear divided over every single issue at stake.
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strong knowledge of EU law, rather than the provision of case-by-case decisions 
which strongly take into account the domestic context of individual Member 
States. This also explains the fact that proportionality stricto sensu does not play 
a predominant role in EU law, as our subsequent assessment of the case law 
confirms.
However, the assembled descriptive elements also show that there can be 
no static picture for EU law, as the legal regime arguably is in transition. There 
is an increasingly complex set of values to be represented. While economic 
integration remains a central value, non-economic values and horizontal effect 
of market freedoms and fundamental rights have begun to render the picture 
more complex. We examine this changing paradigm subsequently with the 
justification of judicial review. The descriptive section has provided us with a 
background against which the changing normative elements relevant in the pre-
balancing exercise can be pointed out.
 III  The Justification of Judicial Review in European Union 
Law
The task of assessing the justification of judicial review and 
setting out possible arguments of pre-balancing is complicated in EU law, as ele-
ments of the procedural democracy doctrine and the standard of review have not 
received systematic treatment and discussion in the case law. We can compare 
the situation somewhat to the German Federal Constitutional Court, where 
effectively different standards of review apply. The Court of Justice, however, 
expresses far less extensively why it chooses different versions of review. Rather, 
it seems that the pertinent parts in the case law have grown rather ‘naturally 
and incrementally’.50 This has led scholars to suggest a more systematic treat-
ment of the matter, taking inspiration from the margin of appreciation doctrine 
as developed by the European Court of Human Rights.51
In the present section, we aim to systematize the justification for adapt-
ing the standard of review and the normative justification offered by the Court 
for such adjustments. Four cases can be distinguished. First, we observe a 
lenient approach to scrutiny in the field of the exercise of EU competences. 
Second, the standard of review in light of fundamental rights is – unduly, as 
we suggest – deferent, although recent case law has suggested more intrusive 
review, showing that the Court seems to be becoming increasingly aware of the 
need to strengthen the equal representation component of its review. Third, in 
reviewing Member States’ measures against the benchmark of the fundamen-
tal freedoms of the internal market, the Court adopts a very intrusive stance, 
which goes together, to some extent, with the lenient standard of review of EU 
50  J. Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine’ (2011) 17 European Law 
Journal 80, 90.
51  Ibid., 101.
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measures. Both reinforce the impression that here pre-balancing results in a 
model close to special interest review. EU law is granted deference because it is 
presumed to realize the integrationist objectives of the internal market, while 
the potential deviation by Member States for the sake of regulatory autonomy 
must satisfy higher requirements to be found permissible. Fourth, the Court 
has increasingly been extending its review to cases of horizontal effect of both 
market freedoms and fundamental rights, without, however, setting out satisfac-
torily the reasons for this important development. In conclusion, pre-balancing 
in EU law does not provide results as close to a model of special interest review 
as a cursory look might have suggested. Rather, a paradigmatic shift is on its 
way which seems to push judicial review increasingly towards a model of equal 
representation review.
 A Judicial Review and the Exercise of EU Competences
EU competences are a complex matter. A variety of underlying 
values can be discerned. In a first section, we aim to unravel some of the com-
plexity to show the conflict of values at stake. Unfortunately, the second section 
shows that the case law has hardly addressed the justification of judicial review 
and the use of proportionality analysis based on the substantive values, as the 
procedural democracy doctrine would suggest. Instead, deference generally pre-
vails based on the institutional consideration of not interfering with the discre-
tion of the legislator. We conclude that this leads to an undue deference given to 
EU institutions in comparison to the strict review imposed on Member States, 
without sufficient justification given as to why the value of economic integration 
should be given such favourable treatment as a reason for intrusive review.
 i. The system of competences
As a starting point, the EU as an international organisation 
is governed by the principle of conferred powers as regards its competences.52 
Yet, practice proves more complicated than that.53 The scope of EU competences 
must be distinguished from the principles regulating its exercise. Article 5 TEU 
sets out subsidiarity and proportionality as such principles. This express refer-
ence has made the use of proportionality analysis less debated, but still leaves 
some open questions as to the standard of review used.
The discussion of the problems involved at the stage of defining the very 
competences of the EU already shows that the identification of concrete values 
which enter into conflict is anything but simple. Generally, at least at this level 
the interests involved seem of a predominantly public nature. To simplify, one 
52  Article 5 (1) TEU.
53  See generally sceptical on the proposition of the EU as based on the principle of conferred powers D. 
Wyatt, ‘Is the European Union an Organization of Limited Powers?’ in A. Arnull and others (eds.), A 
Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 3.
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could in most cases oppose the interest of central regulation and the interest of 
local autonomy to regulate. Yet, in detail every EU legal act requires a precise 
legal basis and thus there is also a weighing exercise between the various values 
that one specific piece of regulation tries to attain.
The Lisbon Treaty aimed to provide a comprehensive account of the system 
of competences: Articles 2 to 6 TFEU provide general rules governing the 
competences, a categorisation and a list of competences. In a limited number of 
cases, the EU thus possesses exclusive competence,54 while in another number 
of fields its competence may merely support Member States’ action.55 Thirdly, 
there is an area of ‘shared’ competence.56 But to put the question of competences 
into practice, a balancing exercise is needed to determine the appropriate legal 
basis.
As a general rule, the exercise of EU legislative competence must always 
be based on a concrete legal basis. These legal bases are, however, ‘scattered’ 
throughout the Treaty57 and often broadly phrased. For many legal acts, matters 
became more complicated because they impinged on various potential legal 
bases, so that a complex case law has emerged which aims to delimit when a 
legal basis should be used or when recourse to a double legal basis is called for.58 
This is also important in order to safeguard that the relevant procedural rules 
apply, in particular because this ensures appropriate participation of the legisla-
tive institutions.59
54  Article 3 TFEU.
55  Article 6 TFEU.
56  Article 4 TFEU. Yet, already the fields of ‘shared’ competence in between pose conceptual problems: 
Theoretically, in an area of shared competence the Member State can act unless the EU has acted and 
occupied the field. If the EU decides to cease exercising competence in a field, the Member States may 
again exercise their competence, see Article 2 (2) TFEU. The doctrine is, however, still divided over 
whether there is true and definitive pre-emption through EU legislation or whether the Member States 
maintain competence, while pre-emption only acts at the legislative level. See in favour of the first prop-
osition L. Gormley, ‘Free Movement of Goods and Pre-emption of State Power’ in A. Arnull and others 
(eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011), 373; see in favour of the second R. Schütze, ‘Supremacy without Pre-emption? The Very Slowly 
Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1023, 1030.
57  S. Weatherill, ‘Competence and Legitimacy’ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of 
European Union Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 19.
58  See with further references to case law K. St. Clair Bradley, ‘Powers and Procedures in the EU Constitu-
tion: Legal Bases and the Court’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 91 ff.
59  The Court has tended to ‘merge’ procedural rules in cases of a double legal basis, so that maximum 
participation of all political institutions, in particular the European Parliament, was ensured, see Ibid., 
91. One might, however, object to this ‘levelling-up’ of procedures for legislation that such automatic 
preference for the involvement of the European Parliament is nowhere written in the Treaty and may 
jeopardize the balance between the institutions, E. Sharpston and G. De Baere, ‘The Court of Justice as 
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Proportionality analysis, as mentioned above, comes in as a step after the 
determination that the EU can act, i.e. that there is a valid legal basis. It operates 
at the stage of determining the necessary extent once a decision in favour of EU 
action has been reached.60 In this regard, it has to be distinguished from the 
principle of subsidiarity, which operates at an earlier stage than proportionality, 
i.e. when deciding whether action should be taken at EU level or not.61
 ii.  The standard of review in the case law on the 
competences of the European Union
Generally, the Court refers to the principle of proportionality, 
which comes as no surprise in light of the express reference to that principle in 
Article 5 TEU. However, based on the need to give discretion to the EU legisla-
tor, the CJEU then gives broad deference in adjusting the standard of review.
The Working Time Directive case can be examined as an example of review of 
the exercise of EU legislative competences as to their compatibility with the prin-
ciple of proportionality. In this case, the United Kingdom sought for annulment 
of a directive for the reason, among other grounds, that the principle of propor-
tionality had been infringed by the adoption of the directive. The Court held, 
however, after having set out generally the principle of proportionality, that in 
the present context the principle could only be applied to strike down the direc-
tive if the Council as the legislator had committed a ‘manifest error or misuse of 
powers’ or ‘manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion’.62 While in principle 
the Court referred to the ‘principle of proportionality’, only a weak version of 
this test was implemented. The Court set out in its case law the four limbs of its 
standard definition of the principle of proportionality. In fact, however, by reduc-
ing the intensity of its scrutiny the Court only applied part of what it preached 
without providing satisfactory reasons for doing so.63
Also in later case law, only ‘manifestly inappropriate’ legislative action would 
fall foul of proportionality review.64 This rather lenient standard only rarely led 
to the annulment of EU legislation.
There are some cases of annulment. In Spain v Council, the CJEU repeated 
the formula set out in Jippes and similar cases.65 Despite the emphasis on the 
discretion of the legislator, the Court then, however, found that it was not possi-
a Constitutional Adjudicator’ in A. Arnull and others (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in 
Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 138.
60  Tridimas, General Principles, 176.
61  Scholars have noted that EU legislation itself seems hardly to pay more than lip service to the idea of 
subsidiarity, see e.g. Craig, ‘Institutions’, 60.
62  Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council (Working Time Directive) [1996] ECR I-5755, paras 57-58.
63  See similarly sceptical T.-I. Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 
European Law Journal 158, 185.
64  See e.g. Case C-189/01 Jippes and others [2001] ECR I-5689, para 82.
65  Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285, paras 96-97.
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ble to assess how the Council arrived at its conclusions, because the Council 
as the legislator had enacted the pertinent rules despite an appalling lack of 
evidence. The CJEU thus struck down the directive because the Council had 
exceeded the boundaries of its discretion and violated the principle of propor-
tionality.66
Despite its seeming deference, the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard of 
review therefore possesses some teeth. The Court examines the concrete reason-
ing for a decision and aims to protect procedural rights without substantially 
changing the applicable legal test.67
By contrast, review becomes increasingly more complex because of the 
increasing importance of the concept of precaution in cases of science-based 
measures.68 In Gowan, the restrictions on the use of a chemical substance 
were found to be acceptable in light of a precautionary approach because 
there remained ‘certain concerns regarding the intrinsic toxic effects’ of the 
substance.69 Subsequently, the assessment of whether the measure was ‘mani-
festly inappropriate’ became even less rigid than usual, the Court accepting the 
restrictions simply because of the possibility of later modifications provided for 
in the directive and because of the wide discretion to be given to the Commis-
sion.70
 iii. Conclusion
In reviewing the exercise of EU competences by EU institutions 
based on the principle of proportionality, the Court has chosen a very deferent 
standard of review, in effect finding violations only in cases where it becomes 
virtually impossible to assess the reasons that led to the conclusion of legisla-
tion. It is deplorable that the Court has not set out in more detail its reasons to 
see only a weak justification for judicial review in these cases. Due deference 
for the legislator seems to be the only reason, while no substantive issues in the 
values at stake are discussed. This becomes all the more striking as compared 
with the strict standard of review adopted to review the Member States’ action 
66  Ibid., paras 134-135.
67  H.C. Hofmann, ‘Which Limits? Control of Powers in an Integrated Legal System’ in C. Barnard and O. 
Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 55; Tridimas, 
General Principles, 147.
68  See on this point with references to further case law A. Adinolfi, ‘The Principle of Reasonableness in 
European Union Law’ in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor and C. Valentini (eds.), Reasonableness and Law 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 391.
69  Case C-77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Judgment of 22 December 2010, not yet 
published, para 77. Such lenient scrutiny was already used by the General Court earlier in a landmark 
case on the precautionary principle, see Case T-13/99 Pfizer v Council [2002] ECR II-3305.
70  Gowan, paras 84-86. See sceptical of the reasoning in Gowan A. Alemanno, ‘Case C-79/09, Gowan 
Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v. Ministero della Salute, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1329, 1330.
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as legislators. The EU institutions thus seem to enjoy a presumption of acting 
in the interest of economic integration, while this presumption does not apply to 
Member States’ measures.
 B  Judicial Review of EU Measures and Fundamental Rights 
in EU Law
There has been increasing influence and codification of funda-
mental rights as a new sort of value which required appropriate representation 
and protection in EU law. A short section examines this development, before 
we assess the actual standard of review adopted by the CJEU. It becomes clear 
that despite the observable ongoing shift towards a model of review resembling 
more equal representation than special interest review, in early case law the 
Court reviewed respect of fundamental rights with insufficient intrusiveness. 
Generally, the discussion of elements of procedural democracy is deplorably 
cursory, if present at all. We therefore suggest that more efforts be required in 
future cases if the Court aims to truly position itself as protective of fundamen-
tal rights.
 i. Fundamental rights in the EU legal order
While initial drafting initiatives before the Rome Treaties had 
still provided fora considerable role for fundamental rights protection for the 
emerging European Economic Community, the failure of both the European 
Defense Community and the subsequent abandonment of the idea of a Euro-
pean Political Community led to the signing and ratification of rather narrowly 
targeted treaties on the European Economic Community and the Atomic Energy 
Community.71 During the 1960s, in particular German litigants tried to chal-
lenge Community measures referring to violation of their fundamental rights, 
but the CJEU still refused to accept such claims without an explicit basis in the 
Treaty.72 Only a few years later, however, in Stauder and Internationale Han-
delsgesellschaft the Court began to accept the idea that EU measures had to be 
reviewed as to their respect for fundamental rights as general principles of EU 
law.73 To uncover the nature and substance of fundamental rights, the CJEU not 
only drew comprehensively from constitutional traditions of the Member States, 
but also found inspiration in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which leads to the effect that there is, broadly speaking, convergence 
71  G. De Búrca, ‘The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution 
of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 474-475.
72  See e.g. Case 40/64 Sgarlata and others v Commission [1965] ECR 215, p. 227, where the CJEU held that 
even fundamental principles existing in the legal systems of all Member States could not override 
express Treaty provisions.
73  See for more details on this point section II.B.ii.
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in the standards of protection of fundamental rights between both courts.74 
However, the latter’s generous use of proportionality stricto sensu is not as widely 
spread in EU law.75 At some points, the Court has also paid tribute to the exist-
ence of a European consensus, like the European Court of Human Rights. In 
the Omega case, the Court accepted the high level chosen for the protection of 
human dignity as a central constitutional value in Germany without intrusive 
review, because it found different constitutional conceptions of dignity among 
the Member States perfectly acceptable.76
Subsequently, the Treaty was been amended to take into account the rele-
vance of fundamental rights for the EU legal order. After a reference in the 
preamble of the Single European Act 1987, the Maastricht Treaty gave such 
rights formal status in the Treaty text, whereas the Amsterdam Treaty made the 
Copenhagen Criteria a treaty-based standard for accession of future Member 
States and introduced the competence for the EU to combat discrimination 
based on a wide range of criteria apart from nationality.77 The most comprehen-
sive effort of codification resulted in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms.78 Drafted and ‘proclaimed’ in 2000, it eventually received binding 
legal value in the Lisbon Treaty,79 although several Advocates General and later 
even the Court itself had begun referring to  to the Charter in their legal argu-
ments even before this.80
The Charter provides a written text assembling the fundamental rights 
and freedoms which can be opposed as private interests to the public interests 
pursued by EU legislation and regulatory action. As far as similar rights are 
enshrined in the ECHR or domestic constitutions, the Charter aims for a 
harmonized interpretative approach.81 As an interesting feature, the Charter, 
however, only applies to Member States ‘when they are implementing Union 
law’.82 This seems to correspond to the reluctance uttered by some towards the 
adoption of a broad power of fundamental rights review over Member States’ 
action in cases such as Wachauf.83 The claim to interpret these provisions 
broadly to close a perceived gap in the scope of fundamental rights review of 
the CJEU seems ill-conceived in this light,84 as review is already undertaken by 
national constitutional courts and if necessary the European Court of Human 
Rights outside the context where Member States implement EU law.
74  See on this judicial dialogue in more detail Tizzano, 128-129.
75  See section IV.B.
76  C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, paras 37-38.
77  See on these various treaty reforms in more detail De Búrca, 480-481.
78  For the actual version, see [2007] OJ C303, 1.
79  Article 6 (1) TEU.
80  Tizzano, 134-135.
81  See Article 52 (3) and (4) of the Charter.
82  Article 52 (5) of the Charter.
83  See section II.B.ii.
84  See for such a claim Stone Sweet, ‘Court of Justice’, 153.
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The classic opposition between private interests in the form of fundamen-
tal rights and public interests implemented in EU legislation and regulation is 
complemented again by a very explicit reference to proportionality analysis as 
a legal test. Article 52 (1) of the Charter states that ‘subject to the principle of 
proportionality’, limitations on rights must be ‘necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest’ or the ‘need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others’. It thereby also foreshadows the possibility that more complex than mere 
‘public’ interests may find themselves in the second scale of the balance.
 ii.  The standard of review in the case law reviewing 
European Union measures against fundamental rights
In principle, the Court takes some inspiration from the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. Unfortunately, however, this does not extend to 
the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights on the justification of 
judicial review. There is only little reasoning in the case law on the justification 
and as a consequence on the appropriate standard of review. Overall, we can 
observe a rather superficial standard of review that uses elements of proportion-
ality analysis, but with surprising deference mirroring to some extent the case 
law on the exercise of EU competences by EU institutions. Only later case law 
shows a shift towards a more intrusive exercise of review powers.
As mentioned, review based on the respect of fundamental rights started 
with an obiter dictum in Stauder and more substantial findings in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft. In the latter case, a system of deposits connected to export 
licences was challenged as excessively impinging upon traders’ interests and 
rights. Having found that there was no system as efficient as the present one,85 
the CJEU moved to examine whether the burden on trade was excessive, thereby 
causing a violation of fundamental rights.86 While one could have expected a 
lengthy discussion of proportionality stricto sensu after this statement, the Court 
effectively found rather summarily that the costs caused by the scheme did not 
reach an amount ‘disproportionate’ to the total value of the goods.87
A more explicit reasoning was offered in Hauer. The case concerned a 
regulation prohibiting the cultivation of new vineyards in the framework of the 
common organisation of the wine market. The Court underlined that restric-
tions on private property for public purposes such as the common organisa-
tion of a market under the agricultural policy were an accepted feature in all 
constitutional orders of the Member States.88 It then examined whether the 
contested regulation effectively pursued an objective of general interest ‘or’ 
whether it caused a ‘disproportionate and intolerable interference with the rights 
85  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, paras 10-12.
86  Ibid., para 14.
87  Ibid., para 16.
88  Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, para 20.
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of the owner, impinging upon the very substance of the right to property’.89 
The threshold for finding a violation was thus set very high, and consequently 
not met.90 While the Court referred to fundamental rights and examined the 
impact on the latter, in fact the test was marked by a deferent standard of review, 
since only virulent violations going to the very substance of a right constituted a 
violation.91
In the Bosphorus case, the Court remained extremely terse in its reasoning. 
It held that the sanctions prescribed by the regulation at issue served a highly 
important objective, the ‘fundamental’ interest to end a war and restore peace, 
and their effects on the property rights of the company targeted by the sanctions 
could thus not be seen as ‘inappropriate or disproportionate’.92
The CJEU applied a similar test in the case of directives as legislative mea-
sures aimed at a more general public than regulations. In Metronome Musik, the 
Court merely held that it did not ‘appear’ as if the relevant objectives of general 
interest could have been achieved by means less restrictive of the freedom to 
pursue a trade or profession.93 In Booker Aquaculture, the CJEU found a mea-
sure acceptable using the common two-tier test, examining first whether the 
measure – a directive containing measures to prevent the emergence and spread 
of diseases for aquacultures – contributed to some objective of general policy.94 
As a second part, it then held that only an impairment of the ‘very substance’ 
of the right to property could lead to a finding that proportionality had not been 
respected in the adoption of the directive.95
In a few cases, the Court has thus shown at least some willingness to go 
beyond a rather formalistic review of regulations and directives, if substantial 
interference with a fundamental right or an interest valued very highly seemed 
to be at stake. Still, at the end of the day these few stronger words have not been 
followed by a more elaborate reasoning and in particular not by a different 
outcome, since the CJEU has effectively upheld EU measures in the mentioned 
cases.
In more recent years, however, the Court has taken a more vigorous 
approach to judicial review in fundamental rights cases, in particular as regards 
89  Ibid., para 23.
90  Ibid., para 29.
91  The same test was also applied in the first Bananas case, where Germany complained that a regulation 
organizing the common market for bananas changed the import system, disadvantaging German trad-
ers with substantial effects on their right to property and free exercise of profession. The Court could 
not find an interference with the ‘very substance’ of the rights at issue and rejected the claim, see Case 
C-280/93 Germany v Council (Bananas) [1994] ECR I-4973, para 87.
92  Case C-84/95 Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others [1996] ECR 
I-3953, para 26.
93  Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik v Music Point Hokamp [1998] ECR I-1953, para 26.
94  Here the completion of the internal market for aquacultures, Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aqua-
culture and Hydro Seafood [2003] ECR I-7411, para 78.
95  Ibid., paras 79 and 85.
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recent cases of measures freezing the assets of individuals suspected of terrorist 
activities.96 In the landmark case Kadi, the Court used the familiar formula of 
a ‘disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of 
the fundamental right to respect for the property’ for review.97 The CJEU then, 
however, intensified its review. While it found the objective of the sanctions 
highly important, the Court qualified that this meant that the measures should 
not be considered ‘per se’ inappropriate or disproportionate, thereby slightly 
qualifying the formula used in Bosphorus.98 Subsequently, it found the sanctions 
in breach of fundamental rights because there had been no reasonable proce-
dural opportunity for the individual to put his case before competent authorities 
for any sort of review.99 While using the same formulas as in earlier cases, the 
CJEU thus seemed willing to sharpen the teeth of the standard of review in 
these later cases.100
 iii. Conclusion
Summing up, the Court has opted for a use of proportional-
ity analysis that refers to the European Court of Human Rights’ case law and 
somewhat mirrors the latter’s notions. However, in reality a much weaker stan-
dard of review is at play, and there is no comparable discussion of the appro-
priate standard of review and the justification of judicial review. More recent 
case law seems to take the protection of fundamental rights more seriously as 
a justification of stricter review. However, the Court does not explain why this 
change of mind has occurred. As a conclusion, there is an ongoing shift towards 
more appropriate, even equal representation of values beyond the integrationist 
paradigm. At the same time, the CJEU’s terse reasoning does not allow for more 
comprehensive conclusions on its perception of the justification of its funda-
mental rights review.
 C  Judicial Review of Member States’ Measures and the 
Internal Market Freedoms
The fundamental freedoms of the internal market and among 
them – because of its early development – the free movement of goods constitute 
the area where the most debate on the justification of judicial review has taken 
96  A. Albors-Llorens, ‘Edging Towards Closer Scrutiny? The Court of Justice and Its Review of the 
Compatibility of General Measures with the Protection of Economic Rights and Freedoms’ in A. Arnull 
and others (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), 264.
97  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR I-6351, para 357.
98  Ibid., para 363.
99  Ibid., paras 368-370.
100  See for a discussion of the follow-up case law to Kadi Albors-Llorens, 262-263.
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place. The debate on the scope of the pertinent provisions, e.g. Article 34 TFEU 
on the quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent 
effect on the free movement of goods, mirrors conflicting views as to whether 
fundamental freedoms should be read as rights with the need for intensive judi-
cial review or rather as more limited obligations on Member States. We first set 
out the discussion on the appropriate scope of Article 34 TFEU and compare it 
briefly to the other internal market freedoms, showing that to some extent there 
is a paradigm shift – similar to the increasing role of fundamental rights review 
– through the increasing importance of Union citizenship as a non-economic 
Treaty freedom. The conceptual debate is then best phrased in terms similar to 
the procedural democracy doctrine in United States constitutional law; and as in 
the United States’ context, the question of ‘virtual representation’ must be asked 
with vigour to ascertain the appropriate standard of review.
 i.  The appropriate scope of the internal market freedoms 
and EU citizenship
The free movement of goods provides a suitable example of 
the general debate on the appropriate scope of internal market freedoms, as it 
has developed over decades and seen most academic comment. Despite some 
formal limits to its reach, there is a remarkably strong rights-based reading of 
the free movement of goods that seems, at first view, to strengthen our find-
ing of a setting of special interest review with strong emphasis on the value of 
economic integration. Yet, this is not the full picture. The other economic Treaty 
freedoms have indeed seen similar development in the case law, but there is also 
increasingly important case law on the non-economic concept of Union citizen-
ship, which shows that judicial review by the CJEU increasingly follows a hybrid 
paradigm. Non-economic values other than fundamental rights play an increas-
ingly important role in the Cout’s review. In our opinion, judicial review in EU 
law is therefore to be positioned between the models of special interest review 
and equal representation review, moving closer to the second.
a. The example of the free movement of goods
A variety of provisions govern the free movement of goods. The most central 
tool to enable free circulation of goods was and continues to be the prohibition 
of quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect 
enshrined in Article 34 TFEU. In particular the interpretation of the term 
‘measures having equivalent effect’ became a central question in determining 
how far the internal market ought to reach early on. If the notion is under-
stood as focusing primarily on discriminatory measures, a narrower group is 
encompassed and Member States retain more of their regulatory autonomy. By 
contrast, a broad understanding of measures based on their effect as restrict-
ing market access would include a large number of regulatory measures, which 
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would help to further the idea of integration with the purpose of furthering one 
internal market across the EU.101
The Court held boldly in Dassonville that ‘[a]ll trading rules enacted by 
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions’.102 With this broad definition, a high 
amount of Member State regulations could potentially fall under the prohibition 
of Article 34 TFEU. This meant in practice that justification for such measures 
was needed. In the absence of EU-wide harmonizing measures Member States 
were entitled to act to protect the public interest, but only insofar as they could 
provide a justification and show that the measure in question bore a reasonable 
– proportionate – relationship to the policy objective brought forward. While 
initially only the list of express derogations in Article 36 TFEU seemed to be at 
the disposal of Member States, the CJEU made clear that for non-discriminatory 
measures, a broader list of public policy objectives – referred to as mandatory 
requirements – could also qualify as justifying trade-restrictive effects of a 
measure.103
For both express derogations under Article 36 TFEU and mandatory 
requirements, the Court subsequently introduced the condition that compli-
ance with fundamental rights must be ensured. It thus reviewed the use of 
such derogations and requirements in light of fundamental rights at issue.104 
In Schmidberger, the CJEU went a step further and found that the protection of 
a fundamental right itself could constitute a public interest eligible to act as a 
justification for a measure which interfered with the free movement of goods.105
Yet, in terms of the scope of Article 34 TFEU, the Court continued to 
strengthen market integration by introducing the concept of mutual recognition, 
holding that products ‘lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member 
States’ could not be excluded from circulation in other Member States without a 
valid reason.106
With the two seminal judgments of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, the Court 
laid the foundation for pro-integrationist judicial review in the field of free move-
ment of goods. The basic approach was to subject broadly all regulations capable 
101  See for an early publication on the topic L. Gormley, Prohibiting Restrictions on Trade within the EEC : 
The Theory and Application of Articles 30-36 of the EEC Treaty (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1985), 18. The paral-
lel to the considerations applying under the United States Dormant Commerce Clause is striking, see 
chapter 4 section III.B.
102  Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville et al [1974] ECR 837, para 5.
103  See already Ibid., para 6. See for the term of mandatory requirements Case 120/78 Rewe/Bundesmonopo-
lverwaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649, para 8.
104  ERT, para 45; Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Bauer Verlag 
[1997] ECR I-3689, para 26.
105  Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republic of Austria [2003] 
ECR I-5659, paras 71-73. See also in the field of services Omega, para 35.
106  Cassis de Dijon, para 14.
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of affecting intra-EU trade to judicial scrutiny as a potential measure having 
equivalent effect, then examining at a second stage whether the Member State 
– bearing the burden of proof – could bring forward a credible justification and 
demonstrate that the measure was proportionate to its aims. Often, the Dasson-
ville kind of reasoning has been labelled a ‘rule of reason’ which allows deroga-
tions to the a priori primacy of the internal market interest.107 This approach 
leads to a high burden put on the Court, as it is the Court’s task to frequently 
engage in proportionality analysis of regulatory measures. Most of the adjudica-
tive work is left to the phase of justification of a measure.108
Yet, concerned about the potential over-inclusiveness of Article 34 TFEU, 
some suggested that some measures with less trade-restrictive effect should 
be excluded.109 The Court followed these views in Keck and Mithouard and 
held that a category of measures that restricted or prohibited ‘certain selling 
arrangements’ did not fall within the scope of Article 34 TFEU.110 The judgment 
has been strongly criticized by those preferring a rule of reason approach,111 
while others stepped up in its defence as necessary to counter the inflation of 
claims against simple national regulatory measures without much integration-
ist merit.112 While the debate continued, the CJEU explored other avenues of 
broadening and restricting the scope of Article 34 TFEU. There had already 
been suggestions that instead of the rather categorical exclusion chosen in Keck, 
one might use a de minimis rule to exclude from the scope of the broad Dasson-
ville definition of measures having equivalent effect those measures that only 
had a minor effect on trade.113 In a number of cases before and after Keck, the 
Court held that some Member State measures would not be considered as falling 
107  See e.g. L. Gormley, ‘The Definition of Measures Having Equivalent Effect’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout 
and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 192.
108  See on this point Tridimas, General Principles, 206-207.
109  Typically, an article by White as well as an opinion written by Advocate General Tesauro are cited as 
having prepared the ground for the decision in Keck, see E. White, ‘In Search of the Limits to Article 
30 of the EEC Treaty’ (1989) 26 Common Market Law Review 235 and the Opinion of Advocate General 
Tesauro in Case C-292/92 Hünermund and others v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg [1993] 
ECR I-6787.
110  Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard 
[1993] ECR I-6097, paras 14 and 16. These measures had, however, to fulfil the conditions of applying 
to ‘all relevant traders’ in the territory of the Member State and of affecting ‘in the same manner, in 
law and in fact’ the marketing of imported and domestic products, Criminal Proceedings against Bernard 
Keck and Daniel Mithouard, para 16.
111  See e.g. L. Gormley, ‘Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judgment in Keck & Mithouard’ (1994) 
European Business Law Review 63.
112  See for a defence of the decision R. Joliet, ‘The Free Circulation of Goods: The Keck and Mithouard 
Decision and The New Directions in The Case Law’ (1995) 1 Columbia Journal of European Law 436.
113  See the well-known opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 and M6 
[1995] ECR I-179.
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under the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU if they were non-discriminatory, did 
not have the purpose of regulating trade and had an effect ‘too uncertain and 
indirect’ on trade.114 The effect on trade remains a crucial criterion in defining 
the scope of Article 34 TFEU. The later case law applying the Keck test seems to 
have also brought a renewed scrutiny even for selling arrangements as to their 
discriminatory effects, but also beyond that on their mere effect on trade.115 
While different tests thus applied to the two categories of selling arrangements 
and of regulatory measures with an uncertain and indirect effect on trade, both 
tests ultimately seem to reunite some sort of inquiry into the effects of a meas-
ure.116
In later case law, the Court continued to expand the scope of Article 34 
TFEU; it even found the rules of the internal market applicable in cases where 
the facts seemed to be confined to a single Member State.117 The problem of 
reverse discrimination, where Member States discriminate against their own 
products or traders, has, however, not yet led the CJEU to adopt a more far-
reaching jurisprudence.118 Most recent case law added that even rules which 
merely focus on the use that could legally be made of products could fall under 
the concept of measures having equivalent effect, if they hinder access of foreign 
products to the market of a Member State.119
There are opposing views in the doctrine which denounce that the scope 
given to Article 34 TFEU is over-inclusive.120 As one solution, inspiration from 
competition law could arguably be fruitful in the future. Competition law would 
compare products based on econometric assessments. Consequently, what 
114  Case C-69/88 H Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen [1990] ECR I-583, para 11; Case 
C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, para 24. See more recently Case C-291/09 Francesco Guarnieri & Cie 
Judgment of 7 April 2011, not yet published, para 17.
115  See the discussion of case law in E. Spaventa, ‘The Outer Limits of the Treaty Free Movement Provi-
sions: Some Reflections on the Significance of Keck, Remoteness and Deliège’ in C. Barnard and O. 
Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 256-257.
116  Ibid., 264.
117  C-321/94 Pistre and others [1997] ECR I-2343.
118  See on this problem and on a potential broader interpretation of the internal market rules to deal with 
it A. Tryfonidou, ‘The Outer Limits of Article 28 EC: Purely Internal Situations and the Development of 
the Court’s Approach through the Years’ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of Euro-
pean Union Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 207 and 217 ff., respectively.
119  Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519, para 37. See closer on the case A. Rosas, ‘Life after 
Dassonville and Cassis: Evolution but no Revolution’ in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and 
Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: 
Hart Publlishing, 2010), 438.
120  See e.g. N. Bernard, ‘On the Art of Not Mixing One’s Drinks: Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon Revisited’ 
in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 462-463, who suggests that 
a more discrimination-based focus as under Article 35 TFEU, which deals with export restrictions and 
measures of equivalent effect, would have saved the Court the whole dilemma of Keck.
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should be prohibited under Article 34 TFEU are neither formally discriminatory 
nor formally market access restricting measures, but ‘selective burden’ mea-
sures which create a burden for new market entrants, thereby favouring estab-
lished competitors.121
Summing up, the predominance of rule-of-reason thinking points towards 
a rights-conception of the free movement of goods. This rights-conception 
also becomes visible in areas of the other market freedoms, as is subsequently 
shown.
b. The other internal market freedoms and EU citizenship
The free movement of workers, services and capital and the freedom of 
establishment have undergone separate paths of development in the case law. 
As a common feature it nonetheless appears notable that the Court has never 
repeated the debate on the scope of the relevant provisions as in the case of 
the free movement of goods. Early on the Court rejected the application of a 
presumption similar to the Keck holding in other fields.122 Under most of these 
economic freedoms, the case law developed a rule of reason approach. Even non-
discriminatory measures were thus subject to scrutiny, insofar as they repre-
sented an obstacle to the free movement of workers, capital, services or compa-
nies. Member State therefore had to show that there existed a public interest 
as a justification for their regulatory measure and demonstrate the measure’s 
proportionality.123 There is also case law that takes up the concept of measures 
having too indirect or remote an effect on the relevant fundamental freedom to 
fall under the respective prohibition from the case law on the free movement 
of goods.124 Furthermore, the Court started much earlier to use a language of 
‘rights’ to defend in particular claims by Union citizens as workers or service 
providers or recipients based on the Treaty’s respective fundamental freedom 
against Member State regulation.125
Up to this point, the substantial opposition of interests seemed to follow 
roughly the lines of private economic interests, typically workers or traders, 
121  The latter, of course, being typically domestic producers, see G. Davies, ‘Understanding Market Access: 
Exploring the Economic Rationality of Different Conceptions of Free Movement Law’ (2010) 11 German 
Law Journal 671, 678 ff.
122  Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141, paras 34 ff.; Case 
C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL et al v Bosman et al [1995] ECR 
I-4921, para 103.
123  See already early C. Barnard, ‘Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw?’ (2001) 
26 European Law Review 35.
124  See references to the case law in D. Edward and N.N. Shuibhne, ‘Continuity and Change in the Law 
Relating to Services’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law 
– Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 256.
125  See for early references N.N. Shuibhne, ‘The Outer Limits of EU Citizenship: Displacing Economic Free 
Movement Rights?’ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford: 
Hart, 2009), 185.
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against public interests, such as regulation for the purpose of public order or 
environmental protection. But the rise of EU citizenship as a new Treaty free-
dom for persons moving for non-economic motives has somewhat complicated 
the picture. EU law has undergone a shift from a purely market-based paradigm 
of integration towards an ever stronger paradigm of policy integration.126 Intro-
duced by the Treaty of Maastricht, the concept of citizenship has been discov-
ered by the Court as the new ‘fundamental status’ of the nationals of Member 
States.127 As a central tool, the CJEU has combined the new citizenship rights 
with the obligation for Member States not to discriminate based on national-
ity, thereby creating a broad right to equal treatment.128 Union citizenship 
opened up a large number of fields to the Court to assess potential violations of 
EU law in various areas, such as the right to a name,129 language regimes for 
ethnic minorities130 or even the law on the conferral and loss of Member States’ 
nationality itself.131 Some have questioned whether there were potential limits 
of citizenship.132 Such limits are indeed particularly questionable because to 
date there seems to be no clear recognition in the case law of what could be an 
opposing value to the value of citizenship. Some suggested that greater impor-
tance must be given to the concept of solidarity in future case law. Solidarity 
would counterbalance problematic cases such as those of Union citizens who 
have moved to another Member State and claim benefits in the social system of 
that state which they are not entitled to because they lack an effective link with 
that Member State.133 The Court has been criticized as relying excessively on 
proportionality as a remedying principle, instead of a more systematic approach 
based on the value of solidarity. In many cases the solution found is thus simply 
that territorial welfare restrictions must take into account the personal circum-
stances of every individual case. Such a solution is manifestly ill-suited to the 
idea of legal certainty.134
126  De Witte, 359.
127  Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193, 
para 31.
128  See for references to the case law J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of 
Integration and Constitutionalism’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 586.
129  Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig and Landratsamt Calw [1993] ECR I-1191; see also Case 
C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613.
130  Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637.
131  Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449.
132  See with some concern on the expanding case law of the Court Shuibhne, 194-195.
133  M. Ross, ‘The Struggle for EU Citizenship: Why Solidarity Matters’ in A. Arnull and others (eds.), A 
Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 
286.
134  M. Dougan, ‘Expanding the Frontiers of European Union Citizenship by Dismantling the Territorial 
Boundaries of the National Welfare States?’ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of 
European Union Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 162.
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Based on this overview of the development of the internal market freedoms 
and citizenship, it must now be assessed how judicial review has been conceptu-
ally justified in the doctrine. We have found strong reliance on rights-thinking 
and the rule of reason. Reliance on the principle of proportionality is a logical 
consequence. Subsequently, we discuss the differing standards of review in the 
case law and the overall conceptualisation of internal market freedoms in the 
literature.
 ii. Varying standards of review in the case law
The CJEU does not engage in lengthy discussion of the stan-
dard of review or explicitly considers elements of the procedural democracy 
doctrine in its case law. As a consequence, some reading between the lines is 
necessary to assess how concrete values have influenced the Court’s approach.
As a starting point, there are some indications that the standard of review is 
adapted in cases of review of Member State measures based on the underlying 
value for which the regulating state claims regulatory autonomy.
As the most prominent example, if the Court senses that there is likely 
to be an economic justification for trade-restrictive measures, i.e. protection-
ism, often a more intrusive standard of review is taken for measures.135 On the 
opposite side, some public interests lead the Court to take a less intrusive stance 
on its legal test to review Member State measures. An often-cited example is the 
case law on measures aiming at environmental protection.136 Similarly, under 
the justification of public or national security, the Court showed reluctance to 
impose too many constraints on the national courts, leaving to them a great part 
of the final assessment of proportionality.137
Generally, we have also observed considerably stricter review for Member 
States’ measures in comparison to the EU institutions. 138 The importance of 
furthering the rationale of the single market leads the Court to adopt a more 
intrusive standard of review, while for review at EU level a more lenient standard 
is in use.
Some would argue that the differences in the standard of review follow 
the dividing line between legislative and administrative measures rather than 
between measures of EU and of national origin.139 One can certainly identify a 
general tendency to subject administrative measures to stricter scrutiny than 
legislative measures.140 Intrusiveness correlates with the values typically inter-
fered with by administrative as opposed to legislative measures. There may be 
135  Gerards, 92.
136  E.g. in Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, the Court was willing to accept even a plainly 
discriminatory measure without paying further attention to this characteristic.
137  Tridimas, General Principles, 228-229.
138  See also Ibid., 193.
139  Harbo, 173.
140  See for a similar view Hofmann, 54.
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a correlation in the sense that under predominantly ‘legislative’ instruments, 
broader public interests are opposed, while individual rights as private interests 
tend to intervene more often in the case of ‘administrative’ measures.141 Yet, 
directives may also impinge significantly e.g. on economic operators’ freedom 
to exercise their profession or their property rights. It is thus suggested that 
instead of a division between legislative and administrative measures, there is a 
continuum. The differences in the intrusiveness of review are based predomi-
nantly on the nature of interests interfered with. EU measures of a more 
administrative kind are more likely to cause substantial interference with private 
positions, thereby triggering a concern on the appropriate protection of funda-
mental rights. The Court has not always been explicit about this concern,142 but 
the tougher scrutiny adopted in such cases can nevertheless be understood in 
this sense.
Still, there seems to be a qualitative leap in the intrusiveness of review 
between the review of EU measures and of Member States measures if the 
burden of proof and the narrow interpretation of derogations from fundamental 
freedoms are taken into account.143 A perhaps more useful division to under-
stand varieties in the standard of review uses the underlying interests that are 
weighed against each other.
Summing up, there is some variation in the intensity of scrutiny that can be 
derived from the case law, although the Court’s reasoning remains very brief. 
The interest of economic integration operates as a factor sharpening review. The 
subsequent section aims to describe how this conceptual focus can be brought 
together with the procedural democracy doctrine. Provisions such as the prohi-
bition of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect can be 
understood as ensuring virtual representation of out-of-state traders. Parallels to 
the United States jurisprudence and debate on the Dormant Commerce Clause 
become visible.144
 iii.  The procedural democracy doctrine and the scope of the 
free movement of goods
We will take the debate on Article 34 TFEU’s scope as the 
example, as much of the doctrine has also done so. This academic discussion 
bears witness to a dispute over the nature of Article 34 TFEU itself. The argu-
ments in this debate can be made fruitful for the discussion of the justification 
of judicial review.
The ‘rule of reason’ approach posits Article 34 TFEU as a traders’ right 
trumping, at first view, the Member States’ interests in regulating for the public 
purpose, unless they can fulfil the requirements of the narrowly interpreted 
141  See on this point insightful Tridimas, General Principles, 138.
142  Harbo, 178.
143  See on this point section IV.A.
144  See chapter 4 section III.B.
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express derogation of the Treaty or the mandatory requirements created in the 
case law for non-discriminatory measures.145
By contrast, an opposite view refuses to read Article 34 TFEU broadly as a 
tool for traders to free themselves from all sorts of potentially trade-hindering 
regulation. The Keck jurisprudence is understood as an indication that no 
general right to unhindered trade is contained in Article 34 TFEU.146 A more 
limited prohibition of protectionism should instead be the content of Article 
34 TFEU. At this point, the similarity to the debate surrounding the Dormant 
Commerce Clause in United States constitutional law becomes visible.147
The ‘virtual representation’ argument put forward in that context has 
also emerged in the debate in EU law: Should the trader’s right under Article 
34 TFEU be read as a tool to ensure representation of the foreign economic 
actors? Should judicial review thus ensure representation in domestic politi-
cal processes from which foreign economic operators are excluded and thus 
disadvantaged?148 The Member States would in principle be entitled to take their 
own decisions when regulating in the public interest. But EU law and judicial 
review aim to force them to take into account the interests of foreign traders. 
This view would suggest that the use of proportionality analysis in judicial 
review is to be understood as an order to ‘think federal’,149 and an intrusive stan-
dard of review is justified.
From the opposite position, Regan argues that, as in the case of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the appropriate representation of domestic interests is suffi-
cient to ensure non-protectionist regulation.150 In his view, a mere necessity test 
would be sufficient and could replace full-scale proportionality analysis, since 
review should only focus on finding market exploitation effects and protection-
ism as condemned motivations for regulating.151
In principle, it appears reasonable that the Court operates following a model 
of special interest representation in the area of the internal market freedoms 
and that thus no predominant weight falls on full-scale proportionality analysis. 
However, based on similar reasons as in the case of the United States consti-
145  For a view describing the fundamental economic freedoms as ‘rights conferring’ in their nature, see e.g. 
O. Odudu, ‘Economic Activity as a Limit to Community Law’ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The 
Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 237.
146  See with further references Shuibhne, 185-186.
147  See already chapter 4 section III.B.ii.
148  See M.P. Maduro, We the Court: the European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution: a 
Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998).
149  See in this respect on national courts Tridimas, General Principles, 241.
150  See succinctly K. Nicolaidis, ‘Kir Forever? The Journey of a Political Scientist in the Landscape of 
Mutual Recognition’ in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics 
of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 454.
151  D.H. Regan, ‘An Outsider’s View of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon: On Interpretation and Policy’ in 
M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on 
the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 469 and 471.
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tutional law, it appears exaggerated to suggest with Regan that proportionality 
analysis should play no role at all. In many cases, there may be appropriate 
representation of out-of-state interests through in-state groups. In some situ-
ations, however, there remains the possibility of a failure of the democratic 
process to the detriment of foreign economic operators which is not remedied 
through representation of corresponding local interests. In such a situation of 
an imbalance of values, we suggest that even under a model of special interest 
representation a narrow role should remain for full-scale proportionality analy-
sis.152
 iv. Conclusion
Summing up, the justification of judicial review is rather poorly 
discussed by the CJEU. Many elements can effectively be found between the 
lines of case law and using the doctrinal discussion, but more intense discus-
sion in the case law would certainly increase transparency and clarity. Under 
the review of Member State measures under the internal market freedoms, 
the paradigm has shifted from purely economically based integration towards 
broader values with the emergence of citizenship as a non-economic Treaty 
freedom. There continues to prevail, however, a broad rights-based reading of 
all the various fundamental freedoms, which leads the Court to exercise its 
review with strong preference for the interest of integration to the detriment of 
Member States’ regulatory autonomy. As the section on the use of the ‘principle 
of proportionality’ by the Court shows, the seemingly predominant rights-based 
reading of provisions like Article 34 TFEU in the case law has led to an undue 
over-emphasis on economic integration in the manner in which proportionality 
analysis is handled.153
 D  Horizontal effect of fundamental freedoms and 
fundamental rights
In our opinion, review by the CJEU represents a hybrid model 
still close to a model of special interest representation, but moving increas-
ingly towards equal representation. Another dimension in which non-economic 
values have been gaining in importance becomes visible in the Court’s increas-
ingly resorting to elements of horizontal effect, which is given both to funda-
mental freedoms under the Treaty as well as to fundamental rights. We first 
assess both developments, before discussing the very sparse justification for this 
extension and intensification of judicial review by the CJEU.
152  See chapter 4 section III.B.ii.
153  See section IV.
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 i. Horizontal effect and the internal market freedoms
As a starting point, the Court imposed considerably broad 
obligations on the Member States to secure the market freedoms enshrined in 
the Treaty. It insisted in particular on the duty of cooperation, part of the prin-
ciple of sincere cooperation, which requires Member States to act to ensure the 
respect of Treaty obligations. Member States have thus been required to act to 
remove obstacles to the fundamental freedoms.154
Beyond these obligations, the Court began to give horizontal effect to some 
Treaty provisions. For this purpose, in some cases it found collective rule-
making activities by private entities to be comparable to state regulation and 
imposed obligations of ensuring free movement e.g. on sports federations.155 
Later case law extended the effect of the internal market rules to trade unions156 
and a private bank,157 without providing a substantial justification for this exten-
sion.158
Concern arises out of the fact that justification of their trade-restrictive 
action may prove difficult for private parties. The Court has indicated that 
private parties could also avail themselves of a public interest as a justification 
to defend their measure.159 For some commentators, this is sufficient to appease 
fears of an overextension and the quasi-‘Verstaatlichung’ of private relations.160 
Still, there remain imbalances in the model built by the CJEU, in particular as 
the justification for any breach of a fundamental freedom is subject to narrow 
interpretation and a restrictive distribution of the burden of proof.161 To success-
fully assert a justification is thus a highly difficult task for private parties in 
practice.
As a logical continuation, private parties must also be able to justify infringe-
ments of the fundamental freedoms by reliance on the exercise of their own 
154  See for but one example Schmidberger, para 64, where the Court found a potential breach because 
Austrian authorities had not prevented a demonstration taking place on an important motorway, which 
thereby inhibited the transport of goods.
155  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale and others [1974] ECR 1405, 
paras 18 and 25. See also Bosman, para 83.
156  Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP 
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, paras 35-37, and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] 
ECR I-11767, paras 98-100.
157  Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139, paras 35-36.
158  De Witte, 334. See also e.g. critical of the judgments in Viking and Laval C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘Infor-
mal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the 
Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 1.
159  Bosman, para 86.
160  W. Sauter and H. Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 103.
161  See section IV.A.
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fundamental rights.162 In connection with the ever more lenient scrutiny of the 
Court as to the link to free movement required to activate review for a potential 
interference with EU law,163 the CJEU’s role as a court of review of fundamental 
rights could thereby considerably increase in the future.
 ii. Horizontal effect of fundamental rights in EU law
In the vigorously criticized Mangold case,164 the Court found 
that the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of age as a general prin-
ciple of EU law and simultaneously as a fundamental right165 could exercise its 
effect in a national labour law dispute between an employer and an employee.166 
Again, the Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the scope and effects of 
EU law.
In Mangold, the time limit of expiration of the directive containing the 
specific obligation of non-discrimination had not yet expired, but the Court 
relied on the fact that the contested national measure was taken formally as an 
implementing measure of the directive to enforce the general principle underly-
ing the directive.167 The case also caused some concern as to the appropriate rela-
tionship between general principles and express legislation.168 The subsequent 
partial confirmation of Mangold in Kücükdeveci led to fears that the reach of EU 
law would be dramatically expanded. Instead of merely verifying compliance 
in cases where Member States implement EU law or derogate from it, Member 
States are subject to review and have to respect the EU ‘public law order’ even in 
cases where there is a mere overlap in the subject matter that is being regulat-
162  E. Spaventa, ‘The Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights as General Principles of Union Law’ 
in A. Arnull and others (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 212.
163  See as mentioned Pistre, but also Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279.
164  See with further references M. Dougan, ‘In Defence of Mangold?’ in A. Arnull and others (eds.), A 
Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 220 
footnote 6.
165  See on the disputed content and legal basis of the prohibition Ibid., 221-222.
166  Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981, para 77.
167  In contrast to the Mangold case, in Case C-427/06 Bartsch [2008] ECR I-7245, para 17, no link with EU 
law was found because the relevant national measure did not implement the directive. In Case C-555/07 
Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365, paras 24-26, the relevant rules fell in a field regulated by the now applica-
ble directive and therefore EU law, including the general principle prohibiting age discrimination, was 
applicable.
168  K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Role of General Principles in EU Law’ in A. Arnull and others 
(eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011), 189-190, suggest that there are issues of institutional balance both horizontally between the EU 
judiciary and the EU legislator (the former overwriting legislation by expressing itself on general princi-
ples) and vertically between the EU and the Member States (the Court overwriting Treaty requirements 
such as unanimity decision-making by adjudication).
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ed.169 Put together with the potential horizontal effect of fundamental rights, EU 
law could become a wide-open door for individuals to invoke fundamental rights 
against other individuals.170
Wide-spread horizontal effect of fundamental rights is an important consti-
tutional development that not all constitutional orders of Member States have 
been willing to accept. In particular, horizontal effect is capable of triggering 
private liability claims, thereby transferring the risk from Member States to 
private individuals, while the latter are not necessarily capable of foreseeing 
their legal obligations.171
 iii. Conclusion
The increasing relevance of horizontal effect has extended the 
scope of judicial review by the Court. Arguably, this feature strengthens the 
shift towards more values being represented as the basis of judicial review; at 
the same time the extension of horizontal effect for Treaty freedoms imposes 
in parallel the consideration of the special interest of economic integration on 
private parties. Unfortunately, the reasons given for this significant development 
remain somewhat hazy. In view of the CJEU’s general jurisdiction, there are 
legitimate concerns about a revolutionary extension of its fundamental rights 
review as implicitly suggested by cases such as Mangold. The Court seems to 
follow the path taken by the German Federal Constitutional Court in Lüth.172 But 
it should then clarify, as in the German case, how the institutional balance and 
private autonomy can be safeguarded, i.e. whether review would somehow follow 
a model akin to special interest review. Less intrusive review could be justified, 
as in the German case. Perhaps, as one author has put it, at the end of the day 
the Court may be forced to accept that it is not able to ‘correct all evils of society’ 
through its judicial review.173
 E Conclusion
The present section assessed to what extent the CJEU uses 
varying degrees of scrutiny and discusses these differences in light of the proce-
dural democracy doctrine. While a variety of different standards were effectively 
found, the reasoning in the case law remains scarce on the matter. There are 
some general tendencies which lead to the conclusion that the Court follows a 
model of special interest review. As a consequence, its review is more lenient 
in the case of measures by EU institutions than those by Member States, as the 
former are presumed to act based on the interest of economic integration, while 
the latter’s action is perceived as a deviation from this interest. The increasing 
169  Dougan, ‘Mangold’, 239.
170  Spaventa, ‘Horizontal Application’, 212.
171  Ibid., 217.
172  See chapter 3 section III.B.iii.b.
173  Spaventa, ‘Horizontal Application’, 218.
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review in light of fundamental rights, Union citizenship as a non-economic 
Treaty freedom and the development of horizontal effect have broadened the 
scope of values represented and show that there is a paradigmatic shift towards 
equal representation review. Still, the debate on the justification of review under 
Article 34 TFEU bears witness to the fact that the predominant conceptualisa-
tion of review is based on a reading of the Treaty as a charter of trader’s rights. 
The subsequent section fleshes out the claim that the interest of economic 
integration continues to be better protected than other interests. Beyond the 
variety of standards of review observed in this section, the Court also introduced 
a rule-exception relationship between Treaty freedoms and the exercise of regu-
latory autonomy by Member States for this purpose. This hierarchical setting of 
values contradicts even the setting of equal representation review if the Court’s 
arguments for such a model of judicial review should be accepted.
 IV The Principle of Proportionality in European Union Law
The present section assesses the ‘typical’ and most wide-spread 
use of proportionality analysis in EU law, i.e. in the case of review of Member 
States’ measures against the benchmark of internal market freedoms. As has 
been set out in the previous sections, there are a number of standards of review 
that the Court applies to its ‘principle of proportionality’. Centrally, this situa-
tion of review shows, however, to what extent the Court seems to pre-balance 
its situation of review, reaching the conclusion of a model of special interest 
representation. As was examined earlier, the Court adopts a very broad reading 
of fundamental freedoms, finding violations even in cases of non-discriminatory 
measures. This frequent finding of interference is coupled with a test that relies 
on very strict necessity with an important burden of proof on the Member 
State and with less frequent reliance on proportionality stricto sensu. It can be 
concluded that, despite some more recent developments, review by the Court 
strongly emphasizes the interest of economic integration, while representing 
only in a somewhat hierarchically lower manner other interests pursued by 
Member States exercising their regulatory autonomy, thereby adding an undue 
element of hierarchy to special interest review.
 A  The Necessity Approach of the Court Towards Review of 
Member States’ Measures Derogating from the Market 
Freedoms
The Court applies a ‘rule of reason’ approach to the various 
Treaty freedoms, which also extends to the non-economic concept of citizen-
ship.174 Conceptually, every interference with a freedom granted by the Treaty 
can be justified by a public interest, be it enshrined in the Treaty in the form of 
174  See on this point Y. Borgmann-Prebil, ‘The Rule of Reason in European Citizenship’ (2008) 14 Euro-
pean Law Journal 328.
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an express derogation or rather accepted by the Court in form of the case-law-
based mandatory requirements.175 The Court accepted a variety of more or less 
clearly defined public interests at the request of the Member State in question.176 
The stage of offering a justificatory reason thus did not prove too problematic for 
Member States trying to defend domestic regulation. If there is suspicion of pro-
tectionism, review will be intensified.177 However, exclusionary reasons think-
ing is rather limited to cases where exclusively economic reasons of protecting 
domestic operators are the only pertinent explanation for a measure.178
At the second stage, the Court insisted on the respect of the ‘principle of 
proportionality’. The derogations as well as the mandatory requirements have 
been understood as ‘exceptions’ by the Court. They must therefore be inter-
preted narrowly and the burden of proof for the fulfilment of the proportionality 
requirement lies with the Member State.179
This restrictive approach combined with the broad scope given to the market 
freedoms180 produced a considerable amount of case law, most of which strikes 
down national regulatory measures for the benefit of further market integration. 
Generally, the balance seems tilted towards negative integration to the disadvan-
tage of domestic regulatory autonomy.181
While the amount of case law renders any comprehensive statement futile, 
some trends in the case law can still be identified. The reference to the principle 
of proportionality in the Court’s case law does not always take the same shape. 
Generally, however, the test employed predominantly emphasises a necessity 
test comparing the chosen measure with alternatives.182 In a fairly typical case, 
the Court was confronted with a national prohibition on packaging margarine 
in a package shaped similarly to that used for butter so that the consumer could 
not be misled into buying the wrong product. The CJEU accepted the objective 
of preventing the deception of consumers in principle, but then held that a mere 
labelling rule could achieve the objective just as well and struck the prohibition 
down as contrary to internal market rules.183
Seemingly simple, the test sometimes proved problematic to put into prac-
tice. As an example, in cases concerning measures for consumer protection the 
175  There is an impressive amount of varying terminology that the Court has used over the years in the 
various areas of internal market law, but there are no perceivable conceptual differences. See for an 
enumeration of the varying terms C. Barnard, ‘Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is 
State Interest Really Protected?’ in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 275.
176  See for a list Ibid., 276-279.
177  See section III.C.ii.
178  See e.g. Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517, paras 16-17.
179  Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219, paras 26-27.
180  See section III.C.i.
181  Tridimas, General Principles, 193-194, points in comparison to the much more regulator-friendly 
approach of the Court in interpreting trade agreements in the external relations of the EU.
182  Adinolfi, 390.
183  Case 261/81 Rau v De Smedt [1982] ECR 3961, para 17.
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Court did not find it easy to clarify what kind of consumer Member States were 
allowed to protect. The Court sometimes admitted the protection of a rather 
easily deceivable consumer, while in other cases it departed from the notion of 
a fairly reasonable consumer who would attentively read labels on products to 
avoid deception.184 Moreover, the CJEU often accepts the solution of labels as a 
less trade-restrictive alternative than other regulatory measures, without consid-
ering that labelling may actually not prove of similar efficiency upon closer 
inspection.185
The CJEU tackled a majority of cases using the necessity test in this often 
rather blunt fashion. One may think that a necessity test leaves an ultimate 
margin of autonomy to the Member State that proportionality analysis stricto 
sensu would not. However, in the case of EU law, the narrow interpretation and 
burden of proof requirements combined with the restrictive use of necessity 
effectively erected a high threshold for Member States’ measures. A recent study 
thus remarked that the increasing intensity of review by the CJEU led to an ever-
increasing number of national measures failing the test of proportionality in 
comparison to 10 or 20 years ago.186
 B The Use of Proportionality Stricto Sensu
The internal market case law is far from uniform. The previ-
ous statement on the predominance of the necessity test must thus be quali-
fied, since the Court also referred to proportionality stricto sensu in a number of 
cases.
Perhaps the most well known case is Danish Bottles. In this case, the CJEU 
assessed a Danish quantitative restriction on the products which importers 
could market in non-approved containers. The restriction had been introduced 
to facilitate the operation of a system for returning containers which had been 
approved for this purpose. The Court struck down the measure, since it found 
that even though the Danish system had a high positive impact on environ-
mental protection, the trade-restrictive effect of the quantitative restriction was 
‘disproportionate to the objective pursued’.187
184  See e.g. for protection of rather vulnerable consumers Case 382/87 Buet and others v Ministère public 
[1989] ECR 1235, para 13. By contrast, in Case C-470/93 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe 
Köln v Mars [1995] ECR I-1923, para 24, the Court established the standard of a ‘reasonably circumspect 
consumer’ who was unlikely to be deceived e.g. by misleading advertising on the packaging of a prod-
uct.
185  See for a such rather cursory acceptance of labelling despite concerns on similar efficiency Case 76/86 
Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1021, para 16.
186  Barnard, ‘Derogations’, 295. Furthermore, the CJEU’s approach changes over time, as the increasing 
tendency to decide ever more cases itself rather than leaving part of the assessment to national courts 
shows; see Barnard, ‘Derogations’, 296.
187  Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark (Danish bottles) [1988] ECR 4607, para 21.
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In Stoke-on-Trent, the reference to ‘weighing the national interest in attain-
ing [a public interest] against the Community interest in ensuring the free 
movement of goods’ was used more generally to determine whether the effect 
on trade of a measure – a prohibition against opening shops on Sundays – was 
sufficiently direct to entail a violation of Article 34 TFEU in the first place.188
Typically, in classic internal market cases, proportionality stricto sensu thus 
only plays a subordinate role in a small number of cases, where a necessity 
assessment does not produce a satisfactory result for the Court. The reasoning 
in internal market cases was more extensive in cases involving fundamental 
rights.
In Schmidberger, the Court accepted that fundamental rights could act as a 
justification for obstacles to the free movement of goods. An authorized demon-
stration on a motorway caused traffic interference in the case. Based on case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, the CJEU held that the freedom 
of expression and the freedom of assembly at stake were not absolute rights, but 
that a weighing exercise had to ensure that a ‘fair balance’ was struck between 
these interests and the interest of the economic Treaty freedom.189 The CJEU 
went on to weigh the rather limited and predictable blocking of traffic against 
the legitimate goal pursued by the authorities when authorizing the demonstra-
tion and found an appropriate relationship of the factors at issue.190 Without 
express wording, this comes close to proportionality stricto sensu. Yet, the Court 
then returned to a less restrictive means language and concluded that no less 
trade-restrictive alternative was at the disposal of the Austrian authorities.191
In Omega, the Court also decided itself on the compatibility of a measure 
causing a hindrance to the market justified by the concept of human dignity as 
enshrined in the German Constitution. Yet, it took a step back at the same time 
by clarifying that the interpretation of public order, under which the justification 
was brought, could accommodate differing constitutional conceptions among 
Member States and did not impose one common constitutional benchmark 
across the EU.192 In its rather terse analysis of proportionality stricto sensu, it 
held that the ‘level of protection’ adequate in Germany could only be reached by 
prohibiting the laser game at issue, while the measure targeted only the prob-
lematic product and no other games.193 It seemed thus to undertake a rather 
necessity-based review.
In Familiapress194 the CJEU decided to send the case back to the national 
court, providing only some general guidance. The measure at issue aimed at the 
188  Case C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v B & Q Plc [1992] ECR 
I-6635, para 15.
189  Schmidberger, paras 79-81.
190  Ibid., paras 84 ff.
191  Ibid., para 93.
192  Omega, paras 37-38.
193  Ibid., para 39.
194  Familiapress, paras 27 and 29.
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maintenance of press diversity, but not only caused an obstacle to the free move-
ment of goods, but also had a negative impact on freedom of expression. In its 
guidance, the Court focused in particular on less restrictive alternatives rather 
than suggesting open-ended balancing.
In conclusion, proportionality stricto sensu has played a rather subordinate 
role as part of the test before the CJEU. It has seen some use in cases of conflicts 
with fundamental rights. In the latter cases, the Court has, however, sometimes 
also avoided undertaking comprehensive balancing by sending matters to the 
national court if assessments could be carried out better by the latter.
 C  Increasing Complexity under the ‘Principle of 
Proportionality’ and the Case of Extraterritorial Measures
Beyond the question of the use of proportionality stricto sensu, 
the test to review Member States’ measures has developed increasing complexity 
by adopting new features during the last decade. This can be understood in light 
of the Court’s role, which forces it to adjudicate constantly with an eye on the 
coherency of its solution in one case for EU law as applied across the EU. Rather 
than finding case-by-case solutions like the European Court of Human Rights, 
it must thus strive to provide generally applicable guidelines and indicate what 
general benchmarks will apply to future legislation of all Member States.
As one such guideline, precaution has played an increasingly important role 
in EU internal market law. After the General Court had expressly accepted the 
principle of precaution as a general principle of EU law,195 it became an impor-
tant tool for the CJEU to review national measures in the fields of public health 
and environmental protection. In Commission v Netherlands, the Court found 
that precaution could widen the margin of discretion for Member States to 
adopt measures for health protection purposes where scientific uncertainty still 
prevailed.196 But protective measures had to be based on an assessment of the 
potential risk at issue, which again led to a proportionality-based review of the 
measures adopted. The Court found that the denial of marketing authorisation 
for products enriched with certain vitamins went beyond what was necessary, 
because the denial was only based on the lack of nutritional need of the popula-
tion. This justification fell outside the scope of the risk assessment undertaken 
in that case.197
Furthermore, the application of proportionality in internal market cases 
also changed priorities and introduced new topics. With the limits of mutual 
195  Pfizer v Council, para 115.
196  Case C-41/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, paras 42-43.
197  Ibid., paras 68-69. See closer on the case and its predecessor before the EFTA Court C. Baudenbacher, 
‘The EFTA Court, the ECJ, and the Latter’s Advocates General – a Tale of Judicial Dialogue’ in A. 
Arnull, P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays in Honour of Sir 
Francis Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 94-95.
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recognition emerging in certain cases,198 the Court began asking Member States 
to actively further mutual recognition. For this purpose, the Court requires 
Member States’ authorities to recognize product requirements fulfilled in other 
Member States in an active manner and asks Member States to include recog-
nition clauses in domestic product legislation.199 Often, this has been termed 
the ‘proceduralisation’ of proportionality, as the regulatory process is the newly 
discovered focus of review.200 As a similar topic, in recent case law the CJEU also 
started to emphasize the topics of consistent and coherent operation of Member 
States’ measures in its proportionality review.201
These focal points introduced to somewhat streamline the analysis under 
the ‘rule of reason’ have not, however, given rise to strict forms of categorisa-
tion. Comparing the review of trade restrictions with extraterritorial effects 
undertaken by the CJEU with that of the Supreme Court under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the difference becomes clear. As discussed in the pertinent 
section, United States courts generally tend to classify in terms of whether they 
‘control conduct beyond the boundary of the state’, in which case they are placed 
under strict scrutiny like discriminatory measures and in most cases struck 
down.202 Contrary to this categorical approach, the CJEU integrates extraterrito-
rial elements into the normal scrutiny under the ‘rule of reason’.203
In a recent controversy, applicants attacked the inclusion of aircraft operators 
for all their flights arriving or departing from EU airports in the EU greenhouse 
gas emissions trading scheme. This inclusion resulted in costs for foreign opera-
tors, as they had to buy allowances. Discussing the claim of an unduly extraterri-
torial effect of EU law in the case, the Court upheld the relevant EU directive, as 
it found that there was a sufficient territorial connection. Only aircraft operators 
who had deliberately chosen to land or depart from EU airports fell under the 
allowance trading scheme.204 The EU could take such measures to fulfil the 
high level of protection sought for in the area of the fight against global warm-
ing, even if part of the activities that caused the undesired effects of pollution 
took place outside of its territory.205 Both the fact that a territorial link was given 
and that the effects of global warming and air pollution would be felt indepen-
dently of territorial boundaries thus seem to play a role in the Court’s reason-
198  Gormley, ‘Definition of MEEs’, 203.
199  See with examples Barnard, ‘Derogations’, 286-287.
200 Ibid., 286.
201  See on this point G. Mathisen, ‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification of Member 
State Measures Restricting Free Movement’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1021.
202  See chapter 4 section IV.B.iii.
203  See generally on the rather permissive stance of EU law towards extraterritorial effects even in compari-
son to WTO law L. Ankersmit, J. Lawrence and G. Davies, ‘Diverging EU and WTO Perspectives on 
Extraterritorial Process Regulation’ (2012) Minnesota Journal of International Law Online 14.
204  Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America a.o. v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change Judgment of 21 December 2011, not yet published, para 127.
205  Ibid., paras 128-129.
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ing, much more than a clear categorisation of whether a measure qualifies as 
‘extraterritorial’ or not.
 D Conclusion
Summing up, the test developed for the internal market is 
predominantly marked by an emphasis on the necessity prong, while a rather 
subordinate role is played by proportionality stricto sensu. The rigorous imple-
mentation of necessity with a substantive burden of proof imposed on the 
Member State trying to justify its measure leads to a strong emphasis on the in-
terest of economic integration. At the same time, contrary to case law under the 
United States Dormant Commerce Clause, no strong categorisation with diffe-
rent degrees of scrutiny emerged. As the example of extraterritorial measures 
related to climate change shows, the CJEU seems much more willing to balance 
considerations as to whether extraterritorial effects can be justified.
The over-emphasis on the value of economic integration seems to become 
somewhat anachronistic in light of the changes of EU law that have been 
observed in the previous sections. To some extent, it is suggested that more 
frequent reliance on proportionality stricto sensu as well as a less rigorous test 
of necessity could help to balance out the scales in light of the increasing shift 
towards a model of equal representation review and more values being accepted 
as requiring representation that we observed in the previous section. Sending 
cases back to national courts could arguably also prove advantageous at this 
stage, with national courts being better equipped for proportionality stricto sensu 
because of their knowledge of the socio-economic and legal context of a Member 
State’s measure.
 V Evaluation and Conclusion
The discussion of the CJEU’s setting of judicial review and 
its use of proportionality analysis conveys, at first glance, a setting of review 
focused on uniform interpretation of the Treaties and representation of eco-
nomic integration as the central value. Throughout the course of history, the 
Court established itself as the central authority of interpretation and validity of 
EU law. Some described the Court as a constitutional court, but its predominant 
task remains the adjudication of a legal order whose priorities point towards 
economic integration as a central rationale. Institutional features also show that 
priority is given to uniformity of judicial decisions over adjudication by judges 
familiar with a domestic context or the expression of dissenting or separate 
opinions.
A closer look at the normative justification of judicial review reveals, by 
contrast, that the CJEU considers itself as actually being in a hybrid situation, 
manoeuvring between special interest review and equal representation review. 
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This has been shown with the various standards of review used by the Court to 
adjudicate in the increasingly complex settings of conflicts of values that EU law 
encompasses. The Court has to date paid deplorably little attention to justifying 
its review. Still, the case law indicates that review in light of fundamental rights, 
under the non-economic Treaty freedom of Union citizenship and the increas-
ing horizontal effect given both to internal market freedoms and fundamental 
rights has led to a larger number of values being represented in EU law and 
to various adaptations of the standard of review in the use of the ‘principle of 
proportionality’.
Despite this increasing need to represent more values, the Court’s focus and 
discussion on the justification of review remains largely limited to the economic 
internal market freedoms. A rights-based reading of provisions such as Article 
34 TFEU prevails, which leads the Court to adopt a ‘rule of reason’ to review 
Member States’ measures perceived as deviating from a Treaty freedom. This 
rule of reason plays out in a restrictive necessity test which imposes significant 
limits on Member States’ regulatory autonomy. By contrast, proportionality 
stricto sensu is mentioned, but not very often used by the Court.
The actual use of proportionality analysis thus reinforces the impression 
of a model of special interest review with an undue hierarchy in favour of the 
interest of economic integration. In principle, one could agree with the occa-
sional use of proportionality stricto sensu. The use of necessity, however, unduly 
puts economic integration at a higher hierarchical position than other values 
pursued by Member States under their regulatory autonomy. Generally, the 
shifting paradigm towards a model of equal representation review and towards 
representation of more values should lead to more balancing of values on an 
equal footing, with reliance on proportionality stricto sensu. In particular coop-
eration with national courts which are familiar with domestic socio-economic 
and legal contexts could here be fruitful for the Court.
WTO Law
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 I Introduction
With the discussion of WTO law, we move to a clearer case of a 
model of special interest review than under judicial review in EU law. Far more 
intergovernmental in its setting and based on a limited number of legal norms, 
WTO law focuses strongly on various issues to promote the interest of trade 
through various means. We thus find no comparable shift of emphasis as in EU 
law, where fundamental rights, Union citizenship and the horizontal effect of 
internal market freedoms and fundamental rights has extended proportionality 
analysis and judicial review to individual interests and the private sphere.
In WTO law, the broader context shows that despite a historical develop-
ment of ‘judicialisation’, one can hardly speak of a truly constitutional system 
when discussing dispute settlement. There is a clear focus on the topics of the 
WTO agreements, a generally unbalanced institutional system and adjudicative 
instances that reflect expertise in trade law and economics rather than repre-
sentativeness of the diverse WTO membership.
Although a rights-based reading of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) as the central WTO covered agreement has at some points been 
suggested, such a justification for more intrusive judicial review has not been 
able to establish itself. Examining the justification of judicial review, by contrast, 
we find a rather narrow, text-based interpretation which has led in practice to a 
somewhat fragmented case law. To some extent, the categorisation of the legal 
analysis into strictly separated steps is reminiscent of the categorisation in 
United States constitutional law, but it is based on different reasons, here the 
overemphasis of literal interpretation to counter fears of judicial activism from 
an international adjudicative system. Our findings of a model of special interest 
review being largely confirmed, in our view full-scale proportionality analysis 
should only play a role in rare cases.
Practice indeed shows predominant reliance on necessity tests, but also some 
rather unfortunate features: There is a marked fear of proportionality stricto 
sensu and hardly any systematic discussion of the standard of review in the light 
of the procedural democracy doctrine, which has led to a very blurry actual legal 
test, the so-called ‘weighing and balancing’ solution developed under Article 
XX. Other agreements offer a comparable picture.
 II The Broader Context of Judicial Review in WTO Law
Historically, there has been an undeniable development 
towards ‘judicizialication’ of the WTO dispute settlement system. However, the 
adjudicators are not truly embedded in the national context, and comparisons 
between the WTO Appellate Body and a domestic constitutional court are not 
persuasive in the light of the former’s specific characteristics as a specialized 
trade-court of limited jurisdiction.
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 A  A Historical Overview of the Development of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs of 1947 was the 
predecessor of the International Trade Organisation’s comprehensive regime, 
which ultimately never entered into force because of the failure of the negotia-
tion process.1 The GATT as a torso contained only few provisions on dispute set-
tlement. In this light, it was initially hard to predict how successful trade dispute 
settlements would be in the long run.2 Article XXIII provided that in a case 
where a party thought that there was nullification or impairment of benefits 
arising out of the GATT due to measures taken by another party, there should 
first be an exchange of written proposals for resolution, followed by a possibil-
ity to refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. This provision formed 
the basis of dispute settlement, which initially relied only on negotiations before 
establishing special ‘intersessional commitees’ and later ‘working parties’.
However, from the very beginning there was controversy on the overall 
purpose of the dispute settlement system: Should it provide relief for concrete 
dispute cases or rather promote long-term stability and predictability of the 
interpretation of the legal texts?3 In the mid-1950s, panels, consisting of 3 or 5 
experts, were used as a step towards a more and more judicial procedure.4 This 
procedure proved to be a success and led to a process of legalisation of dispute 
settlement with a shift away from power politics towards a more central role 
for the law.5 The sparse wording of the provision thus served as a legal basis for 
the resolution of more than 140 trade disputes: Panels established ad hoc wrote 
reports that subsequently had to be adopted by the Council of Representatives of 
the GATT 1947 CONTRACTING PARTIES in order to become binding.6
Yet, there were also unsatisfactory aspects which led the parties to the 
GATT to consider reform. As a starting point, the practice was codified in an 
understanding during the Tokyo Round negotiations.7 Most matters, however, 
required more substantial reform. In particular, the positive consensus rule, 
an informal practice, required that all decisions taken by the CONTRACTING 
1  See on the International Trade Organisation’s failure J. Odell and B. Eichengreen, ‘The United States, 
the ITO, and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership’ in A. Krueger (ed.) The 
WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 184ff.
2  J. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 137.
3  Ibid., 138.
4  See R.E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1975), 66 ff.
5  See for a broader picture S. Zleptnig, ‘The Standard of Review in WTO Law – An Analysis of Law, 
Legitimacy and the Distribution of Legal and Political Authority’ (2002) European Business Law Review 
427, 440.
6  R.E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law – The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Salem 
N.H.: Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993), 287.
7  Jackson, 140-141.
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PARTIES were taken by unanimity. This rule also applied to the decision to 
establish a panel and the adoption of the reports of panels and led to the prob-
lem that the losing party could veto both decisions.
With the success of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the new Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) entered into force and provided more compre-
hensive rules on a number of aspects. The academic debate also intensified and 
focused in particular on various features of the dispute settlement system which 
proved hard to put into traditional categories. Central changes included the 
introduction of an appellate instance, the Appellate Body, which is in charge of 
review of legal issues in panel reports,8 and a negative consensus rule according 
to which panel reports would henceforth be adopted unless there was consensus 
against such adoption.9 Also, the establishment of panels could no longer be 
blocked by one WTO member.10 The Appellate Body was created as a perma-
nent instance of review of the panel decisions. Unlike panels, the Appellate 
Body consists of seven permanent members who additionally should possess 
expertise in law and international trade and who, ideally, are elected in order to 
broadly represent WTO membership.11 Of course, representativeness remains 
cursory through this method, and expertise in trade law and economics is the 
more important qualification of Appellate Body members. As a consequence 
of these changes, scholars have observed a strengthened paradigmatic change 
away from rather diplomatically functioning dispute settlement towards a 
compulsory, more judicial mode of operation.12
In the light of historic development, the impression could arise that the 
WTO dispute settlement system is on its way to becoming somewhat of a consti-
tutional adjudicative system for the global trading regime. Yet, some institu-
tional characteristics make the case of constitutional adjudication doubtful for 
the WTO and also explain why adjudicators appear to feel poorly legitimized to 
engage in intrusive review using proportionality stricto sensu or balancing.
 B  The WTO Institutional System and Constitutional 
Adjudication
The creation of the WTO and its de facto compulsory third-party 
adjudication system has provoked a debate among scholars on the constitutional 
features of the new legal regime of international trade. Constitutionalist theories 
of WTO law point in the direction that the WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
can be understood as similar to a domestic constitutional judicial system.
8  Art. 17 DSU.
9  Article 16.4 DSU.
10  Art. 6.1 DSU.
11  Article 17.3 DSU.
12  See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and 
External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 (2001) 191 Journal of World Trade 202.
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Such constitutional perspectives have e.g. been developed by a stream of 
scholars pursuing a project of ‘institutional managerialism’.13 Such accounts 
focus strongly on the institutions of the WTO and base the constitutional nature 
of the legal regime on this specific institutional system. Approaches of judicial 
norm-generation take matters further and suggest that adjudication in regimes 
such as the WTO can be ‘constitutive as well as reflective’ of constitutional 
law.14 The predominant adjudicative power of the WTO should thus be read in 
the light of insights from constitutional law.15 Could one, thus, draw a parallel 
between the quasi-judicial system of the WTO and a constitutional court such as 
in Germany or the Supreme Court of the United States?
Several arguments render such comparisons doubtful. As a starting point, 
the argument has often been repeated that there is hardly a robust inter-insti-
tutional balance between the institutions of the WTO.16 The legislative side 
is underdeveloped, and as a consequence judicial law-making by the dispute 
settlement system is a virtualsine qua non for further development of the WTO 
rules.17 Yet the difficulty of ‘correcting’ adjudicative decisions by later legislative 
activity can also play out as an argument for judicial restraint. To argue in favour 
of an additional power shift towards the WTO judiciary, as the use of propor-
tionality analysis would entail, requires convincing arguments.
Even beyond considerations of institutional relations in the WTO, the scope 
and function of judicial review as it is undertaken by the panels and the Appel-
late Body upon closer examination proves unclear, to say the least. There are 
aspects that support the argument that judicial review in the WTO should 
be understood as a limited and functionally oriented exercise not to be easily 
equated with constitutional review. These elements support the subsequent 
assessment of pre-balancing, which will show a rather clear picture of a model 
close to special interest review.
13  See e.g. J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (London: Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs, 1998).
14  D.Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization : Legitimacy, Democracy, and 
Community in the International Trading System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 177.
15  See also D.Z. Cass, ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation 
as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 European Journal of Inter-
national Law 39.
16  Cass, Constitutionalization, 109, shows explicitly that there is no principle of ‘institutional balance’, as 
the Appellate Body recognized in the case law.
17  P. Eeckhout, ‘The Scales of Trade – Reflections on the Growth and Functions of the WTO Adjudicative 
Branch’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 3, 5. R. Howse, ‘Moving the WTO Forward – 
One Case at a Time’ (2009) 42 Cornell International Law Journal 223, lists instances where political 
deadlock resulted in progress of WTO law achieved through its adjudicative institutions.
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 C The Rationale of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
To assess the rationale of WTO dispute settlement, a narrow 
view would start with the text of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
However, in order to gain a more comprehensive picture, we should also 
identify more generally the goals of the DSU discussed in academic doctrine. 
Furthermore, a look at the consequences of a finding of breach reveals a some-
what particular mechanism in WTO law which enriches our perspective of the 
descriptive elements of judicial review.
 i.  The text of the DSU and doctrinal discussion on the policy 
goals of the DSU
Art. 3.2 DSU states that the system is a ‘central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’. The 
panel in United States – Section 301 has similarly emphasized this point, stating 
that the DSU is ‘one of the most important instruments to protect the security 
and predictability of the multilateral trading system’.18 The main aim of the 
system of dispute settlement for panels should thus be to clarify the existing 
provisions of the WTO agreements.19 At the same time, Art. 3.2 DSU makes 
clear that reports by panels and the Appellate Body must not ‘add to or diminish 
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’. Consequently, 
despite their powerful institutional position, the dispute settlement organs are 
required to exercise judicial restraint. As the Appellate Body has stated, the DSU 
is not ‘meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to “make law” 
by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of 
resolving a particular dispute’.20
Despite the fact that with the lack of a strong legislative component, the 
development of WTO law has largely rested on the shoulders of panels and the 
Appellate Body, the underlying mandate is actually rather restricted.21 This has 
also proven true in the views on what law should apply in WTO dispute settle-
ment: There seems to be reluctance to include norms of international law other 
than the WTO covered agreements in the adjudicative process.22
Even if the doctrine is taken into account beyond the mere text of the DSU, 
the picture does not change substantially. It has been suggested more broadly 
18  United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 1974 WT/DS152/R, 27 January 2000, para 7.75.
19  Y. Guohua, B. Mercurio and L. Yongjie, WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding : a Detailed Interpreta-
tion (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005), 17.
20  United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India AB-1997-1, WT/
DS33/AB/R, 25 April 1997, p. 19.
21  See also P.-T. Stoll, ‘Article 3 DSU’ in R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll and K. Kaiser (eds.), WTO – Institutions and 
Dispute Settlement (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 287 para 13.
22  See for a comprehensive overview of the problem and the relevant case law P. Delimatsis, ‘The Fragmen-
tation of International Trade Law’ (2011) 45 Journal of World Trade 87.
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that the dispute settlement pursues a number of policy goals which may also 
enter into conflict. The DSU should thus achieve various objectives such as to 
restrict international tensions, provide prompt settlement of disputes,23 provide 
precedents for stability and predictability, resolve ambiguities in the treaty text, 
promote compliance with the treaty, re-establish the balance of benefits among 
WTO members, give access to a fair court proceeding including a reasoned 
final decision and allocate powers between various levels of the ‘international 
landscape’.24 Such broader views on the objectives of the dispute settlement 
system demonstrate that the focus lies on the character of the WTO covered 
agreements as a contract of substantially equal sovereign states. Despite the 
sophistication of the trade regime, it remains based on an old-fashioned inter-
State treaty.
 ii. The consequences of a breach of WTO law
The consequences of a finding of a breach are peculiar in WTO 
dispute settlement. A panel does not declare the domestic law or regulation 
invalid or influences its legal force in any other way, but simply authorizes trade 
retaliation, the ‘suspension of concessions’. The rather scarce provisions in the 
DSU have led to intense debate on the setting and goals of trade retaliation: 
A variety of reasons could potentially underlie the system as it is drafted. For 
example, one could understand the DSU rules as providing for a mere system of 
compensation, where the main aim is either to rebalance trade between trading 
partners or to compensate those economic operators in a state that have suf-
fered under a violation of WTO law for their damages. On the other hand, trade 
retaliation could also serve a more sanctioning purpose focusing on the breach-
ing party; in this setting, retaliation would predominantly serve either to induce 
compliance or even to punish the breaching party.25 All these matters influence 
how the leeway ought to be used in designing concrete retaliation in terms of 
the benchmarks of calculation, the targeted sectors, the timing and resort to 
cross-retaliation.26 Article 22.4 DSU sets out that the level of suspension of 
concessions ‘shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment’. 
Based on this, part of the doctrine has suggested that the DSU could actually 
be based on the idea of ‘efficient breach’: the actual goal is not so much compli-
ance with WTO obligations, but to ensure that those hurt by WTO violations 
are compensated, while a party could buy itself off even in the case of persistent 
23  As required by Art. 3.3 DSU.
24  Jackson, Changing Fundamentals, 147-150.
25  See for a concise overview J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context: 
What Is the Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations?’ in C.B. Bown and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), The Law, 
Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 38.
26  Ibid., 39-40.
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violations of WTO law.27 Such an overall rationale of WTO law could be read as 
changing the role of WTO adjudication in itself: Rather than adjudicating in 
a quasi-constitutional setting in regulatory disputes, panels and the Appellate 
Body would then rather act as organs verifying contractual breaches and deter-
mining the sum to be paid in terms of compensation.
The actual legal texts, however, seem to contradict the ‘efficient breach’ 
hypothesis. Article 22.1 DSU emphasizes the temporary character of compensa-
tion and the suspension of concessions as tools of retaliation. Article 22.8 DSU 
states that suspension of concessions is temporary until the violating measure 
has been removed or a mutually satisfactory solution has been found. Also, 
the case law and the arguments of parties seem to predominantly depart from 
a reading of the DSU as having the central purpose of inducing compliance, 
not allowing for efficient breach.28 The truth may lie somewhere between the 
extremes, but inducing compliance is arguably one central objective of the WTO 
dispute settlement system.29
Summing up, the ‘efficient breach’ hypothesis does not prove highly convinc-
ing. Still, there remains a remarkably complex set of policy goals pursued by 
the WTO dispute settlement system as it is set up. It seems inconclusive in this 
light to simply equate WTO dispute settlement with constitutional adjudication 
and the corresponding need to represent a broad set of values. Consequently, our 
overall impression of a specialized system focused on the appropriate represen-
tation of trade interests is strengthened.
 D Conclusion
What becomes clear from this discussion of descriptive ele-
ments is that the WTO dispute settlement system is highly centred on trade 
and the international trade regime. It may thus have a broad mandate looking at 
the WTO covered agreements, but at the same time its mandate is a function-
ally very narrow one. Other topics such as the protection of other public values 
overlap with trade and have led to substantial debate on how so-called ‘trade 
27  See e.g. W.F. Schwartz and A.O. Sykes, ‘The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolu-
tion in the World Trade Organization’ (2002) 32 Journal of Legal Studies 179; A.O. Sykes, ‘Optimal Sanc-
tions in the WTO: The Case for Decoupling (and the Uneasy Case for the Status Quo)’ in C.B. Bown and 
J. Pauwelyn (eds.), The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 346. See for contrary views J. Jackson, ‘International Law Status of 
WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to ‘Buy Out’?’ (2004) 98 American 
Journal of International Law 109.
28  See with further references J. Pauwelyn, Optimal protection of international law : navigating between Euro-
pean absolutism and American voluntarism (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
140-141. See for some controversial statements by WTO arbitrators Pauwelyn, ‘Goal of Suspending 
WTO Obligations’, 54-55.
29  Pauwelyn, ‘Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations’, 61.
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and...’ issues should ideally be resolved.30 But in these issues the WTO panels 
and Appellate Body come up against their own limits and limitations.
The problem caused by such limited rationale of the dispute settlement 
system is the incapacity to truly integrate the abovementioned non-trade 
concerns. This is coupled with the WTO’s legislative incapacity, which so far has 
proved unable to arrive at ‘positive integration’; i.e. legislative decisions which 
could reconcile competing values with trade. Consequently, the WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body operate in an environment where trade standards are 
predominantly applied.31 An implicit structural bias results from this feature, 
which renders it even more difficult to perceive the WTO dispute settlement 
system as an equivalent of constitutional review.32 This bias does not necessar-
ily operate to the overall advantage of trade and to the disadvantage of other 
interests, as the example of the development of lenient review under the ‘new 
approach’ in the subsequent section will show. However, the need perceived by 
adjudicators to engage in proportionality stricto sensu is arguably weakened if the 
goal is no full argumentative representation of all interests.
The function of international adjudicators in panels and the Appellate Body 
is thus rather that of representatives in a specialized judiciary than that of 
embedded adjudicators in a quasi-constitutional setting where they are called 
to rebalance competing values at face level. With this impression in mind, the 
next section examines possible pre-balancing solutions and the justification of 
review through panels and the Appellate Body in light of the procedural democ-
racy doctrine, as far as it can be applied to the obligations in the WTO covered 
agreements.
 III The Justification of Judicial Review in WTO Law
The debate on the justification of judicial review and the result-
ing choice of a standard of review are a thorny issue in WTO law. As the present 
section shows, the debate on the justification of judicial review is thin – certainly 
30  For one of the original contributions to the debate, see J. Dunoff, ‘The Death of the Trade Regime’ 
(1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 733.
31  T. Kleinlein, ‘Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint? The Potential of Balancing in International 
Economic Law’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1141, 1151. See also A. Paulus, ‘International Adjudication’ 
in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 215, who claims that tribunals must go beyond the ‘narrow confines of their own system’ 
to appropriately address conflicts with other values.
32  See on structural bias M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Reissue with a new epilogue) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 600 ff. See 
also M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’ (2009) 20 European Journal of 
International Law 7, 9. Sceptical on structural bias in WTO law D.H. Regan, ‘International Adjudica-
tion: A Response to Paulus – Courts, Custom, Treaties, Regimes, and the WTO’ in S. Besson and J. 
Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 238.
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because of the predominance of textual interpretation. We will first assess the 
relevant facts on the standard of review in the text of the agreements and the 
case law, before we then engage at a more conceptual level: Under the GATT, 
the question arises whether review should be perceived as justified as a form of 
virtual representation based on the procedural democracy doctrine. Examining 
the case law on national treatment as a useful example for the understanding of 
GATT by the WTO adjudicative bodies and the doctrine, we find a rather limited 
understanding of the GATT in practice. This understanding appears convincing 
in our eyes and provides a model of special interest review as a result of pre-bal-
ancing; but as is subsequently shown the WTO judiciary’s take on pre-balancing 
has led to exaggerated fear of proportionality stricto sensu and blurred case law 
in the attempt to avoid the latter at all costs. Under the TRIPS Agreement, due 
to its different rationale, the question must be phrased differently, i.e. whether 
intellectual property rights should justify intense judicial review because of 
their character as human rights.
 A  Introductory Remarks on The Standard of Review in WTO 
Dispute Settlement
The debate on the standard of review is another example of the 
incomplete contract setting in which judicial review is embedded in WTO law. 
Historically, the problem of the appropriate measure between intrusive review 
and deference for panels only started to raise attention with the increasing judi-
cial character of the dispute settlement system. Before the creation of the WTO 
only few panel reports therefore referred to the concept; and those that did did 
so without developing a clear content. During the Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions, the topic was discussed intensely for the first time, but different views 
prevented a clear codification. Some states favoured a highly deferent standard, 
while others feared for the overall consistency of WTO law if an excessively wide 
margin of appreciation were granted to WTO members by panels and the Appel-
late Body.33 As a consequence, there is no explicit provision on the matter.34
The case law has struggled with the issue of the standard of review for facts 
and decisions based upon facts.35 Article 11 DSU has been used as a fall-back 
provision, because this provision on the function of panels states that panels 
should make an ‘objective assessment of the matter’. In particular in its EC – 
Hormones report the Appellate Body stated that neither de novo review nor total 
deference to national authorities’ determinations were required, but something 
33  Zleptnig, 429-430.
34  With the exception of Art. 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement which provides for a highly deferent 
standard of review.
35  Matters proved easier for the standard of review of the law. As a 2003 study has remarked, panels and 
the Appellate Body consistently engaged in full de novo review, i.e. following the principle of iura novit 
curia, see M. Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 237.
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in between.36 In assessing factual determinations by national authorities, panels 
are thus called according to the case law to verify whether all relevant evidence 
has been examined and where there is an adequate explanation of how the 
evidence supports the determinations made.37
The Appellate Body continued in the Hormones case that the standard of 
review must reflect the balance between those jurisdictional competences that 
WTO members conceded and those they decided to retain for themselves.38 The 
language reveals a very contractual vision of the WTO as an intergovernmental 
organisation, which also impacts on the judicial system established in its frame-
work. Case law on the institutional balance within the WTO has also refrained 
from truly addressing the issue.39
In conclusion, there is no thorough deference by panels and the Appellate 
Body. Yet the background of the chosen standard of review is hardly openly 
discussed, despite the vagueness of the underlying legal provisions of the DSU. 
Panels and the Appellate Body have not engaged in a more in-depth discussion 
of the institutional balance and competences and their distribution between the 
WTO’s judicial branch and the members. Neither does there seem to be much 
discussion, on the whole, on elements of procedural democracy as the underly-
ing justification for judicial review. This silence is most likely to be explained 
by the incomplete institutional system of the WTO, which cannot easily be 
explained in the same terms as the classic triangle of legislative, executive and 
judicial powers. Rather, it continues to correspond, to a substantial extent, to a 
contractual and intergovernmental setting.40
 B  A Rights-Based Conception of the GATT as the 
Justification for Judicial Review
As discussed, the case law also does not engage in detail in 
discussing the strength of its justification of judicial review based on ‘rights’ 
that it should protect. Subsequently, we show that there are two competing 
perceptions of how the GATT – which is at the centre of the debate as the ‘oldest’ 
agreement – can be read: either as enshrining traders’ rights or rather as a more 
limited set of obligations for WTO members. While we do not find the first 
perspective wholly convincing, there is another level at which the justification of 
judicial review also seems to play a role: In the case law under Article XX, which 
is examined in much more detail in the following section.
36  EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) AB-1997-4, WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/
DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, para 117.
37  Guohua, Mercurio and Yongjie, 126-127.
38  EC – Hormones (Appellate Body report), para 115.
39  See on such case law P. Mavroidis, ‘Article 11 DSU’ in R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll and K. Kaiser (eds.), WTO 
– Institutions and Dispute Settlement (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 398 paras 27 ff.
40  Oesch, 241.
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 i. The controversy on a right to trade under the GATT
Most prominently, Petersmann has suggested reading trade 
law in the light of a right to trade given to individuals.41 In his later writings, he 
combined this right to trade with human rights42 without necessarily clarifying 
the consequences or compatibility of this reading with the intergovernmental 
structure of the WTO and its dispute settlement system. The vision is strongly 
influenced by economic views on the welfare gains from trade liberalisation43 
and links up well with the market-access-based view of the GATT as an instru-
ment of strong liberalisation.
As in the case of the Dormant Commerce Clause in United States constitu-
tional law44 as well as in European Union internal market law,45 Regan opposes 
such rights-based views as far as they lead to intrusive judicial review with the 
use of balancing or proportionality analysis. In his view, a reading of the GATT 
as defending a right to trade or even an abstract value of trade is misleading, 
because it suggests as a consequence an act of balancing trade against other 
public interests, while the overall project according to Regan is never about 
competing interests in the first place. Instead, the aim in economic terms is to 
reach efficient outcomes, which are best achieved through local adjustments 
of the market mechanism by public regulation. These adjustments must be 
checked as to whether they improve the overall efficiency of exchanges.46 Instead 
of ‘virtual representation’ through judicial review and proportionality analysis, a 
more limited reading of the GATT should thus be adopted.
Again, Regan’s criticism is convincing on the whole, although the full exclu-
sion of proportionality stricto sensu seems unwarranted for limited cases where 
a misrepresentation of values based on a true failure of the democratic process 
can indeed be shown before a panel.
As the subsequent discussion of national treatment as the cardinal obligation 
under the GATT demonstrates, the case law also tends to support a more limited 
reading of the agreement. Recent case law does not take up a rights-based read-
ing of GATT either, even though good opportunities have presented themselves. 
In the recent China – Publications case, the Chinese Protocol of Accession 
41  See generally E.-U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International 
Economic Law: International and Domestic Foreign Trade Law and Foreign Trade Policy in the United States, 
the European Community and Switzerland (Fribourg: Fribourg University Press, 1991).
42  E.-U. Petersmann, ‘Human Rights and International Economic Law in the Twenty First Century’ (2001) 
4 Journal of International Economic Law 3.
43  Cass, Constitutionalization, 167 ff.
44  See chapter 4 section III.B.ii.
45  See chapter 6 section III.C.iii.
46  D.H. Regan, ‘Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade within a Federal or Quasi-Federal 
System: Protectionism and Balancing, “Da Capo”’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1853, 1862-1863. See 
for the WTO context D.H. Regan, ‘The meaning of ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article 
XIV: the myth of cost-benefit balancing’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 347.
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contains the phrase ‘China’s right to regulate trade’. The Appellate Body held 
that it saw ‘the “right to regulate”, in the abstract, as an inherent power enjoyed 
by a Member’s government’.47 Discussing the limits of this right to regulate, the 
Appellate Body then opposed, however, not a right to trade, but stated that the 
WTO Agreements ‘operate to [...] discipline the exercise of each Member’s inher-
ent power to regulate by requiring WTO Members to comply with the obliga-
tions that they have assumed thereunder’.48 Therefore, no balancing of compet-
ing rights seemed to emerge in the Appellate Body’s view. In interpreting the 
preamble of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body identified a ‘balance’ 
between a ‘recognition of Members’ right to regulate’ and a ‘desire to avoid creat-
ing unnecessary obstacles to international trade’ similar to the balance estab-
lished between the national treatment obligation and the general exceptions of 
Article XX under GATT 1994.49 Again, a ‘right’ is balanced against a ‘desire’, 
and not another right.
 ii.  Adapting the standard of review based on the values at 
stake
It is in the light of this refusal to grant a rights-structure to 
GATT that we can understand the silence on the standard of review. However, 
we can observe some adaptation of the standard of review based on the values at 
issue, as the procedural democracy doctrine would suggest. Unfortunately, this 
‘new approach’ is not a very transparent and predictable judicial creation.
This ‘new approach’ comes down to a particular reading of case law on Arti-
cle XX’s ‘necessary’ condition noted by scholars. The ‘weighing and balancing’ 
test which is discussed subsequently in more detail uses the relative importance 
of values as one factor; but it does so here not so much to weigh competing 
values, but rather to adapt the standard of scrutiny.50 The more important the 
value pursued by a WTO member’s regulation, the more deferent the scrutiny 
of the WTO judiciary would thus be, both concerning the first stage of weigh-
ing and balancing and the second stage of comparing a measure to alterna-
tives. This helps to explain the light-handed approach in particular in cases of 
measures pursuing goals of environmental protection. As the classic example, 
the decision in Brazil – Tyres has thus been welcomed as a more comprehensive, 
regulator-friendly assessment of measures of environmental policy which aims 
47  China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audio-
visual Entertainment Products AB-2009-3, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 December 2009, para 222.
48  Ibid., para 222.
49  United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes AB-2012-1, WT/DS406/
AB/R, 24 April 2012, para 96.
50  See in particular E. Vranes, Trade and the Environment – Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO 
Law, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 274-275. See also D.A. Osiro, ‘GATT/
WTO Necessity Analysis: Evolutionary Interpretation and Its Impact on the Autonomy of Domestic 
Regulation’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 123, 135.
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to identify problematic protectionist features, but maintains a fairly deferent 
standard of review.51
 iii Conclusion
Summing up, panels and the Appellate Body have not given a 
rights reading to GATT. They have remained deplorably silent on the issue of 
justification of judicial review. Under the ‘new approach’, panels and the Appel-
late Body adapt the intensity of scrutiny to the values at issue – comparable to 
some extent to the margin of appreciation doctrine under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, judicial reason-
ing on this tendency remains scarce. Subsequently, we explore in more detail 
what alternative reading to the right-to-trade approach has effectively been taken 
by panels and the Appellate Body. A disconcerting tendency to put literal inter-
pretation over conceptual sequencing of legal test becomes visible. Literalism 
can somewhat be explained by the contractual setting of WTO dispute settle-
ment we have observed, but is nonetheless incapable of justifying the resulting 
fragmented approach.
 C National Treatment under the GATT
The national treatment obligation is the central pillar of the 
GATT. Its concrete interpretation determines how the GATT operates, and the 
scope of its obligations imposed on WTO members. Article III GATT has been 
subject to a very literal interpretation, which does not adopt a rights-based read-
ing, but also does not accord sufficient attention to a logical sequence of legal 
tests for trade-restrictive measures which would appropriately accommodate all 
competing interests. This point is illustrated by the relationship with Article XX, 
which is examined in detail in the subsequent sections. The rigidity of the case 
law simultaneously seems to exclude any closer reflection on an appropriate jus-
tification of judicial review and on an appropriate use of proportionality analysis.
Read in its context, Article III GATT is in a rule-exception relationship 
with Article XX GATT, which sets out the general exceptions. The more rigid 
a reading of Article III GATT is adopted, the more regulatory policies of WTO 
members with an impact on trade and competitive conditions must be justified 
under Article XX GATT. By contrast, adopting a broader test under Article III 
GATT taking into account cases of regulatory reasons for apparent discrimina-
tion reduces the pressure on Article XX. This relationship has received most 
of the attention of panels and the Appellate Body, while the literal approach to 
51  See e.g. G. Van Calster, ‘Faites Vos Jeux – Regulatory Autonomy and the World Trade Organization 
after Brazil – Tyres’ (2008) 20 Journal of Environmental Law 121, 130. As a positive development, the less 
intrusive scrutiny proposed by the ‘new approach’ under the ‘necessary’ requirement of Article XX has 
also considerably reduced the problem of hierarchy between review under Article XX’s sub-paragraphs 
featuring ‘necessary’ and Article XX (g) featuring ‘relating to’, see Vranes, 282.
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interpretation has prevented much thinking as to whether legal tests such as 
those under Article III GATT should be applied with a view to appropriately 
representing competing values based on the justification of judicial review.
 i. The rationale of GATT
GATT was concluded as a trade agreement. To explain the 
different interpretations of GATT, one must begin with the fundamental ques-
tion: Why do states conclude trade agreements in the first place? The two main 
opposing views of GATT are best understood by considering the different eco-
nomic theories underlying the discussion on this topic.
Some suggest thus that trade agreements are concluded by states to avoid 
a prisoner’s dilemma if several large states begin manipulating the terms of 
trade, e.g. by adopting a revenue-gaining strategy of imposing optimal tariffs.52 
Others reject the terms of trade story and argue that the avoidance of protec-
tionism and ‘irrational’ regulation is the purpose of trade agreements.53 Some 
scholars argue that the main interest for governments may be to gain support 
from domestic interest groups by trade agreements which are advantageous for 
the these groups.54 By contrast, other evidence seems to support the views that 
trade agreements are concluded to strengthen governments’ resistance against 
domestic pressure groups.55 A last stream of scholars argues that trade reduces 
conflict and that it is therefore foreign policy considerations that motivate the 
conclusion of trade agreements.56 The most convincing explanation may in fact 
be a combination of several or all of the theories mentioned above rather than 
one predominant one.57
Against this background of competing policy considerations that gave rise 
to the GATT, it is understandable that there has been some difficulty in defin-
52  See e.g. K. Bagwell and R.W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2002), 13.
53  D.H. Regan, ‘What Are Trade Agreements For? – Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, With a 
Lesson for Lawyers’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 951, 963 and 968.
54  G.M. Grossman and E. Helpman, ‘Protection for Sale’ (1994) 84 The American Economic Review 833, 
834-835.
55  G. Maggi and A. Rodríguez-Clare, ‘A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements’ (2007) 97 The 
American Economic Review 1374, 1377.
56  S.W. Polachek, ‘Conflict and Trade’ (1980) 24 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, 56. Newer research, 
however, casts doubt on this explanation, as there seems to be no obvious connection between trade and 
conflict, see R. Glick and A.M. Taylor, ‘Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact 
of War’ (2010) 92 Review of Economics and Statistics 102, 112. Other authors suggest that the conflict-
reducing effect of trade is limited to bilateral, not multilateral trade, see P. Martin, T. Mayer and M. 
Thoenig, ‘Make Trade Not War?’ (2008) 75 Review of Economic Studies 865, 894.
57  D. Irwin, P Mavroidis and AO Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 200.
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ing what exactly the GATT should tackle as a concern, and consequently how its 
obligations should be interpreted.58 Two main readings can be distinguished.
Some read GATT as a promise of reciprocal market access. This view would 
correspond largely to the rights-based reading we have encountered in the previ-
ous section. WTO members have thus granted each other certain conditions 
of competition which products face at importation and which should not be 
disturbed. In other words, products have a ‘right of access’ to another member’s 
market.59 For all measures concerned by the GATT, be they tariffs, taxes or 
regulatory treatment, the emphasis lies on the competitive relationship between 
products and an effects-based view of protectionism. Article III GATT on 
national treatment would thus examine only whether different treatment exists 
in the presence of a competitive relationship between products and would cast 
its net of prohibition widely.60 The regulatory intention behind trade restrictive 
measures should be reviewed only later at the stage of the general exceptions 
enshrined in Article XX.61
Competing voices, however, cast doubt on the market access reading of the 
GATT. A more reduced reading of the GATT suggests that it merely constitutes 
an incomplete contract which contains a pledge of non-discriminatory treatment 
of imported products.62 Instead of granting a right to trade or to market access, 
WTO members have agreed to a binding of tariffs and a prohibition of discrimi-
nation in the field of taxes and regulation, but left domestic policies unbound 
to the widest extent.63 In the assessment of what is prohibited, econometric 
assessments of the competitive relationship between products play a role, but so 
does the regulatory intent of WTO members which can be a reason for its own 
for measures with an effect on trade. As a consequence, the general exceptions 
of Article XX become less important in such a reading of the GATT because 
the trade-off between a public purpose pursued by regulation and its trade-
restrictive effect can take place as part of the earlier analysis of whether a GATT 
violation has occurred in the first place.
These competing views become more visible with the example of how 
national treatment has been interpreted by the WTO judiciary and discussed in 
58  See on this point K.N. Schefer, ‘Dancing with the Devil: A Heretic’s View of Protectionism in the WTO 
Legal System’ (2009) 4 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 423.
59  This term is used by R. Howse and D. Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 249, 257.
60  See e.g. Vranes, 191-193.
61  The latter then ought to be interpreted more broadly, see Ibid., 214-215 footnote 146.
62  For an exploration of the idea of GATT as an incomplete contract see H. Horn and P.C. Mavroidis, ‘Still 
Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law on 
Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 39, 53-54.
63  This also means that a number of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies remain possible, as P. Mavroidis, 
Trade in Goods – The GATT and the Other Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 215 footnote 56, demonstrates.
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the doctrine. Only the second interpretation allows national treatment to operate 
as a legal test also representing non-trade interests.
 ii.  The debate on the national treatment standard in the case 
law under Article III GATT
Article III GATT lays down an obligation of national treatment 
for internal taxes and charges as well as for regulation in its paragraphs 2 and 4. 
In its first paragraph, the general purpose of avoiding the use of such measures 
‘so as to afford protection to domestic production’ is set out. Panels and the 
Appellate Body have subsequently embarked on a very literal reading of the pro-
vision and developed a test of discrimination based on the effects of a measure 
on the competitive relationship between products, while in the doctrine several 
voices have argued that the anti-protectionist rationale of Article III requires that 
regulatory aims be taken into account as well.64
The debate has first centred on the identification of what constitutes ‘like 
products’. Based on a GATT 1947 document, the Border Tax Adjustment Report,65 
the Appellate Body introduced an effects-based reading of Article III in the early 
days of the WTO, rejecting all consideration of regulatory purpose.66
While economists have already questioned the criteria for the assessment of 
competitive relationship between products,67 the case law has in some instances 
permitted regulatory purpose as playing a role in the assessment of whether two 
products are like.68 This has led some scholars to advocate an ‘aim and effects’ 
test69 which was already used by panels in the GATT 1947 days.70 Some even 
64  See for a more extensive discussion of the complex structure of Article III and suggestions for an alter-
native interpretation to the current one D.H. Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose and “Like Products” in Article 
III:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article III:2)’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 443, 476.
65  Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments L/3464, BISD 18S/99, 20 November 1970.
66  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages AB-1996-2, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R and WT/DS11/AB/R, 
4 October 1996, p. 22-23. See also European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribu-
tion of Bananas AB-1997-3, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997, paras 215-216.
67  See e.g. D.J. Neven, ‘How should “protection” be evaluated in Art. III GATT disputes?’ (2000) 15 HEC 
Lausanne cahiers de recherches économiques 1, 18, or Horn and Mavroidis, 62-63.
68  See Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages AB-1999-6, WT/DS110/AB/R and WT/DS87/AB/R, 13 Decem-
ber 1999, paras 71-72.
69  See the well-known essay R.E. Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for 
an Aim and Effects Test’ (1998) 32 International Lawyer 619 ; see also F. Roessler, ‘Beyond the Ostensi-
ble – A Tribute to Professor Robert Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of the Likeness of Products 
Under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2003) 37 
Journal of World Trade 771, 778, and A. Porges and J.P. Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regula-
tion: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 783, 785.
70  United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages DS23/R, BISD 39S/206 (panel report 
adopted on 19 June 1992), para 5.25; United States – Taxes on Automobiles DS31/R (panel report from 11 
October 1994, not adopted), para 5.8.
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suggested installing a legal test at the level of the inquiry into the likeness of 
products: a state should show under a necessity test whether the identification of 
two products as like was the least trade-restrictive measure.71
While the more flexible likeness analysis in the later case of EC – Asbestos72 
was welcomed by some,73 the fundamentally economic approach to likeness also 
continued to prevail in this case. Attention shifted to the second stage of the 
national treatment analysis. If likeness was the ‘fishing net’, the criterion of ‘so 
as to afford protection’ should be the means of assessing the catch.74 A finding of 
likeness does not yet mean that a measure falls under the prohibition of Article 
III, because there still has to be a finding of less favourable treatment.75 Such 
treatment can be identified either by comparing whether any imports receive 
less favourable treatment than any like domestic products or by comparing 
aggregated groups of imported and domestic products.76 Recent scholarship has 
suggested that the choice of the concrete test should depend on the degree of the 
competitive relationship between the products at issue.77
Next to the substantive test under less favourable treatment, however, some 
have suggested that regulatory intent could be more usefully integrated at this 
second stage than at the first stage of likeness. The case law has hinted at this 
possibility.78 Less favourable treatment could thus be justified by bringing 
forward a public policy objective and demonstrating a link between the two. 
71  See G. Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement – Adjudicating the Boundaries of Regu-
latory Autonomy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002).
72  European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products AB-2000-11, WT/
DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001, paras 117-118.
73  R. Howse and E. Tuerk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations – A Case Study of the Canada-EC 
Asbestos Dispute’ in G. De Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), The EU and the WTO – Legal and Constitutional 
Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 304, have tried to explain the Appellate Body’s decision as an 
attempt to address two constituencies, free traders as well as advocates of other interests.
74  Horn and Mavroidis, 60.
75  As the Appellate Body also famously underlined in EC – Asbestos (Appellate Body report), para 100.
76  L. Ehring, ‘De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law – National and Most Favoured Nation Treat-
ment – or Equal Treatment?’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 921, 924-925, refers to ‘diagonal’ and 
‘asymmetric impact’ tests. See also O.K. Fauchald, ‘Flexibility and Predictability under the World Trade 
Organization’s Non-Discrimination Clauses’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 443, 467.
77  N. Diebold, ‘Non-Discrimination and the Pillars of International Economic Law – Comparative Analysis 
and Building Coherency’ (2010) 24 Society of International Economic Law Online Proceedings Working 
Paper 1, 18-19.
78  In Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes AB-2005-3, 
WT/DS302/AB/R, 25 April 2005, para 96, the Appellate Body held that less favourable treatment was 
not established if a modification of competitive conditions could be explained by factors ‘unrelated to the 
foreign origin of the product’.
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Parallels to the test under Article XX have been drawn, as the latter provision 
would practically become redundant in such a case.79
On the whole, however, the case law remains inconclusive. No broad rights-
based reading has been adopted, but the test of likeness continues to empha-
size competition, and regulatory intent has not been accommodated in a solid 
manner at any level. Despite the intense debate on how to ensure appropriate 
representation of competing values, the appropriate standard of review or the 
use of proportionality analysis have not received sufficient attention in the case 
law.
 iii. Conclusion
The discussion of national treatment has shown that there 
are inherent tensions underlying the interpretation of the GATT. The dispute 
between a market-access-based view and a less far-reaching anti-protectionism 
reading has led to an incoherent, over-textual interpretation based on a barely 
coherent insistence on certain product criteria for the assessment of likeness. 
The new focus on less favourable treatment has yet to show whether it can 
produce a more convincing rationale for the national treatment test. In sum, 
thus far the opportunity to develop a comprehensive test with a logical sequence 
allowing for an appropriate representation of the competing values has not been 
made use of. Textualism and ad-hoc decision-making have prevailed. It is in the 
light of the competition-based reading of Article III GATT that the burden of 
analysis is placed on Article XX GATT. As has been shown, some adaptation of 
the standard of review has taken place in the case law under the latter provision. 
Still, the very blurry ‘weighing and balancing’ test developed under Article XX 
GATT is to no small extent caused by the unsatisfactory solution found under 
Article III GATT, which again goes back to an unwillingness to engage in con-
ceptual debates on the justification of judicial review in the case law.
Most of the WTO covered agreements could be described by and large as 
following the logic of GATT, setting out in more detail specific aspects of trade 
obligations. A different case is presented by the TRIPS Agreement. Conse-
quently, it merits treatment apart as to the justification of judicial review under 
its provisions.
 D  The TRIPS Agreement and the Problem of Intellectual 
Property Rights as Human Rights
The TRIPS Agreement generally operates in a different manner 
from GATT and GATS. It substantially pursues three objectives: to expand a 
minimum standard of intellectual property protection throughout the WTO 
79  J. Pauwelyn, ‘Comment: The unbearable lightness of likeness’ in M. Panizzon, N. Pohl and P. Sauvé 
(eds.), GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 368.
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membership, to strengthen the domestic enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and to facilitate international dispute settlement by subjecting the TRIPS 
obligations to WTO dispute settlement.80 The Agreement thus incorporates sub-
stantive standards for the protection of a number of intellectual property rights, 
including copyrights, trademarks and patents.
Against the background of the above analysis of the GATT, one could argue 
at this point that TRIPS is, to a far greater degree than GATT, concerned with 
the rights of individuals, as it protects intellectual property rights, which can 
be compared to property rights. The case law has not discussed the matter to 
date. Yet, the equation of intellectual property rights with human rights is not as 
straightforward as a first look may suggest.
Article 15 (1) of the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, for example, enshrines the right of everyone ‘to 
benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author’, 
but in parallel ‘to take part in cultural life’ and ‘to enjoy the benefits of scien-
tific progress and its applications’. Intellectual property rights regimes are thus 
not to be understood as an end in themselves, but as incorporating a balance 
between the rights of inventors and creators and the interests of the wider soci-
ety.81
The equation is even more strongly qualified in the General Comments 
on the Covenant, where human rights are seen as fundamental, inalienable 
and universal entitlements inherent in the human person as such. In contrast, 
intellectual property rights as enshrined in legal regimes are considered first 
and foremost as means of temporary protection by which States aim to provide 
incentives for invention, strengthen the distribution of creative productions and 
further the development of cultural identities for the benefit of society at large. 
They can be allocated, traded, limited and forfeited and generally serve to protect 
business and corporate interests and investments.82 Yet, to understand them as 
equal to human rights neglects their substantially instrumental character.83
In the light of such arguments, to our mind there is no specifically strong 
justification for intrusive review. Based on the procedural democracy doctrine, 
one would have to argue first why the protection of a specific codification of 
property rights merits special protection through intrusive judicial review.
80  J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Dog That Barked But Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the 
WTO’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 389, 391.
81  See in more detail D. Matthews, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and the Right to Health’ 
in W. Grosheide (ed.) Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2011), 122.
82  Ibid., 124.
83  See also for the case of the ‘right’ to patents claimed by some academics J. Brinkhof, ‘On Patents and 
Human Rights’ in W. Grosheide (ed.) Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2011), 153.
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 E Conclusion
Summing up, the procedural democracy justification of judicial 
review is poorly discussed in WTO law, as is the standard of review in general. 
The rather weak institutional balance in the WTO is perhaps the most central 
reason. But at the same time, there continues to be debate on the extent to which 
the GATT should be read as a rights-instrument in the first place. The case law 
has not embraced such a reading, but understands the GATT more literally as 
an ensemble of obligations. Under the TRIPS Agreement, what is protected are 
aspects of property rights. Still, the human rights similarity arguably does not 
lead to a strong claim for intrusive judicial review, because intellectual property 
rights as in the TRIPS Agreement themselves only enshrine a special codifica-
tion of a previous balancing exercise between public and private interests.
In our view, pre-balancing would yield a result somewhere close to a model 
of special interest review. To some extent, comparisons to EU law on the internal 
market are useful: Panels and the Appellate Body have never accepted the rights-
based reading that has become common-place for internal market freedoms in 
EU law. Instead, the GATT has been understood as an incomplete contract based 
on a variety of policy goals it is designed to achieve. While in principle this 
solution is convincing, the result of such inconclusiveness combined with the 
fear of being accused of judicial activism as an international adjudicative body 
in a contractual setting has led the WTO adjudicative instances to adhere to a 
very literal interpretation of the provisions of GATT. The example of national 
treatment as enshrined in Article III GATT shows that the result is a number of 
legal tests whose conceptual justification and logic of sequence is not sufficiently 
taken into account. Examining the case law under Article XX GATT and similar 
provisions, we thus discover a remarkable fear of engaging openly in proportion-
ality analysis, which leads to the adoption of the blurred ‘weighing and balanc-
ing’ test whose true content is virtually impossible to discern. Some inspiration 
from the CJEU has been found in the case of the ‘new approach’, which adapts 
the standard of review based on the values at issue like the CJEU has done in 
cases on environmental protection. However, judicial reasoning lacks transpar-
ency to a similar extent in both cases.
 IV  ‘Weighing and Balancing’ and Similar Necessity-Based 
Tests in WTO Law
A number of tests close to proportionality analysis can be 
observed under various WTO covered agreements. While the exceptions under 
the TRIPS Agreement function according to their own logic and are discussed 
separately, there are some common threads that link the tests in GATT, the 
TBT and the SPS Agreement. Starting with the ‘weighing and balancing’ test 
developed under Article XX GATT, we observe that the literal reading given to 
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the GATT provisions by panels and the Appellate Body has led to rather isolated 
single steps of analysis. In the case of Article XX, a logical sequence with Article 
III GATT on national treatment is missing, as is a truly logical distinction for 
the separate tests adopted under sub-paragraphs of Article XX and the chapeau 
of Article XX. The ‘weighing and balancing’ test itself is a remarkable combina-
tion of references to balancing and a prevailing abhorrence of proportionality 
stricto sensu, which overshadows the actual necessity test that seems to do most 
of the work. A similar, though slightly different picture emerges under Article 
2.2 TBT, which in its phrasing leaves some doubt as to whether it enshrines full-
scale proportionality analysis. By contrast, Article 5.6 SPS Agreement prescribes 
a necessity test in its wording and has been interpreted according to this feature. 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, the case law has focused on a literal reading of 
the exceptions provisions, while the doctrine has suggested legal tests closer to 
balancing, in particular to take into account the objectives of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Having identified the WTO legal regime as following the model of special 
interest review, we suggest that there is a good case to generally avoid propor-
tionality stricto sensu except in some very specific cases. However, the avoid-
ance of this test in the case law has actually led to the emergence of a virtually 
incomprehensible legal test, which causes great costs in terms of predictability 
and legal certainty.
 A Article XX GATT and Article XIV GATS
While assessing Article XX GATT, we also consider Article XIV 
GATS as a similarly structured provision on general exceptions. After an initial 
assessment of Article XX GATT, the conceptual similarity of both provisions is 
thus briefly shown in order to justify why they can be examined together. Turn-
ing to the concrete examination of the various tests operating under Article XX, 
the structure of the provision combined with literal interpretation has led to the 
emergence of several legal tests. Most prominently, under the condition of mea-
sures that must be ‘necessary’ to achieve a public interest, the ‘weighing and bal-
ancing’ test has emerged. Under a different sub-paragraph, however, the term 
of measures ‘relating to’ a public interest objective has been subject to a diffe-
rent reading. To complicate matters further, the introductory phrase to Article 
XX GATT, the chapeau, has also received an interpretation that at some points 
seems to carry some of the burden of the situation of value conflict. While this 
categorisation has led to solutions that are not always convincing, it should also 
be noted that it has not led to similarly fragmented results as compared e.g. to 
United States constitutional law. While in the latter, the categorisation leads to 
different results, as has been shown with the example of extraterritorial mea-
sures and the difficulty of their justification under strict review, in WTO law the 
Appellate Body has loosened older categorical distinctions. Process and produc-
tion methods as well as measures with extraterritorial effect are no longer found 
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to be in violation of WTO law as such, but only subject to the usual judicial 
scrutiny.
 i. Article XX GATT
Article XX found its way into the GATT based on some precur-
sor provisions in earlier international treaty law. In the 1920s, the short-lived 
Convention on the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restric-
tions already contained a clause of general exceptions to the prohibition of trade 
restrictions.84 The clause allowed certain measures for the pursuit of a number 
of listed public policy objectives and included an introductory clause prohibit-
ing such measures’ being applied in a manner which could constitute ‘arbitrary 
discrimination’ or a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’. More permis-
sively, a similar clause in two trade agreements concluded by the United States 
with Mexico and Uruguay, stated that ‘[n]othing’ in the agreement should be 
construed to prevent the adoption of such measures.85
The lengthy negotiation process of the GATT 1947 eventually produced a text 
mixing elements from both precursors86 which reads in its most relevant parts:
Article XX: General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
necessary to protect public morals;
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
[...]
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, [...] the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the 
prevention of deceptive practices;
[...]
[...]
84  See article 4 of the Convention, ‘Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and 
Restrictions’ (1931) 25 The American Journal of International Law 121. On the Convention’s failure see 
Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes, 162 footnote 309.
85  See J.H. Jackson, ‘The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law’ (1967) 
66 Michigan Law Review 249, 314, and S. Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in 
GATT Article XX ‘ (1991) 25 Journal of World Trade 37, 43.
86  The chapeau was inserted on particular insistence by the British delegation. See generally for a concise 
overview of the drafting process and the emergence of Article XX GATT Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes, 99 
ff. and 163.
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relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption;
[...]
The GATT 1947 panels and the WTO adjudicative bodies thus found them-
selves faced with the challenge of interpreting the conflict between the values 
enshrined in the provision and the trade disciplines imposed by the GATT itself. 
The terms ‘necessary’ enshrined in particular in paragraphs a, b and d and the 
term ‘relating to’ enshrined in paragraph g became the stage for the develop-
ment of legal tests.
Two problems have continuously troubled the application of Article XX 
GATT. Conceptually, the creation of such a limited number of grounds to depart 
from the WTO trade obligations proves problematic in pursuing the manifold 
objectives of the modern regulatory state which may in many cases have an 
effect on trade.87 The refusal to consider regulatory purpose in any way under 
the national treatment analysis has put even more weight on the interpretation 
Article XX GATT.
As a second aspect, the WTO adjudicative bodies have opted for a highly text-
based method of interpretation which entails conceptual problems in terms of 
sequencing the analysis.88
A broad interpretation of the various public policy headings of Article XX 
GATT has managed to maintain a margin of manoeuvre for WTO members to 
date. Under Article XX (a), measures to pursue public morals could be justi-
fied in principle based on a fairly broad, country-by-country definition of the 
concept of public morals.89 Some more contentious suggestions have, however, 
not yet been approved in the case law, such as the potential to justify measures 
87  See concisely Mavroidis, Trade in Goods, 254.
88  For a critique and some examples of this overemphasis on textual interpretation see P. Mavroidis, ‘No 
Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 421, 470 ff.
89  See United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services WT/
DS285/R, 10 November 2004, paras 6.461 ff. and China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products WT/DS363/R, 12 
August 2009, para 7.759. See also M. Krajewski, ‘Playing by the Rules of the Game? – Specific Commit-
ments after US – Gambling and Betting and the Current GATS Negotiations WTO Appellate Body 
report, 20 April 2005, WT/DS258/AB/R, ‘United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services’’ (2005) 32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 417, 440, and more 
sceptical of an overly interpretation of public morals N. Diebold, ‘The Morals and Order Exceptions in 
WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the Undermining Mole’ (2007) 11 Journal of International 
Economic Law 43, 51.
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to protect human rights90 or animal welfare91 in an extraterritorial manner, e.g. 
via the introduction of import bans. Article XX (b) has served to accommodate a 
broad range of public health and environmental policies.92 Under Article XX (d), 
regulatory objectives such as the collection of taxes, consumer protection or the 
combat of smuggling and money-laundering have been accepted.93 Article XX 
(g) has been broadly interpreted both as to its wording94 and using other interna-
tional law as evidence95 to suggest that a number of measures of environmental 
conservation policy could be justified.
But the example of the case law on the chapeau demonstrates that other 
conceptual difficulties result from a strict adherence to the text of a less than 
perfectly drafted provision. In addition, the overlap between the two environ-
mental exceptions has led to ‘policy heading shopping’ because of the more leni-
ent test developed under Article XX (g), as is subsequently shown.
 ii. Article XIV GATS
Article XIV GATS follows the model of Article XX GATT as a 
provision for general exceptions. It assembles substantially the same grounds 
of exception, although in a different order and leaving aside measures for the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, unlike Article XX (g) GATT. Fur-
thermore, Article XIV (a) GATS provides justification for measures necessary 
to protect public morals or to maintain public order, thereby drawing a wider 
circle than the mere protection of public morals set out in Article XX (a) GATT. 
However, a footnote is included to avoid an overextension of Article XIV (a) 
GATS which refers to a formula developed initially by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for restrictions on the free movement of workers:96 measures to 
90  S. Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception in Trade Policy’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 
689, 742.
91  E.M. Thomas, ‘Playing Chicken at the WTO: Defending an Animal-Welfare Based Trade Restriction 
under GATT’s Moral Exception’ (2007) 34 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 605, 625. See 
also more recently P.L. Fitzgerald, ‘“Morality” May Not Be Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: 
Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 
85, 123.
92  See the various cases discussed subsequently in section IV.A.iii.
93  See, respectively, United States – Malt Beverages, para 5.42; Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef WT/DS161/R and WT/DS169/R, 31 July 2000, para 6.58; and Colombia – Indica-
tive Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry Report of the Panel, WT/DS366/R, 27 April 2009, para 
7.498.
94  United States – Automobile Taxes, para 5.57; United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996, paras 6.36-6.37.
95  United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products AB-1998-4, WT/DS58/AB/R, 
12 October 1998, paras 129-132.
96  Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, para 35.
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maintain public order are acceptable only if a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society’.97
Generally, panels and the Appellate Body have accepted a conceptually simi-
lar interpretation of Article XIV GATS and Article XX GATT.98 This appears 
reasonable, as structurally they are also similar and pose the same interpretative 
challenges, taking into account the differences noted above.
 iii.  The ‘weighing and balancing’ test for measures 
‘necessary’ to achieve a public interest
The legal test under the various sub-paragraphs requiring 
measures to be ‘necessary’ to achieve a public interest substantially developed 
in various phases: In an early period, an informal way of assessing the facts was 
transformed into a more formalized legal test. Later, in the WTO case law the 
landmark ruling in the Korea – Beef case reformulated the test and led to contro-
versial understandings. The subsequent case law has taken up and applied the 
Korea – Beef test. To this date, however, the test remains somewhat blurry and 
unpredictable as to its operation.
a. The restrictive necessity test of the GATT 1947 era
Generally, the law under Article XX during the GATT 1947 era has been 
described as the construction of a virtually ‘impossible’ threshold for domestic 
regulatory measures.99 After some cases of rather vague application of a test 
resembling necessity,100 the test of the GATT 1947 was clearly spelled out in 
United States – Section 337. Noting the disagreement of the parties on whether 
there was a requirement to use ‘the least trade restrictive measure available’,101 
the panel held that justification of a measure as necessary was not open to a 
party if another GATT-consistent alternative was open to the party. If no GATT-
consistent measure was reasonably available, the measure entailing the least 
degree of inconsistency had to be chosen, but a change of the desired level of 
97  Footnote 5 to Article XIV GATS. P. Delimatsis, ‘Protecting Public Morals in a Digital Age: Revisiting 
the New WTO Rulings on United States – Gambling and China – Publications and Audiovisual Products’ 
(2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 257, 277, warns of the catch-all potential the phrase 
could otherwise have achieved.
98  See in particular United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services AB-2005-1, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005, para 291.
99  I. Venzke, ‘Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX GATT into 
Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1111, 1116.
100  See United States – Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies L/5333, BISD 30S/107 (panel report 
adopted on 26 May 1983), para 58; Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act L/5504, 
BISD 30S/140 (panel report adopted on 7 February 1984), para 5.20.
101  United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 L/6439, BISD 36S/345 (panel report adopted on 7 
November 1989), para 5.25.
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protection was not required.102 In practice the degree of inconsistency proved to 
be a difficult benchmark which effectively boiled down to an assessment of trade 
effect, although the panel did not state so nor gave indications as to how the 
assessment of inconsistency should take place. Despite the terminology which 
resembles a test of necessity, the panel did not in fact pay much attention to 
the level of enforcement and to the implementation of alternatives.103 Concerns 
were aggravated by the subsequent ruling in the first case opposing trade and 
health under Article XX(b), when the panel in Thailand – Cigarettes used the test 
from United States – Section 337 to strike down rather crude trade restrictions to 
impose less trade-restrictive but more costly alternatives without truly examin-
ing whether a developing country such as Thailand could afford such policies, 
i.e. whether they were reasonably available.104 Later case law has not added much 
to these findings.105 The test has, however, consistently been applied in the 
same manner without regard to the concrete public interest opposed to trade 
at stake.106 It has rightly been criticized as showing a strong bias in favour of 
trade.107
b.  The new ‘weighing and balancing’ test introduced in Korea – Beef
The second phase of case law after the emergence of the WTO law brought 
forth a new test. Aiming for a more literal reading, in the landmark case Korea – 
Beef the Appellate Body put the term ‘necessary’ on a continuum between ‘indis-
pensable’ and ‘making a contribution to’, located ‘significantly closer’ to the 
first pole ‘indispensable’.108 In its view, an assessment of a variety of factors was 
required to determine whether a measure was ‘necessary’ to pursue an objective. 
For this purpose, the assessment ‘involv[es] in every case a process of weighing 
and balancing a series of factors’ which ‘include’109 the ‘relative importance of 
the common interests or values that the law or regulation to be enforced’ aims to 
102  Ibid., para 5.26.
103  Osiro, 127 and footnote 14.
104  Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes DS10/R, BISD 37S/200 (panel 
report adopted on 7 November 1990), paras 74-79.
105  In United States – Malt Beverages, para 5.43, the panel applied the test as in United States – Section 337. 
In United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna DS21/R, BISD 39S/155 (report from 3 September 1991, 
not adopted), para 5.28, the panel adopted a highly restrictive reading of the test, requiring that all other 
available options had to be exhausted before an import ban could be used. In United States – Restric-
tions on the Imports of Tuna DS29/R (panel report from 16 June 1994, not adopted), para 5.38, the panel 
excluded justification under Article XX tout court by pointing at the coercive character of the trade 
embargo in question.
106  Delimatsis, ‘Protecting Public Morals’, 262.
107  M. Ming Du, ‘Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or 
Reality?’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1077, 1091.
108  Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef AB-2000-8, WT/DS161/AB/R and 
WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 December 2000, para 161.
109  Ibid., para 164.
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protect,110 the ‘extent to which the measure contributes to the realisation of the 
end pursued’ and the ‘extent to which [it] produces restrictive effects on interna-
tional commerce’.111 Notably, the term ‘include’ allows the conclusion that other 
elements could also be taken into consideration, as the Appellate Body confirms 
in later cases, without, however, ever revealing which elements this could be. 
Conscious of the earlier case law, the Appellate Body also recalls the jurispru-
dence of United States – Section 337 which already contained this analysis.112
The passage has been read by many as introducing balancing or proportion-
ality stricto sensu in the interpretation of the term ‘necessary’.113 The impres-
sion of balancing is reinforced by the subsequent discussion of Korea’s level of 
protection by the Appellate Body. The latter concept can be understood as partly 
borrowed from the SPS Agreement114 and prescribes that WTO members cannot 
be required to change the desired level of enforcement.115 Yet in Korea – Beef, the 
Appellate Body subsequently overthrew the high level of protection indicated 
by Korea because of the implausible connection between the stated high level 
of protection sought for and the measures undertaken in the past to ensure the 
prevention of consumer deception as regards the origin of beef.116
For other commentators opposing a balancing reading of the report, the 
strong emphasis on the prerogative of a WTO member to choose its level of 
protection and a closer reading of the words of the Appellate Body support the 
conclusion that while the words may have opened the door a crack to balancing, 
effectively the Appellate Body did not balance in Korea – Beef. Regan in particu-
lar emphasized that there could be no balancing or cost-benefit analysis if a level 
of protection had to be respected.117 Instead, Korea had not convincingly substan-
tiated its level of protection.118 The reference of the Appellate Body that the test 
110  Ibid., para 162.
111  Ibid., para 163. It is at this point that the criterion of ‘less inconsistency’ is transformed into an inquiry 
into the trade restrictiveness of a measure.
112  Ibid., para 166.
113  See e.g. S. Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegal-
ity’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 59, 100, A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality 
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73, 164, or 
Osiro, 129, who qualifies this finding, however, stating that the case law indicates that the Appellate 
Body is not likely to implement the test in practice.
114  Ming Du, 1089.
115  Korea – Beef (Appellate Body report), paras 176-177.
116  Korea – Beef (Appellate Body report), para 178.
117  Regan, ‘The myth of cost-benefit balancing’, 354-355.
118  In support of this view e.g. A. Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2001) 4 Journal of International 
Economic Law 441, 469-470, J. Neumann and E. Türk, ‘Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World 
Trade Organization Law After Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines’ (2003) 37 Journal of World 
Trade 199, 209, P. Van den Bossche, ‘Looking for Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2008) 35 Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration 283, 292, and C.B. Bown and J.P. Trachtman, ‘Brazil – Measures Affecting the 
Import of Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act’ (2009) 8 World Trade Review 85, 121. Reading the report 
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in United States – Section 337 already encompassed the same inquiry further 
supports this view.119 In light of the later case law, this view appears more 
convincing. The main work seems to be done through the part of the ‘weighing 
and balancing’ test that resembles necessity.
As this second stage of the test, a comparison with reasonably available alter-
native measures has to be executed.120 At this point, the alternative of selective 
inspections of beef shops was accepted by the Appellate Body and meant that the 
Korean measure failed the test under Article XX.121 The relationship between 
these two stages of the ‘weighing and balancing’ test has not been clarified, and 
it does not become fully clear whether the test is not fulfilled as a consequence 
of the erroneous level of protection or because of the availability of alternatives. 
Conceptually, it appears difficult to understand how a measure could pass the 
first stage, which seems to resemble proportionality stricto sensu, and subse-
quently fail a comparison to alternatives. Only the later inquiry, which resembles 
necessity, ensures that the least trade-restrictive measure is identified in the 
first place. Therefore, in the present setting it seems quite impossible to find 
alternatives which would provide a better ratio between trade effects and the 
contribution towards the purported regulatory objective. Yet in reality the first 
stage is undertaken with such light scrutiny that in most cases the comparison 
with alternatives in fact constitutes the decisive part of the analysis of mea-
sures. In our view, the Appellate Body and subsequent panels seem to simply 
have settled for the high flexibility provided by the ‘weighing and balancing’ test 
without confronting its conceptual problems. The necessity test which actually 
seems to do most of the work can simply be adjusted in its strictness by means 
of the standard of review determined under the ‘new approach’ which has been 
described previously.122
c.  Subsequent refinement of the ‘weighing and balancing’ test
EC – Asbestos offered the opportunity for the Appellate Body to restate its 
view on the test under ‘necessary’ in Article XX.123 It repeated the ‘weighing 
and balancing’ formula, but strongly emphasized the right of WTO members to 
choose their level of protection.124 After EC – Asbestos, commentators also noted 
together with the later United States – Gambling report, Regan, ‘The myth of cost-benefit balancing’, 
364, argues that the test should be understood as a burden of proof issue, more precisely as the require-
ment of a WTO member to demonstrate ‘a high enough level of goal-achievement from the measure, 
and a low enough level of trade-restriction’ to make a prima facie case in a necessity test.
119  Van Calster, 133, as well as Bown and Trachtman, 89-90, correctly note that this reference caused a 
lot of confusion about the relationship between the Korea – Beef ‘weighing and balancing’ test and the 
necessity analysis in United States – Section 337.
120  Ming Du, 1093.
121  Korea – Beef (Appellate Body report), para 180.
122  See section III.B.ii.
123  Neumann and Türk, 213.
124  EC – Asbestos (Appellate Body report), para 168.
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for the first time the rather cursory assessment by the Appellate Body of the 
factor of whether a measure contributes to the end pursued.125
Yet the next major steps were arguably undertaken in United States – 
Gambling. The Appellate Body applied the Korea – Beef test, focusing strongly 
on its relationship with the comparison with reasonably available alternatives.126 
The Appellate Body held that a measure could not be considered a reasonably 
available alternative if it was ‘merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where 
the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the measure 
imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substan-
tial technical difficulties.’127 It also insisted on the capacity of alternatives to 
achieve the level of protection sought for by the defending WTO member.128
In United States – Gambling the Appellate Body also reformed the approach 
to the burden of proof. Generally, the Appellate Body has attributed the burden 
of proof to the party that asserts a particular claim of violation as a complainant, 
or to the party acting as a defendant in the case of an exception or defence.129 
Article XX has consistently been treated as an exception as regards the burden 
of proof. In United States – Gambling, the Appellate Body qualified this position 
and held that under the ‘necessary’ test, a defendant was not required to identify 
all potential alternatives and to exclude them. Rather, the defendant had to make 
a prima facie case under the ‘weighing and balancing’ condition, while it was for 
the complainant to identify reasonably available alternatives. Only then did the 
defendant have to establish why these were not ‘reasonably available’.130
In the next crucial case, Brazil – Tyres, the Appellate Body applied the 
‘weighing and balancing’ test with a particularly light hand. It confirmed the 
panel’s superficial characterisation of the regulatory goal of Brazil as the reduc-
tion of exposure to risks for human, animal and plant life or health caused by 
the accumulation of waste tyres and of the intended level of protection as the 
risk reduction ‘to the maximum extent possible.131 In assessing the contribu-
tion of the measure, the Appellate Body accepted a qualitative assessment and 
125  Desmedt, 466, deplores that the Appellate Body only assessed the existence of a health risk without 
examining whether the actual policy, a ban of a product, truly contributed to the desired objective.
126  In United States – Gambling (Appellate Body report), paras 306-307, the Appellate Body seems to suggest 
that first the weighing and balancing is undertaken and ‘then’ a comparison with reasonably alterna-
tives follows.
127  Ibid., para 308.
128  Ming Du, 1093.
129  United States – Wool Shirts and Blouses (Appellate Body report), para 14. See more comprehensively on 
the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement D. Unterhalter, ‘Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO 
Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ (2009) 42 Cornell International Law Journal 209.
130  United States – Gambling (Appellate Body report), paras 309-311. See approvingly from the point of view 
of economic cost-of-proof theory M.T. Grando, ‘Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Disputes: A 
Critical Analysis’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 615, 651-653.
131  Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres AB-2007-4, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 December 2007, 
para 144.
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a nearly theoretical appraisal that the measure was ‘apt’ to make a material 
contribution.132 This light hand on the contribution was explained by the fact 
that a measure could be assessed as part and parcel of a ‘comprehensive strategy’ 
of interacting measures to tackle a complex environmental problem.133
At the second stage of the test, the Appellate Body underlined that elements 
of a comprehensive strategy such as the one already in place in Brazil could not 
qualify as alternative measures, as they would weaken the policy as a whole.134 
Some alternatives were qualified as overly costly and thus excluded as not 
reasonably available. It is remarkable, however, that some alternatives are hardly 
ever truly considered by panels and the Appellate Body.135
While the main part of scrutiny takes place under the second part of the 
‘weighing and balancing’ test, the Appellate Body seemed to keep the door open 
to balancing at one point in the report.136 Yet it can be argued that the evalua-
tion of alternatives and their reasonable availability took centre stage in Brazil 
– Tyres, while the first part of the ‘weighing and balancing’ test was merely paid 
lip service.
There remain some points of criticism. The lenient approach also visible 
in the interpretation of what exactly is the regulatory objective and the level 
of protection simultaneously leads to more discretion for the panel to decide 
upon what qualifies as an alternative.137 In addition, the two issues were not 
sufficiently kept apart, since the regulatory objective constitutes the ‘value’ to be 
protected, while the level of protection indicates the ‘degree’ to which it ought to 
be pursued.138 To allow a merely theoretical contribution risks drawing the circle 
of alternatives too widely, as all measures with a theoretical impact could then 
qualify. The statement that measures forming part of a more comprehensive 
regulatory package should not be considered as alternatives does justice to the 
complexity of regulation in technical fields such as environmental protection, 
but raises the question of how to delineate these complementary measures from 
132  Brazil – Tyres (Appellate Body report), paras 146-147 and 150.
133  Ibid., para 151.
134  Ibid., para 172. In the light of the level of protection, non-generation measures were to be preferred over 
waste management measures, see Brazil – Tyres (Appellate Body report), para 174.
135  Brazil – Tyres (Appellate Body report), para 175. Bown and Trachtman, 120, critically remark that for 
some reason, the Appellate Body never seems to seriously consider tariffs, subsidies or taxes as reason-
ably available alternatives under Article XX.
136  Paragraph 150 reads: ‘[W]hen a measure produces restrictive effects on international trade as severe 
as those resulting from an import ban, it appears to us that it would be difficult for a panel to find that 
measure necessary unless it is satisfied that the measure is apt to make a material contribution to the 
achievement of its objective.’ For a possible reading as proportionality analysis see Venzke, 1135; see 
sceptical Van den Bossche, 294.
137  B. McGrady, ‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative 
Regulatory Measures’ (2008) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 153, 158.
138  Bown and Trachtman, 124.
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other alternatives that a WTO member must consider as an alternative.139 In 
subsequent case law, the two-stage test developed in Korea – Beef has continu-
ously been applied, with only some light meandering.
d. Conclusion
Summing up, there is a general confusion in the two-pronged ‘weighing and 
balancing’ test developed by the Appellate Body. After Korea – Beef, despite some 
language pointing towards some sort of full-scale proportionality analysis, the 
later case law confirmed an understanding that the second stage of the ‘weigh-
ing and balancing’ test, i.e. the comparison with reasonably available alterna-
tives, is the central test. A sceptical observer of the case law could even suggest 
that the Appellate Body is simply weighing and balancing the individual steps 
of its weighing and balancing test to reach the appropriate results. The conse-
quence of the still unsolved mystery of how the emphasis on the level of protec-
tion and the weighing and balancing formula in the light of the relative impor-
tance of the value at issue interact has led to a highly casuistic approach. On 
the positive side, the adaptation of the burden of proof has somewhat reduced 
the problem of truly construing Article XX as an exceptions provision. In this 
respect, a comparison to EU law on internal market freedoms can be drawn. As 
has been observed in the pertinent section,140 the CJEU uses its necessity test in 
a much more – and in our view even exaggeratedly – restrictive way. Regulatory 
autonomy is thus taken more seriously in WTO law under the ‘necessary’ condi-
tion than in EU law. Even following a model of special interest review, an adjudi-
cator must thus not necessarily over-emphasize the interest that it is focused on, 
as the case law by the Appellate Body demonstrates. On a less satisfactory note, 
however, this generally reasonable approach of the ‘weighing and balancing’ 
test is belied by the blurredness of the actual legal analysis. It remains largely in 
the dark whether and on what basis the standard of review is adapted under the 
‘new approach’, and it is still a mystery whether in some extreme case propor-
tionality stricto sensu could be used.
 iv. The test for measures ‘relating to’ a public interest
The case law under Article XX (g) regarding the requirement 
that measures must relate to conservation policy is a text-book example for literal 
interpretation. Panels and the WTO Appellate Body have developed a separate 
legal test which is more lenient than the requirement found for the term ‘neces-
sary’ based on the weakness of the term ‘relating’. At the same time, it is under 
this sub-paragraph that we again find some more regulator-friendly reforms in 
139  Bown and Trachtman, 127, suggest that the only distinction should be whether measures are already 
implemented or not yet implemented. It may, however, be more fruitful to adopt a more complex distinc-
tion. McGrady, 167-168, proposes using the concept of ‘complementary measures’, which uses the diffe-
rent effect upon the same regulatory goal as distinguishing criterion.
140  See chapter 6 section IV.A.
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the case law. Despite earlier categorisation as inadmissible measures, newer case 
law has no longer subjected process and production measures and measures 
with extraterritorial effects to an automatic prohibition, but subjected them to 
‘normal’ scrutiny.
a.  The development of a lenient test under Article XX (g) GATT
In case law before the advent of the WTO some efforts were made to 
reach a test beyond pure textual interpretation. Panels construed ‘relating to’ 
as a requirement that a measure must be ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation 
purposes. This interpretation created a wider category than under the ‘neces-
sary’ requirement,141 although in practice some testing against alternatives 
occurred in panels’ reasoning.142 Later GATT 1947 case law used the test as a 
rather strict examination of suitability, i.e. of whether a measure ‘contribute[s] 
directly to’ the objective.143
In the first case under the WTO regime, however, the Appellate Body 
vigorously rejected the ‘primarily aimed at’ approach suggested by the panel144 
because it had no basis in the treaty text and did not take into account suffi-
ciently the different degree of connection between measure and objective which 
the treaty drafters had wanted when phrasing Article XX (g) and other sub-
paragraphs. Instead, the Appellate Body suggested a more deferent interpreta-
tion, according to which a measure merely had to be not ‘merely incidentally 
or inadvertently aimed at’ conservation policies, a weak suitability requirement 
easily fulfilled by the measure at issue.145 Furthermore, based on a reading of the 
chapeau the Appellate Body underlined that the ‘measure’ should be understood 
more comprehensively as the whole regulation instead of only its discriminatory 
141  Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon L/6268, BISD 35S/98 (panel 
report adopted on 22 March 1988), para 4.6. In United States – Tuna I, para 5.33, and United States – 
Tuna II, para 5.22, the panels applied the same analysis, but came out with flawed results because of the 
erroneous assessment of the extraterritorial aspects of the measure at issue, see on extraterritoriality 
section IV.A.iv.c.
142  In Canada – Exports of Unprocessed Salmon, para 4.7, the panel found export restrictions as not ‘primar-
ily aimed at’ conservation because for other fish species no similar restrictions were needed for the 
same purpose. To suggest with C. Wofford, ‘A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO 
Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT’ (2001) 24 Harvard Environmental Law Review 
563, 578, that the test amounted to an ‘odd cost-benefit analysis’ appears, however, to overstretch the 
panel’s reasoning.
143  United States – Automobile Taxes, para 5.60.
144  The panel’s interpretation of ‘primarily aimed at’ came close to a necessity inquiry as under the other 
sub-paragraphs of Article XX in this case, see Venzke, 1125.
145  United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline AB-1996-1, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 
April 1996, pp. 17-18.
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aspects, which rendered justification under the new interpretation of ‘relating to’ 
even more easily available.146
In the later United States – Shrimp case, the Appellate Body explained further 
that ‘relating to’ should mean that there has to be a ‘close and genuine relation-
ship of ends and means’.147 Focusing on the structure of the import ban at issue 
rather than the effects, the Appellate Body found that the measure as well as 
its limited exceptions were related ‘clearly and directly’ to the objective of the 
conservation policy.148 The test under the ‘relating to’ criterion was, as a conse-
quence, transformed from a variant of the necessity test into a light-handed 
analysis of suitability without the need to demonstrate concrete effects, but 
instead a rational link between a measure and the policy objective claimed.
One could argue that this less intense scrutiny is to a certain extent balanced 
out by the additional requirement set out in Article XX(g) that measures must 
be ‘made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption’. In the GATT 1947 case law, panels struck down measures if no 
domestic consumption restriction could be found149 or examined restrictions 
with the same rather strict interpretative approach taken under the ‘relating 
to’ criterion.150 However, in parallel to the development under ‘relating to’, the 
Appellate Body weakened the interpretation of the required equivalent restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption in United States – Gasoline. It 
held that the clause should be read as a ‘requirement of even-handedness in the 
imposition of domestic restrictions’, which does not require identical treat-
ment.151 In analysing even-handedness, again no pure effects test should be 
adopted, as conservation measures only show effects after a considerable period 
of time.152
As the subsequent section shows, to some extent the weakening of the test 
has effectively led panels and the Appellate Body to strengthen their review 
under a different label, i.e. the chapeau.153 At the same time, by choosing this 
deferent test as the interpretation for Article XX (g) the Appellate Body has made 
it easier to pursue conservation policies than other public interests, implicitly 
establishing a hierarchy.154 Arguably, this seems to go beyond what the treaty 
drafters had in mind when setting up Article XX, based on older precursor 
146  Ibid., p. 15. The panel had used its legal findings of less favourable treatment under Article III:4 to test 
the discriminatory aspects of the measure under Article XX(g). Desmedt, 472, supports a more consis-
tent application of the same reasoning under all sub-paragraphs of Article XX.
147  United States – Shrimp (Appellate Body report), para 136.
148  Ibid., para 138.
149  United States – Prohibition of Tuna and Tuna Products Imports from Canada L/5198, BISD 29S/91 (panel 
report adopted on 22 February 1982), paras 4.10-4.11.
150  Canada – Exports of Unprocessed Salmon, para 4.6.
151  United States – Gasoline (Appellate Body report), p. 19.
152  United States – Shrimp (Appellate Body report), para 144.
153  See section IV.A.v.
154  Desmedt, 472.
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provisions. A more coherent test could simply set up a test closer to that under 
the other sub-paragraphs of Article XX and combine the analysis with an appro-
priate light standard of review.
Despite the somewhat over-textual interpretation of Article XX which has 
been observed in this case, more interpretive flexibility has been introduced 
for another topic under Article XX (g) GATT. On issues such as extraterrito-
rial measures, we had shown in the case of United States constitutional law the 
rigidity of the system of tiers of scrutiny. Article XX (g), by contrast, has been 
the stage for remarkable change in the case law over the years, which has led 
from the early exclusion of process and production methods and measures with 
extraterritorial effect to their examination with normal scrutiny.
b. The case of process and production methods
In loosening the test under Article XX (g), in the landmark United States – 
Shrimp case the Appellate Body simultaneously abandoned an old categorical 
approach to trade restrictions of a certain character.
In earlier case law, so-called process and production methods (PPM) had 
been observed with a high degree of scepticism by the international trading 
system. Such regulations focus on the characteristics of a product’s manufac-
turing process, and on whether the process influences the composition of the 
product or not. In particular processes that do not affect the final composition 
of the product, but also methods which aim at purposes that are not related to 
the functionality, safety or similar qualities of the product155 have generally been 
considered as problematic because they could easily be abused for protectionist 
motives. From an economic point of view, however, regulators may sometimes 
be compelled to intervene in the form of PPMs for externalities that cannot be 
tackled differently.156 In this light, it is also suggested that the very existence of 
an externality must necessarily be determined by the concerned state.157 Oppo-
nents of PPMs argue that PPMs come down to the unilateral imposition of a 
country’s standards in an extraterritorial manner, which may even amount to 
coercion if developing countries have to bear important adaptation costs to enjoy 
continuous access to the markets of industrialized countries.158 But such claims 
are focused on particular factual situations and appear difficult as support for 
a general prohibition of PPMs. Discussion in the doctrine thus focused on the 
155  So-called non-product-related PPMs.
156  Howse and Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction’, 273, cite the example of externalities of a product 
which are imposed by a minority on a majority which does not consume the product in question, which 
can render a ban of the product indispensable to tackle the majority’s concern.
157  D.H. Regan, ‘How to think about PPMs (and climate change)’ in T. Cottier, O. Nartova and S.Z. Bigdeli 
(eds.), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 112.
158  D.C. Crosby, ‘Tilting at Conventional WTO Wisdom’ in T Cottier, O Nartova and SZ Bigdeli (eds), 
International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 126.
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question which forms of PPMs were more likely to be acceptable under WTO 
law and which were likely to very often violate the rules.159
The case law started with a similarly categorical view of the inadmissibility 
of PPMs.160 As landmark cases in this regard, the Tuna reports excluded PPMs 
from possible justification under Article XX because of their extraterritorial and 
coercive effect161 and because they could impair the ‘balance of rights and obliga-
tions among contracting parties, in particular the right of access to markets’.162 
However, even some of the earlier GATT 1947 case law began admitting 
producer-based PPMs as potentially compatible with Article XX.163 The full turn-
around came with United States – Shrimp, where the Appellate Body rejected 
that a category of measures which conditioned access to a WTO member’s 
market should be considered per se as prohibited, because such an interpreta-
tion would render Article XX itself mostly useless: Most measures allowed by it 
would possess such characteristics.164 Instead of an outright prohibition, PPMs 
are thus simply subject to scrutiny as to the need for and consistency of a PPM.
c. The case of measures with extraterritorial effects
Linked to the issue of PPMs, there is the treatment of measures with 
extraterritorial effects in WTO law. PPMs are typical, but not the only example 
of regulation which exerts extraterritorial effects.165 General international law 
allows the exercise of jurisdiction based on three different links: nationality, 
territoriality and effects which materialize within a state’s jurisdiction. The 
effects criterion has proven most contentious in practice, as benchmarks or 
criteria to assess the quality and quantity of effects required to grant jurisdiction 
are difficult to determine in an objective manner.166 With the particularly trade-
restraining effect of measures which impose conditions on the entry of prod-
159  See e.g. Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs”’, 67 ff.; Howse and Regan, ‘The Product/Pro-
cess Distinction’, 270 ff.; country-based PPMs are therefore too broad in most situations and will often 
fall foul of GATT disciplines, while PPMs based merely on the manner of production could often be in 
compliance as origin-neutral measures pursuing a public purpose. Producer-based PPMs require close 
scrutiny, as they may easily be tilted against foreign producers.
160  See e.g. Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations familiales) G/32, BISD 1S/59 (panel report adopted on 7 
November 1952), para 3; Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee L/5135, BISD 28S/102 (panel report 
adopted on 11 June 1981), paras 4.6-4.9.
161  United States – Tuna I, para 5.32.
162  United States – Tuna II, para 5.26.
163  United States – Automobile Taxes, paras 5.61 and 5.66.
164  United States – Shrimp (Appellate Body report), para 121.
165  As one example, tariff preferences are granted by industrialized countries to developing countries based 
on their human rights record, which does not attach directly to the products at issue, see e.g. in Euro-
pean Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries AB-2004-1, 
WT/DS246/AB/R, 7 April 2004.
166  H. Horn and P. Mavroidis, ‘The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies’ (2008) 42 Jour-
nal of World Trade 1107, 1126
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ucts into a territory some have argued in WTO law that a contractual approach 
should be taken: WTO members have promised access to their market, so if 
they close it down by such measures they must compensate foreign producers.167 
Yet, this view departs from a strongly market-access based perception of the 
GATT. More convincing solutions admit such compensation only in cases where 
large countries effectively abuse their market power by means of extraterritorial 
measures.168
In WTO jurisprudence, a struggle between categorical exclusion and normal 
scrutiny can be observed. Initially, the panel in United States – Tuna I simply 
held that Article XX could not apply to measures in an ‘extrajurisdictional’ 
manner.169 The United States – Tuna II phrased more carefully that it would not 
have to answer the question of a jurisdictional limit of Article XX, as the mea-
sure already failed to comply with Article XX as a coercive PPM.170 In a similar 
vein, the Appellate Body in United States – Shrimp stated that it would not have 
to answer expressly the question of jurisdictional limits in Article XX to decide 
the case. At the same time, however, it accepted that Article XX (g) could cover 
a measure aiming at the protection of migratory species occurring in waters 
outside the jurisdiction of the regulating WTO member, as long as there was a 
‘sufficient nexus’ with the territory of the relevant WTO member.171 The Appel-
late Body’s explicit refusal to clarify the jurisdictional limits of Article XX has 
led to a variety of readings of this paragraph, which range from the establish-
ment of territorial jurisdiction of the United States to the justification of the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States.172 In any event, it 
can safely be assumed that there is no longer a categorical refusal in WTO law to 
permit measures exclusively because of their extraterritorial character. Instead, 
they are subject to the test under the relevant sub-paragraph and the scrutiny 
under the chapeau.
Recent case law under the TBT Agreement seems to point in a similar direc-
tion. In United States – Tuna III, the panel and the Appellate Body refused to 
accept an argument by Mexico which claimed that requirements for a dolphin-
protecting label could constitute per se illegitimate ‘extraterritorial’ regulation 
because of the pressure to adapt products this could entail for foreign traders.173 
167  K. Bagwell, P. Mavroidis and R.W. Staiger, ‘It’s a Question of Market Access’ (2002) 96 American 
Journal of International Law 56, 67, suggest that a non-violation complaint could be the solution to such 
a case. See also the hint in EC – Asbestos (Appellate Body report), para 188.
168  Regan, ‘How to think about PPMs’, 115.
169  United States – Tuna I, paras 5.27-5.28.
170  United States – Tuna II, paras 5.15-5.16.
171  United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R, 15 May 1998, para 
133.
172  See for a concise overview Vranes, 161 footnote 406.
173  The panel in United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products WT/DS381/R, 15 September 2011, para 7.371, refers here to the findings of the Appellate Body in 
United States – Shrimp.
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Instead, a normal analysis under Article 2.1 TBT as to whether the products in 
question were ‘like’ and whether imported products received ‘less favourable 
treatment’ should ensue.174
d. Conclusion
Summing up, the literal approach with which Article XX (g) – and with it 
conceptually all of Article XX’s sub-paragraphs – has been interpreted thus 
astonishingly led to categorisations as to which test is to be applied under the 
various sub-paragraphs, but simultaneously broke up older categorisations. As a 
consequence, PPMs and extraterritoriality are subject to judicial scrutiny – but 
are no longer per se prohibited characteristics of measures. While this develop-
ment is commendable, the fragmented review under the various sub-paragraphs 
is hardly convincing if Article XX is observed from a conceptual rather than 
purely text-based perspective. A more coherent test combined with varying stan-
dards of review appears to offer a more convincing solution.
 v. The chapeau of Articles XX GATT and XIV GATS
Under the chapeau clause of the general exceptions clauses, 
measures which involve an ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or ‘dis-
guised restriction’ on trade should be excluded. The textual approach to the 
interpretation of this provision has resulted in a somewhat blurry case law. 
Generally, the case law has attempted to separate, under the chapeau, the level 
of application and enforcement of a measure from its general existence. This 
became the third part of a three-pronged analysis after the assessment of the 
public policy objective and the test of whether the relevant test under a sub-para-
graph is fulfilled. By this token, a balance between the right of a WTO member 
to invoke an exception and the substantive rights of other WTO members under 
the GATT should be respected.175 In United States – Shrimp as the most exten-
sive interpretation of the chapeau clause, the Appellate Body thus developed a 
reading in which the chapeau prohibits ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ focused 
on over-restrictive substantive requirements and ‘arbitrary discrimination’ as 
concerned with the procedural aspects of trade measures.176
Yet the case law highlights the conceptual difficulty of keeping a separate 
test under the chapeau. As a starting point, the scope of the measure to be 
examined is not truly clarified to date. The case law has tried to separate the 
interpretation of the chapeau from the interpretation of substantive national 
treatment enshrined in Article III GATT.177
174  United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products 
AB-2012-2, WT/DS381/AB/R, 16 May 2012, para 226.
175  United States – Shrimp (Appellate Body report), para 156.
176  See Ibid., paras 162 ff. and para 177.
177  United States – Gasoline (Appellate Body report), p. 21.
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For the purpose of keeping Article XX autonomous, the notion of measure 
has thus been defined differently. The measure examined under Article XX 
must be broader than the mere violation found under Article III as a violation of 
national treatment.178 More recent case law, however, seems to suggest a return 
to examining the aspects of a measure which are in violation under Article 
XX.179 The more narrow view appears more in line with a systematic reading of 
the GATT that sees no fundamental difference between the concept of discrimi-
nation set out in the chapeau and national treatment in Article III. In favour of 
the other view, however, it has been suggested that a separate test could allow 
the substantially different discrimination tests under both provisions to be 
maintained.180 It also means, however, substantial weight on the test under the 
chapeau.
The interpretation of the latter, however, has hardly proven capable of fulfill-
ing expectations of coherence. At some points, parts of other tests under Article 
XX seem to have been outsourced to be resolved at the level of the chapeau with-
out a closer explanation or relationship to the main tests under the relevant sub-
paragraphs.181 Another concern is the only apparently neat separation between 
a measure and its ‘application’ which is examined under the chapeau. In Brazil 
– Tyres, parts of the measure at issue have rather randomly been assigned to the 
chapeau and examined in that framework rather than as part of the measure as 
a whole.182
To conclude, the chapeau is thus potentially far from stable and its interpre-
tation seems to be used by panels and the Appellate Body as a potential fall-back 
test which can accommodate reasoning on national treatment as well as under 
other tests that does not properly fit in at an earlier stage. Literal interpretation 
178  The earlier more restrictive view which only aimed to examine the aspects of a measure in violation 
with national treatment under Article XX had been developed in United States – Section 337, para 5.27.
179  Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines AB-2011-1, WT/DS371/AB/R, 17 
June 2011, paras 177 ff.
180  See for a comprehensive overview of the case law A. Davies, ‘Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article 
XX in Light of the ‘New’ Approach in Brazil-Tyres’ (2009) 43 Journal of World Trade 507, 537.
181  In United States – Gasoline (Appellate Body report), p. 26, the Appellate Body compared the contested 
measures with reasonably available alternatives similar to the test under sub-paragraphs of Article XX. 
In Brazil – Tyres, the Appellate Body examined whether a ‘rational connection’ to the overall objective 
of the trade measure existed for the aspects of its application which were under scrutiny, Brazil – Tyres 
(Appellate Body report), para 228.
182  Brazil – Tyres (Appellate Body report), paras 225 ff. Brazil had introduced an import ban on waste tyres 
for environmental reasons, but excluded MERCOSUR countries from the ban because of a ruling of a 
MERCOSUR tribunal. Instead of examining this exception under the chapeau as part of the ‘applica-
tion’ of the measure, it was convincingly suggested that it should have been scrutinized as part of the 
overall measure, which would mean that e.g. the level of protection sought for by Brazil would have to be 
lowered since some imports of environmentally harmful goods were permitted, see Bown and Tracht-
man, 124.
317
chapter 7 wto law
has once again led to an overemphasis on treaty terms to the detriment of pre-
dictability and of a coherent sequence of legal tests.
 vi. Conclusion
Article XX GATT and its corollary Article XIV GATS contain 
an exhaustive list of public interests for the pursuit of which WTO members 
may deviate from their substantive obligations under GATT and GATS. Some 
room for tests adjudicating the value conflict of trade against domestic regula-
tory autonomy has been created by the WTO judiciary by means of an interpre-
tation of the individual headings, which accommodate a rather comprehensive 
number of public policy objectives. Yet, on the whole a very literal reading 
combined with the high weight put on Article XX GATT through the restric-
tive understanding developed for national treatment has led to an unsystematic 
functioning of the provisions; tests have been developed under the individual 
headings without due regard for the overall functioning of the provision includ-
ing its chapeau clause.
The central ‘weighing and balancing’ test developed under the term ‘neces-
sary’ in several sub-paragraphs of Article XX GATT seems to posit a somewhat 
awkward sequence. It starts with a ‘weighing and balancing’ exercise which 
includes the importance of the value protected by the regulation. The contri-
bution – the regulatory benefit – of the measure is then apparently taken into 
account together with the trade-restrictive effect. Despite appearances, however, 
this does not turn out as balancing or proportionality stricto sensu, since the 
subsequent step of a comparison with reasonably available alternatives – a not 
all-too strict version of necessity – does most of the work of excluding some 
measures. Lack of transparency and predictability is a central characteristic of 
the ‘weighing and balancing’ test. In the light of our finding that pre-balancing 
for judicial review in the WTO yields a result close to a model of special interest 
review, the reliance on necessity is in principle a useful choice. However, the 
rejection of proportionality stricto sensu in the case law arguably seems exag-
gerated. Other elements are, however, commendable. In comparison to the 
very strict assessment of necessity in EU internal market law, the more equally 
distributed burden of proof, the more careful examination of measures as alter-
natives and the adaptation of the standard of review through the ‘new approach’ 
render the test somewhat more respectful of domestic regulatory autonomy.
Literal interpretation has also led to only partly convincing solutions under 
the chapeau clause and under Article XX (g), which posits the condition of mea-
sures ‘relating to’ a public interest. However, similarly respectful of domestic 
regulatory autonomy as under the ‘weighing and balancing’ test, the Appellate 
Body has in its case law refused to continue older categorical prohibitions of 
certain trade-restrictive measures, i.e. PPMs and measures with extraterritorial 
effects.
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In examining other WTO covered agreements, we find inspiration from 
‘weighing and balancing’ both in the case of Articles 2.2 TBT and 5.6 SPS 
Agreement. The exceptions under the TRIPS Agreement have in a way led a 
life of their own, as the agreement is structured somewhat differently from the 
other ‘typical’ covered agreements.
 B Article 2.2 TBT Agreement
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement sets up several require-
ments for technical regulations of WTO members. These must not be ‘prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade’ and must not be more ‘trade restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective’ such as the ones provided in a demon-
strative list,183 ‘taking into account the risks non-fulfilment would create’. There 
is some scholarly debate on the appropriate interpretation of the provision, in 
particular as to whether its wording could encourage full-scale proportionality 
analysis. Recent case law seems to move the test under Article 2.2 TBT close to 
the one under Article XX GATT, but with some regulator-friendly aspects. We 
conclude that, based on the model of special interest representation, the solution 
found is in principle convincing, though the fear of proportionality stricto sensu 
again seems somewhat exaggerated.
 i. The debate in the doctrine
Generally, most scholars refer to the test under Article XX 
GATT as the test to apply in order to assess what is understood as a regulation 
that is no more trade-restrictive than necessary.184 However, with that test being 
understood in various ways by scholars,185 the discussion on whether proportion-
ality stricto sensu is endorsed by Article 2.2 TBT has led to differing conclusions.
In particular the express reference to the ‘risks of non-fulfilment’ that must 
be taken into account has led some to suggest that proportionality analysis 
including proportionality stricto sensu has expressly been laid down by the draft-
ers of the TBT Agreement.186 At first view, ‘taking into account the risks non-
fulfilment would create’ seems to open the door for an understanding that some 
measures may be unnecessarily trade-restrictive to an extent where the risks 
of non-fulfilment should be considered – which comes down to proportionality 
stricto sensu. On the other hand, one could also read the provision differently, 
focusing on the terms ‘taking into account’: Using proportionality stricto sensu 
183  This list includes national security, the prevention of deceptive practices, as well as protection of human 
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.
184  L. Tamiotti, ‘Article 2 TBT Agreement’ in R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll and A. Seibert-Fohr (eds.), WTO – 
Technical Barriers and SPS Measures (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 218 para 17.
185  See section IV.A.iii.b on the various understandings of the test developed in Korea – Beef.
186  See e.g. Desmedt, 459-460.
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could be read as going beyond a mere taking into account of risks and suggest 
implicitly accepting in some cases the risk of non-fulfilment.
A number of scholars have read Article 2.2 TBT as containing a necessity 
test. As an example, Vranes compares the provision with the other paragraphs of 
Article 2 TBT which require that international standards be used unless they are 
not suitable (Article 2.4 TBT), that other members’ standards should be given 
positive consideration if they are deemed equally suitable (Article 2.7 TBT) and 
that performance standards are to be preferred over other standards (Article 2.8 
TBT).187 A necessity reading is thus convincing based on economic insights in 
this light, since performance standards have indeed been qualified as the least 
trade-restrictive means by economists in such circumstances.188
As another argument, an express footnote using the term of ‘proportionality’ 
was deleted during the drafting process of Article 2.2 TBT.189 In addition, the 
note ‘taking into account the risk of non-fulfilment’ can also be read differently: 
Article 2.2 TBT lists factors for the assessment of risks, which should then 
simply inform the necessity analysis suggested by the provision.190
There is thus room for both readings in the wording and context of Article 
2.2 TBT. From a conceptual point of view, our model of special interest review 
suggests predominant reliance on tests other than proportionality stricto sensu. 
However, in situations where there is severe under-representation of one interest 
– trade in this case – there could be reliance on full-scale proportionality analy-
sis.
 ii. The case law
Recent case law has led to some innovations and confirmed 
a necessity-based reading of Article 2.2 TBT. Even at the level of the test of 
national treatment more regulator-friendly approaches become apparent.
National treatment under the TBT Agreement has been read by one panel 
with more openness towards considering regulatory purpose.191 In United 
States – Clove Cigarettes, the panel extensively interpreted Article 2.1 TBT which 
prescribes ‘treatment no less favourable’ to imported products than that granted 
to domestic ‘like products’. Faced with similar interpretative choices as in the 
case of Article III GATT, the panel opted, however, for a rather aims-and-effects 
based reading of likeness. It thus assigned considerable weight to the regulatory 
187  Vranes, 308-309.
188  On the economic rationale of the least trade-restrictive means requirement of various measures see A.O. 
Sykes, ‘Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1, 21-22.
189  Vranes, 310.
190  Tamiotti, 220 para 24.
191  Compare the case law discussed under Article III GATT in section III.C.ii.
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purpose of the measure to find that the products at issue were indeed like.192 The 
Appellate Body, however, rejected this reading and held that the likeness of prod-
ucts had to be assessed on ground of competitive relationship only, ‘in isolation 
from the measure at issue’.193 Taking into account regulatory objectives pursued 
by a measure would not only be difficult because of the choice among a variety 
of objectives this could often require,194 but mainly prevent the assessment of 
the appropriate ‘marketplace’ on which then the assessment of ‘less favourable 
treatment’ as the second step had to take place.195 This assessment would be 
distorted by taking into account regulatory objectives at the level of likeness.
Following doctrinal suggestions that had already been raised for Article 
III GATT as discussed previously, the Appellate Body in United States – Clove 
Cigarettes proposed  assessing the role of regulatory distinctions at the level 
of ‘less favourable treatment’, which was also confirmed in the subsequent 
Appellate Body report in United States – Tuna III.196 At this level, the panel had 
already clarified with reference to the similar analysis under Article III GATT 
that the examination of ‘less favourable treatment’ required a comparison of 
groups of products as to their treatment, which the Appellate Body confirmed.197 
The panel had also hinted here at the fact that a resulting modification of the 
conditions of competition to the detriment of the group of imported products 
could still be explained by some factors unrelated to the foreign origin of prod-
ucts.198 The Appellate Body made the point clearer: at the level of less favourable 
treatment; the assessment should inquire whether prohibited de jure or de facto 
discrimination was at stake or whether the effects on a group of imported prod-
ucts could be explained by a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’.199 To draw the 
line between de facto discrimination and legitimate regulatory distinctions, the 
Appellate Body suggested looking at the ‘circumstances of the case, that is, the 
design, architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application of the tech-
nical regulation at issue, and, in particular, whether that technical regulation is 
evenhanded’.200 Some first insights as to how legal tests to assess the relation-
ship between the impact of a measure and the objective pursued by a legitimate 
regulatory distinction emerged in United States – Tuna III. The Appellate Body 
clarified that initially, the complainant had to make a prima facie case that a 
measure was inconsistent with Article 2.1 TBT. Then, however, the respond-
ent had to bring forward evidence to show that his measure was ‘calibrated’ to 
192  United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes WT/DS406/R, 2 September 
2011, paras 7.246-7247.
193  United States – Clove Cigarettes (Appellate Body report), para 111.
194  Ibid., paras 113 and 115.
195  Ibid., para 116.
196  Ibid., para 111; United States – Tuna III (Appellate Body report), para 215.
197  United States – Clove Cigarettes (Appellate Body report), para 180.
198  Ibid., para 7.269.
199  Ibid., para 181.
200 Ibid., para 182.
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the risks identified which should be tackled by the label at issue.201 Examining 
whether detrimental impact stemmed ‘exclusively’ from a legitimate regulatory 
distinction, the Appellate Body found that in the present case the United States 
could not show that the measure was sufficiently closely tailored to a specific 
problem; ‘calibration’ seemed to perform a similar function as a necessity test, 
although with particular focus on whether satisfying evidence for a particular 
risk tackled by the measure was brought forward.202 Future case law must show 
whether this test will develop in a similar direction as the test under Article XX 
GATT and whether it will also be used under Article III:4 GATT. The Appellate 
Body criticized the use of judicial economy by the panel in the case, noting that 
contrary to the view of the panel, the obligations under both provisions were not 
‘substantially the same’ and differed in scope and content.203 Still, the Appellate 
Body did not spell out how this would work out in detail, and did not suggest an 
alternative legal test.
These developments also raise the question of whether some convergence 
will ensue with the assessment under Article 2.2 TBT. Because of the different 
structure of the TBT Agreement, Article 2.2 is structured as a positive obliga-
tion rather than an exception.204 Panels have used the pertinent GATT case law 
as an inspiration.205 Despite some differences in their approach, all three panels 
in United States – Clove Cigarettes, United States – COOL and United States – 
Tuna III seemed to arrive at a similar conclusion, i.e. that a necessity test akin to 
the pertinent part of the ‘weighing and balancing’ test under Article XX GATT’s 
‘necessary’ condition constitutes the core of the analysis.206
In United States – Tuna III, the panel found no anchorage for e.g. proportion-
ality stricto sensu while construing the phrase ‘taking into account the risks non-
fulfilment would create’. Instead, it simply understood the phrase as requiring 
the consideration of non-fulfilment in the form that alternative measures were 
excluded if they presented a higher risk of non-fulfilment of the level of protec-
201  United States – Tuna III (Appellate Body report), para 283.
202  Ibid., paras 284 and 297.
203  United States – Tuna III (Appellate Body report), para 405.
204  United States – Tuna III (panel report), para 7.458.
205  United States – Clove Cigarettes (panel report), para 7.368; United States – Certain Country of Origin Label-
ling (COOL) WT/DS384/R and WT/DS386/R, 18 November 2011, para 7.667; United States – Tuna III 
(panel report), para 7.457.
206 See United States – Clove Cigarettes (panel report), para 7.352, United States – Tuna III (panel report), para 
7.465, and United States – COOL, para 7.557. The panel in United States – Tuna III (panel report), para 
7.460, goes to great lengths to distinguish that contrary to Article XX GATT, it is not the necessity of a 
measure fulfilling the objective but rather the trade restrictiveness of a measure that must be justified. 
The practical relevance of the distinction remains somewhat unclear, however, since the level of protec-
tion as the central concept of the panel’s reasoning is accepted under Article 2.2 TBT just as well as 
under Article XX GATT.
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tion sought for by the regulating state, i.e. as an emphasis on the right of WTO 
members to choose their level of protection when regulating public concerns.207
The Appellate Body read the phrase somewhat more as an element of its 
own: It suggested that this enlarged the ‘weighing and balancing’ to be under-
taken and should lead to an examination of alternatives ‘in the light of the 
nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of the consequences that would arise 
from non-fulfilment of the legitimate objective’.208 Such ‘consequences’ of ‘non-
fulfilment’ could be read as a crack in the wall for a future appearance of propor-
tionality stricto sensu. But in summarizing its approach, the Appellate Body 
was quick to muddy the waters again. The Appellate Body concluded that three 
elements are to be examined under the necessity condition of Article 2.2 TBT, 
the contribution of a measure towards a regulatory objective, its trade-restrictive-
ness and ‘the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of consequences that 
would arise from non-fulfilment’.209 Deviating from a possible proportionality 
stricto sensu reading of this passage, the Appellate Body was, however, quick to 
subsequently describe the test as coming down in ‘most cases’ to a typical neces-
sity test of comparing a measure with alternatives, which presents the classic 
features of alternatives as ‘less trade restrictive’, making an ‘equivalent contri-
bution’ and ‘reasonable available’ as in other case law.210 A footnote notes that 
there could be ‘at least’ two instances where no necessity assessment is required: 
These are situations where a measure is not trade-restrictive and where a 
measure makes no contribution to the regulatory objective.211 These seem to 
be rather obvious cases of hardly any practical relevance which can already be 
sorted out by previous steps of the analysis.
The solution suggested by the Appellate Body in United States – Tuna III 
emphasizes the pure necessity character of the inquiry less than the findings of 
the panel seem to suggest; still, despite many words it falls short – in a manner 
reminiscent of the ‘weighing and balancing’ discussion under Article XX GATT 
– of embracing in any clear way situations where true full-scale proportionality 
analysis may be used.
As to the burden of proof, in construing its test of necessity the panel in 
United States – Tuna III imported the attribution of the burden of proof from 
the setting of Article XX GATT, imposing only the identification of reasonably 
available alternatives on the complaining party.212 It could, however, be argued 
that Article XX GATT as an exceptions provision should be treated differently 
from Article 2.2 TBT as a positive obligation, in which case the complainant 
207  United States – Tuna III (panel report), para 7.467.
208  United States – Tuna III (Appellate Body report), para 321. See also the later confirmation of this approach 
in United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) AB-2012-3, WT/DS384/AB/R and WT/
DS386/AB/R, 29 June 2012, para 461.
209 Ibid., para 322.
210  Ibid.
211  Ibid., para 322 footnote 647.
212  United States – Tuna III (panel report), para 7.468.
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would bear the burden of proof for all elements of Article 2.2 TBT.213 The result 
in United States – Clove Cigarettes demonstrates the advantage for the defending 
regulating state that such a shift of the burden entails.214
A somewhat curious rule for the burden of proof was subsequently set up 
by the Appellate Body in United States – Tuna III. It suggested a middle way, 
holding that the complainant had to make a prima facie case that a measure was 
‘more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the contribution it makes to the 
legitimate objectives, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’; 
for this purpose, the complainant ‘may also seek to identify a possible alterna-
tive measure that is less trade restrictive’. Then the burden would shift to the 
respondent.215 What remains unclear, however, is how a complainant should 
show that a measure is more restrictive than necessary without identifying an 
alternative.
It remains for future case law to show whether the test close to ‘weighing 
and balancing’ used for Article 2.2 TBT will also make its way to Article 2.1 
TBT’s less favourable treatment assessment. If a reasonable distribution of 
the burden of proof is found, this could serve as a useful solution. The fear of 
proportionality stricto sensu discussed in the case of Article XX GATT seems, 
however, already to have been transposed to Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
 iii. Conclusion
Summing up, future case law will show whether more ele-
ments of the interpretation of Article XX GATT will be transposed to Article 
2.2 TBT. It seems, however, that the test may be similar in some respects, but is 
more regulator-friendly in the case of Article 2.2 TBT. There is no closed list of 
regulatory objectives, and the attribution of the burden of proof – if confirmed 
as in United States – Clove Cigarettes – favours the defending WTO member in 
dispute settlement proceedings. These features keep the balance in the favour 
of the regulating state, although another feature from Article XX GATT has not 
yet appeared in the case law: Up to this point, there appears to be no adaptation 
of the standard of review based on the interest at issue. Based on the Appellate 
Body’s finding in United States – Clove Cigarettes, there also seems to be increas-
ing leeway under the condition of ‘less favourable treatment’ in Article 2.1 TBT 
to assess the effects of regulation on groups of imported products and put them 
in relation with a purported regulatory objective. It seems likely and reasonable 
that the solutions embraced under Article 2.2 TBT will serve as an inspiration 
for this purpose.
213  See for this approach the panel in United States – Clove Cigarettes (panel report), para 7.331, based on 
agreement among the parties.
214  See Ibid., para 7.431.
215  United States – Tuna III (Appellate Body report), para 323.
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 C Article 5.6 SPS Agreement
Article 5 SPS Agreement regulates the assessment of risk and 
the determination of the appropriate level of protection for so-called sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS). Article 5.6 SPS stipulates that WTO members 
are to ensure that SPS measures are ‘not more trade-restrictive than required 
to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking 
into account technical and economic feasibility’. The notion of ‘more trade-
restrictive than necessary’ is explained in footnote 3 to Article 5.6, which under-
lines that for a measure to fail this condition, there must be ‘another measure, 
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that 
achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is sig-
nificantly less restrictive to trade’.
The wording clearly suggests a necessity test, while the notion of alternative 
measures is qualified by the fact that technical and economic feasibility must be 
given. In addition, alternative measures must also fulfil the requirement not of 
being ‘significantly’ less trade-restrictive. The SPS Agreement thus prescribes 
by its explicit wording a necessity test with significant discretion to choose 
a specific measure for WTO members. Because of this explicit wording, it is 
rather difficult to suggest the introduction of proportionality stricto sensu at this 
occasion.216
The case law has also strongly supported the idea of a necessity test and in 
particular elaborated the concept of a WTO member’s level of protection. The 
Appellate Body thus used the footnote to Article 5.6 SPS to distinguish three 
different elements to be fulfilled: the reasonable availability in the light of 
economic and technological feasibility, the achievement of a WTO member’s 
chosen level of protection and a significantly lower negative effect on trade.217 
It defended the concept of the level of protection, rejecting alternatives if their 
potential to achieve the level of protection had not been demonstrated with 
scientific evidence.218 One of the panels has admitted that it may prove diffi-
cult to determine whether an alternative measure is able to achieve the WTO 
member’s chosen level of protection.219 This, however, could not relieve the 
panel of its burden; when it found alternative measures which could reduce 
216  See, however, L. Strack and P.-T. Stoll, ‘Article 5 SPS Agreement’ in R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll and A. 
Seibert-Fohr (eds.), WTO – Technical Barriers and SPS Measures (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 456 
para 65, who suggest that a test ‘similar’ to the principle of proportionality in EU law should apply. The 
predominant reliance on necessity in EU law (see chapter 6 section IV.A) is perhaps the reason for their 
suggestion.
217  Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon AB-1998-5, WT/DS18/AB/R, 6 November 1998, 
para 194.
218  Ibid., paras 210 ff. See also Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products AB-1998-8, WT/DS76/
AB/R, 22 February 1999, paras 8.83-8.84.
219  Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada WT/DS18/RW, 
18 February 2000, paras 7.128-7.131.
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the risk significantly and achieve the relevant member’s level of protection, the 
panel refrained from imposing one particular course of action on the member, 
but held that the relevant member could decide autonomously on the concrete 
set-up of the measure.220
The test chosen under Article 5.6 SPS is thus respectful of the explicit 
wording of the provision and links substantial respect for the level of protection 
chosen by a WTO member with a certain margin of manoeuvre given to the 
WTO member in the means it chooses to achieve that end.221
 D The Exceptions to the TRIPS Agreement
A different setting is presented by the TRIPS because of its 
different structure.222 Yet, at the same time there are also exceptions in the 
TRIPS Agreement which serve to strike a balance between the protection of 
intellectual property rights and public interests.223 As an example, Article 13 on 
copyrights provides:
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
Article 30 on exceptions to patents provides in addition that account should 
be taken of the ‘legitimate interests of third parties’.
As is discussed below, the case law has opted for a highly literal interpreta-
tion and created a three-step test, while voices in the doctrine have called for a 
more flexible test to account for the collision between intellectual property rights 
as values and other societal values.
 i. The test under the exceptions to the TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS exceptions have given room to the development of 
a test based on a highly literal interpretation. Panels224 have created a three-step 
test: limitations or exceptions introduced by WTO members must be confined 
to certain special cases; these cases must not conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the work; and as a third prong, they must not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder.225
220  Ibid., para 7.144. See also Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand 
AB-2010-2, WT367/DS/AB/R, 29 November 2010, para 363.
221  Ming Du, 1089.
222  See already section III.D.
223  C.M. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 135. Article 13 on copyrights, Article 17 on trademarks and 
Article 30 on patents can be named in that regard.
224  There is no Appellate Body report on this topic to date.
225  See for a detailed discussion Ibid., 146 ff.
326
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
In the application of this step-by-step test, panels have required the condi-
tions to be fulfilled cumulatively. The first step mostly requires a clearly defined 
exception whose scope of applicability is narrowly drawn.226 During the second 
step, the determination of what constitutes ‘normal exploitation’ of works is 
examined in the light of economic considerations.227 Under the third prong 
of the test, panels struggled both with the determination of what constitutes 
‘unreasonable’ prejudice228 and with the identification of the legitimate interests 
of the rights holder as well as the identification of interests that may justify a 
limitation in the first place.229
In Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, the panel defined legitimate interests 
as ‘a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are “justifiable” 
in the sense that they are supported by relevant public policies or other social 
norms’.230 However, it gave a more restrictive reading to the ‘legitimate interests’ 
of the rights-holder: the relevant claim had to rest on a ‘widely recognized policy 
norm’231 and had to be sufficiently ‘compelling’.232 As has been noted, the panel 
thereby introduced additional thresholds for the recognition of interests of 
rights holders, as such a ‘widely recognized policy norm’ must be grounded in 
the views of substantial number of countries worldwide and must also convey 
a certain importance.233 This feature immediately reminds us of the approach 
of the European Court of Human Rights when the existence of a ‘consensus’ is 
looked for.234 However, while in that case the Court simply narrows its standard 
of review if a consensus is found, in dispute settlement under the TRIPS Agree-
ment the existence of views of a substantial number of countries is the precondi-
tion for the recognition of a legitimate interest.
In United States – Copyrights, the panel held that the term ‘legitimate’ not 
only meant lawful from a positivist perspective, but also carried the mean-
ing of legitimacy in a normative perspective, which required the ‘protection 
of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that underlie the 
protection of exclusive rights’.235 While in the relevant case these interests were 
of an economic nature, the panel underlined that legitimate interests were not 
226  United States – Section 110(5) of United States Copyright Act WT/DS160/R, 15 June 2000, paras 6.108-
6.109.
227  Ibid., para 6.183. J.T. Füller, ‘Article 13 TRIPS’ in P.-T. Stoll, J. Busche and K. Arend (eds.), WTO – Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 283 para 14, criticizes 
that the panel refrained from suggesting general criteria to determine ‘normal use’.
228  Füller suggests that in any case limits to the full maximisation of profits for beneficiaries can be intro-
duced, Füller, 284 para 16.
229  Article 30 TRIPS expressly prescribes taking into account the ‘legitimate interests of third parties’.
230  Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000, para 7.69.
231  Ibid., para 7.77.
232  Ibid., para 7.82.
233  Pauwelyn, ‘Intellectual Property Disputes’, 405-406.
234  See chapter 5 section III.B.i.
235  United States – Copyright, para 6.224.
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necessarily limited to this category.236 In a later case, a panel then recognised 
the interest of consumer protection as legitimate for the justification of a limited 
exception to the rights of trademark holders which were based on the legitimate 
interest to protect the distinctiveness of their trademarks.237
 ii. Debate on a less rigid test under the exceptions provisions
Some authors have voiced concerns on the mechanistic appli-
cation of the three-step test which would cause a very narrow reading of the 
clauses on limitations and exceptions in particular in the field of copyrights.238 
A number of scholars have thus drafted a declaration requiring a change in the 
interpretation of the three-step test.239 Their claim is that an unduly narrow 
interpretation of the three-step test leads to an under-representation of the 
interests of the public at large to the benefit of right holders’ interests, which 
contradicts the balance of interests underlying intellectual property rights, the 
latter also being enshrined in Article 7 TRIPS.240 In particular interests enshrin-
ing fundamental rights and undue restrictions of competition that can arise 
out of the use of intellectual property rights must be appropriately accounted 
for in the framework of a test under the TRIPS exceptions.241 Consequently, the 
three-step test should in future be applied as a comprehensive overall assess-
ment; legislatures and courts should not be prevented from introducing open-
ended limitations and exceptions, and there should not be a conflict with the 
normal exploitation of works by such behaviour if the exceptions and limitations 
introduced are ‘based on important competing considerations’ or counter anti-
competitive effects of intellectual property rights use on secondary markets.242 
Next to human rights and competition, other values such as scientific progress 
and cultural, social or economic development should be accepted as public inter-
ests.243 This manner of applying the three-step test arguably suggests a holistic 
236  Ibid., para 6.227.
237  European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products 
and Foodstuffs WT/DS290/R, 15 March 2005, paras 7.668 and 7.676-7.677.
238  See e.g. Correa, 155.
239  See for the document www.ip.mpg.de/ww/en/pub/news/declaration_on_the_three_step_.cfm (access 
on 6 March 2012).
240  Declaration – A Balanced Interpretation of the „Three-Step Test“ in Copyright Law, 2. Article 7 provides 
as an objective that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should operate ‘in 
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare’ and lead to a ‘balance of rights and obligations’. 
The Doha Declaration on Public Health has also emphasized the need to read each TRIPS provision in 
the light of the objectives and principles of the Agreement, among which one can count Article 7, see 
S. Reyes-Knoche, ‘Article 30 TRIPS’ in P.-T. Stoll, J. Busche and K. Arend (eds.), WTO – Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 541 para 17.
241  Ibid., 2.
242  Ibid., 4-5.
243  Ibid., 5.
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weighing exercise.244 Concerns have also been voiced about the overreliance on 
the interpretative methods of ‘ordinary meaning’ and ‘context’ in the case law to 
the detriment of more integrative interpretation using Article 7 TRIPS under a 
more teleological construction based on the agreement’s ‘object and purpose’.245
Others, however, read the case law as striking an appropriate balance. 
For Pauwelyn, there is a difference in the drafting of the TRIPS limitations 
and exceptions as opposed to Article XX GATT, but still panels have usefully 
managed to bring into play public interests through the back door of legitimate 
interests of third persons.246 The functioning of the weighing exercise may be 
more limited through the step-by-step sequence of the three-step test than under 
Article XX GATT. In particular, if a measure is broad, it will not pass the first 
step, although a justification by a legitimate purpose may have existed. Further-
more, the weighing exercise itself was also narrowed down by the requirements 
imposed on legitimate interests of right holders by the panel in Canada – Phar-
maceutical Patents.247 But the exceptions do not serve as the only possibility 
to deviate from TRIPS obligations in order to pursue other public interests in 
Pauwelyn’s view. Unlike Article XX GATT, in TRIPS Article 27 (2), TRIPS also 
provides for exclusions to patentability if such an exclusion is required to protect 
‘ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment’. Article 6 TRIPS leaves 
the question of exhaustion of intellectual property rights untouched and thus 
gives scope for parallel imports. Article 7 and 8248 were not intended to ‘overrule’ 
other TRIPS provisions as the latter already constitute the result of a weighing 
exercise between competing public interests.249
Still, it can be argued that the exceptions and limitations provisions in 
TRIPS potentially cover a substantial range of domestic regulatory measures.250
In the light of these arguments, an ideal test under the TRIPS exceptions 
and limitations provisions has yet to see the light of day in the case law. At the 
theoretical level, however,  it appears  appropriate to note that the strict step-by-
step sequence of the analysis is, as the drafters of the declaration have found, 
244  Füller, 281 para 10, argues furthermore that a balancing formula such as a ‘rule of reason’ could also be 
acceptable, as long as it transparently sets out the interests to be balanced and is thus sufficiently certain 
as required by the first prong of the three-step test.
245  See, based on an empirical study of TRIPS case law, H.G. Ruse-Khan, ‘The (Non)Use of Treaty Object 
and Purpose in Intellectual Property Disputes in the WTO’ (2011) 11 Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law Research Paper 1, 33.
246  Pauwelyn, ‘Intellectual Property Disputes’, 410.
247  Ibid., 411.
248  Article 8 TRIPS allows WTO members to adopt measures ‘necessary to protect public health and nutri-
tion’ and measures to ‘prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights’, but prescribes that all such 
measures must be ‘consistent with the provisions’ of the TRIPS Agreement.
249  Pauwelyn, ‘Intellectual Property Disputes’ 412.
250  During the drafting process of TRIPS, there have even been attempts to codify a non-exhaustive list of 
permitted exceptions which can arguably be used as an inspiration, see Reyes-Knoche, 547 paras 28 ff.
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exaggerated textualism. Since the justification of judicial review under TRIPS 
does not seem conducive to highly intrusive review,251 intrusive proportional-
ity analysis arguably should not constitute the solution to all problems. There 
remains, however, some leeway to be used to loosen the three-step test. As an 
example, it appears conceptually difficult that a panel is called to assess whether 
an exception is sufficiently narrow in the absence of any benchmark. The provi-
sions of domestic law may be a starting point, but without a look at the purpose 
– the legitimate interest – pursued by a measure, a finding of narrowness can 
probably only be based on intuition in borderline cases. Suitability and necessity 
may help to identify ‘narrowness’ in such cases. The identification of ‘legitimate 
interests’ also seems somewhat over-restrictive. The need to identify a majority 
of countries with similar views risks locking in current views on the exploita-
tion of intellectual property rights and excluding legitimate interests based on 
majority views. Instead of a threshold approach to recognition, panels could take 
inspiration from the European Court of Human Rights at this point. Instead of 
excluding legitimate interests, they could adapt the standard of review based on 
whether a broad consensus exists. Legitimate interests which are not based on 
widely used policy norms would thus be subject to more intrusive scrutiny, but 
not excluded from the outset. Such renovations arguably do not overthrow the 
carefully negotiated balance of the TRIPS Agreement, but still give some more 
flexibility to the TRIPS Agreement.
 E Conclusion
Generally, panels and the Appellate Body have so far abstained 
from a clear engagement in proportionality stricto sensu in the interpretation of 
the WTO covered agreements. In the case of the SPS and TBT agreements, this 
seems based on clear textual exclusion of such a test (Article 5.6 SPS Agree-
ment) or at least textual elements that render such an interpretation less suitable 
(Article 2.2 TBT). The case of the TRIPS Agreement has presented adjudicators 
with the difficulty of a number of exceptions, which has led them to rather nar-
rowly construe the provisions in front of them. Article XX GATT as the central 
provision is a narrowly drafted provision for exceptions for certain public policy 
objectives. Its unsystematic and highly literal interpretation has not helped in 
allowing a coherent picture to emerge. Its wording, however, arguably does not 
exclude an interpretation along the lines of proportionality stricto sensu. The 
WTO judiciary has, however, embraced the rather blurry ‘weighing and balanc-
ing’ test, which in a rather obscure way puts in relation the value protected by 
regulation, the contribution of a measure towards the regulatory objective and 
the trade-restrictive effect, only to subsequently compare the measure to reason-
ably available alternatives.
Still, it should be noted that the prevailing necessity test on which the 
‘weighing and balancing’ test rests presents some positive features. Through 
251  See section III.D.
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the appropriate attribution of the burden of proof and the implicit adaptation of 
the standard of review under the ‘new approach’, the test effectively represents 
values at stake in a less hierarchical manner than e.g. under EU law. Earlier cate-
gorical exclusion of PPMs and extraterritorial measures has given way to more 
measured scrutiny in more recent case law. Still, the evident fear of proportion-
ality stricto sensu seems exaggerated in our view and not normatively justified, 
and the ‘weighing and balancing’ process remains to a large extent opaque and 
under-theorized.
 V Evaluation and Conclusion
In our contextual assessment, a historical overview shows 
that today’s dispute settlement system of the WTO is the result of a process 
of increasing ‘judicialisation’. However, as closer insights on the institutional 
balance and in particular the rationale and objectives of the dispute settlement 
system show, adjudication under WTO law generally remains a technical, trade-
focused process where specialized adjudicators can hardly feel legitimized in 
aiming for a quasi-constitutional approach of representing all interests equally 
in a balancing act. In our view, this explains to quite a great extent the reluc-
tance to engage in balancing or proportionality stricto sensu, without, however, 
justifying such reluctance normatively.
Pre-balancing for judicial review in WTO law has, in our view, yielded a 
result close to a model of special interest review. In the discussion in the case 
law, unfortunately, fairly few elements of procedural democracy can be found. 
The debate on national treatment under the GATT can be related to an overall 
debate on whether GATT should be read as an instrument containing rights. 
The actual case law and discussion of the standard of review, however, do not 
take up the idea of reading GATT as a rights instrument, and generally remain 
somewhat vague on the subject. In the case of the TRIPS Agreement, justifying 
judicial review because of the nature of intellectual property rights as aspects 
of property rights is not a highly convincing argument. The provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement already express a previous balance found between property 
rights as individual interests and public interests. The case for intrusive review 
using proportionality analysis thus seems weak, which has further bolstered our 
overall conclusion of pre-balancing for judicial review under WTO law resulting 
in a model of special interest review.
The overall reliance on necessity tests can generally be welcomed in this 
light. Under the ‘necessary’ condition of Article XX GATT, the Appellate Body’s 
‘weighing and balancing’ test is the central legal test. We have noted with 
approval that the operation of necessity has been adjusted to better represent 
both the interest of trade and of regulatory autonomy as compared to the restric-
tive version of necessity operating in EU internal market law. At the same time, 
older categorisations for PPMs and extraterritorial measures have been aban-
331
chapter 7 wto law
doned in the case law, leading to a more flexible scrutiny as compared e.g. to the 
scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause in United States constitutional 
law.
However, shortcomings remain. Panels and the Appellate Body seem to be 
using the flexibility of the ‘weighing and balancing’ test to obscure an unwill-
ingness to seriously consider proportionality stricto sensu, which in our view 
cannot be excluded absolutely, but should still play a role in a very limited set of 
cases under the model of special interest representation. Furthermore, many 
conceptual issues and the sequence of the ‘weighing and balancing’ test remain 
blurred by the constant repetition of the same formulas without clearly setting 
out e.g. how the standard of review changes according to the interests at stake.

International Investment Law
chapter 8
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 I Introduction
International investment law is a somewhat peculiar regime 
of international economic law.1 In principle, international investment law is 
based on the idea of providing standards of treatment and protection of foreign 
investment. The setting of judicial review in investment arbitration, however, 
features a remarkably prominent position given to investors as individuals who 
are able to bring host states before an arbitral tribunal to claim compensation for 
breaches of an investment protection obligation. At first glance, the analogy with 
human rights protection comes to mind, and one is tempted to draw compari-
sons with the protection of the right to property. Consequently, international 
investment law would probably feature as a model of equal representation review 
similar to the European Court of Human Rights. However, a closer look leads 
to the conclusion that the human rights review parallel is rather crude. When 
one looks more closely at the details, pre-balancing results rather in a model of 
special interest review.
Starting with the context, history as well as institutional characteristics and 
the political economy of investment arbitration point less towards a process of 
increasing judicialisation towards a quasi-constitutional regime of adjudication, 
but rather to a limited, technical task of finding treaty breaches and adjudicating 
the appropriate details of compensation – which in our view can be presented as 
the insurance contract perspective.
With this in mind, pre-balancing the justification of judicial review cannot 
easily be put on equal footing with the case of fundamental rights or human 
rights adjudication. The procedural democracy doctrine would justify intru-
sive review based on the violation of specific interests which are central to the 
democratic process. In the case of investment law, confusion and disagreement 
surrounds the very notion of investment, which is not clearly recognized as 
a public interest. The justification of judicial review could follow the lines of 
procedural democracy if international investment law is set up as regime that 
protects property rights as human rights. However, the functioning of invest-
ment arbitration casts severe doubt on this point.
In examining the case law, we find some references to proportionality 
analysis. However, there is no systematic test that has emerged. The case law is 
predominantly fact-specific and has only just begun to construct tests that are 
being taken up and repeated by other tribunals. As an early evaluation, we thus 
conclude that following a model of special interest representation, tribunals 
should refrain from frequent use of full-scale proportionality analysis, although 
it may be justified in situations where the interest of investment seems to be 
severely underrepresented in the domestic political process.
1  Many of the arguments presented in this chapter were already published in a shorter version in B Pirker, 
‘Seeing the Forest without the Trees – The Doubtful Case of Proportionality Analysis in International 
Investment Arbitration’, in: A Herwig, C Joerges and G Pavlakos (eds), Proportionality in a Post-National 
Context, forthcoming 2013.
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 II  The Broader Context of Judicial Review in International 
Investment Law
In the present section, insights into the historical development 
reveal that a narrative of continuous ‘judicialisation’ and constitutionalisation 
seem exaggerated. Furthermore, the institutional design of investment arbitra-
tion leaves some doubt as to whether arbitrators are well placed for full-scale pro-
portionality analysis. Eventually, the political economy of investment arbitration 
positions it closer to a bilateral, contractual mechanism for limited technical 
purposes than to quasi-constitutional adjudication. Some voices in investment 
arbitration would categorically exclude the use of full-scale proportionality by 
tribunals, because the latter would otherwise question a pre-established balance 
of interests laid down by the legislator or treaty-drafters.2 Without going that far, 
the broader context offers an explanation for a more cautious approach to pre-
balancing to establish the appropriate use of proportionality analysis by arbitral 
tribunals.
 A  The History of Judicial Review in International 
Investment Arbitration – Two Conflicting Narratives
Two narratives can be opposed here. On the one hand, one view 
describes the history of international investment law as a ‘progressive’3 develop-
ment towards judicialisation, institutionalisation and constitutionalisation. Such 
a progressive perspective would logically suggest the continuous development 
of interpretations along the lines of other, older constitutional regimes such as 
domestic constitutional legal systems. On the other hand, there are elements 
that suggest a less straightforward path calling into question the progressive 
narrative and with it the constitutionalisation objective of investment arbitration.
 i. The progressive narrative
The starting point of the international law on investment 
protection was concern about the protection of property and appropriate treat-
ment of a state’s nationals in another state. The use of international treaties for 
this purpose began in the late eighteenth century, when the United States in 
particular started to conclude treaties of ‘Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ 
with trading partner countries. These treaties focused on trade relations, but 
also included provisions granting ‘special protection’ to the property of inves-
2  See recently Abaclat and others (formerly Beccara and others) v. The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No 
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (4 August 2011), Dissent of Professor Abi-Saab 
(28 October 2011), para 251, where balancing is found to be ‘clearly ultra vires the powers of the Tribu-
nal’.
3  Term borrowed from A. Mills, ‘Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International 
Investment Law and Arbitration’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 469, 471.
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tors from the partner state, requiring the payment of compensation in cases of 
expropriation.4 Next to these treaties, there existed a general consensus as to the 
existence of a minimum standard of treatment for foreign investors anchored in 
customary international law.5
Yet, when these norms ought to have been put into practice in the case of a 
perceived violation, only diplomatic protection was available: the home state of 
an investor had to espouse the latter’s claim and address it by diplomatic means 
or with military force.6 The predominant view taken by capital-exporting states 
in the early 20th century was best described by the well-known Hull-formula: in 
case of expropriation, a state was required by customary international law to pay 
‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation to the foreign investor.7
After the Second World War and during the subsequent process of decolo-
nisation, newly independent countries and communist countries started a 
series of expropriations which were not accompanied by ‘prompt, adequate and 
effective’ compensation; this prompted capital-exporting states to look for a 
better way to protect their investors.8 As force was no longer permitted after the 
entry into force of the United Nations Charter and as customary international 
law provided only incomplete protection, developed countries opted for treaties.9 
The first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was signed in 1959 between Germany 
and Pakistan. However, these first attempts to protect investors by international 
treaties were not yet coupled with the aim of enforcing them by dispute settle-
ment, including interpretation of the treaty and judicial review of the host 
state’s regulatory actions. Instead, they served as political documents to support 
efforts of diplomatic protection.10 Since then, there has been a constant growth 
in the conclusion of BITs which led to some 2676 BITs in existence by the end 
of 2008.11 The 1990s have also seen the conclusion of regional agreements 
including provisions on investment protection, and a new tendency to conclude 
agreements mixing provisions on trade and on investment.12
4  K.J. Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005-2006) 12 UCDavis 
Journal of International Law and Policy 157, 158-159.
5  Ibid., 159.
6  A. Lehavi and A.N. Licht, ‘BITs and Pieces of Property’ (2011) 36 Yale Journal of International Law 115, 
121.
7  See on the emergence of this formula during the dispute over Mexican expropriation measures in the 
inter-War period A. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639, 644-645.
8  See for an overview of these waves of expropriation Lehavi and Licht, 120.
9  Vandevelde, 169.
10  T. Waelde, ‘Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples’ in C Binder and others (eds), 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century – Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 748.
11  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Recent Developments in International Invest-
ment Agreements (2008-June 2009)’ (2009) UN Doc UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8, 2.
12  See closer on NAFTA and other agreements of the ‘global’ age Vandevelde, 180 ff.
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In terms of judicial review, the paradigmatic change was introduced in the 
form of dispute settlement provisions in these BITs. BITs started to typically 
include the general and prospective consent to arbitration by a host state. As 
a consequence, investors could bring a claim directly to arbitration simply by 
offering their own consent, without the need to have their claim espoused by 
their home state. Arbitration clauses thus created a ‘whole new review mecha-
nism’ against actions of the host state.13 Typically, such clauses also designate 
framework rules according to which arbitration should proceed, the most 
commonly used being the rules and institutional mechanisms of the Interna-
tional Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).14 Also, as a 
common provision the need to exhaust local remedies is often excluded, giving 
the investor direct access to arbitration and the possibility to avoid allegedly 
biased domestic courts.15
The strengthened dispute settlement provisions and the increasing number 
of BITs led to an explosion of cases brought to arbitration from the late 1990s 
onwards. ICSID alone registered 351 cases by mid-2011, the majority of which 
were initiated after 1997.16
The growing amount of case law prompted tribunals to increasingly rely 
on a mild form of precedent in their decisions, referring to other tribunals’ 
decisions in their reasoning. Adopting a progressive perspective, a commen-
tator suggested that investment arbitration was moving towards a process of 
‘judicialisation’ which would result in system-building.17 Based on the fact that 
investment arbitration subjects the regulatory power of host states to the rules 
and constraints of investment treaties, a quasi-constitutional character was 
ascribed to such arbitration.18 According to this first narrative, investment law 
as a discipline is on a continuous path towards coherent, universal standards of 
investment protection and the strengthening of the rule of law, and is supported 
in this process by the increasingly self-stabilizing mechanism of investment 
arbitration.19
13  J. Wouters and N. Hachez, ‘The Institutionalization of Investment Arbitration and Sustainable Develop-
ment’ in M-C Cordonier Segger, MW Gehring and A Newcombe (eds), Sustainable Development in World 
Investment Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 718.
14  See concisely Ibid., 619.
15  S.W. Schill, ‘SystemŞBuilding in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking’ (2011) 12 German Law 
Journal 1083, 1089.
16  The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2011-2, available at www.icsid.org, 7.
17  Schill, 1088.
18  A. Newcombe, ‘Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law’ (2007) 8 Journal of World Invest-
ment & Trade 357, 366. See for a strong claim on the constitutionalisation of investment law P. Behrens, 
‘Towards the Constitutionalization of International Investment Protection’ (2007) 45 Archiv des Völkerre-
chts 153.
19  See also for an account based on the concept of global administrative law B. Kingsbury and S.W. Schill, 
‘Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerg-
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A progressive perspective on the development of international investment 
arbitration thus suggests that despite the fragmentary, bilateral origins a new, 
coherent system of international law is emerging, including an increasingly 
coherent system of judicial review. The more such a perspective is adopted, the 
more appropriate it might also seem to suggest that proportionality analysis is 
a key concept to be used in such an arbitration setting. Several authors argue 
thus in favour of proportionality analysis as a ‘rational’ process20 for weighing 
competing arguments21 in the interpretation of substantive standards of investor 
protection in BITs. Commentators welcomed proportionality analysis as a tool to 
improve the reasoning of tribunals, without necessarily clarifying why the use 
of proportionality analysis would automatically entail such an effect or whether 
alternative legal tests could play a more fruitful role in individual contexts.22 
Some doubts arise, however, on the straightforward development of judicial 
review that seems to stand behind such accounts. There is room for a second 
competing narrative, departing from which one can assess with more scepticism 
the institutional setting of investment arbitration and its political economy.
ing Global Administrative Law’ (2009) New York University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series Working Paper No 9-46 1.
20  B. Kingsbury and S.W. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regula-
tory Actions in the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality’ in S.W. Schill (ed.) International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 88. See also in the 
context of investment arbitration intersecting with the law on State immunity S.W. Schill, ‘International 
Investment Law and the Law of State Immunity: Antagonists or Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ in R. 
Hofmann and C.J. Tams (eds.), International Investment Law and General International Law – From Clini-
cal Isolation to Systemic Integration? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 258.
21  See also A. Stone Sweet, ‘Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier’ (2010) 4 Law & 
Ethics of Human Rights 46, 50.
22  A. Stone Sweet and F. Grisel, ‘Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to Constitution-
alization?’ in P.-M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 131. See also H. Xiuli, ‘The 
Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Law 635, 642; J. Krommendijk and J. Morijn, ‘’Proportional’ by What Measure(s)? Balancing 
Investor Interests and Human Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality Principle in Investor-State 
Arbitration’ in P.-M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Human rights in international 
investment law and arbitration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 442; C. Henckels, ‘Indirect 
Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review 
in Investor-State Arbitration’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 223, 228-229. See also in 
the context of the fair and equitable treatment standard R. Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in Inter-
national Investment Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 153, who admits at the same 
time that arbitrators’ personal views may play a role in the process of the weighing of competing claims.
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 ii. A less linear account
A progressive perspective on the development of international 
investment law and arbitration is only possible if some elements are left out of 
the picture. In bringing them back in, more concern arises on the fragmented 
nature of the international investment legal regime and its form of dispute set-
tlement, i.e. arbitration. The emergence of BITs can alternatively be understood 
as a reaction to the constant contestation of the claim that customary interna-
tional law provided for some particular level of protection of foreign investors. 
In light of this, it becomes necessary to re-examine the claims of a continuous 
judicialisation of investment arbitration, at least as far as the nature of judicial 
review in investment law is concerned.
In the early 20th century, Latin-American states in particular contested the 
prevalent view of capital-exporting states according to which there was a certain 
international minimum standard of treatment for aliens, in particular as regards 
fair treatment23 and the need to pay compensation at market value for expropri-
ated property. The obligation to compensate was particularly contested based on 
the doctrinal basis established by Calvo;24 only national treatment – i.e. treat-
ment comparable to that for nationals – should be granted to foreign investors.25
Renewed support for similar views became apparent in the above mentioned 
wave of expropriations, but also in efforts to create new rules. The capital-
exporting states’ efforts to create multilateral norms of investment protection 
were not crowned by success and led to the emergence of a strategy of bilateral 
law-making.26 By contrast, the newly independent developing and socialist 
countries tried to further establish their views in the framework of the United 
Nations, in particular by using their new majority in the General Assembly 
to adopt the Declaration of the New International Economic Order in 1974.27 
According to this resolution, full permanent sovereignty over a state’s resources 
included the right to nationalisation, while a duty to compensate or the details of 
compensation were not mentioned at all.28
23  See on this point the important case Neer v. Mexico Opinion, US-Mexico General Claims Commission, 
15 October 1926, 21 American Journal of International Law (1927) 555.
24  C. Calvo, Derecho Internacional Teórico y Práctico de Europa y América (Paris: D’Amyot e.a., 1868), paras 
170-171.
25  See closer on the discussion in particular between Mexico and the United States Guzman, 646. See 
on the two conflicting opinions concisely M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18. See also on the Calvo doctrine Sornarajah, 21.
26  See e.g. the unfinished International Law Commission project to codify a minimum standard of treat-
ment for foreign nationals in the 1950s, the failure of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protec-
tion of Foreign Property or the collapse of the negotiations of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 
the 1990s, see Mills, 474.
27  Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, General Assembly Resolution, U.N.Doc. A/
RES/3201(S-VI), 1 May 1974, reprinted in 13 International Legal Materials 1974, 715.
28  Vandevelde, 167. The earlier 1962 UN resolution on permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
had still required ‘appropriate’ compensation, while the 1973 resolution clarified that the amount and 
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This opposite view subsequently lost strength. Outright nationalisations 
became rare in the late 1970s, and the emergence of the Washington Consen-
sus and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a more wide-spread acceptance 
of foreign direct investment as a positive source for economic development, 
which also led to increasing signing of BITs.29 Still, contestation of the specific 
protection of investors by international law has not lost critics. On the contrary, 
the earlier division along North-South lines is becoming increasingly blurred as 
a result of increasing capital-export from former developing countries; simul-
taneously, criticism has also been voiced in academic and political circles of 
the ‘North’ against the special system of investment protection. The process of 
signing new BITs has, overall, also lost some of its speed in recent years.30 The 
potential restrictive effect of awards imposing high compensation payments on 
domestic regulatory autonomy was criticized.31 Linked to these public law effects 
of arbitration is the claim that the commercial arbitration setting of investment 
arbitration is unsuitable for the chosen task.32 The argument in favour of propor-
tionality analysis is, therefore, sometimes claimed to be grounded in an effort to 
lend additional output legitimacy to an adjudication system in crisis.33
Summing up, the fragmented way in which the investment regime evolved – 
i.e. mostly in bilateral treaties, interpreted and enforced by arbitration – arguably 
mirrors the described tensions between more investor-friendly positions and 
opponents who are worried about the loss of regulatory autonomy of host states. 
The development of judicial review in the international investment regime thus 
proves more complex than at first glance. The subsequent sections must accord-
ingly examine the institutional design and political economy of investment 
arbitration more closely.
 B  The Institutional Design of Judicial Review in Investment 
Arbitration
The central point of concern for many scholars in the cur-
rent regime of investment arbitration is the mixture of a setting of commercial 
arbitration with the substantially public-law-based issues that come before such 
adjudication. Elements that can be brought forward include, for instance, the 
manner of payment of compensation were for the national state to regulate, see Guzman, 649-650.
29  Lehavi and Licht, 124.
30  Z. Elkins, A. Guzman and B. Simmons, ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960-2000’ (2008) University of Illinois Law Review 265, 299.
31  Mills, 489.
32  Perhaps the strongest claim in this regard has been issued by G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 180 ff., who suggests that the present 
system of investment arbitration should be abandoned and that public courts staffed with permanent 
judges should replace it.
33  E. Leonhardsen, ‘Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ (2012) 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 95
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confidential setting of proceedings. Claims for more transparency have arisen 
as a consequence.34 Two main concerns, furthermore, relate more directly to the 
possibility of having recourse to proportionality analysis. First, representative-
ness of arbitrators is low. Second, the arbitration setting is likely to contribute to 
very low predictability if proportionality analysis is embraced.
On the first point, because a tribunal is created ad hoc for each dispute, arbi-
trators do not enjoy a security of tenure comparable to judges. They are chosen 
by the parties. This choice may take into account to what extent arbitrators are 
familiar with the socio-economic and legal background of a particular dispute. 
In practice, however, choice is predominantly based upon expertise in interna-
tional investment law and the political view that a particular potential arbitrator 
has expressed in the past in scholarly writings or legal practice, i.e. whether 
he or she has sided with host states or investors.35 This causes severe issues of 
independence of arbitrators, in particular since they themselves have an interest 
in being employed in future investment arbitration litigation, be it as counsel or 
arbitrator, and may be influenced in their decision-making.36
It also comes as no surprise that the representation of interests is not neces-
sarily balanced as far as the methods of interpretation of BITs are concerned. 
General studies of the interpretative methods used by tribunals demonstrated a 
tendency of tribunals to rely on teleological approaches, which leads to a rather 
investor-friendly reading of BITs because of the wording of preambles and 
objectives of BITs, which tend to describe foreign investment as a welcome and 
beneficial factor for economic development.37
For proportionality analysis, the main point of concern which follows out of 
these ad hoc appointments of experts in investment law is a high likelihood that 
arbitrators are not overly familiar with the social, economic and legal circum-
stances surrounding a particular dispute case. If proportionality analysis should 
be used, this lack of ‘embeddedness’ can render difficult the weighing between 
competing values in context. Context-sensitivity would be central to reach an 
informed result.38
34  See e.g. Mills, 485, or Wouters and Hachez, 630.
35  Wouters and Hachez, 628.
36  See concisely on this point G. Van Harten, ‘Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discus-
sion’ (2010) 2 Trade, Law and Development 14, 36-37.
37  See e.g. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, 138; Waelde, 732; see also on the narrow interpreta-
tion of exceptions to BIT obligations A. Newcombe, ‘General Exceptions in International Investment 
Agreements’ in M.-C. Cordonier Segger, M.W. Gehring and A. Newcombe (eds.), Sustainable Develop-
ment in World Investment Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 361 ff.
38  See on this point W.W. Burke-White and A. von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Sphere: The 
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 283, 336. 
Burke-White and von Staden suggest the margin of appreciation doctrine as a more useful test than 
proportionality analysis. It remains doubtful, however, why the problem of context sensitivity should not 
play out similarly under the margin of appreciation, because the latter requires a similar weighing of 
competing values. The only difference seems to be that the margin of appreciation adapts the standard 
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On the second point, the ad hoc setting of investment arbitration is likely 
to give rise to highly fragmented casuistic case law. The setting where only 
a solution to one dispute has to be found does not necessarily encourage the 
consideration of earlier case law and the search for some sort of coherence.39 The 
fragmented setting of arbitral tribunals adjudicating a multitude of only partly 
similar BITs is contrasted with the broad standards contained in these BITs, 
which gives the tribunals a large margin of discretion in interpretation. The 
tribunals’ adjudicative activity has correctly been qualified as ‘law-making’.40
For proportionality analysis, such a fragmented case law could increase the 
unpredictability of awards. If non-embedded tribunals were to decide every case 
from scratch, the task for non-embedded arbitrators becomes even more difficult 
because of their broad discretion.
Yet, at least this last point can be nuanced to a certain extent. Recent contri-
butions demonstrate that a mild form of precedent used by tribunals reduces 
to some extent the potential for fragmentation in the case law. First, the high 
amount of case law produces in itself a stabilizing effect for international invest-
ment law as a system.41 ‘Normative expectations’ are formed out of the exist-
ence of earlier case law for later cases.42 Second, based on this preceding case 
law, tribunals cite are citing other tribunals’ awards in their reasoning more 
and more to either support their own conclusions or to explain different solu-
tions. They do not ignore each other’s case law with the reference to the essen-
tially bilateral and separate nature of each dispute, as one might have feared.43 
Instead, some have described the phenomenon as a ‘burden of argumentation’ 
which shifts towards a tribunal that needs to justify an interpretation different 
from the one taken by previous tribunals, thereby necessarily engaging with the 
other tribunal’s view. 44
Still, despite these developments it appears overrated to read judicial review 
in investment arbitration as necessarily aimed at the development of universal 
standards of investor protection. In comparison, the European Court of Human 
Rights45 has a role in aiming for common minimum standards of human rights 
protection, which strengthens its mandate for judicial review.46 The stabilizing 
of review before proportionality analysis is undertaken. The same problem thus arises at an earlier level. 
See similarly sceptical on the institutional capacities of investment arbitration Henckels, 244.
39  See on this point Schill, ‘System-Building and Lawmaking’, 1104.
40  See Ibid., 1092, and Burke-White and von Staden, 336.
41  Wouters and Hachez, 634.
42  Schill, ‘System-Building and Lawmaking’, 1106.
43  Ibid., 1104.
44  T. Kleinlein, ‘Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint? The Potential of Balancing in International 
Economic Law’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1141, 1143.
45  See chapter 5 section III.A.
46  A similar argument has already been made in the doctrine when rejecting inspiration from the case law 
of the ECtHR for investment tribunals, compare J.E. Alvarez and K. Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and 
Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime’ in K.P. Sauvant (ed.) Yearbook on 
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effect of the use of precedent in investment arbitration should not, however, be 
easily conflated with this treaty-based mandate. The fragmented nature of the 
investment regime has already been explained as based on the disagreement 
over fundamental issues of investor protection, including the nature of invest-
ment arbitration. As one scholar puts it, there is room to perceive investment law 
and arbitration as a process of ‘global harmonisation and systematisation’, but 
also to conceive it as ‘essentially bilateral’ and ‘quasi-contractual’.47
As a consequence, institutional elements rather explain how over-reliance 
on proportionality analysis could prove more damaging than beneficial in terms 
of results. The subsequent section adds some more insights into the political 
economy of investment protection by arbitration, which reinforces the impres-
sion that arbitration serves a rather specific, technical purpose of providing 
compensation, which again seems rather to suggest judicial self-restraint in the 
interpretation of BITs by arbitral tribunals.
 C  The Political Economy of International Investment Law 
and Judicial Review
In order to fully understand international investment law and 
arbitration as mechanisms for the protection of investments, some elements of 
political economy prove insightful. Substantially, two perspectives on the invest-
ment regime can be taken: both suggest that investment law is aimed at provid-
ing improved property protection and thereby promoting investment. One line 
of thought furthermore perceives investment law and arbitration as a promoter 
of good governance and the rule of law in particular in developing countries. A 
different line of thought suggests that investment treaties and arbitration func-
tion more as an insurance policy for the investor and are less linked to domestic 
institutional reform than to the determination of a breach and the consequent 
determination of compensation. Both claims are examined below in light of 
empirical observations on the effect of BITs and arbitration and on the remedies 
typically provided in BITs.
As a starting point, however, the basis of the view of BITs as providing a 
form of insurance against detrimental host state behaviour should be set out 
in more detail. The obsolescing bargaining theory has been advanced as one 
central economic rationale for BITs.48 According to this theory, a multinational 
company planning to invest in a country and the country itself have divergent 
International Investment Law & Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008-2009), 444-445, or S.R. 
Ratner, ‘Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law’ 
(2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 475, 500.
47  Mills, 480.
48  There are two scholars predominantly cited as the first to bring up the theory, see R. Vernon, Sovereignty 
at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1971); and T. Moran, 
Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1974).
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interests. Initially the host state has a strong incentive to attract investment 
and the resources such as capital, technology or expertise connected to it. The 
investor is thus in a situation of power for an initial bargaining of investment 
conditions. After the investment is made, however, the balance shifts in favour 
of the host state, who can now subject the investment to regulation and seek rent 
or expropriate if desired. In order to reduce this risk of deteriorating investment 
conditions for the investor and to improve the initial package of conditions for 
the investor, host states may add protection through a BIT. The latter can then 
be understood as a sort of insurance which should render credible the host 
state’s commitment refraining from unfair or detrimental treatment of the 
investor in the future.49
Based on this insight, it is generally claimed that BITs and investment 
arbitration operate to improve the conditions for investment. As a consequence, 
investment influx into a country should be favourably influenced by the signing 
of a BIT.
However, studies on this effect show conflicting results.50 The possibility 
to grant better property rights protection to potential direct investors is often 
advanced as one of the main explanations for BITs.51 Countries thus sign BITs 
in a competitive effort to reach agreements with the most promising partners. 
Both the earlier spread of BITs and the more recent decrease can be explained in 
terms of increasing saturation of the market for investment capital protection.52
Looking more closely at the empirical effects on domestic institutions, one 
central justification for the investment law regime is the improvement of domes-
tic institutions which can result from the review exercised by arbitral tribunals. 
Faced with the threat of being punished for unfair treatment of investors by 
domestic institutions such as courts or administrative authorities, host states 
would have an incentive to improve governance, the rule of law and the quality 
of their institutions.53
49  Lehavi and Licht, 125.
50  See a study finding positive effects e.g. T. Büthe and H.V. Milner, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Foreign Direct Investment: A Political Analysis’ in K.P. Sauvant and L.E. Sachs (eds.), The Effect of 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Invest-
ment Flows (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 214. See for a far more sceptical appraisal J. 
Yackee, ‘Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link between Investment Treaties and Foreign 
Direct Investment’ in K.P. Sauvant and L.E. Sachs (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 391, who suggests the correlation is substantially weaker and mostly holds true 
for countries with low investment risk.
51  Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 297.
52  Ibid., 298.
53  See e.g. S.D. Franck, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law’ 
(2006) 19 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 337, 365. See also Schill, ‘System-
Building and Lawmaking’, 1085.
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Yet, some concerns remain about this suggestion. Because they typically 
contain a clause excluding the need to exhaust local remedies, BITs often func-
tion as an alternative form of dispute resolution that allows an investor to avoid 
the domestic judiciary.54 The possibility for circumvention of domestic justice, 
however, strongly suggests that there is even less of an incentive for host states 
who have problems with governance and the rule of law to invest in improve-
ment. Investors as potentially powerful economic and political players could 
act as a catalyst for reform, but with the alternative of BIT arbitration available 
to them they have no incentive to act in the domestic setting, and local politi-
cal forces are also less likely to see the need for judicial reform.55 Some have 
countered that there may be a possibility for a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between 
domestic courts and international arbitration, the former emulating the quality 
of decision-making of the latter and thereby improving its own quality.56 Given 
the highly specialized and confidential nature of investment arbitration, one 
may, however, wonder whether such a relationship is a truly realistic assump-
tion. Consequently, the exclusion of local remedies does not support the rule-of-
law narrative for investment arbitration.
A second element to be taken into account is the system of remedies 
provided for and commonly used in investment law. General international law 
typically foresees restitution as one central remedy for breaches of international 
law.57 In international investment law, compensation is predominant. As studies 
show, there are occasionally remarks by tribunals on other possible remedies.58 
The vast majority of awards, however, goes straight to compensation and does 
not even bother to discuss other remedies, which are also hardly ever addressed 
by the parties to the dispute.59 Strictly legally speaking, a good argument can be 
made for other remedies; there is no convincing reason why the rules of general 
law should not apply in the context of investment arbitration in the absence of 
54  Some scholars already develop ideas of abandoning such clauses, see Wouters and Hachez, 636.
55  T. Ginsburg, ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Governance’ (2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 107, 119.
56  Franck, 372.
57  See the fundamental findings of the Permanent Court of Justice in Factory at Chorzow Judgment of 
13.9.1928, PCIJ Series A, No 17, p. 47. The 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility drafted by the 
International Law Commission also foresee a primary duty of restitution for a State breaching an inter-
national obligation, unless it is materially impossible or implies efforts out of all proportion, see Article 
35 of the Draft Articles.
58  See for examples S. Hindelang, ‘Restitution and Compensation – Reconstructing the Relationship in 
Investment Treaty Law’ in R. Hofmann and C.J. Tams (eds.), International Investment Law and General 
International Law – From Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 176 ff.
59  Ibid., 175.
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explicit provisions regulating the issue.60 As a consequence, there are indeed 
claims to bring restitution back into the picture as a possible remedy.61
However, there are some practical reasons of political economy which 
explain the focus on compensation and also strengthen the insurance policy 
narrative of investment arbitration. In practice, it should be noted that BIT viola-
tions are normally very grave for an investment and often lead to its termina-
tion. In the situation of investment arbitration, the investor has typically already 
left the country and is simply looking for compensation to limit the economic 
damage suffered by the failed investment. Host states similarly are likely to be 
reluctant to consider restitution as a remedy, since their unwillingness to comply 
with investment protection rules is the very starting point of creation of the 
whole system of BITs and arbitration.62
Consequently, while there may be a legal leeway for the introduction of 
restitution, in practice investment arbitration seems to be perceived and used by 
the participants much more with the insurance policy mindset described before. 
The above mentioned removal of the duty to exhaust local remedies speaks out 
even more strongly in favour of this suggestion: The clause which removes this 
duty was qualified as ‘over-inclusive’, because it typically acts for both conclud-
ing states, despite the fact that often one developed country as a treaty party will 
possess a quite well-developed domestic judicial and administrative system.63 
Reading BITs and arbitration through the ‘insurance’ lens, however, the clause 
makes more sense: It simply alleviates the burden on the investor to cash in the 
insurance premium by removing an otherwise cumbersome obligation imposed 
on the investor. Even the one-way setting of investment arbitration, which only 
allows the investor to bring the host state before a tribunal, supports this view.64
As a result, arbitrators’ main task seems to consist mostly in determining a 
violation and finding appropriate compensation than in re-assessing the balanc-
ing of interests undertaken by a legislator or administrator in order to suggest a 
‘better’ balance. Both the rule of law claim and claim of restitution as a central 
remedy having failed, the political economy of investment arbitration seems to 
rest primarily on the idea of an insurance contract. Judicial review thus func-
tions predominantly with the idea of providing appropriate compensation ex post 
to investors in particular cases.
60  A. van Aaken, ‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State 
Liability – A Functional and Comparative View’ in S.W. Schill (ed.) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 733.
61  Hindelang, 198; see also van Aaken, 749.
62  A. Kulick, ‘Book review, Stephan W. Schill (ed.). International Investment Law and Comparative Public 
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 917, 923.
63  Van Harten, ‘Five Justifications for Investment Treaties’, 34.
64  Ibid., 37.
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 D Conclusion
The context of judicial review in investment arbitration thus 
showed that such arbitration tends to follow a rather narrow mandate with a 
technical focus on investment protection. Some claim, based on a progressive 
perception of the development of judicial review in international investment 
law, that investment arbitration is on a continuous path from the early begin-
nings towards the creation of a fully judicialized system protecting universal 
standards of treatment for investors in host states. A closer look at the history 
and its inconsistencies reveals that there is a second narrative which accounts 
partly for the fragmented nature of the investment regime; a history that is 
marked by bilateral treaty-making and only partial judicialisation in the form of 
arbitral tribunals. Consequently, upon closer examination some further concern 
on such claims arise. First, the institutional setting is not necessarily suited to 
the comprehensive use of proportionality analysis, in particular because of the 
use of non-tenured arbitrators who are not necessarily sufficiently embedded in 
the social, economic and legal background of a case to undertake an informed 
balancing exercise of competing claims. Second, the political economy of invest-
ment arbitration does not point towards review for the purpose of improvement 
of domestic institutions in a host state or the promotion of a global rule of law 
and investment protection minimum standards. Instead, it seems to pursue the 
logic of an insurance policy for investors which offers the determination of a 
breach and calculation of compensation ex post, exemplified by the predominant 
use of compensation as a remedy by tribunals. This limited mandate resulting 
from the factual context of investment arbitration should, in our view, be taken 
into account in our subsequent discussion of pre-balancing and the justification 
of judicial review.
 III  The Justification of Judicial Review in International 
Investment Law
To date investment tribunals have not expressly addressed the 
question as to what extent they perceive their exercise of judicial review as justi-
fied based on grounds of the procedural democracy doctrine. However, some of 
the doctrinal debate and a few implicit statements in the case law provide some 
guidance on this point. There is considerable definitional vagueness on whether 
investment should be perceived as a public interest itself, or whether the whole 
investment law regime should operate as a sort of property rights protection 
regime. In light of some doubts, we conclude that again, a model of special 
interest review appears to offer the more appropriate solution as the result of 
pre-balancing.
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 A Investment as a Public Interest
The clear identification of public interests is crucial in the 
application of proportionality analysis. Investment law is, however, a field that 
suffers from under-definition of the public interests underlying it. Part of the 
problem is the hybrid nature of a field of international law that gives prominent 
place to private individuals as opposed to states.
On the side of investors, much seems to remain unsaid on the exact nature 
of the interest behind the regime of investment protection. Despite the fact that 
there seems to be increasing adherence to the statement that investment law is 
indeed a public law regime and opposes – to a certain extent – ‘public’ interests, 
what stands behind investment law remains somewhat mysterious.65
To what extent should investment be understood as a public interest? 
The debate on the notion of investment itself demonstrates that there is still 
no consensus. While this debate focuses on the potential reach of the ICSID 
Convention itself, implicitly it shows that some would rather see any form of 
commercial interest protected as an investment. Others would require that an 
investment contribute and participate to the development of the economy of the 
host state in some way –thereby arguably introducing a public interest dimen-
sion through the criterion of a contribution to the economy. In the case law, the 
Salini decision has added to the definition of what qualifies as an investment 
a criterion of contribution to the economic development of the host state.66 A 
number of tribunals subsequently took up this approach in order to restrict 
the scope of what should qualify as an investment.67 However, other tribunals 
rejected the Salini test or gave it less weight,68 and the criterion of a contribution 
to economic development is also contested in the doctrine.69
The above mentioned debate focuses, however, on the jurisdictional reach 
of ICSID and investment arbitration at large. In the substance of international 
investment law, there seems to be, by contrast, a tendency to easily assume 
between the lines a property protection rationale for investment protection. This 
assumption begs the question of whether the rather crude and general stan-
dards of protection for investors can truly be equated with the right to property 
as enshrined in various domestic constitutions and international human rights 
treaties.70
65  Kulick, 920.
66  Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No ARB/00/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (23 July 2001), para 52.
67  See with references to case law D.A. Desierto, ‘Development as an International Right: Investment in 
the New Trade-Based IIAs’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 296, 302 ff.
68  Ibid., 307 ff.
69  See, based on the travaux préparatoires of the ICSID Convention, J.D. Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of 
‘Investment’: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard 
International Law Journal 257.
70  Sceptical on this point M. Perkams, ‘The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public 
Law – Searching for Light in the Dark’ in S.W. Schill (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative 
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One of the consequences of this non-conceptualisation is unsatisfactory case 
law. The tendency by tribunals to rely on investment-friendly preambles and 
objectives of BITs to arrive at pro-investor interpretations of BIT provisions can 
be mentioned in this regard.71 Also, debate continues on the question to whom 
rights contained in BITs pertain. Some argue that investors possess ‘direct’ 
rights,72 while others suggest that investors only bring claims based on rights 
still owned by their home state.73 Again, this controversy shows that the hasty 
equation of BIT rights with property rights is difficult to sustain.
The fuzziness of what interest ‘investment’ should constitute also becomes 
problematic for proportionality analysis, as balancing requires clearly defined 
rights and public interests. A conceptualisation along the lines of property rights 
may be appealing at first glance, but is not convincing upon closer examination.
 B Investment Law as a Regime Protecting Property Rights
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for a value 
underlying international investment law is the protection of property as a right. 
The standard on expropriation immediately comes to mind and is subsequently 
discussed as to the possible parallels with rights protection and the justification 
of judicial review under the procedural democracy doctrine.
The reach and contours of the obligations contained in the expropriation 
standard are far from settled. Still, it can be argued that expropriation comes 
closest among all the other standards of protection to the content of a funda-
mental right in the form of the right to property. In the case law, scholars have 
found that tribunals engaged in a veritable ‘property discourse’ in the adjudica-
tion of expropriation cases.74
The protection of property is not necessarily a central right in the procedural 
democracy justification of judicial review, as its relation to the political process is 
not as direct as e.g. in the case of the right to free assembly. Still, in principle as 
a fundamental rights violation it could qualify, depending on the prevailing view 
of what rights merit special protection and intrusive review in a specific legal 
regime. By way of example, the European Court of Human Rights perceived 
the protection of property rights as so important that it extended its review to 
require positive measures from states to protect private property.75 By contrast, 
Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 148.
71  See for an insight into economic theory underlying the favourable view on foreign direct investment 
Sornarajah, 48 ff.
72  See e.g. Hindelang, 195.
73  Typically, the view of the tribunal in The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States 
of America ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (26 June 2003), para 233, is cited as support for this 
hypothesis.
74  Lehavi and Licht, 131.
75  See chapter 5 section III.C.ii.
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under its categorical approach, the United States Supreme Court grants only low 
protection through deferent review to economic rights.76
There could thus be a need for virtual representation by judicial review in 
light of the failure of the democratic process in a host state. Investors could typi-
cally develop the argument that they do not have nationality in the host state and 
therefore cannot participate sufficiently in domestic decision-making processes 
– assuming the latter’s democratic character. This argument has been used e.g. 
by the tribunal in the Tecmed case.77 One may already have doubts at the practi-
cal level whether political participation by means of voting as a national is the 
only form of representation of interests for foreign investors. Typically, influence 
is also gained e.g. by setting up a subsidiary in the host state,78 or by means of 
lobbying power as a company and sometimes as an important employer.79
While the use of the concept of property may thus point in the direction 
of something equivalent to fundamental rights protection, in practice a look 
towards the broader context of investment arbitration casts doubt upon this 
assumption. First, the way in which investment arbitration offers access to 
justice differs fundamentally from the situation of fundamental or human 
rights protection. The basis of claims brought before an arbitral tribunal is the 
possession of an investment, which draws a rather narrow circle of economic 
actors that are actually eligible to be protected in the form of virtual representa-
tion of their interests under investment arbitration.80 Investors may represent 
a minority whose interests may have been overlooked by a majority in a legisla-
tive or administrative process. But the similarity with virtual representation of 
fundamental or human rights interests stops there. Looking at the content of 
investors’ rights, the latter do not possess a right to property based on the BIT, 
but rather may simply insist on the respect of the general obligations – here the 
conditions for lawful expropriation – laid down in said treaty. The systems of 
protection thus differ from one another, as can also be seen by the conditions of 
a breach and the remedies.81
76  See chapter 4 section III.A.ii.
77  See the detailed discussion of the case in section IV.A.ii.c. See also the tribunal in Joseph Charles Lemire 
v. Ukraine ICSID Case No ARB/06/18, Award (28 March 2011), para 57: ‘Foreigners, who lack political 
rights, are more exposed than domestic investors to arbitrary actions of the host State and may thus, as a 
matter of legitimate policy, be granted a wider scope of protection.’
78  See also Perkams, 111 footnote 16.
79  The tribunal in Lemire v. Ukraine strikingly seems to admit this point between the lines in its discussion 
as to whether a foreign investor is less privileged in a national public procurement administrative proce-
dure, as the investor does not have the ‘political clout’ and contacts that local economic operators may 
have. As a consequence, in its view investment arbitration and its additional protection should simply 
help to achieve a ‘level playing field’, Lemire v. Ukraine, paras 64-65.
80  J.D. Taillant and J. Bonnitcha, ‘International Investment Law and Human Rights’ in M.-C. Cordonier 
Segger, M.W. Gehring and A. Newcombe (eds.), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 76-77.
81  J. Pauwelyn, Optimal protection of international law : navigating between European absolutism and Ameri-
can voluntarism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 145, points out that generally inter-
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Second, investment arbitration does not seem to offer virtual representation 
because of the lack of subsidiarity of the protection it grants. Typically, BITs 
exclude the need to exhaust domestic legal remedies.82 Consequently, they offer 
a way to avoid the domestic judiciary rather than an additional access to justice 
once all domestic remedies have been used.83 The protection of investment 
arbitration therefore seems to operate following the idea of an insurance policy,84 
while in most contexts of human or fundamental rights the system of protec-
tion operates in a subsidiary manner; only when mechanisms of protection at 
the domestic or lower level fail does protection by judicial review intervene in a 
subsidiary manner based on the idea of virtual representation.85
Summing up, even though BIT provisions on expropriation may resemble 
human or fundamental rights provisions on property protection, some concep-
tual differences remain. The justification for judicial review is thus not similarly 
compelling. In our view, this failed equation further supports a limited justifica-
tion for review in investment arbitration and as a result use of proportionality 
analysis close to a model of special interest representation.
 C Conclusion
The main difficulty in assessing the justification of judicial 
review in investment arbitration lies in the vagueness of the values underly-
ing the investment legal regime. It is unclear whether investment is a public 
interest. The debate on the Salini test shows that there is no unanimous view on 
a possible public interest dimension of investment. Another possibility would be 
to read a right of property into the investment legal regime. The rules on expro-
priation seem to partly point in that direction. Yet, a closer look reveals that 
their rationale seems more limited and in particular virtual representation is 
difficult to transpose conceptually to the context of investment arbitration. Other 
standards provide context to the level of protection that investors should enjoy, 
but fail to convince as rights of their own comparable to fundamental or human 
rights. Consequently, we conclude that pre-balancing yields a result close to 
a model of special interest representation for investment arbitration.86 The 
subsequent assessment shows that indeed, tribunals have not widely engaged in 
proportionality analysis. However, there are various references to ‘proportional-
national investment law rules constitute liability rules rather than property rules, which means that 
they encourage ‘efficient breach’ as long as appropriate compensation is paid. The case of expropriation 
provisions is particularly compelling: If compensation is paid, such expropriation is typically not even 
considered a breach of treaty.
82  See discussion in section II.C.
83  See also Wouters and Hachez, 635.
84  See section II.C.
85  See e.g. on subsidiarity of the European Court of Human Rights chapter 5 section II.B.
86  A similar recommendation to use a deferent standard of review and rely on proportionality stricto sensu 
only in a ‘residual’ manner is embraced by Henckels, 240 and 253-254.
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ity’, which can be criticized in our view because it is difficult to see what exact 
test they refer to.
 IV  ‘Proportionality’ and Similar Tests in International 
Investment Law
The present section assesses the norms used and the interpre-
tation of the latter by arbitral tribunals to examine to what extent tribunals used 
proportionality analysis and similar tests. For this purpose, we discuss norms 
and case law under the standards of expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, 
national treatment, non-precluded measures clauses and – as a rather recent 
development – general exceptions clauses which are modelled after similar pro-
visions in the GATT and the GATS. We discover that there are some references 
to ‘proportionality’ and ‘reasonableness’ in the case law. However, the legal tests 
used are often not expressly set out, while mostly fact-based reasoning decides 
the question. We conclude that there emerges a need to spell out more clearly to 
what extent proportionality analysis is used.
 A Expropriation
As a consequence of the idea of territorial sovereignty, states are 
generally considered to have the right to expropriate private property, be it that 
of foreigners or of their citizens. International investment law did not funda-
mentally change this view, but instead added additional rules to delimit ‘lawful’ 
from ‘unlawful’ expropriation and to ensure that compensation is paid to an 
investor in all cases of expropriation.
 i.  Norms on expropriation and the concepts of direct and 
indirect expropriation
The typical norm for this purpose is a provision on expropria-
tion which puts up certain conditions for expropriation to be ‘lawful’. Conditions 
for such lawful expropriation are ‘usually’87 accepted as the following:
•	 A measure expropriating an investor must pursue a legitimate public 
purpose.88
•	 A measure must not cause discrimination or be applied in an arbitrary 
way.
•	 A certain minimum standard of treatment and due process is some-
87  A. Salazar, ‘NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Counter-Advertising Law’ 
(2010) 27 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 31, 50.
88  Tribunals generally tend to accept a purpose claimed by a regulating state. In ADC v. Hungary, the 
tribunal stated rather generously that ‘some genuine interest of the public’ would be sufficient, ADC v. 
Hungary ICSID Case No ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal (2 October 2006), para 432.
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times set out as a separate requirement, although it can also be under-
stood as part of the condition of non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary 
treatment.89
•	 In order to be lawful, expropriation must be accompanied by prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation.
BITs, but also regional investment agreements such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enshrine these requirements in one form or anoth-
er.90 Expropriation which fulfils the above requirements is ‘lawful’ and does 
not constitute a breach of the relevant treaty. While in earlier days the distinc-
tion between lawful and unlawful was discussed as relevant for the applicable 
standard of compensation, more recently standards of compensation tend to be 
set out explicitly in BITs. The relevance of this differentiation and the related 
discussion in the doctrine and the case law therefore lost momentum.91
The debate therefore concerns  the boundaries of the definition for so-called 
indirect expropriation. In earlier days expropriation typically took the form 
of direct expropriation by means of administrative decrees or similar formal 
acts.92 In the majority of cases nowadays, the entitlement of an investor to his 
property remains intact, but action by the host state largely deprives the inves-
tor of the possibility to use the investment or interferes in another way with its 
substance.93 The term of indirect expropriation was coined for such expropria-
tory measures. As a problem, host states are likely not to recognize the expro-
priatory character of their action and deny the payment of compensation.
As a reaction to claims for compensation, host states bring forward the 
concept of ‘police powers’. This label comprehends regulatory measures taken by 
states to protect and further public welfare.94 The present situation in the case 
law is perhaps best summed up by using two issues on which tribunals disa-
gree in various combinations. First, there is disagreement on whether ‘police 
89  R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 91.
90  Article 6(1) of the United States’ model bilateral investment treaty of 2004 provides a good example: 
‘Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through 
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”), except: 
for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum Standard of Treat-
ment] (1) through (3).’
91  C. McLachlan, L. Shore and M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 331.
92  Ratner, 476-477.
93  Dolzer and Schreuer, 92.
94  The term was used and recognized as a principle in customary international law for example by the 
tribunal in Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic Partial Award (UNCITRAL Rules, 17 March 2006) 
18(3) World Trade and Arbitration Materials 166, paras 258 resp. 262. As Krommendijk and Morijn, 434, 
show, this basic idea found entry in a number of revised texts of model bilateral investment treaties and 
newly concluded treaties.
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powers’, also referred to as ‘bona fide’ regulation, should ever give rise to a duty 
to compensate95 or whether this could be the case if a strong negative effect on 
the property at issue is exerted. Second, tribunals are divided over the question 
whether only the effect of regulation should matter or whether other factors – 
in particular the public interest pursued by a host state’s measure – should be 
considered as well.96
 ii. Legal tests developed under expropriation provisions
Indirect expropriation cases have become the main arena for 
the development of legal tests close to proportionality. In situations of indirect 
expropriation a central role is played by the regulatory purpose of the measure.
Substantially, tribunals developed three different ways to decide cases. In a 
first line of cases, tribunals focus on the effect of regulatory measures, attrib-
uting expropriatory character to them by degree. In a second line, tribunals 
exclude a whole category of measures from the reach of expropriation and the 
connected duty to compensation, using a definitional approach to ‘police powers’ 
measures or ‘bona fide’ regulation. In a third line of cases, tribunals take into 
account regulatory purpose, but also inquire into the relationship between the 
negative effect on investment and the beneficial effects of regulation. Propor-
tionality-based tests have emerged in this third category.
Subsequently, a first section briefly presents the case law of the so-called 
‘sole effects’ doctrine and the definitional approaches to ‘police powers’ mea-
sures. Then, the case law resorting to more elaborate proportionality reasoning 
is examined.
a. The ‘sole effects’ doctrine
A variety of cases can be found which see indirect expropriation as a thresh-
old issue for which a certain degree of effect on the investment must be reached. 
The perhaps most striking ruling can be found in Santa Elena, where a tribunal 
sharply excluded the consideration of the regulatory purpose of measures. It 
held that expropriation measures for environmental purposes such as the one at 
issue might be ‘laudable and beneficial to society as a whole’; however, the exist-
95  Early on, there were attempts to codify this concept. See for such an attempt the Harvard Draft Conven-
tion on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens: According to its Article 10(5), 
an uncompensated taking of property should not be considered wrongful in certain situations, among 
which we find the ‘action of the competent authorities of the State in the maintenance of public order, 
health or morality’ or other effects which are ‘incidental to the normal operation of the laws of the 
State’. The powers specified must not, however, be used in an abusive manner to deprive a foreigner 
of his property. For a commented version of the Harvard Convention see L.B. Sohn and R.R. Baxter, 
‘Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens’ (1961) 55 American Journal of 
International Law 545, 554.
96  These two cleavages are succinctly pointed out by Perkams, 111.
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ence of a public purpose for the taking could not change the ‘legal character’ of 
the measure as expropriation for which compensation had to be paid.97
Similarly, in Metalclad, the tribunal stated that it ‘need not decide or consider 
the motivation or intent of the adoption’ of the environmental decree at issue.98 
In Siemens, the tribunal did not accept Argentina’s argument referring to the 
consideration of regulatory purpose because the treaty clause only spoke of indi-
rect expropriation as to its effects without mentioning the intent of the govern-
ment.99
Instead of taking into account regulatory purpose, tribunals focused on the 
threshold for expropriation to exclude regulatory measures from the reach of 
the duty to compensate linked to expropriation. The tribunal in Metalclad took 
a broad approach to expropriation and held that serious restrictions of the use 
of an investment could amount to expropriation.100 Later tribunals, however, 
refused to adopt such a broad concept of indirect expropriation. In SD Myers, the 
tribunal found that, usually, the case law did not treat regulation as amounting 
to expropriation. This was due to the fact that in most cases, regulation would 
not involve a sufficient degree of interference.101 The tribunal in Pope & Talbot 
admitted that regulation might interfere with an investor’s operations, but that 
a mere loss of profits would not be sufficient to reach the threshold of expropria-
tion. Instead, the arbitrators suggested that interference must be sufficiently 
restrictive as regards the overall control of the investment and affect day-to-day 
operations.102
In Spyridon Roussalis, the tribunal found the regulatory purpose of a state 
‘relevant but [...] not decisive’, only to subsequently quote an earlier tribunal’s 
decision that found no need to determine the intent of a government at all.103
Tribunals thus used the threshold of the required intensity of effects on an 
investor to avoid over-inclusiveness of the standard of indirect expropriation.
97  Compania de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No ARB/96/1, Award 
(17 February 2000), paras 71-72.
98  Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000), para 111.
99  Siemens Corp. v. Republic of Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Award (6 February 2007), para 270.
100  Metalclad v. Mexico, para 103. The tribunal held in this respect that expropriation could also take the 
shape of ‘covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving 
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State’.
101  SD Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada Partial Award on Merits (13 November 2000), 8 ICSID Report 
4, paras 281-282. A similar view is taken by the tribunal in Marvin Feldman v. Mexico ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (16 December 2002), para 103.
102  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada Merits, Phase 1, Award (26 June 2000) 7 ICSID Report 69, 
paras 100-102.
103  Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award (7 December 2011), para 330.
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b. The ‘police powers’ exception
A completely different road has been chosen by a second group of tribunals 
that opted for a categorisation instead of a threshold of effects. They aimed for a 
more holistic examination of each case taking into account regulatory purpose 
as a distinctive feature.104
The tribunal in Methanex examined whether the regulatory measure at 
issue was taken for a public purpose, was non-discriminatory and was enacted 
in accordance with the principles of due process. In such a case, the measure 
should not be deemed to be expropriatory and no compensation would be due, 
unless specific commitments had been given to the investor by the regulat-
ing state beforehand.105 The Methanex test makes it possible to take regulatory 
purpose into account, but already raises concerns on the feasibility of a clear-cut 
categorisation of measures along the lines it proposes.106
In Saluka, the tribunal similarly adopted a rather categorical approach. It 
held that the host state’s measure fell within the range of bona fide regulation 
which, as was recognised by customary international law, would not amount 
to unlawful expropriation.107 The tribunal hinted at more extensive reasoning 
on proportionality, however,  stating that international law had yet to define a 
‘bright and easily distinguishable line’ between legitimate, non-compensable 
regulatory measures and measures which could amount to unlawful expropria-
tion if no compensation was paid. The ‘context’ within which a measure was 
adopted and applied would be crucial in this determination.108
The tribunal in ADC seemed willing to discuss regulatory purpose and its 
role in the assessment of potential expropriatory measures, but the host state 
could not produce such a purpose.109
A somewhat mixed approach was taken by the tribunal in Continental. In 
its view, a distinction had to be drawn between two types of encroachment by 
104  Already in the 1980s, Higgins famously questioned the feasibility of a clear conceptual division between 
indirect expropriation and the legitimate exercise of ‘police powers’ by a host state: ‘What I hope 
nonetheless to have shown in these lectures is that questions relating to property in international law 
need to be looked at as a coherent whole. Questions of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
compensation, public interest, concessions, regulatory controls, human rights, are all intertwined. If we 
isolate them we exclude relevant factors from our consideration.’ R. Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by 
the State: Recent Developments in International Law’ (1982-III) 176 Recueil des Cours 259, 331.
105  Methanex Corp. v. United States Award (3 August 2005) 44 ILM 1345, Part IV Chapter D para 7.
106  A similarly sceptical view is taken by S.A. Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation 
of International Investment Agreements’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1037, 1051. 
Others find the decision highly convincing, see H. Mann, ‘The Final Decision in Methanex v. United 
States: Some New Wine in Some New Bottles’ (2005) IISD Research Paper, available at wwwiisdorg, 7, for 
whom the award successfully draws a ‘sharp line’ between expopriatory measures subject to compensa-
tion and other regulatory measures.
107  Saluka v. Czech Republic, paras 255 ff.
108  Ibid., paras 263-265.
109  ADC v. Hungary, paras 429 ff. The tribunal held with a hint of irony that its ‘curiosity’ on this point 
would have to remain ‘unsatisfied’, para 433.
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public powers on private property.110 On the one hand, there were measures 
which constituted either ‘outright suppression or deprivation of the right of 
ownership, usually by its forced transfer to public entities’ or ‘limitations and 
hampering with property, short of outright suppression or deprivation, interfer-
ing with one or more key features, such as management, enjoyment, transfer-
ability, which are considered as tantamount to expropriation, because of their 
substantial impact on the effective right of property’. In this category of cases, 
the usual terminology of lawful and unlawful expropriation therefore applied 
even if the measure pursued a public purpose, and compensation had to be 
paid in all cases. These findings seem in line with the sole effects doctrine, 
although the public purpose of a measure is mentioned. For the second category, 
however, the tribunal held that these were ‘limitations to the use of property in 
the public interest that fall within typical government regulations of property 
entailing mostly inevitable limitations imposed in order to ensure the rights of 
others or of the general public’. These limitations often proved to be beneficial 
overall even for the property affected, did not affect the ‘basic, typical use’ of an 
investment and did not impose an unreasonable burden on one owner compared 
with similarly situated owners, which meant that no one single investor should 
be forced to bear the burden for an advantage given to a wider group.111 Such 
limitations did not amount to expropriation and no compensation was due.112 
Here, the regulatory purpose seemed clearly relevant, although the tribunal did 
not state explicitly whether more extensive reasoning on proportionality would 
be required or whether it suggested a category of its own. At least the insistence 
on a reasonable burden on the individual investor seems to point towards more 
extensive analysis close to proportionality analysis.
Similar findings were made by the tribunal in Impregilo. It held that ‘less far-
reaching’ measures which merely ‘regulate or restrict the right to use property’ 
should be treated apart.113 Despite their sometimes serious economic effects, 
these measures were not expropriations. However, there might be ‘borderline 
cases’ which leave the investor with only a nominal property right; cases which 
again should be treated as an expropriation.114 The rigidity of this approach 
was denounced by a dissenting arbitrator who pointed out that the rational link 
between the host state’s action and the purported purpose had all-too easily 
been accepted by the tribunal without looking closely enough at the evidence 
and considering all arguments.115
110  Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case no ARB/03/9, Award (5 September 2008), para 
276.
111  Ibid., para 276 and corresponding footnote 405.
112  It should be noted that the subsequent analysis of the case was rather cursory, as the tribunal saw most 
of the allegations taken outside its scrutiny because of the non-precluded measures clause of Article 
XI of the pertinent United States – Argentina bilateral investment treaty, as discussed in more detail in 
section IV.D.iii., see Continental Casualty, para 283.
113  Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/07/17, Award (21 June 2011), para 270.
114  Ibid., para 270.
115  See dissent by Brower, Ibid., para 29.
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These last cases highlight the difficulty of categorisation along the lines of 
a regulatory purpose. The Continental tribunal tries in a more elaborate way to 
rectify some of the neglect for the effects of a measure which approaches such 
as the one taken by the tribunal in Methanex cause. While categorisations in 
themselves may be rigid, the Continental tribunal offers a rather flexible legal 
test emphasizing examples for the features of measures it would like to treat 
differently.
c.  The Tecmed decision and the emergence of proportionality analysis
The Tecmed decision can almost be understood as the opposite of the 
approach taken in the Santa Elena decision. The tribunal found that regulatory 
measures were not as such excluded from the scope of measures which could 
amount to indirect expropriation. It then explicitly embraced proportionality 
analysis, stating that consequently it would have to examine whether such mea-
sures were ‘proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and 
to the protection legally granted to investments’.116 The tribunal then referred to 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights117 to borrow from the latter’s 
advanced experience with proportionality analysis.118 The arbitrators empha-
sized that some deference was due to the state when it defined the issues of 
public policy to be addressed, but that at the same time the reasonableness of 
the measures had to be assessed as to the deprivation of economic rights and 
reasonable expectations of investors in relation to the aim pursued. The extent 
of the deprivation of the investor would also be influenced by the fact whether 
there had been compensation. The tribunal referred to the ECtHR’s judgment 
in James v. United Kingdom.119 Like the ECtHR, the tribunal underlined that the 
fact must be taken into account that foreign investors have a reduced or even no 
participation in the taking of decisions which affect them, since they do not have 
political rights as nationals of a host state. Furthermore, there might be ‘legiti-
mate reason’ for requiring a national to carry a more extensive burden than a 
non-national.120 Proportionality would in any case not be found if a person had 
to bear an ‘individual and excessive burden’.
Tecmed represents the most explicit and comprehensive recourse to propor-
tionality analysis in an expropriation case. The judicial borrowing in the case 
116  Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED, SA v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB/AF/00/2, Award 
(29 May 2003), para 122.
117  Henckels, 233, correctly notes that the tribunal does not sufficiently justify why it borrowed from the 
European Court of Human Rights at this point.
118  The tribunal refers here to various older decisions of the European Court of Human Rights which 
analyse measures under the angle of proportionality regarding their impact on the access to justice 
and length of judicial proceedings (Matos e Silva, Lda. and others v. Portugal (16 September 1996) 
ECHR 1996-IV, no 14) and on private property (Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and others v. Belgium (20 
November 1995) Series A No 332; Mellacher and others v. Austria (19 December 1989) Series A No 169).
119  James and others v. United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, Series A, No 98, (1986) 8 EHRR 123, para 63.
120  TECMED v. Mexico, para 122.
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went as far as to even transpose the margin of appreciation doctrine of the 
ECtHR to investment arbitration in the form of deference, which the tribunal 
suggested applied to a host state’s regulatory measures.121 However, there is no 
discussion as to the adaptation of the standard of review based on substantive 
values at issue, as the substantive side of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
would suggest.122
The subsequent analysis of the case’s features in Tecmed is fairly persuasive 
in its comprehensiveness and weighing of the arguments. At the same time, 
there seems to be no excessive reliance on proportionality stricto sensu, so that 
one wonders whether a more elaborate spelling out of the test actually applied 
would point more towards necessity.123 Therefore, unfortunately both the stan-
dard of review and the actual sub-tests of proportionality analysis remain in the 
dark, while the tribunal focuses on the facts of the case.
The subsequent case law referred to the Tecmed decision, but without truly 
applying it to a similarly broad extent. The later decision in LG&E agreed with 
Tecmed that a ‘balance’ had to be found in the analysis of both the causes and 
the effects of a measure. By means of such a balancing analysis, one should 
distinguish the right of a state to adopt policies from its power to take an expro-
priatory measure.124 Proportionality analysis as in Tecmed should be the tool 
to assess when state action was ‘obviously disproportionate to the need being 
addressed’.125 Only in such cases would compensation be required from a state 
when the latter was exercising its right to adopt public policies.126
In Azurix, the tribunal compared the approaches chosen in SD Myers and 
in Tecmed and found the latter more convincing.127 The tribunal in Total also 
confirmed that it would follow the ‘dominant approach’, i.e. taking into account 
the legitimate purpose pursued by any measure including the latter’s ‘features 
and object so as to assess [its] proportionality and reasonableness’. A measure 
thus classified as ‘regulatory’ would not give rise to compensation.128
121  Krommendijk and Morijn, 444.
122  See chapter 5 section III.B.i. See sceptical on the intrusive standard of review effectively chosen by the 
tribunal Henckels, 233.
123  See e.g. TECMED v. Mexico, para 149, where the tribunal discusses concretely why the resolution 
depriving the investor of the future exploitation of his business was not required in light of the ecologi-
cal circumstances of the matter.
124  LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 
2006), para 194.
125  Ibid., para 195.
126  Subsequently, however, the tribunal found that the effects did not amount to expropriation in the first 
place and did not really apply its earlier findings.
127  Azurix Corp. v. Republic of Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006), para 312.
128  Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability (27 December 2010), 
para 197 footnote 232.
361
chapter 8 international investment law
 iii. Conclusion
The import of proportionality analysis into investment arbitra-
tion under the case law on indirect expropriation can be welcomed in the sense 
that it answered the need for a more extensive reflection on the relationship 
between measures taken for a public purpose and their effects on investors’ 
rights.129 However, the uniform reference to ‘proportionality’ causes concern 
since tribunals do not seem to truly develop clearly defined legal tests, but 
simply weigh arguments in a rather raw fashion. While the results are often 
plausible, there is a deplorable lack of predictability. Since we suggested a model 
of special interest representation for investment arbitration, in our view pro-
portionality stricto sensu should only be used in rare cases, while other avenues 
– e.g. a necessity test – should preferably be explored. To avoid over-restrictive 
scrutiny with a bias in favour of investment protection, tribunals could e.g. find 
inspiration in the process of ‘weighing and balancing’ embraced by the WTO 
Appellate Body under Article XX GATT.130 The ‘weighing and balancing’ test 
offers a balanced approach to the burden of proof and a refined comparison with 
alternative measures.131 As another shortcoming of the case law, the standard of 
review is not clarified, although the tribunal in Tecmed made some hesitant first 
suggestions.
 B Fair and Equitable Treatment
The fair and equitable treatment standard is a provision in most 
bilateral investment treaties which aims to provide a certain minimum level of 
protection to investors. It acts mainly as a gap-filler next to the more specific 
substantive standards of protection in investment treaties. Treaty makers have 
created many different versions of the clause, some referring to the minimum 
standard of treatment for foreigners foreseen in customary international law132 
or to general rules of international law.133
129  See for a similar view M. Paparinskis, ‘Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable Development’ in 
M.-C. Cordonier Segger, M.W. Gehring and A. Newcombe (eds.), Sustainable Development in World 
Investment Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 318, who also favours an 
approach examining the regulatory ‘method’ over a mere acceptance of any regulatory ‘intent’ without 
further scrutiny to exclude expropriatory character of a host state’s measure. See also Leonhardsen, 125, 
who applauds the clearer distinction developed in Tecmed between non-compensable general regulatory 
measures and cases of indirect expropriation.
130  See chapter 7 section IV.A.iii.d. Note also the differences to the use of necessity in EU law, which has 
been found too restrictive of domestic regulatory autonomy in comparison, see chapter 6 section IV.A.
131  Ideally, a tribunal should simultaneously avoid transposing the discussed blurriness of the analysis 
under Article XX GATT.
132  See e.g. the interpretive statement to the United States model BIT 2004, Article 5 (2). See for other 
examples R. Kläger, ‘’Fair and Equitable Treatment’ and Sustainable Development’ in M.-C. Cordo-
nier Segger, M.W. Gehring and A. Newcombe (eds.), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 242-243.
133  See e.g. the French model BIT 2006, Article 4.
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 i. General tendencies in the case law
The case law on fair and equitable treatment has a tendency to 
be highly fact-specific in each individual case. A judgment ‘in the abstract’ of 
the content of fair and equitable treatment appears difficult to achieve.134 Still, 
since the coming of age of the standard in investment treaty arbitration in the 
early 2000s, tribunals have produced a substantial amount of case law. Con-
troversy emerged as to whether the standard to measure state action should be 
rather deferent as in customary international law equivalent to the Neer case135 
or more demanding.136 However, as the threshold for finding a violation of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard is quite high, generally speaking, only 
few tribunals perceived a need to proceed to extensive reasoning, limiting their 
argumentation after a lengthy assessment of the facts to often nothing more but 
a few paragraphs.137
Instead, tribunals referred to a multitude of factors which had not been suffi-
ciently taken into account by the host state. Scrutinizing the case law, scholars 
identified several elements that led to a finding of violation of the fair and equi-
table treatment standard: breach of requirements of stability and predictability,138 
legality,139 legitimate expectations of investors,140 due process,141 arbitrariness 
134  Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 
2002), para 118.
135  In Neer v. Mexico, para 4, it was held that an act by a state’s authorities would have to amount to ‘an 
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short 
of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insuf-
ficiency’ to amount to a violation.
136  As an example, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada Merits, Phase 2, Award (10 
April 2001) UNCITRAL (NAFTA), para 110, interpreted the fair and equitable treatment standard 
broader than the Neer formula. Subsequently, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a Note of 
Interpretation which rejected this view and retained that the reference to the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard in NAFTA was equivalent to the minimum standard of treatment of aliens in customary 
international law (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Note of Interpretation, 31 July 2001).
137  Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, 116.
138  For example, in Metalclad v. Mexico, para 99, the tribunal found that Mexico had ‘failed to ensure a 
transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment’.
139  In Metalclad v. Mexico, para 93, one factor of the violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
was the misapplication of domestic law by the local administrative authority.
140  Such expectations can be induced by a host state’s action which are directed towards the investor, but 
also derive from the general legislative framework in place, see e.g. GAMI Investments Inc. v. The United 
Mexican States UNCITRAL, Final Award (15 November 2004), para 100. However, other tribunals later 
held that the legitimate expectations of investors must also be examined as to their reasonableness, see 
Parkerings-Compagniet v. Lithuania ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, Award (11 September 2007), para 333, and 
Continental v. Argentina, para 258.
141  See e.g. Waste Management Inc. v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (30 
April 2004), para 98.
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and discrimination,142 transparency143 and – in a few cases – of proportionality144. 
Reasoning following the lines of proportionality analysis does not seem  central 
to fair and equitable treatment. Rather, the standard appears to be a threshold 
issue for which a variety of elements can be assessed and weighed. The bound-
ary towards national treatment is not easy to draw, as sometimes fair and equita-
ble treatment serves as a gap filler, taking up elements of discrimination that are 
not brought under a national treatment claim by a tribunal.145
 ii.  Legal tests under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard
Under the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard, tribunals, 
at various occasions, used terms like reasonableness or proportionality. These, 
however, remain at the level of references and it is difficult to distil elements of 
proportionality analysis or similar legal tests from the highly fact-based reason-
ing.
In Pope & Talbot, the tribunal referred at various points to the concept of 
reasonableness in its decision. It held that the host state’s authorities’ actions 
constituted a ‘reasonable response’ to the problems encountered, which also 
respected the principles of fairness and equal treatment.146 In MTD, the tribu-
nal simply held that the standard of fair and equitable treatment ‘encompassed’ 
proportionality among other concepts.147
The arbitrators in Saluka discussed the concept of reasonable expectations 
for the investor and how host states were supposed to regulate ‘bona fide’. The 
latter should thus ensure that their conduct was ‘reasonably justifiable by public 
policies’ and that in particular differential treatment was motivated by ‘rational 
policies’ and not by a hidden preference for local economic operators.148
In Continental, the tribunal held that as part of the assessment under the fair 
and equitable treatment standard ‘the relevance of the public interest pursued 
by the State, accompanying measures aimed at reducing the negative impact 
142  Schill, 19, here points as an example to the early case before the International Court of Justice Elettron-
ica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI, United States of America v. Italy) Judgment of July 20 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p 
15, para 128.
143  One can again cite as an example the statement by the tribunal in Metalclad, para 99, where a ‘transpar-
ent’ legal framework had not been granted.
144  See for an overview Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, 118-119.
145  See on this interaction with the example of the SD Myers case K. Miles, ‘Sustainable Development, 
National Treatment and Like Circumstances in Investment Law’ in M.-C. Cordonier Segger, M.W. 
Gehring and A. Newcombe (eds), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 272.
146  Pope & Talbot v. Canada (Merits, Phase 2), paras 125, 128 and 155.
147  MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award (25 May 
2004), para 109.
148  Saluka v. Czech Republic, see in particular para 307.
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are also to be considered in order to ascertain fairness’.149 The arbitrators thus 
decided to scrutinize both the genuineness of the value pursued by the host 
state and the negative effect on the investor to determine whether the require-
ment of ‘fairness’ had been respected.
In EDF v. Romania, the tribunal borrowed from the statements on propor-
tionality issued by the tribunal in Azurix, holding that a ‘reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought’ should be 
established.150
Similarly, in Total the tribunal held that in examining whether the inves-
tor’s legitimate expectations had been respected under the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment, the host state’s right to regulate domestic matters in the 
public interest had to be taken into account. As a consequence, a ‘standard of 
reasonableness and proportionality’ had to be used to assess the circumstances 
of regulatory change with an impact on the investor.151
 iii. Conclusion
The resorts to proportionality under the fair and equitable 
treatment standard are less explicit and the analysis less advanced152 than in the 
case law on expropriation. Tribunals strongly emphasized the facts, sometimes 
at the cost of a more developed reasoning and without explaining sufficiently 
the legal standard they applied.153 As an overall aim, the case law seems to 
establish a set of elements that must be present to reach a certain threshold of 
unfair treatment. At this stage, only more extensive legal reasoning can lead to a 
clarification on what tribunals actually mean when they refer to reasonableness 
or proportionality.
 C National Treatment
National treatment standards call for a comparison between the 
treatment received by local investors and the foreign investor, as far as like cir-
cumstances allow a comparison.154 In earlier days, these standards played a less 
important role than for example in the law of international trade, as the standard 
149  Continental v. Argentina, para 261.
150  EDF (Services) Ltd v. Romania ICSID Case No ARB/05/13, Award (8 October 2009), para 293.
151  Total v. Argentina (decision on liability), para 123. Leonhardsen, 134-135, suggests that Total represents 
one of the most sound uses of proportionality analysis to date, though the textual basis for this finding 
seems weak in our view.
152  See also Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, 249.
153  S.W. Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of 
Law’ (2006) 6 International Law and Justice Working Papers 1, 6.
154  Dolzer and Schreuer, 178-179, show that typically, contrary to ‘European’ national treatment clauses, 
‘American’ clauses tend to include the explicit qualifier of investors ‘in like situations’ or ‘in like circum-
stances’.
365
chapter 8 international investment law
of treatment of domestic investors was not particularly high. Only later, with an 
improvement in the standard of treatment of domestic economic actors, did the 
standard gain importance in investment treaty arbitration.155
 i.  Regulatory purpose and national treatment in 
international investment law
The leeway for the choice of criteria for comparison and for the 
evaluation of differential treatment is in most cases large, which renders the 
concrete test adopted somewhat of a ‘value judgment’.156 Fundamentally, there 
is a division of views. Some suggest that, similar to the context of international 
trade law, the main concern for national treatment in investment law is the use 
of regulatory means by the host state to favour local economic operators over for-
eign investors. In these accounts, the main test for assessing national treatment 
is based on an inquiry into the competitive relationship between the investor 
and the domestic operators.157 By contrast, other scholars suggest that contrary 
to the context of international trade law, national treatment should focus more 
generally on fairness for individual investors, which means that a national 
treatment test should examine whether there is a discriminatory act against an 
investor based only on the latter’s foreign nationality and on no other legitimate 
public policy objective.158 Any inquiry would in the latter case have to be based 
on a broader examination of the regulatory context rather than on a narrow 
assessment of the competitive relationship between economic operators. As we 
have already found an assessment of national treatment using regulatory context 
more convincing in the context of WTO law,159 such a solution is even more 
appropriate in international investment law. The overall rationale of national 
treatment in investment law is not structured along a rule-exception construc-
tion, as is Article III and Article XX GATT. There is thus conceptually no other 
way to examine regulatory purpose than at the stage of the national treatment 
analysis, as, at least in most cases, no exceptions provision exists.160
Despite these disagreements, scholars substantially agree that ‘the adjudica-
tor should ultimately focus on the rationality of the state’s purpose in assessing 
a claim for breach’.161 This explicit consideration of public purpose in investment 
law brings into play a potential leeway for proportionality analysis, as the effect 
155  N. DiMascio and J. Pauwelyn, ‘Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or 
Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2008) 102 The American Journal of International Law 48, 67.
156  Miles, 269.
157  See e.g. J. Kurtz, The Obligation of National Treatment in International Investment Law (Ann Arbor: JSD 
Thesis University of Michigan, 2011), 83. See already for the discussion on national treatment in WTO 
law under Article III GATT chapter 7 section III.C.ii.
158  See e.g. DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 75-76.
159  See chapter 7 section III.C.iii.
160  See on the more recent introduction of general exceptions clauses section IV.E.
161  Kurtz, 96.
366
proportionality analysis and models of judicial review
of discrimination of means can be weighed against the contribution of these 
means to the purported public interest objective.
 ii. Legal tests under the national treatment obligation
In adjudicating national treatment in investment arbitration, 
tribunals addressed issues at several stages which should be distinguished for 
the sake of clarity. First, it must be determined with which domestic investors 
the investor should be compared. Some tribunals limited comparisons to inves-
tors in the same sector of the economy,162 while others opted for a wide interpre-
tation of the likeness of circumstances across sectors.163 Second, less favourable 
treatment must be found to establish a violation of national treatment. Tribunals 
took into account the regulatory objective of regulations which create distinc-
tions sometimes at the first level, sometimes at the second level. This also led 
them in the direction of proportionality analysis.
Contradictory decisions have emerged as to whether discriminatory intent 
must be shown.164 It was also questioned whether only discriminatory treatment 
on the basis of nationality or on different grounds should fall foul of national 
treatment in investment treaties. Regulatory intent could provide a useful 
criterion in cases where the distinction and differential treatment are based 
on public policy reasons which the host state pursues. Proportionality analysis 
made its entry to examine the link between the measure which is allegedly 
discriminatory and its public policy justification.
In treaty codification, some states reacted to this trend by codifying in more 
detail the national treatment standard. In a Norwegian model BIT165 a footnote 
was added to the national treatment provision which stated that the pursuit of 
legitimate public policy objectives might cause discrimination, but that this 
discrimination should not necessarily constitute a breach of the treaty.
The case law too took up the challenge to provide appropriate space for the 
consideration of the regulatory purpose of a measure which causes discrimina-
tion. This becomes all the more relevant in cases of de facto discrimination, 
where disadvantageous treatment results not from a formal distinction in law, 
but from the factual impact of a measure. In such cases, tribunals imposed 
a certain burden of persuasion on the claiming party to show that de facto 
discrimination was established.166
162  SD Myers v. Canada, para 250.
163  Occidental v. Ecuador LCIA Case No UN 3467, Award (1 July 2004), para 173.
164  The tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina, para 321, excluded such intent explicitly, whereas in Alex Genin, 
Eastern Credit Ltd. v. Republic of Estonia ICSID Case No ARB/99/2, Award (25 June 2001), para 369, 
intent to discriminate was seen as a prerequisite.
165  According to Spears, 1059 footnote 121, the draft was initially released for comment, but subsequently 
withdrawn again because it was not approved by parliament.
166  See e.g. GAMI v. Mexico, para 114.
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Some legal tests resembling proportionality analysis appeared in the exami-
nation of the rational link between differentiations and differential treatment on 
the one hand and the purported regulatory objective on the other.
As a starting point, the tribunal in SD Myers suggested that comparisons 
between the investor and domestic companies should be limited to the same 
economic sector.167 As NAFTA did not contain an express provision to derogate 
from national treatment for public policy reasons, such as those contained in 
the GATT, the tribunal held that any comparison between foreign and domes-
tic investors would have to ‘take into account circumstances that would justify 
governmental regulation that treat them differently in order to protect the public 
interest’.168 The tribunal’s analysis remained somewhat blurred, but eventually 
found that the measures at issue could not validly claim to fulfil the suggested 
environmental objective, in particular because alternative measures promised 
the same result.169
In Pope & Talbot, the tribunal refined the analysis. After differential treat-
ment had been found within one sector, a presumption of violation arose, alleg-
ing that the measure at issue caused prohibited discrimination based on the 
nationality of the investor. A host state would have to show that the measure had 
a ‘reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not distinguish, 
on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies, and 
(2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of 
NAFTA.’170 If a difference in treatment could be shown to bear a ‘rational rela-
tionship’ to legitimate government policies, the foreign investor and the domes-
tic companies would not be considered to be ‘like’, and no violation of national 
treatment arose.171
The tribunal in Feldman followed the Pope&Talbot approach and decided that 
the national treatment standard should prohibit ‘unreasonable’ distinctions. 
As a consequence, differential treatment for cigarette resellers as exporters in 
comparison to cigarette producers as exporters could be reasonably explained by 
the need to fight smuggling with such a policy.172
In Methanex, the tribunal took a very narrow approach, excluding broader 
competition concerns173 and taking only identical foreign and domestic produc-
ers of the same substance into account as in like circumstances.174 Producers of 
similar substances were excluded from the scope of companies in like circum-
167  SD Myers v. Canada, para 248.
168  Ibid., para 250.
169  Ibid., para 255.
170  Pope & Talbot v. Canada (Merits, Phase 2), para 78.
171  Ibid., para 79.
172  Feldman v. Mexico, paras 170 ff.
173  See for a criticism of this aspect Kurtz, 181-182.
174  Methanex v. US, part IV, chapter B, para 6.
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stances because of the legitimate regulatory differentiation on environmental 
grounds.175
In GAMI, the tribunal was content ‘that a reason exists for the measure 
which was not in itself discriminatory’.176 The arbitrators thus found it sufficient 
that a purpose for the measure was given without questioning in greater detail 
how the individual elements of the measure were linked to that purpose.
Similar deference can be found in UPS v. Canada. The majority accepted 
here that Canada’s international treaty commitments on postal mail created no 
like circumstances to compare the foreign investor to Canada Post.177 A dissent-
ing arbitrator, however, argued that the host state should be required to meet a 
higher burden to show that there were no ‘like’ circumstances, if a competitive 
relationship had already been demonstrated by the claimant.178 Closer scrutiny 
of the distinction and the related differential treatment had to be linked with 
the purported purpose of the regulation to avoid absurd results as in the present 
case, where the lack of like circumstances excluded a violation of national treat-
ment despite the fact that the differential treatment had no rational link to the 
distinction drawn between the various economic operators.179
In Paushok, the tribunal accepted the heavier taxation of a specific sector 
as ‘unwise’ but not discriminatory, and even found no problem in the severe 
restrictions imposed for the employment of truck drivers, despite the fact that 
they seemed not to be based on a real need and their discriminatory effect for 
the employment of foreign workers was acknowledged.180
Contrary to such leniency, in Corn Products closer scrutiny was held to be 
indispensable by the tribunal, since discrimination did not cease to be discrimi-
nation merely because of the existence of a ‘laudable goal’ or a goal whose 
achievement ‘can be described as necessary’.181 Also, in Cargill the discrimina-
tory effect of a tax used as a countermeasure could not be justified by the asser-
tion that it necessarily had to discriminate against certain investors in order to 
be effective.182
How such close scrutiny could be undertaken was demonstrated by the 
tribunal in ADM. After a lengthy examination of the questionable purpose 
brought forward by Mexico and of the measures chosen to implement it, the 
175  Ibid., part IV, chapter B, para 28.
176  GAMI v. Mexico, para 114.
177  United Parcel Service of America v. Government of Canada ICSID NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration, Final 
Award (11 June 2007), para 118.
178  See dissenting opinion in Ibid., para 17.
179  See dissenting opinion in Ibid., para 51.
180  Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company, CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. Government of Mongolia 
Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (28 April 2011), para 366.
181  Corn Products International v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on 
Responsibility (15 January 2008), para 142.
182  Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/2, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration, 
Award (18 September 2009), para 220.
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tribunal came to the conclusion that the tax adopted was not ‘proportion-
ate’ as a countermeasure as brought forward by the defending host state, and 
furthermore neither ‘necessary’ nor ‘reasonably connected to the aim said to be 
pursued’.183
Eventually, a rather explicit endorsement of proportionality can be found 
in Parkerings. The tribunal held that in order to violate the national treatment 
standard, ‘discrimination must be unreasonable or lacking proportionality, for 
instance, it must be inapposite or excessive to achieve an otherwise legitimate 
objective of the State.’184 In such a manner, ‘differentiated treatments of similar 
cases’ could be justified.
 iii. Conclusion
Summing up, the development of proportionality analysis is 
still at an early stage under national treatment. While the debate on the appro-
priate criteria for likeness is ongoing, the acceptance of regulatory purpose 
as an important factor in assessing the reasons and way of differential treat-
ment prompted some first statements in the case law. Some tribunals refrain 
from closer scrutiny and are content with the existence of a regulatory purpose 
for measures. Others take a closer look. Again others even explicitly refer to 
concepts such as ‘proportionality’ or ‘reasonableness’. Yet, most awards remain 
based on a close assessment of the specific facts and tend not to engage in detail 
in setting out a legal test. In the future, it is suggested that necessity could play 
a useful role under a model of special interest representation. The comparison 
with reasonably available alternatives used by the tribunal in SD Myers can be 
considered a useful example.
 D  Non-Precluded Measures Clauses and the Defence of 
Necessity
In situations of crisis, host states can refer to specific treaty 
clauses which foresee that a ‘[t]reaty shall not preclude the application by either 
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment 
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interest.’185 
Clauses such as Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT just quoted are often 
referred to as ‘non-precluded measures clauses’.186 A second avenue of argument 
183  Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate&Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. The United Mexican States 
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/04/05, Award (21 November 2007), para 158.
184  Parkerings v. Lithuania, para 368.
185  Article XI, BIT between the United States and Argentina (1991).
186  Typically, such clauses are enshrined in United States BITs, but other states have also started to include 
such clauses in their BITs, Dolzer and Schreuer, 489. There has also been intense debate as to whether 
these clauses can be considered self-judging, see A.K. Bjorklund, ‘Economic Security Defenses in 
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is opened by customary international law. Article 25 of the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility187 as the pertinent codi-
fication provides that states may plead a state of necessity in order to preclude 
wrongfulness of action they have taken in emergency situations.
 i. The norms allowing the invocation of a state of necessity
Both provisions have been invoked in the context of the Argen-
tinean economic crisis in the early 2000s. Investors brought claims for com-
pensation before investment tribunals, as they suffered severe losses caused by 
emergency measures undertaken by the government.188
Arbitral tribunals saw themselves faced with the challenge of balancing 
the need for emergency government action in the crisis against the legitimate 
interest of investors to be protected. The case law thus provides two lines of 
reasoning. In an earlier line of case law and in several cases where no express 
treaty clause on necessity had been included in the relevant BIT, tribunals 
tended to adhere to the rather restrictive conditions of customary law to adjudi-
cate investors’ claims. A virtually paradigmatic turn towards a more comprehen-
sive weighing exercise took place in the ruling of the Continental tribunal.
In the first line of case law, the basis represents the codification of customary 
international law on the responsibility of states for wrongful acts by the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC). The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
provide for a specific rule for a state of necessity as a ground of precluding the 
wrongfulness of a state’s action. The following conditions apply:
Article 25. Necessity
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for preclud-
ing wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking 
necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
International Investment Law’ in K.P. Sauvant (ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008-2009), 498, or Dolzer and Schreuer, 493.
187  Article 25 , ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International 
Law Commission’ (2001) II Part Two Yearbook of the International Law Commission .
188  Stone Sweet, ‘Proportionality’s New Frontier’, 69, provides a very succinct summary of the crisis.
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If these conditions are fulfilled, the wrongfulness of the action of a host state is 
excluded. However, such an exclusion of wrongfulness is ‘without prejudice’ to 
the question of compensation for damages caused.189
Four conditions are set out in the provision. While the second two preclude 
the very access to the defence of Article 25, the first two suggest elements of 
proportionality analysis. There must be an essential interest to be safeguarded 
(paragraph 1a), while on the other hand no essential interest of other states or 
the international community must be impaired (paragraph 1b). This balancing 
exercise has, however, not played an important role in the case law. More empha-
sis has been put by tribunals on the requirement that emergency measures must 
constitute ‘the only way’, which has been read as a strict test of necessity. The 
defence of Article 25 remains, however, inaccessible to states that have contrib-
uted with their previous action to the emergence of an economic crisis or in situ-
ations where a norm expressly excludes the possibility of invoking necessity.
Because of the very explicit wording of the provision, there seems to be 
only little room for a less text-based test such as balancing or proportionality 
stricto sensu without overturning the structure and wording of the provision. It 
therefore comes as no surprise that more flexible tests have only been developed 
in cases where the adherence to Article 25 were loosened in favour of an inter-
pretation focused more on the very broad wording of non-precluded measures 
clauses, also taking inspiration from legal tests from other legal regimes.
 ii.  Legal tests under the conditions of Article 25 of the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles
Even in presence of Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT as a 
non-precluded measures clause, some tribunals have found it difficult to give 
independent meaning to that provision. They have therefore conflated the stan-
dard with the conditions established in Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles.190 
Typically, tribunals accepted that the severe economic situation of Argentina 
qualifies as a sufficiently serious threat against national security interests which 
could in theory excuse emergency measures detrimental to investors’ interests. 
However, they subsequently rejected the defence of a state of necessity by Argen-
tina based on two grounds. First, they found that Argentina had contributed 
189  Article 27 of the ILC Draft Articles.
190  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, 44 ILM 1205 
(2005), para 91, without clear guidance regarding the use of Article 25 of the ILC Articles; in LG&E v. 
Argentina, para 245, the tribunal held that Article 25 of the ILC Articles ‘supported’ its analysis of Arti-
cle XI; see also Enron Corp., Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Award 
(22 May 2007), para 334, where the treaty clause was found to be ‘inseparable’ from Article 25; see also 
Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Award of the Tribunal (28 
September 2007), para 378.
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to the emergence of a situation of necessity by its previous policies.191 Second, 
they adopted a very narrow reading of the requirement that the measure to be 
defended must constitute ‘the only way’ for a State to safeguard an essential 
interest.192 Only in one case did the tribunal find that necessity excused Argen-
tina’s actions.193
In other cases, the relevant BIT between Argentina and the other state did 
not contain a specific clause on necessity situations, which meant that Article 25 
of the ILC Draft Articles was applied. In National Grid the tribunal found that 
Argentina had not been able to show that it had not contributed to the emer-
gence of the crisis.194 In Suez, the tribunal found again that Argentina had partly 
contributed to the emergence of the crisis and that its measures had not been 
the only means available.195
As Article 25’s requirements were never found to be fulfilled, tribunals also 
refrained from interpreting whether compensation would be due under Article 
27 of the ILC’s Articles even if the measure was excused under Article 25.
The case law based effectively on Article 25 of the ILC’s Articles thus adopts 
a very strict necessity test. As soon as some alternatives appeared open to a gov-
ernment, tribunals consistently found that a state of necessity could not excuse a 
host state’s emergency measures. Furthermore, as a consequence of the attribu-
tion of the burden of proof to the host state, the latter was virtually compelled to 
prove a negative.196 Contrary to this line of case law, the tribunal in LG&E took 
the opposite solution to impose the burden on the investor. Article 25’s require-
ments were thus fulfilled in this exceptional case.197
191  See e.g. Enron v. Argentina, paras 311-312. On the difficulty of establishing and evaluating the various 
endogenous and exogenous causes of an economic crisis see A. Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Foreign Investment 
Protection and Regulatory Failures as States’ Contribution to the State of Necessity under Customary 
International Law – A New Approach Based on the Complexity of Argentina’s 2001 Crisis’ (2010) 27 
Journal of International Arbitration 141. See also more recently Impregilo v. Argentine, para 358.
192  See e.g. Enron v. Argentina, paras 308-309. The restrictiveness of the test goes back to a similarly narrow 
reading adopted by the International Court of Justice when interpreting a precursor provision to Article 
25 of the ILC Articles, see Case concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) ICJ 
Reports 1997, p 7, 40 para 55.
193  In LG&E, the tribunal primarily applied Article XI of the BIT and only applied Article 25 of the ILC’s 
Articles in support. It imposed the burden of proof on the investor and found no sufficient rebuttal of 
the case for a state of necessity made by Argentina; see for a detailed commentary S.W. Schill, ‘Interna-
tional Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises – Comment on the ICSID 
Decision in LG&E v. Argentina’ (2007) 24 Journal of International Arbitration 265, 278.
194  National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal Award, 3 November 2008, at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf, para 260.
195  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic/AWG 
v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 and UNCITRAL (AWG), Decision on Liability (30 July 
2010), paras 260 and 264.
196  Enron v. Argentina, para 309.
197  Favourable towards this solution Schill, ‘International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power’, 280. 
It should, however, be noted that some see the LG&E decision as highly politically motivated and there-
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 iii. Legal tests in the interpretation of treaty provisions
A second line of case law does not depart from Article 25’s 
strict conditions. Later decisions have questioned the automatic interpretative 
link established between non-precluded measures clauses and the standard in 
Article 25 of the ILC’s Articles. The Annulment Committee in CMS disagreed 
with the tribunal’s view and suggested that the treaty provision should apply as 
lex specialis and be interpreted independently. In its view, the clause constituted 
a primary norm which excluded a treaty violation in the first place. Article 25 
could only exclude wrongfulness of a violation of a treaty.198 As a consequence, if 
Article XI of the BIT applied, no breach arose and no compensation was due.199 
The tribunal had incorrectly interpreted Article XI. However, because of its 
limited jurisdiction in the annulment procedure, the Committee did not provide 
a more extensive independent interpretation of Article XI.200
In Continental, the tribunal abandoned for the first time the link between 
Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT and Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles and 
provided an independent interpretation of the treaty provision. It held that the 
severe economic conditions and their societal consequences in Argentina could 
qualify as ‘affecting an essential security interest’ in the sense of Article XI of 
the BIT.201 Then, to determine whether the measures taken by Argentina quali-
fied as ‘necessary’ according to the provision, the arbitrators decided to borrow 
extensively from the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body. They based this 
finding on the fact that Article XI was derived from Article XX GATT, a provi-
sion establishing general, permanent exceptions for measures which pursue 
public health, public morals and other public policy objectives.202 The tribunal 
consequently applied the interpretation given to Article XX GATT in the two 
landmark WTO cases Korea – Beef and Brazil – Tyres.203 The test applied was a 
fore not very telling in legal terms, see S.F. Hill, ‘The “Necessity Defense” and the Emerging Arbitral 
Conflict in its Application to the U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty’ (2007) 13 Law and Business 
Review of the Americas 547, 562 with further references.
198  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 (Annulment Proceeding), 
Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (25 
September 2007), para 129.
199  Ibid., para 146.
200 Ibid., para 136.
201  Continental v. Argentina, para 178.
202  Ibid., para 192, reads as follows: ‘Since the text of Art. XI derives from the parallel model clause of 
the U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the 
Tribunal finds it more appropriate to refer to the GATT and WTO case law which has extensively dealt 
with the concept and requirements of necessity in the context of economic measures derogating to the 
obligations contained in GATT, rather than to refer to the requirement of necessity under customary 
international law.’ (footnotes omitted).
203  Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef AB-2000-8, WT/DS161/AB/R 
and WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 December 2000 and Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
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comparison of the measures undertaken by Argentina with a range of alterna-
tives in light of their ‘reasonable’ availability to the host state. With one excep-
tion, the tribunal found Argentina’s measures to be ‘necessary’ and rejected the 
claim for compensation for these measures, as no treaty breach had emerged.
After Continental, the doctrine intensely discussed the conflicting decisions 
of tribunals and annulment committees in cases in the context of the Argen-
tinean economic crisis. A number of scholars rejected an autonomous reading 
of non-precluded measures clauses independent of Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles.204 Others disagreed and argued in addition in favour of borrowing 
from WTO case law as in Continental. Moreover, some suggested other sources 
such as case law of the European Court of Human Rights on proportionality.205 
A third group subscribed in principle to the idea of borrowing to fill the broad 
wording of non-precluded measure clauses with meaning. For this purpose, 
however, they seemed ready to accept as a source of law both customary inter-
national law as well as security exception clauses in international trade agree-
ments.206
Some argue that proportionality analysis may offer an appropriate safeguard 
against abusive use of the provision as well as an appropriate leeway for states 
in economic emergency situations.207 Others would prefer restraint to a less 
value-laden, less restrictive measures test in order not to overburden invest-
ment tribunals which are hardly familiar with enough of the context of a case 
to take a truly informed decision.208 A sort of mixture between the last two 
AB-2007-4, WT/DS332/AB/R, 3 December 2007, see chapter 7 section IV.A.iii.b.
204  See e.g. Alvarez and Khamsi, part III(C), who argue that in light of the wording and the objective 
pursued by Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT,the provision cannot be usefully separated from the stan-
dard in customary international law. Bjorklund, 497-498, rejects the argument often advanced that an 
interpretation in light of customary international law would not give effet utile to the clause and under-
lines that the two provisions of Article XI and Article 25 must not necessarily be seen as operating at a 
different level as the CMS Annulment Committee had suggested. For an extensive critique of the rules 
of interpretation used by the Continental tribunal, see D.A. Desierto, ‘Necessity and “Supplementary 
Means of Interpretation” for Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2009-2010) 31 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 827.
205  See e.g. Stone Sweet, ‘Proportionality’s New Frontier’, 75, who perceives the proportionality analysis in 
WTO law as a more ‘mature’ version which should be adopted by arbitral tribunals. W.W. Burke-White 
and A. Von Staden, ‘Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application 
of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 307, 368-370, approve of the use of ECHR case law including the concept of a margin 
of appreciation.
206 See e.g. Dolzer and Schreuer, 499.
207  A.K. Bjorklund, ‘The Necessity of Sustainable Development?’ in M.-C. Cordonier Segger, M.W. Gehring 
and A. Newcombe (eds.), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 389.
208  J. Kurtz, ‘Adjudicating the Exceptional at International Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) 59 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 325, 366 ff.
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approaches may promise the best results. As generally suggested by our model 
of special interest representation, necessity should operate as the predominant 
test. An intrusive standard of review could be arguably justified by the nature 
of the provision, i.e. the exceptional character of the necessity defence. At the 
same time, it appears unavoidable to keep a minimal leeway under which 
proportionality analysis could apply in order to sort out the few cases where an 
actual abuse of the defence becomes visible based on elements of the case. The 
adoption of the ‘weighing and balancing’ test in Continental, however, seems all 
too permissive,209 as the test focuses on general regulatory policy and not the 
exceptional situation of emergency measures.
Later case law partly endorsed, partly rejected the findings in Continen-
tal. The Annulment Committee in Sempra struck down the award given by 
the tribunal.210 The Committee held that to apply Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles before Article XI of the BIT amounted to an ‘illogical’ sequence and 
would unduly establish Article 25 as a peremptory definition of the necessity.211 
In its view, the two provisions envisaged different situations, as the Annulment 
Committee in CMS had already underlined.
The Annulment Committee in Enron chose a more deferent approach. It 
contented itself with the reasons suggested by the arbitral tribunal in Enron for 
the common interpretation given to Article XI and Article 25 and rejected the 
CMS Annulment Committee’s award as going beyond the powers of annulment 
committees.212 It found no annullable error in the tribunal’s findings.213
Also, the later annulment decision in Continental did not overthrow the find-
ings of the tribunal, but upheld the interpretation of the non-precluded mea-
sures clause including the borrowing from WTO law. Partly, this confirmation 
is also based on the limited powers of an annulment committee which could not 
strike down an award because of a mere ‘error of law’.214
209 See also Leonhardsen, 132, who agrees with the outcome reached in the case, but finds the basis for the 
use of balancing in the case unsound.
210  Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (Annulment Proceeding), 
Decision on Annulment (29 June, 2010), para 159. In its eyes, the tribunal had failed to apply the law 
and thereby committed a manifest excess of powers which could lead to the annulment of the award.
211  Ibid., paras 176 and 197.
212  See on the limits of annulment decisions under the ICSID Convention A. Von Staden, ‘Towards Greater 
Doctrinal Clarity in Investor-State Arbitration: The CMS, Enron, and Sempra Annulment Decisions’ in 
A.J. Bělohlávek and N. Rozehnalová (eds.), Czech Yearbook of International Law – Rights of the Host States 
within the System of International Investment Protection (2011), 215 ff.
213  Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 
(Annulment Proceeding), Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic (30 July 2010), para 403 and 405. However, it found errors in the way in which the 
tribunal had reached its substantive conclusions during the analysis under Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles, see paras 377-378.
214  Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic Annulment Proceeding, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/9, Decision on the Application for Partial Annulment of Continental Casualty Company and 
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Despite its mixed reception, the award in Continental is thus still valid as far 
as the mechanisms of investment law provide for it. There remains, therefore, a 
fundamental division in the case law over the defence of necessity as to whether 
adherence to the precise conditions of Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles or a 
more flexible ‘weighing and balancing’ approach borrowed from the WTO or 
even a different legal test from the European Court of Human Rights is the road 
to follow in the presence of interpretative discretion.
 i. Conclusion
The fundamental division of the arbitrators on their view of 
the defence of necessity in investment treaty arbitration, be it based on a treaty 
clause or customary international law, caused most of the debate on whether 
and how to use proportionality analysis in this context. On the one hand, sev-
eral awards supported a very narrow test based on the host country having to 
establish that the measures it had taken were truly the only possible means – a 
virtually impossible task. On the other hand, in LG&E, the shift of the burden of 
proof instead put the investor in the difficult position of having to establish the 
requirements of Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles. Apart from the distribu-
tion of the burden of proof, tribunals also disagree on the degree of strictness of 
the substantive test. The very flexible ‘weighing and balancing’ in Continental 
was correctly denounced as inappropriate, as it dismisses a host state’s obliga-
tions all too easily despite the fact that a BIT has been concluded for the very 
reason of protecting investors in economically rough times. Article 25’s require-
ments, however, appear virtually insurmountable as interpreted by earlier 
awards. While the doctrine remains strictly divided, some hope for at least a 
partial convergence of the analysis in future case law.215 We suggested a middle-
of-the-road approach; under the model of special interest review a necessity test 
is indeed useful to carry most of the burden. The emergency situation justifies 
an intrusive standard of review. Yet, the door must remain open for full-scale 
proportionality analysis in cases where elements of an abuse of the provision are 
apparent.
 E General Exceptions Clauses
As a rather new development, states have started to include 
general exception clauses in BITs.216 Such clauses ought to exempt host states 
from the obligations arising under a BIT if certain key public policy interests 
identified in the relevant clause cannot be pursued without a violation of such 
obligations.
the Application for Partial Annulment of the Argentine Republic (16 September 2011), para 133.
215  Bjorklund, ‘Economic Security Defenses’, 498.
216  See for a number of examples Newcombe, ‘General Exceptions’, 351 ff.
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Two generations of these clauses were identified in the doctrine.217 A first 
group of clauses is modelled on Article XX of the GATT or Article XIV GATS 
respectively.218 The second group regulates procedural aspects for measures 
for public policy purposes, typically prescribing the notification of such meas-
ures.219
Clauses of the first generation usually provide that a party shall not be 
prevented from adopting measures ‘necessary’ to or ‘designed and applied’ to 
protect a public interest such as public health or public morals.220 To date, no 
tribunal has ever construed such clauses. The similarity of the provision to 
WTO legal provisions prompted authors to suggest that a comparable interpreta-
tion is very likely.221 Contrary to this suggestion, tribunals could also use a test 
similar to the one developed under the substantive obligations of BITs such as 
expropriation. General exceptions clauses could then merely be read as guidance 
as to how to interpret the substantive standards of a BIT.222
The similarity of general exception clauses to the equivalent in the GATT 
also bears a potential to restrict regulatory freedom for the host state; general 
exceptions clauses create a closed list of public policy objectives, while for 
example the concept of police powers under the expropriation standard or the 
examination of regulatory purpose in national treatment allow virtually every 
public policy objective a host state claims to be taken into account.223
As a final difficulty, the interaction between general exceptions clauses 
and expropriation provisions could prove difficult. For lawful expropriation, 
compensation is due as discussed previously. It is difficult to see whether the 
applicability of an exceptions clause could permit the derogation from this duty 
to compensate.224
Future case law is likely to bring general exceptions clauses to life. In light 
of their uneasy relationship with other treaty obligations and the tests applied 
under the latter, the most challenging task for tribunals is likely to be the devel-
opment of a legal test which offers coherence with other BIT obligations and 
simultaneously offers a convincing middle ground between granting full leeway 
to host states and restricting their regulatory freedom unduly. In our view, 
217  Spears, 1060-1061.
218  See e.g. Canada Model BIT 2004, Article 10.
219  See e.g. BIT between Japan and Korea (2002), Article 16.1c.
220  For the latter clause see Common Investment Area Agreement of the Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa, Article 22.
221  Spears, 1062. See also Newcombe, ‘General Exceptions’, 363.
222  Dolzer and Schreuer, 503.
223  DiMascio and Pauwelyn, 82-83.
224  H. Mann, ‘Investment Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exceptions Clauses Create a Safe 
Haven for Governments?’ (2007) IISD Background Paper for the Development Country Investment Negotia-
tors’ Forum, available at www.iisd.org 1 (access on 6 March 2012), 12. See in favour of a continuing duty 
to compensate Newcombe, ‘General Exceptions’, 369.
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many of the lessons found under the expropriation case law and doctrine can be 
usefully applied here.225
 F Conclusion
The overview over the case law shows that the engagement with 
proportionality analysis by tribunals in investment arbitration to date remains 
rather cursory. The certainly most explicit use of the concept was undertaken 
in the Tecmed case, but even here the assessment is highly fact-based and does 
not put much weight on developing the individual sub-tests of proportionality 
analysis. Under fair and equitable treatment, the reasoning of tribunals remains 
even more closely tied to the facts of cases, while the test effectively applied may 
refer to terms such as reasonableness or proportionality, but seems to operate in 
practice more like an inquiry into whether a certain threshold of unfair treat-
ment has been crossed. Examining whether the obligation of national treat-
ment has been violated, tribunals did not closely scrutinize the link between an 
allegedly discriminatory measure and its purported regulatory purpose. Some 
initial case law indicates, however, that proportionality analysis could play a role 
in the future, although the tests of suitability and necessity seem to be given 
preference – correctly so, in our view. In the specific context of non-precluded 
measures clauses and a state of necessity being pleaded by host states, tribu-
nals are split over whether strict requirements of customary international law 
or a milder form of weighing – resembling the ‘weighing and balancing’ test 
used under the WTO/GATT’s general exceptions provisions – should be used. 
It seems difficult, however, to extend the latter analogy too far or to proceed to 
full-scale proportionality analysis without somehow paying respect to the very 
limited number of situations where a necessity plea should be used to excuse the 
violation of treaty obligations by a host state. Summing up, future development 
should, in our view, follow the reasoning appropriate under a model of special 
interest review. This would suggest the use of a necessity test which does not 
unduly over-represent one interest by means of its burden of proof or notion of 
alternative measures, and which leaves the door open to proportionality stricto 
sensu in exceptional cases.
 V Evaluation and Conclusion
The present chapter examined in detail the development of 
legal tests close to proportionality analysis in international investment law, find-
ing that only scarce references can be found to date. Generally, the reasoning of 
arbitral tribunals is strongly linked to the facts of cases and does not necessarily 
set out legal tests in great detail.
225  See section IV.A.iii.
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Examining the context of judicial review, historic insights show that the 
narrative of continuous judicialisation of investment arbitration is not convinc-
ing. Still, it is used as a basis by scholars to argue in favour of an increased 
use of proportionality analysis by arbitral tribunals. Similarly, the institutional 
characteristics – in particular the weak standing of arbitrators – do not support 
such straightforward claims. A closer look at the political economy of invest-
ment arbitration reveals that investment arbitration can be better compared with 
a technical mechanism in the framework of an insurance contract than with 
constitutional adjudication. The context thus characterises investment arbitra-
tion more as a narrowly focused, technical mechanism of review.
With this in mind, unfortunately to date there is no intense discussion 
on the topic or on the appropriate intrusiveness of the standard of review and 
pre-balancing. This seems mostly based on confusion as to whether investment 
itself should constitute a public interest. A different explanation could posit 
international investment law as the protection of property rights and justify judi-
cial review through a fundamental rights analogy. However, the specifics of the 
system, in particular its non-subsidiary character and the limited protection of 
property render such an analogy rather tenuous. In our view, this debate would 
have to be led much more openly by tribunals, also to explain the reasons for 
their choice of more or less intrusive review. In any event, the stretched funda-
mental rights parallel has led us to conclude that pre-balancing for investment 
arbitration leads to a result close to a model of special interest review.
In assessing the norms to be interpreted, we found rather broadly worded 
provisions that allow some interpretative leeway. Typically, they restrict the regu-
latory freedom of host states towards their investors by imposing on them the 
obligation to compensate in cases of expropriation or to grant national treatment 
in comparison to domestic economic operators in ‘like’ circumstances. The 
strongest reference to proportionality analysis can be found in the Tecmed case, 
where the tribunal examined whether an excessive burden had been imposed on 
the investor. In our view, in the variety of situations examined, necessity could 
arguably play a predominant role, if in the future the reasoning of tribunals 
would set out in more detail the actual test used beyond mere brief references 
to ‘proportionality’ or ‘reasonableness’. For this purpose, we suggested drawing 
inspiration from WTO law and the ‘weighing and balancing’ test, since in our 
view the latter grants appropriate deference in a model of special interest review. 
At the same time, it must be noted that the latter test also proved to possess 
shortcomings, in particular in terms of its transparency of reasoning.226 More 
open discussion of the justification of judicial review could take inspiration from 
the more expressive approaches in this respect suggested by the United States 
Supreme Court227 or by the European Court of Human Rights under the latter’s 
margin of appreciation doctrine.228 Much of our criticism remains, however, 
necessarily abstract in the absence of extensive engagement with proportionality 
analysis in the case law.
226  See chapter 7 section IV.A.iii.d.
227  See chapter 4 section III.A.ii.
228  See chapter 5 section III.B.i.
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Let us recapitulate. The starting point of this inquiry was the realization that 
not only is proportionality analysis now widely applied across domestic consti-
tutional, European or international economic law, but also that it is applied in 
different manners. Our central aim has been to provide a rationale to explain 
and justify these differences.
For this purpose, we first explored the theoretical foundations of propor-
tionality analysis. To understand why proportionality analysis is worthy of 
discussion at all, we took a closer look and uncovered both its advantage of equal 
representation of all claims and arguments and its disadvantage, i.e. the require-
ment of moral argumentation. The reproach of judicial activism and of judicial 
law-making can be levered against adjudicators because of this disadvantage. 
Consequently, a justification is required for adjudicators to use proportionality 
analysis.
To find this justification we explored the Principles Theory, developed by 
Robert Alexy based to some extent on the work of Ronald Dworkin. The central 
norm-theoretic tenet of the theory is the distinction between rules and prin-
ciples, the latter applying exclusively by proportionality analysis as opposed to 
subsumption. Having found this distinction difficult to sustain, we turned to a 
different level of the theory for support.
At the level of argumentation theory, the Principles Theory explains propor-
tionality analysis as the replica of balancing of reasons for action in practical 
reasoning. Some doubt that such balancing of reasons is omnipresent; Raz 
would suggest the concept of exclusionary reasons: reasons which exclude the 
balancing of some other reasons. However, conceptual difficulties cast doubt on 
this concept. The very exclusion of reasons appears conceptually inexplicable 
unless there is some balancing of the exclusionary force of reasons, which would 
require an external point of view for balancing that cannot simply be assumed 
by the balancing instance. There is thus a pre-balancing of exclusionary force by 
the balancing instance – i.e. on the use of proportionality analysis or its rejec-
tion and instead reliance on subsumption and positive law. This pre-balancing 
exercise turns out to be the anchor point for the varying uses of proportionality 
analysis, as these uses can then, in our view, be explained by a pre-balancing of 
reasons – which emerge from judicial review.
Subsequently, we fleshed out the details of this pre-balancing exercise. In 
our view, the context of judicial review is central to this pre-balancing for an 
adjudicator, because judicial review is an allocation of power to the judiciary 
which must be justified. The procedural democracy doctrine is a milestone in 
setting out such a justification: this doctrine suggests that the very reason why 
a judiciary should be entitled to review of legislative action in the first place is to 
ensure representation of values which may have been inappropriately taken into 
account in the deliberative legislative process. It is about these values and their 
representation that pre-balancing, the weighing of arguments, must take place. 
To develop such arguments, however, we must also take into account the context 
of judicial review, as it is only based on this context that we can fully understand 
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what values should be protected by judicial review in what manner. The histori-
cal development, political economy and institutional setting of judicial review 
are important indicators in this regard. Nonetheless, these are empirical rather 
than normative elements and must therefore be kept apart from the pre-balanc-
ing exercise itself as a balancing of normative reasons. This results in a two-
tiered examination, which we also transposed to the subsequent comparative 
studies. First, we examined the non-normative elements to gain a deeper insight 
into judicial review from a rather descriptive perspective. Second, we turned to 
pre-balancing and fleshed out what values judicial review is about in a specific 
legal regime.
To be able to produce more vivid results, we also introduced the concept of 
models of judicial review. While pre-balancing is an exercise with a particular 
and unique set of arguments of varying strength in each legal regime, some 
commonalities as to the results can be identified in our view. To clarify such 
typical results, we consolidate them into two models. One typical result of pre-
balancing is what we designated an equal representation model. In this case, the 
aim of judicial review is to ensure full representation and a balance between a 
wide variety of values. Pre-balancing thus justifies extensive use of proportional-
ity analysis by an adjudicator. A contrasting typical result is a model of special 
interest representation. Judicial review is directed at the representation of one 
particular interest in this case, and the use of proportionality analysis – though 
not excluded – is appropriate in fewer circumstances. Other tests – including 
truncated tests of proportionality analysis – are often more appropriate, although 
an undue hierarchy in favour of the interest to be represented is not necessarily 
justified.
Having developed the concepts of pre-balancing, descriptive and normative 
elements of judicial review and models of judicial review, several comparative 
studies served to put them to the test of practice. We chose six legal regimes 
with varying focuses on fundamental or human rights, on the distribution of 
competences or on economic interests such as trade or the protection of foreign 
investors for this purpose. With the help of our concepts and a comparable chap-
ter structure, comparisons and adequate criticism were pointed out in each legal 
regime and will now be briefly recalled in detail.
In German constitutional law as our first comparative study, proportionality 
analysis is applied quite routinely as the well-known ‘principle of proportional-
ity’ for fundamental rights in their dimension as shields protecting individuals 
from public interference with their rights. In the field of positive obligations 
and socioeconomic rights, however, proportionality analysis has been rejected 
without convincing arguments. Some of this focus on rights as shields can be 
explained by the historical development of proportionality analysis. However, 
taking a look at the values to be protected in the Basic Law, the justification of 
judicial review rather points towards an equal representation model of judicial 
review. Instead of a rejection of proportionality analysis, we suggested a more 
extensive discussion and justification of the appropriate standard of review in 
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each case; this can be emphasized with a glance towards United States constitu-
tional law, where the discussion of the standard of review and the justification of 
judicial review is much more satisfactory. As a commendable feature, however, 
the Federal Constitutional Court set out quite comprehensively its reasoning 
when deciding on the horizontal effect of fundamental rights, applying propor-
tionality analysis with due deference, which comes down – appropriately in our 
view – to a model of special interest representation which focuses on the balance 
of values found in private law, but maintains due deference for the interest of 
private autonomy.
Examining United States constitutional law, two fields of study are particu-
larly worthy of interest. First, in the fundamental rights case law, we note a 
fragmentation into a variety of different tests, which cannot necessarily be 
justified through the procedural democracy doctrine. While the Supreme Court 
bases itself on the latter doctrine to set out in more detail the intensiveness of its 
scrutiny, there is a remarkable reluctance to engage in proportionality analysis 
with a similar vigour as the German Federal Constitutional Court. Descriptive 
elements such as the history of contestation of the Court’s authority can help 
to explain, but not justify the fragmentation which results in very diverging 
levels of protection for different categories of rights. The particular perception 
of rights predominant in United States constitutional law, however, provides a 
plausible argument in pre-balancing to justify the reluctant approach to engag-
ing in proportionality analysis in the field of positive obligations or horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights. It is thus a more limited equal representation 
model than in the German context.
Second, under the Dormant Commerce Clause, exaggerated scepticism 
of proportionality analysis led the Supreme Court to rely on a categorization 
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures, the former being 
subject to very strict scrutiny, the latter being subject to only a very superficial 
form of ‘balancing’. The rigidity of the distinction could arguably be overcome 
by the justifiably restricted use of proportionality analysis under a model of 
special interest representation combined with appropriate deference.
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the descriptive features 
of judicial review by the European Court of Human Rights explain the very 
flexible approach to proportionality analysis exhibited by the Court, because 
there is ongoing tension between the role of individual and constitutional 
justice of the Court. However, this ‘fair balance’ test also seems justified under 
the procedural democracy doctrine, as over the years the Court has developed 
a particularly broad understanding of the rights enshrined in the Convention, 
which also includes positive obligations. A model of equal representation is thus 
the appropriate result of pre-balancing in most situations of review faced by the 
Court. Not only does the Court protect rights linked directly to the democratic 
process with vigour, but it also protects other rights that guarantee the respect of 
a person’s private life. Generally the discussion of the appropriate intrusiveness 
of scrutiny by the Court is more vivid than in the case of the German Federal 
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Constitutional; however, in the field of horizontal effect of human rights the 
justification of review has remained unfortunately shallow. The least convincing 
feature of the case law is the reluctance displayed in the application of the neces-
sity prong of the ‘fair balance’ test, for which no appropriate justification resorts 
from pre-balancing.
A similarly dynamic, yet differently structured image emerges for judi-
cial review in European Union law. The descriptive features of review sketch 
the Court of Justice of the European Union as predominantly focused on 
the uniform interpretation of a legal order focused on the value of economic 
integration. Yet pre-balancing nuances the picture, as a look at the values to be 
protected shows. The Court has, unfortunately, not always set out with sufficient 
clarity the variety of standards of review used in different situations. Still, review 
is called to represent ever more values with fundamental rights, the emergence 
of citizenship as a non-economic Treaty freedom and the increasing importance 
of horizontal effect given to fundamental rights and Treaty freedoms. A legiti-
mate argument can therefore be made that there is an ongoing shift from a 
model of special interest representation towards equal representation. Yet, in the 
use of the ‘principle of proportionality’, the Court overemphasizes the interest 
of economic integration with a heavy-handed use of the necessity prong, and 
thereby somewhat unjustifiably puts this interest in a hierarchically higher posi-
tion.
WTO law, by contrast, represents a somewhat clearer case of a model of 
special interest representation. Looking at the mere technical set-up of judicial 
review, the focus on trade becomes apparent with the dispute settlement system 
and its specialized adjudicators. It comes as no great surprise that proportional-
ity analysis has been received with reluctance. The result of our pre-balancing 
is indeed a model of special interest representation. This has become clear with 
a discussion of obligations under the GATT such as national treatment and the 
general exceptions provisions. But also for the TRIPS Agreement, the case of 
protection of intellectual property rights as property rights is not as straight-
forward and convincing as a first look might suggest. Most of this discussion is 
regrettably absent in the case law. Still, having conducted our own pre-balanc-
ing, we consequently found the reliance on necessity generally convincing. 
Concern arises, however, on the exaggerated fear of proportionality stricto sensu 
which results in somewhat obscure case law and the rigidity of the legal tests 
under the TRIPS Agreement.
International investment arbitration presents a quite unique setting of 
judicial review. Still, the theoretical framework of pre-balancing and models of 
judicial review proves itself capable of overcoming the differences. The context 
of investment arbitration reveals that claims of using proportionality analysis 
because of the quasi-constitutional setting of such arbitration are exaggerated; 
in fact, the political economy of investment arbitration points more in the direc-
tion of technical adjudication under an insurance contract perspective. While 
the case law has not debated in much detail a possible justification of judicial 
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review under the procedural democracy doctrine, our own pre-balancing accen-
tuates the fuzziness of the interest protected in international investment law. 
A human rights analogy proves hardly convincing, with the consequence that a 
model of special interest focused on the public interest of investment protection 
is the outcome. The case law has to date only paid some lip service to propor-
tionality analysis, so that our assessment and criticism remain to some extent 
inevitably abstract.
Throughout this extensive comparative analysis, the concepts of pre-balanc-
ing and models of judicial review have prevented us from simply accepting 
non-normative features of judicial review as explanations for particular uses of 
proportionality analysis and have forced us to search for a normative justifica-
tion. If none could be found, appropriate criticism and our own pre-balancing 
could be brought forward as suggestions for future jurisprudential development. 
Furthermore, said concepts have helped to structure the comparative studies 
similarly in order to render them comparable despite the differences of the vari-
ous legal regimes examined.
We can thus sum up the findings of the various comparative studies in the 
following overview, distinguishing the pertinent model of review which resulted 
from pre-balancing. In the case of a model of special interest review, we can also 
note what interest is the focus of review.
Situation of review Model of equal 
representation 
review
Model of spe-
cial interest 
review
Special interest 
at issue (if appli-
cable)
German constitutional law – 
fundamental rights
X
German constitutional law – 
fundamental rights in their 
horizontal dimension
X Private auton-
omy
United States constitutional law 
– fundamental rights
X
United States constitutional law 
– Dormant Commerce Clause
X Inter-state trade
ECHR law –
human rights
X
ECHR law – human rights in 
their horizontal dimension
X Private auton-
omy
EU law – internal market free-
doms
X Economic inte-
gration
EU law – fundamental rights 
and citizenship
X
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EU law – fundamental rights in 
their horizontal dimension
X Private auton-
omy
WTO law – GATT, GATS, TRIPS, 
TBT and SPS agreements
X International 
trade
International investment law X Investment 
protection
One final question arises after the long journey: where to go from here? Our 
hope is that readers will take from our study an inspiration to take the institu-
tional context of judicial review into account appropriately when thinking about 
the use of proportionality analysis. The suggested distinction lies between 
descriptive elements which may explain, but not necessarily justify a particu-
lar use of proportionality analysis, and normative elements relevant under the 
procedural democracy doctrine, which can indeed justify a particular use of 
proportionality analysis. With this insight, it should become possible to lead 
a more thorough discussion about proportionality analysis, its promises and 
pitfalls, uses and misuses, without being reduced to answering a simple yes/no 
question as to whether it ought to be used or not. The debate should thus evolve 
more around how it ought to be used.
Proportionality analysis is here to stay. The more comprehensive the discus-
sion becomes about it, the better.
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